Hi, Joe, Alexander, all,

Thanks Joe for the reminder. Thanks Alexander for the careful review, all good 
points. The authors have published a new version which tries to resolve your 
comments below, we also tracked your comments as issues at 
https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/policy-based-network-acl/issues (see issues 
#121~#125), and you may see the correlation with the PR changes here. Please 
also see more reply below inline...

From: Joe Clarke (jclarke) [mailto:[email protected]]
Sent: Wednesday, December 17, 2025 1:49 AM
To: Alexander Pelov <[email protected]>; [email protected]
Cc: [email protected]; [email protected]
Subject: Re: draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-09 early Intdir review

I know you had to go through a lot of process hoops to do this review, 
Alexander.  The chairs appreciate it!

I know it's a bit later than the other reviews, but authors can you acknowledge 
you've seen this?  Thanks.

Joe and BenoƮt

From: Alexander Pelov via Datatracker 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Date: Saturday, December 13, 2025 at 04:44
To: [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Cc: 
[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>
 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>,
 [email protected]<mailto:[email protected]> 
<[email protected]<mailto:[email protected]>>
Subject: draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-09 early Intdir review
Document: draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl
Title: A YANG Data Model and RADIUS Extension for Policy-based Network Access
Control Reviewer: Alexander Pelov Review result: On the Right Track

Review of draft-ietf-opsawg-ucl-acl-09

This review was done as an Early Review as requested from INTDIR.

The document is generally well-written with a clear problem statement and
helpful examples. However, as a reviewer approaching this without having
followed the full evolution of the draft, I have identified several
inconsistencies regarding terminology, the architectural relationship between
group types, and the practical implementation of group identifiers in the
forwarding plane.

Overall, l think the document needs a rework, and depending on the discussion
with the authors that could prove to be minor or major.

1. Terminology

It is somewhat difficult to follow the different terminology throughout the
document. The "terminology" section itself is quite limited, and there are many
similar or related notions used throughout. The core example is the use of
"endpoint-group", "group identity", "user group", "application group", and
"device group."

This inconsistency is particularly visible with the RADIUS Attribute defined in
the document, which is called "User-Access-Group-ID". Reading the draft, this
attribute appears to be the mechanism for the generic "endpoint group," yet the
name seems to suggests its for "Users."

I think the document would gain in readability by explicitly defining:
"endpoint group", "user group", "device group", and "application group". It is
currently unclear what the actual relations are between these types. Sometimes
there seems to be a clear hierarchy (e.g., a user uses a device to access an
application), but other times, the groups appear "flat" (e.g., matching
anything with a given source IP).

In the introduction (Page 3), the text states: "This document also defines a
mechanism to establish a mapping between (1) the user group identifier (ID) and
(2) common IP packet header fields... to execute the policy-based access
control." * What about the "device group ID" and "application group ID"? * The
example in Figure 1 is very user-oriented, but from my understanding,
everything from Step 3 onwards could apply to *any* Endpoint-Group type (e.g.,
Device-Group), not just Users.

Section "4.2. Endpoint Group" has three subsections, each giving a loose
description of how the 3 types of groups operate. The relationship between
these three notions is unclear. As written, the "User group" concept could
effectively cover both Device and Application groups. Why distinguish between
three types? It might be cleaner to define a single, generic "Policy Group" and
indicate that different entities can belong to it.
[Qiufang] Thanks for the valuable comments. A couple of terms have been defined 
explicitly as suggested, we also add a section to clarify the relation between 
different endpoint groups and why there is a need to distinguish between these 
types.
You made a good point that some sections of the draft are quite specific to 
user group and we also need consider device group and application group at the 
same time. There are some clarification in the draft added that tries to 
explain the intention. Please review the update and let us know if you have 
further comments.

2. Precision of Language

In Section "4.2.1. User group," the text states: "if the user group membership
is determined solely by the source IP address, then a given user's group ID
will change when the user moves to a new IP address...". * it is said that "The
user group is determined by a set of predetermined policy criteria (e.g. source
IP address, geolocation data, time of day, or device certificate)". * "if the
user group membership is determined solely by the source IP address, then a
given user's group ID will change when the user moves to a new IP address that
falls outside of the range of addresses of the previous user group."

The wording seems awkward. How does the user "move to a new IP address"?
[Qiufang] Sorry for the bad wording. Have fixed this in 
https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/policy-based-network-acl/pull/127/:
S/move to a new IP address/ is assigned a new IP address/

3. Scenarios

There are many scenarios and use-cases mentioned. Explicitly defining some of
the major scenarios would be beneficial. For example: * NAS with native support
for Group-based Policies. * NAS that does not support Group-based Policies.

More specifically: Section 4.1, bullet point 4 (The Policy Enforcement Point)
ends with "More details are provided in Section 8". However, Section 8 is quite
generic and does not seem to provide the detailed scenarios promised in the
overview.
[Qiufang] Fixed by removing this sentence.

4. Implementation Details and Interoperability

On Page 12 it is stated: "How the 'group-id' string is mapped to the tagging or
field in the packet header in encapsulation scenario is outside the scope of
this document.".

I am not sure if there was a discussion at the WG level about this. It seems to
me that leaving this entirely out of scope could lead to interoperability
issues. String-based matching in the forwarding plane can be expensive. Adding
a field such as `NumericGroupID` and `NumericGroupType` would not be too
expensive implementation-wise and would significantly aid interoperability with
standard encapsulations (e.g., assigning NumericGroupID = 500, NumericGroupType
= "VXLAN/GENEVE"). This, however is for the WG to decide. I am curious if this
was discussed and agreed upon.
[Qiufang] The authors have tracked this at 
https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/policy-based-network-acl/issues/124, and 
internally think it might be hard to give a stable and unified mapping 
mechanism here. And such a NumericGroupID definition might be 
protocol-dependent thus we tend to leave this as augmentation for future work. 
But it would also be good to receive more comments and feedback from the WG 
here.

5. RADIUS Considerations

Regarding "6. User Access Control Group ID RADIUS Attribute":
* "Access-Reject vs. Restricted Accept:" Table 4 lists the attribute quantity
for Access-Reject as "0". However, the introduction states that authentication
failure might result in the user being "assigned a special group with very
limited access permissions". * Usually, an "Access-Reject" terminates the
session (no attributes processed). If the intent is to assign a "special group"
for limited access, this would technically be a "Restricted Access-Accept". The
text should clarify if this scenario results in a Reject (with 0 attributes) or
an Accept (with the special Group ID).
[Qiufang] Maybe check 
https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/policy-based-network-acl/issues/125 and the 
updates in https://github.com/IETF-OPSAWG-WG/policy-based-network-acl/pull/129 
to see if this is good enough. Thanks a lot!
Best Regards,
Qiufang //co-author
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