http://www.geostrategy-direct.com/geostrategy-direct/secure/2005/1_04/do.asp
DOSSIER: Gen. George Casey Mission impossible? U.S. commander must calm Iraq before elections, end insurgency "A car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a symbol that the insurgency is very powerful, when in actuality I don't believe that they are. It's a classic technique of the urban insurgent." Gen. George Casey # Age: 52 # Task: commander of multinational forces, Iraq # Whereabouts: Baghdad Gen. George Casey is in the hot seat in Iraq. As commander of more than 150,000 U.S. troops, Casey has been entrusted with the task of stabilizing Iraq over the next four weeks. In the best-case scenario, the U.S.-led multinational forces and Iraq's military and security forces will protect polling stations and major roads allowing the Jan. 30 elections to proceed smoothly. In the Anbar Province near the Syrian border, polls would likely be disrupted, but in much of the Sunni Triangle, voting will take place relatively smoothly. The worst-case scenario: suicide car bombings in Shi'ite cities and intimidation and attacks throughout the Sunni Triangle. Election Day turns into "Bloody Sunday." Casey is clearly a top soldier and a man who takes his responsibility seriously. He began his career as a mortar platoon leader in 1972 and later rose through the ranks in the infantry and mechanized infantry. In 1982, Casey got his first taste of the Middle East, serving as the U.S. military observer in the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Jerusalem. By the 1990s, Casey was already a brigade commander, corps commander and division commander. He joined the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 2001 as director of strategic plans and policy. Two years later he was called to Iraq. But Casey has been struggling with a military confused over its mission and has been playing catch-up ever since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime. Officials said that, in retrospect, the window of opportunity was from April 2003 until July 2003, when the regime fell and Saddam loyalists were disorganized. Iraqis cheered the fall of Saddam and looked forward to a stable Iraq. But military intelligence officials don't share Casey's optimism. A report, issued in early December, said insurgents have exploited the gaps in field security and in the screening process for recruiting Iraq's military and security forces. Officials believe the Iraqi insurgency, whether Sunni or Shi'ite, could be sustained for years. But the U.S. military had no idea that Saddam loyalists were planning a comeback and had prepared a financial and operational infrastructure. By the time the military felt the force of insurgency attacks, the United States didn't know how to regain the initiative. "In the two to three months of ambiguous transition, U.S. forces slowly lost the momentum and the initiative gained over an off-balanced enemy," a U.S. Army study authored by Maj. Isaiah Wilson stated. "The United States, its Army and its coalition of the willing have been playing catch-up ever since." Only in November 2003, the report said, did the military come up with a stabilization plan. By that time, both the Sunni and Shi'ite insurgencies had been formed. The Sunni insurgency received its money from Syria, the new home of Saddam loyalists. The Shi'ite insurgency was supported by Iran. Over the past 14 months, the Sunni insurgency has certainly grown stronger. U.S. officials said Saddam loyalists have formed a command and control structure and improved their combat skills while penetrating Iraq's military and security forces. Still, Casey has been playing down the effectiveness of the Sunni insurgency. He has maintained that the insurgents have inflated their image with high-profile attacks. "They don't have to do much," Casey said. "A car bomb a day in Baghdad or on the airport road sends a symbol that the insurgency is very powerful, when in actuality I don't believe that they are. It's a classic technique of the urban insurgent. They are trying to provoke us to do something that will make us look like we're overreacting to them." Addressing U.S. troops over the weekend, Rumsfeld said the priority was to make Iraqis responsible for their security. "That's the only way," Rumsfeld said. But last week's attack on a U.S. military base in Mosul changed lots of minds in Baghdad and Washington, particularly among Casey's superiors. A suicide bomber dressed in an Iraqi army uniform entered a U.S. mess hall in the U.S. military base in Mosul and blew himself up, killing 22 people � 14 of them American soldiers. The Al Qaida-aligned Ansar Al Sunna claimed responsibility for the attack. Military commanders understand that insurgents have infiltrated Iraqi military and security forces. The infiltration is so thorough that the U.S. military is no longer certain that even a reorganization of the police would help. "The enemy is effective," Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said. "The enemy's got a brain. The enemy alters its tactics. As things happen on the ground, they see what we do to respond to it. They then change their tactic." Casey's job is to turn around the situation. He has presided over the acceleration of equipment deliveries to U.S. forces, particularly body and vehicle armor to protect patrols and supplies. The general has also pressed for rapid training of the Iraqi military and security forces. He announced plans to form six public order battalions, a special police regiment, four commando battalions and nine regional SWAT teams in January 2005. By February, Casey said, there will be 70 battalions in the Iraqi army, including a mechanized battalion. But military intelligence officials don't share Casey's optimism. A U.S. military intelligence report asserted that Sunni insurgents might have established their headquarters in Mosul, Iraq's third-largest city and, until recently, regarded as relatively quiet. The report, issued in early December, said insurgents have exploited the gaps in field security and in the screening process for recruiting Iraq's military and security forces. Officials believe the Iraqi insurgency, whether Sunni or Shi'ite, could be sustained for years. Saddam loyalists have as much as $1.2 billion in Syrian and other bank accounts for distribution to up to 20,000 operatives in Iraq. The money could finance the insurgency for at least the next 25 years. Sunni insurgents have been successful at intimidating about 40 percent of the country. Officials said Saddam loyalists have directed about 90 percent of the insurgency attacks. They have sent death threats to Iraqis who cooperate with the Americans. As a result, the Defense Department has concluded that the level of violence in the insurgency will continue after the Jan. 30 elections. The only path to success is based on the willingness of Iraqi military and security forces as well as the government in Baghdad to impose order over their country. Addressing U.S. troops over the weekend, Rumsfeld said the priority was to make Iraqis responsible for their security. The defense secretary wanted Baghdad to show more initiative and begin to rely less on the United States. "That's the only way," Rumsfeld said. U.S. military commanders said this would be the new policy in 2005. Officials said U.S. military commanders will take a back seat to their Iraqi counterparts, who will be responsible for much to most of the counter-insurgency and other security missions. The new policy will be tested in northern Iraq, where stability operations appear most effective. Maj. Gen. John Batiste, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, said that by July 2005 an Iraqi National Guard division headquarters would take over northern and northeastern Iraq. The division will have 15 battalions of troops to take over the area. So far, 11 battalions have been deployed. At the same time, the Pentagon plans to increase funding for weapons and other assets. Those assets would include unmanned aerial vehicles as well as linguists from the United States. "The elections in January will go forward," Casey said. "The insurgents will do everything, I believe, in their power to create a situation to make us believe that they're not possible, but they will go forward. As a result we'll take another step in the process of moving Iraq on to a democracy." -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? 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