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----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:59 PM ----- "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 02/17/2003 02:09 PM To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise (#NISR16022003a) NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory Name: Oracle unauthenticated remote system compromise Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 1, 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6 Severity: Critical Risk Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Date: 16th February 2003 Advisory number: #NISR16022003a Description *********** Oracle is the leader in the database market with a 54% market share lead under ERP (Enterprise Resource Planning). The database server is vulnerable to a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. What exacerbates this problem is that no valid User ID or password is required by an attacker. Details ******* There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the authentication process with the Oracle Database Server. By supplying an overly long username when attempting to log onto the database server an attacker can overflow a stack based buffer overwriting the saved return address. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete compromise of the operating system. As most client applications for Oracle will tuncate the length of the username that can be supplied to the database an attacker would need to write their own Oracle "Authenticator" to exploit this issue. That said, NGSSoftware has found one client application that will allow longer usernames so to test if you are vulnerable to this issue, use the LOADPSP utility usually found in "bin" directory found under the OracleHomeInstallDirectory. On Windows, for example, run: C:\ora9ias\BIN>loadpsp -name -user LONGUSERNAME/tiger@iasdb myfile Fix Information *************** NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002. Oracle has reviewed the code and created a patch which is available from: http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert51.pdf NGSSoftware advise Oracle database customers to review and install the patch as a matter of urgency. A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html It is further recommend that Oracle DBAs have their network/firewall administrators ensure that the database server is protected from Internet sourced traffic. Further Information ******************* For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows, please see http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf About NGSSoftware ***************** NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments. http://www.ngssoftware.com/ http://www.ngsconsulting.com/ Telephone +44 208 401 0070 Fax +44 208 401 0076 [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:59 PM ----- "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 02/17/2003 02:12 PM To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003b) NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory Name: Oracle TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ Remote System Buffer Overrun Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 1, 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6 Severity: High Risk Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Date: 16th February 2003 Advisory number: #NISR16022003b Description *********** Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function exists to convert a string into a timestamp with a time zone datatype. This function contains an exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. Details ******* There is a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ function. A normal statement would look like the following, converting a character string string to a value of timestamp with time zone: SELECT TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ('2003-02-016 12:00:00 -8:00','YYYY-MM-DD HH:MI:SS TZH:TZM') FROM DUAL; By supplying a long character string for the second parameter an attacker can overwirte a saved return address on the stack of Oracle process. Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete compromise of the operating system. Fix Information *************** NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002 and Oracle has produced a patch which is available from http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html Further Information ******************* For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows, please see http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf About NGSSoftware ***************** NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments. http://www.ngssoftware.com/ http://www.ngsconsulting.com/ Telephone +44 208 401 0070 Fax +44 208 401 0076 [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:59 PM ----- "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 02/17/2003 02:17 PM To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability (#NISR16022003d) NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory Name: Oracle9i Application Server Format String Vulnerability Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Application Server Release 9.0.2 Severity: Critical Risk Category: Format String Vulnerability Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com Author: David Litchfield (david@ngssoftware) and Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Date: 16th February 2003 Advisory number: #NISR16022003d Description *********** Oracle's 9i Application Server offers a highly functional web server designed to seamlessly integrate with an Oracle backend database server. Based on Apache the server offers many environments for web based applications such as Java/JSP, PL/SQL, Perl and FastCGI. With their latest release of the Application Server, 9.0.2, Oracle has added support for WebDAV, Web Distributed Authoring and Versioning, that turns the Web into a file sharing system. Details ******* DAV is turned on by default. Whilst this is bad in and of itself, as attackers can anonymously upload files to the server, an attacker can exploit a format string bug in the one of the logging functions. If an attacker uses the COPY method and supplies a destination URI that uses a different scheme or port then a 502 Bad Gateway response is returned. This is logged and in doing so the format string can be exploited. Although the Apache mod dav module is not vulnerable itself the vulnerable code is there - it is just not ever executed. Oracle has modified the moddav module and changed it so bad gateway responses are logged - and thus they are vulnerable. Looking at the moddav source >From mod_dav.c revision 1.157 .. .. lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r); if (lookup.rnew == NULL) { if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) { ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO, r,lookup.err.desc); return HTTP_BAD_REQUEST; } return dav_error_response(r, lookup.err.status, lookup.err.desc); } .. .. This code calls the dav_lookup_uri() function in dav_util.c. From dav_util.c revision 1.84 .. dav_lookup_result dav_lookup_uri(const char *uri, request_rec * r) { .. .. if (strcasecmp(comp.scheme, scheme) != 0 || comp.port != port) { result.err.status = HTTP_BAD_GATEWAY; result.err.desc = ap_psprintf(r->pool, "Destination URI refers to different " "scheme or port (%s://hostname:%d)\n" "(want: %s://hostname:%d)", comp.scheme ? comp.scheme : scheme, comp.port ? comp.port : port, scheme, port); return result; .. .. } When dav_lookup_uri() returns to mod_dav.c the format strings occurs .. lookup = dav_lookup_uri(dest, r); if (lookup.rnew == NULL) { if (lookup.err.status == HTTP_BAD_REQUEST) { // THIS IS THE FIRST FORMAT STRING VULNERABILITY ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO, r,lookup.err.desc); .. .. } Of course the code should have read ap_log_rerror(APLOG_MARK, APLOG_ERR | APLOG_NOERRNO, r,"%s",lookup.err.desc); to not be vulnerable. By crafting a specially formed format string and sending to the server an attacker can overwrite arbitrary address with arbitrary values which can allow an attacker to gain control of the web server. To do this they could overwrite a saved return address on the stack, an exception handler or pointer to a function with an address that points to a buffer that contains the arbitrary code to execute. Fix Information *************** NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 24th September 2002. Oracle has developed a patch which is available from http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert52.pdf A check for these issues has been added to OraScan, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Application Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite http://www.nextgenss.com/software/orascan.html About NGSSoftware ***************** NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments. http://www.ngssoftware.com/ http://www.ngsconsulting.com/ Telephone +44 208 401 0070 Fax +44 208 401 0076 [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:59 PM ----- "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 02/17/2003 02:15 PM To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun (#NISR16022003c) NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory Name: Oracle TZ_OFFSET Remote System Buffer Overrun Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 1, 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6 Severity: High Risk Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com Author: Mark Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Date: 16th February 2003 Advisory number: #NISR16022003c Description *********** Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The TZ_OFFSET function returns the time zone offset corresponding to the value entered based on the date the statement was executed. For example: SELECT TZ_OFFSET('US/Eastern') FROM DUAL; would return the time zone offset value of -04:00. The TZ_OFFSET() function contains a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability. Details ******* There exists a remotely exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in the TZ_OFFSET function. By supplying a long character string for the time zone name an attacker can overwrite a saved return address on the stack of Oracle process. Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the TO_TIMESTAMP_TZ() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete compromise of the operating system. Fix Information *************** NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002. Oracle has developed a patch which is available from http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html Further Information ******************* For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows, please see http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf About NGSSoftware ***************** NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments. http://www.ngssoftware.com/ http://www.ngsconsulting.com/ Telephone +44 208 401 0070 Fax +44 208 401 0076 [EMAIL PROTECTED] ----- Forwarded by Jared Still/Radisys_Corporation/US on 02/20/2003 01:59 PM ----- "NGSSoftware Insight Security Research" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> 02/17/2003 05:09 PM To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> cc: Subject: Oracle bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability (#NISR16022003e) NGSSoftware Insight Security Research Advisory Name: ORACLE bfilename function buffer overflow vulnerability Systems Affected: All platforms; Oracle9i Database Release 2, 9i Release 1, 8i, 8.1.7, 8.0.6 Severity: High Risk Category: Remote System Buffer Overrun Vendor URL: http://www.oracle.com Author: David Litchfield ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Date: 16th February 2003 Advisory number: #NISR16022003e Description *********** Oracle's database server contains fuctions for use within queries. The bfilename() function returns a BFILE locator to a binary large object stored in the database. Details ******* The bfilename() function suffers from a remotely exploitable buffer overrun when an overly long DIRECTORY parameter is supplied. Before this issue can be exploited an attacker must be able to log on to the database server with a valid user ID and password, but as the bfilename() function can be executed by PUBLIC by default any user of the system can gain control. Any arbitrary code supplied by an attacker would execute with the same privileges as the user running the service; this account is typically "Oracle" on linux/unix based platforms and Local System on Windows based operating systems such as NT/2000/XP. As such this allows for a complete compromise of the data stored in the database and possibly a complete compromise of the operating system. Fix Information *************** NGSSoftware alerted Oracle to this vulnerability on 30th September 2002. Oracle has developed a patch which is available from http://otn.oracle.com/deploy/security/pdf/2003alert50.pdf A check for these issues has been added to NGSSQuirreL for Oracle, a comprehensive automated vulnerability assessment tool for Oracle Database Servers of which more information is available from the NGSSite http://www.ngssoftware.com/software/squirrelfororacle.html Further Information ******************* For further information about the scope and effects of buffer overflows, please see http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/non-stack-bo-windows.pdf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/ntbufferoverflow.html http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/bufferoverflowpaper.rtf http://www.ngssoftware.com/papers/unicodebo.pdf About NGSSoftware ***************** NGSSoftware design, research and develop intelligent, advanced application security assessment scanners. Based in the United Kingdom, NGSSoftware have offices in the South of London and the East Coast of Scotland. NGSSoftware's sister company NGSConsulting, offers best of breed security consulting services, specialising in application, host and network security assessments. http://www.ngssoftware.com/ http://www.ngsconsulting.com/ Telephone +44 208 401 0070 Fax +44 208 401 0076 [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- Please see the official ORACLE-L FAQ: http://www.orafaq.net -- Author: INET: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fat City Network Services -- 858-538-5051 http://www.fatcity.com San Diego, California -- Mailing list and web hosting services --------------------------------------------------------------------- To REMOVE yourself from this mailing list, send an E-Mail message to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (note EXACT spelling of 'ListGuru') and in the message BODY, include a line containing: UNSUB ORACLE-L (or the name of mailing list you want to be removed from). You may also send the HELP command for other information (like subscribing).