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Armenia: The Crush of Global Pressures December 28, 2004 1815 GMT Summary The former Soviet republic of Armenia, located at the crushing center of a series of geopolitical tectonic plates, is on the cusp of a massive change. But unlike many of the other former Soviet republics that are choosing between Russia and the West, Armenia's choice is not nearly as clear-cut -- and its future will be free of the decisive paths that may be available to other states. Analysis Armenia is a former Soviet republic in trouble. Its economy holds little prospect, its people are leaving in droves and its geopolitical space is under siege. The one factor that has helped it keep its head above water to date is Russian sponsorship. But, as Russia racks up geopolitical defeats, that too could soon give way. The South Caucasus that Armenians call home is where the Russian, Turkish and Iranian geopolitical plates converge, putting the small states there under enormous -- and continuous -- pressure. Georgia and Azerbaijan have opted to look not just to Turkey next door, but also to Europe and the United States. Such connections make Iran -- clerical regime or not -- hostile to both states, a factor that is only enflamed when one considers that nearly a quarter of Iran's population is actually of Azerbaijani ethnicity. Armenia, for reasons of war, history, and the 1915 Armenian Genocide by the Turks, naturally looks to Iran, and especially similarly Orthodox Christian Russia to counterbalance itself against its hostile eastern and western neighbors. Under the Soviet system, Armenia received its oil from Azerbaijan and traded (as part of the Soviet Union) with Turkey. As the Soviet era ended, however, Armenia became embroiled in a war with Azerbaijan over the fate of Nogorno-Karabakh, a majority Armenian enclave within Azerbaijani territory. Armenia -- or if you believe Yerevan's public relations, Armenian volunteers supporting the Karabakh Armenians -- won the war and continues to control a large western slice of Azerbaijani territory contingent to it. But Turks, who consider Azerbaijanis their ethnic kin based on historical, ethnic and linguistic grounds, slapped on a near-total embargo, limiting Armenia's trade options to only Georgia to the north and Iran to the south. Armenia has refused to negotiate down from this untenable geopolitical position. After winning the Nogorno-Karabakh war, Armenian leaders -- backed by a fiery nationalism that is quite popular among Armenians within both the country and the diaspora -- have refused to seriously negotiate a peace agreement with Azerbaijan that might end the military standoff. To be fair, the Azerbaijanis have not exactly been extending olive branches either, but Baku believes that ultimately its oil and natural gas revenues will allow it to build up a military force capable of recapturing its lost territory. It likely is correct. Armenia, on the other hand, is an economic basket case dependent upon diaspora support for one-fifth of its gross domestic product. Nearly one-third of Armenians have emigrated abroad to look for better opportunities since independence in 1991, the sharpest population decline anywhere in the world. Only three million remain. There are eight million Azerbaijanis and 69 million Turks. To sustain its political and military positions, Armenia largely is dependent upon Russia, as the source of nearly all of its energy and its de facto security guarantor. Russia's commitment to the Armenian relationship will soon begin to falter, and with it, quite possibly Armenia's chances for survival. The dawning problem is one that Armenian President Robert Kocharian has foreseen. In October 1999 there was a paramilitary attack against the Armenian Parliament that resulted in the deaths of several members of the country's mostly pro-Russian political faction; Russia took advantage of the situation to send special forces troops in and cement its political influence in the small country. The attack and Moscow's reaction to it shook Kocharian's view of the Russians as a dependable ally. After all, if the Russians could not prevent its most ardent supporters from harm, and would take advantage of Armenian instability to strengthen its grip, was Russian protection really worth it? Kocharian, always a moderate on the issue of Russia, began quietly reaching out to other potential power centers in an attempt to balance foreign interests in Yerevan. But the coming crisis has little to do with Armenian desires of balance, and everything to do with a new world being forced upon the small country. In 2005 the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline will activate, and within two years its sister project, the Shah Deniz natural gas pipeline, will most likely also enter operation. The two parallel lines will transport Azerbaijani energy west through Georgia and Turkey and then on to global markets. Azerbaijan and Georgia will then be getting all of their energy needs from the two projects and will no longer need to import any energy from Russia's Caucasian network. Once that happens, Armenia will no longer be able to depend upon Russian deliveries. On one hand, the economics of maintaining the network of supplying Armenia -- which does not even border Russia -- are questionable unless Russia can also ship petroleum to Azerbaijan and Georgia. Economies of scale and all that. More importantly, the Georgians are not particularly fond of Russians. Once