--- Andrew <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Roger Dingledine schrieb: > > adding much additional anonymity. (Or is it?) > I believe this to be the most interesting > question... since the user > does not know his connection will be relayed via a > client-exit, there > will only be encryption up until the last relay (the > one advertising > itself as an exit). Therefore, even if you > re-encrypt the data for > transfer to the client-exit, it will now be *two* > hops being able to > read the user's traffic in cleartext. > I don't think that's an improvement... I'd even go > as far as saying it's > the exact opposite of what we want.
While your analysis is correct (two potentially unencrypted hops), the encryption concerns in themselves should be irrelevant to the concerns of tor. Tor is not an encryption technology. The only reason for encrypting the other hops is for anonymity so that each hop only knows about its immediate peers. The question is whether an unencrypted last leg affects anonymity? Plain text communication after tor should already be considered compromised and if this leg were unencrypted it should not be considered an additional plain text compromise. -Martin ____________________________________________________________________________________ Be a better friend, newshound, and know-it-all with Yahoo! Mobile. Try it now. http://mobile.yahoo.com/;_ylt=Ahu06i62sR8HDtDypao8Wcj9tAcJ