On Sun, Aug 29, 2010 at 3:54 AM, Mike Perry <mikepe...@fscked.org> wrote: [snip] > Any classifier needs enough bits to differentiate between two > potentially coincident events. This is also why Tor's fixed packet > size performs better against known fingerprinting attacks. Because > we've truncated the lower 8 bits off of all signatures that use size > as a feature in their fingerprint classifiers. They need to work to > find other sources of bits.
If this is so— that people are trying to attack tor with size fingerprinting but failing because of the size quantization and then failing to publish because they got a non-result— then it is something which very much needs to be made public. Not only might future versions of tor make different design decisions with respect to cell size, other privacy applications would benefit from even a no-result in this area. *********************************************************************** To unsubscribe, send an e-mail to majord...@torproject.org with unsubscribe or-talk in the body. http://archives.seul.org/or/talk/