they have a reliable alternative to the purchase of Russian natural gas, they are very likely -- just as the Moldovans, Ukrainians, Belarusians and Transdnesiterians have done before them -- to siphon supplies bound for elsewhere (i.e. Armenia) from the Russian supply line that crosses their territory. That will put Russia in the awkward position of either subsidizing a geopolitical foe, or cutting off supplies to Armenia to spite Georgia. Even worse than the energy issue, Georgia may soon be causing problems for Russia's military deployment in Armenia. Already Georgian authorities -- with full Western support -- are blocking Russia from resupplying and rotating new troops into its Georgian military base in Akhalkalaki near the Armenian border. Once the Russians are forced out of Akhalkalaki, as seems likely, it will become an open question whether Tbilisi will impinge upon Russia's ability to keep its Armenian forces supplied. Either way Russia's most significant contributions to Armenian security are about to fall into jeopardy, and, fate in the Caucasus being a fickle thing, the Armenians must plan accordingly. Armenia is preparing for a possible future without Russian sponsorship in two ways. First, it is looking to its other traditional backer, Iran, to fill the gap. The Armenians and the Iranians already are putting together an alternative natural gas supply line to keep the lights on in Yerevan. Unlike Russia, Iran actually borders Armenia, so maintaining a new network is not an overburdening expense. Unlike the massive trans-Caucasus network that connects Armenia to Russia, the Iranian-Armenian project only requires a mere $30 million, 26-mile pipe linking the countries' networks together. But Iran can never be Russia: their cultures are too dissimilar and, unlike Russia, Iran lacks the ability to project power in a way that might dissuade Azerbaijan or Turkey from working against Armenia. Iran favors Armenia over its Shiite compatriots in Azerbaijan because it is concerned about maintaining supremacy over the Turkic minority within its own country and as a lever to keep Azerbaijan and Turkey physically separated. It is a relationship based upon mutual interest, but unlike Azerbaijan and its Turkish sponsor, the two are not willing to sacrifice anything -- certainly not blood -- for each other. Even if they wanted to, their military projection capabilities are questionable to say the least. Military intimidation in the Caspian is something that has already backfired horrendously on the Iranians. In 2001, Iran fired warning shots at Baku-based ships prospecting near the Iranian-Azerbaijani sea border. Turkey responded by helping Azerbaijan host military exercises. When it was over, several advanced fighter jets, complete with Turkish pilots, remained behind. Undercutting the commitment of the gas line, Iran is even working to pipe some Turkmen gas to the Armenian market so that should Armenia default on its energy debts -- as it has in the past -- Iran will be left holding the transit fees, but Turkmenistan the energy bill. Second, Armenia is extending Washington a tentative hand, and what better way to do it than to support the current administration's primary international project? On Dec. 4, the Armenian Parliament voted to empower Kocharian to send a small team -- 46 support personnel -- to participate in the Iraqi occupation coalition. The contingent will not be seeing any combat, and the entire affair has been carefully orchestrated (with the United States paying for the whole thing). This puts Armenia on the long list of former Soviet republics and clients which have sought to trade the Kremlin for the West: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Serbia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and most recently -- and loudly -- Ukraine. Unlike all of these states, however, Armenia cannot fully choose the Western path. Armenia, unlike the states aforementioned states, is not geographically proximate to the Western states. And unlike Azerbaijan and Georgia (who share this characteristic), Armenia has no oil (unlike Azerbaijan) and has missed out on its chance to be a transit route that could ship petroleum westward (unlike Georgia). Moreover, for Armenia to truly make a go at Westernizing, it would have to bury the hatchet with Turkey and Azerbaijan, which would mean, at a minimum, withdrawing the bulk of its forces -- volunteers -- from internationally-recognized Azerbaijani territory. In addition to that being a non-starter at home, it would enrage the Armenian diaspora, endangering the one international advantage that Armenia enjoys; the diaspora's economic support is the only thing that keeps the Armenian economy in its pseudo-functional shape. This commits Armenia to strategic ambiguity out of circumstance rather than design. Russia is being cut off, the West is for all practical purposes out of reach, and Iran is so fundamentally different that though Armenia can be a good neighbor it could never really be a client. Winds of change are blowing in Armenia. Russia is more strategically distant than ever, and the West's strategy of triggering soft revolutions a la Georgia and Ukraine has proven reliable. Armenia's next presidential elections are in 2006. Winds of change are blowing in Armenia; it is not clear whether Armenia will survive them. ------------------------ Yahoo! Groups Sponsor --------------------~--> $4.98 domain names from Yahoo!. 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