Hizballah has a choice to make
http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=10&categ_id=5&article_id= 13998 By Ali Abdullah Commentary by Tuesday, April 05, 2005 In its large rally on March 8, Hizbullah sought to display the political balance of power in Lebanon; however, in so doing, it also brought to light other not less important realities, namely the sectarian dimension of this demonstration, and the Movement's inevitable slide toward an internal confrontation. It is possible that a feeling of impending danger compelled it to flex its muscles, engage in brinkmanship with the opposition, and appoint itself as spokesperson for the government (kidnapping the state) and society, by linking Syrian troop withdrawal to an agreement between Syria and Lebanon and alluding to the possibility that these troops might remain in the Bekaa Valley for a long time. By talking about the need to uphold the struggle until the whole of Palestine is liberated and ignoring the negative impact that this could have on the regional and international balance of power, which tends to favor the enemy (Israel and the U.S.), Hizbullah is escaping to the fore probably because it realizes how little room it had to maneuver. The equation that Syria created in Lebanon and struggled to maintain in place for the past several years, through the balance of power it established in its constitutional and political institutions in general and in its military and security apparatus in particular, was totally unraveled by the killing of former Premier Rafik Hariri. The assassination has also put the issue of Syria's presence in Lebanon at the top of the international community's priorities, and countries that Syria considered as brotherly and friendly joined its traditional enemies in calling for its withdrawal from Lebanon. The internal ebb and flow of political power in Lebanon has brought to the surface many questions regarding the fate and future role of the country's various political forces, institutions and security apparatus. Efforts by both the opposition and loyalists to galvanize and organize their supporters through street demonstrations and strikes in a show of force after Hariri' s assassination, has put the Bristol and "Ain al-Tineh camps in direct confrontation with one another. Attempts by each side to outdo the other in strength and popular support and calls by both sides on members of the opposing group to switch sides, has probably produced opposite results. The calls by Walid Jumblatt to Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah - who considers himself above being called upon to join the ranks of anyone - to join the opposition and the latter's call for the opposition to stop playing the pressure-through-the-street game and come to the negotiating table, are a case in point. The success of the opposition in bringing down Omar Karami's government and coupling it with a call for the resignation of the security chiefs - on grounds of negligence in preventing the assassination if not outright complicity - and that of the president of the republic, has added to the embarrassment of the loyalists in general, and of Hizbullah in particular. The loyalists' meeting at Hizbullah's headquarters, Nasrallah's news conference after the meeting, and the one-million-man march in Riyad al-Solh Square, should be seen as part of a counter attack to contain the opposition and put pressure on it to minimize its demands and agree to the national dialogue to which both the president and Nasrallah himself had called for. Hizbullah realizes that its turn will be next after Syria leaves Lebanon, because it is the only party in the loyalist camp that has credibility, military ability, and popular support. Though the Amal Movement has some support, it however, lacks credibility, in particular its leader Nabih Berri, who finds him self facing the responsibility of preventing regional powers from exploiting the new internal situation, and international powers from putting undue pressure on Syria. Amal also finds itself shouldering the responsibility of giving Syria room and time to catch its breath to be able to negotiate with the regional and international powers and of preventing the internal equation that Syria had established in Lebanon from coming apart. Thus, Hizbullah finds itself at a crossroads with a choice between two options: 1. Getting involved in the internal struggle and throwing its popular, and maybe also its military, weight behind the loyalist camp by convincing the opposition of the futility of their stance (Lebanon is not Ukraine as Nasrallah said), by trying to revert to the usual Lebanese "neither winners nor losers" outcome, and by giving the Syrians a chance to remain longer in Lebanon. This is basically why Nasrallah took part in the Ain al-Tineh meeting, invited the participants to meet at Hizbullah's headquarters, and organized the million-man march in Riyad al-Solh Square. 2. Staying above the fray, reinforcing its position as the strength behind everyone in Lebanon equally, and holding onto the role it has played so far which is akin to that of a national army in a modern state. If Hizbullah chooses the second option, it will be able to easily evolve from being part of Syria's equation in Lebanon to that of a player in a new national Lebanese configuration based on sovereignty and independence, i.e. territorial sovereignty and independent political will coupled with a strong and special relationship with Syria after the honorable withdrawal of its troops and security apparatus from Lebanon. The success of the first option is not, however, assured, and is fraught with dangers and pitfalls. To pursue such an option will necessarily lead to the loss of the image that gave it its popularity and credibility, that of the national resistance movement that enjoyed the support of everyone and knew how to remain on the sidelines of political infighting and at an equal distance from all the national political forces. Therefore, it seems that the second option is the only way to go for Hizbullah, especially given that Syria and Lebanon's official behavior and Hariri's assassination have put Resolution 1559 on the international community's agenda and, by extension, the movement's head on the block. Hizbullah has thus entered into a long and dangerous tunnel at the end of which could lay a tragic outcome. By getting involved in the internal struggle on the side of the loyalists and putting its popular and military capabilities at the service of the Syrian equation in Lebanon will make the execution of Resolution 1559 and its coupling with the Taif Accord, namely the disarming the resistance/Hizbullah, as Larsen and some Arab countries have done, a universal demand. The adoption of the Taif Accord as a blueprint for solving the current political situation will not remove the danger hanging over Hizbullah's head, but can give it enough time to effect the necessary move to the post liberation and post Syrian period in Lebanon - especially in view of the many Israeli messages to the effect that it is ready to evacuate the Shebaa Farms if the Lebanese army deploys there, which if it happens, will completely close the circle around the Movement. The opposition's insistence on the implementation of the Taif Accord is a message of appreciation and friendship towards Hizbullah, which the latter should seize upon and quickly dissociate itself from the internal struggle, accelerate the implementation the Taif Accord, take part in the upcoming general election which aims at formulating a new national equation based on sovereignty and independence, and transform itself accordingly into a Lebanese political party. Ali Abdallah is a Syrian political writer. 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