Marco A. Calamari ha scritto: > The right question is "What the Chinese government > or TLA's can do controlling at leat the 25% > of network?"
Most of the Internet links wordlwide go through the US, so it makes sense for US intelligence to tap it there (see recent AT&T taps with Narus equipment). As a Tor exit relay is an opportunity for tapping traffic, it makes perfetc sense for China to setup Tor exit relays and gain competitive advantage in analyzing that part of the network traffic. China does not route a significant portion of internet traffic, it has no foothold in any of the key data exchanges worldwide. Setting up a few hundred exit relays in mainland China gets you instant insigth into sensitive traffic worldwide. (by the way, China could also set up exit relays in the US and everywere, it's cheap) Let's see if the design of Tor can cope with a challenge of such a scale. My guess is that countries like China would rather be better served by not disrupting the Tor network (with misleading exit policies, connection timeouts etc) so that they can analyze the traffic that goes through. Of course, they would make sure their own citizen could not reach the Tor network themselves. I would like the torproject website to be more explicit warning users about privacy issues: don't do any cleartext authentication, don't do any ssl authentication if you are not able to check the authenticity of the certificates. As for Germany, let's see what the german citizens do about this law, there is still plenty of room for optimism. Blau