Hi, On Sun, Dec 15, 2013 at 07:34:27PM +0100, Steffan Karger wrote: > One note on the implementation though; the code generates one ephemeral > RSA key that is used during the entire lifetime of an OpenVPN process. > If OpenSSL requests a new (ephemeral) key, it will keep on returning the > same (usually rather small) key. Not the best solution. > > To actually run this code, I had to force usage by selecting the > TLS-RSA-EXPORT-WITH-DES40-CBC-SHA tls-cipher. That generated a 512-bit > ephemeral RSA key, and uses the outdated DES encryption protocol.
I'm not sure I understand the whole picture here. What is happening in the "normal" scenario, and why is this particular cipher calling a different code path inside OpenVPN? > Using this mode could lead to a false sense of security. Then again, one > should be using (Ephemeral) Diffie-Hellman anyway, and OpenVPN requires > a tls-server to supply dh parameters. A user would need to deliberately > choose a weak tls-cipher like TLS-RSA-EXPORT-WITH-DES40-CBC-SHA, which > would be aligning a gun with his foot anyway. If one would decide this > implementation is not good enough anymore, I'd suggest to just strip out > support for this completely. I'm tempted to agree with this :) - single-DES (and 40 bit to that!) really isn't what we want to use. So what would happen if we remove this code, and a user tries to use this tls-cipher? gert -- USENET is *not* the non-clickable part of WWW! //www.muc.de/~gert/ Gert Doering - Munich, Germany g...@greenie.muc.de fax: +49-89-35655025 g...@net.informatik.tu-muenchen.de
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