----- Original Message ----
> From: Tripple Moon <tripple.m...@yahoo.com>
> To: or-Talk Mailinglist <or-t...@seul.org>
> Sent: Monday, April 13, 2009 3:47:50 PM
> Subject: Re: tor with OpenDNS as default DNS, using Firefox+FoxyProxy
>
> > Faking the address resolution does not alter the
> > tracking abilities of web sites in the slightest.
> Well there you are dead wrong sorry to disagree here.
> Websites that track by IP-access are blocked this way.
> Ofcourse, i know there are plenty of other ways to track visitors, but
> IP-tracking is one that can be eliminated by _not_ accessing certain web
> servers
> at all in the 1st place...
Are you saying that a solution to prevent websites from tracking their visitors
is to have a third party block to have a content-based filter in case some of
the blocked websites also happen to have IP tracking enabled (or are under some
form of surveillance)? Is this really what you mean? How does this solution
help when the traffic is coming from a Tor exit node and is reasonably well
anonymized?
> My intentions were not to corrupt the tor service but to cleanup corruption
> of
> DNS servers used at certain locations in the world by authorities, and at the
> same time block some personally setup domains for my own LAN-access.
>
> Try to look at the big-picture what i want to accomplish as a whole, not just
> from tor's P.O.V.
> I want to circumvent the poluted DNS-service of my ISP/country and at same
> time
> block personally chosen domains.
What do you think national authorities would say about someone in their country
openly providing access to Internet content that they have blocked? Why would
someone want to block content that has not already been blocked by the
authorities?
Can you share with us in what way Turkish DNS servers are corrupted? If you
think that would be off-topic here, feel free to email me directly, as I would
be personally very interested in specific examples of Turkish content filtering.
Does OpenDNS allow blocking on a per-domain basis? All I could get from their
website was their list of content categories from which an operator could
choose. May I ask, which domains and content categories were you interested in
blocking? Also, why impose the same blocking that you would use for your own
LAN-access upon any Tor user that happens upon your exit node? Would it not be
better to have any blocking in your exit policy so that users interested in
content that you have blocked may instead route around you rather than see your
personal message to them?
