On 5/15/06, User 165 <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
There are other ways to get information about the connections, but it would be nice to say that you cannot get that information or perform any sort of censorship or compromising of the integrity of data sent through or availability of any destination on the internet using tor itself. I thought this was the whole point of tor.
I don't think it is. It's not that hard, after all, for a government entity which can spy on your connection and the endpoint connection to correlate the two using traffic analysis. http://wiki.noreply.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ#WhatProtections Tor is useful for plenty of legal things. If there were a way for each exit node to filter out any traffic which was illegal in its jurisdiction, Tor would still be useful. This is not at all feasible right now, though.
It should try to attain the same neutrality as a large backbone router, at least as much as is possible.
Large backbone routers aren't equivalent to exit nodes. They'd be more equivalent to middle nodes.
I don't want to have to worry that I'm actually connecting to the site I think I am. That's why I don't like RedirectExit .
Unless you're using a secure connection (https, ssh, etc.) you should always worry that you might not be actually connecting to the site you think you are. Sure, you could take away RedirectExit (I'm not actually up on the useful purpose of it), but that'd only take it away from people playing by the rules. Anthony