Russell,
First of all I've missed to mention Pompeius own seven experienced legions
(average strength 3.750 foot each) that remained from the stock after the
Pirate War (App. Mithr. 14.94, ie strongly exaggerated strength), as part of
Mommsen's 12 legions (40-50.000 foot). Lucullus', on the contrary, had
started with five legions (App. Mithr. 11.72), approximately at full nominal
strength (20-25.000 foot): one from Italy, two from Greek or Asia minor and
two more from Fimbria. The reason why Appian (loc. cit) numbers 30.000 foot
and 1.600 cavalry (as part of Lucullus' five legions) is founded in usually
added 'Asian' auxiliary, here 5-10.000 foot and two (!) alae cavalry (800
horse each) commanded by praefecti equitum [1]. We can directly estimate
that Lucullus' army is structured for operations in rough (or devastated)
terrain, for the cavalry strength is that of a single average legion.
Moreover, the decisive military ratio here is 1:2 in favor of Mithridates at
Amisus (App. Mithr. 11.78).
Unfortunately we don't know the auxiliary strength of Pompey, but I'd
assume, for the frontier of Pontus was no longer devastated as it was with -
and by - the late Lucullus (App. Mithr. 15.97), a strengthening of the
cavalry at least up to half an ala per legion or 4.800 horse and additional
10-20.000 foot.
Lets now turn to Pompeius' acquirements of native substitute troops.
There is indeed literary evidence, not only based on general (existential)
Roman practices during long distance campaigns (cf. Caes. Bell. Gall.).
In Colchis "all neighbouring tribes accompanied (sic!) Pompey on his
exploring expedition" (App. Mithr. 15.103). Similar it was with the
Albanians and Iberians, but first the Battle at River Cyrtus (loc.cit.) "led
them into temporary Roman dependence" [2]. It doubtlessly followed Armenia
and those Armenians, "who [not] deserted Tigranes on the road, when he was
going [to refuge] to Pompey [as his suppliant]."(App. Mithr. 15.104f.;
Mommsen calls him 'client king'). And Ariobarzanes got back the kingdom of
Cappadocia and - additionally - lesser Armenia (app. Mithr. 15), but
doubtlessly not for free. In the following war against Antiochus of
Commagene, the king "entered into friendly relations with him [Pompey],"
(App. Mithr. 16.106), which has meant apostrophised amicitia and future
clientship vs. direct military support in the Syrian raid (esp. cavalry).
I've picked only Appian as the primary source for the Mithridatic Wars to
avoid confusion here. But already Appian shows enough 'evidence' to
understand the Roman technique of forced recruitment mentioned e.g. in
Josephus, when Pompeius collected the Syrian (and Lebanese) auxiliary at
Damascus for his Nabataean campaign (Ant 10.267); cf. Ptolemy XII's offer to
support 8.000 cavalry for the campaign in Pliny Nat. XXXIII.136 [3].
Notes
---------
[1] M. Junkelmann (1991)_Die Reiter Roms, Part 2: Der militärische
Einsatz_Mainz, p. 55
[2] Th. Mommsen (repr.1993)_ Roemische Geschichte_Essen, p. 669
[3] G. Hoelbl (2001)_ A History of the Ptolemaic Empire_ New York, p. 224
Dierk
For private reply, e-mail to "Dierk van den Berg" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
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