The Religious Institution In Iran And The Winds Of Change

Youssef Azizi 

Al-Hayat

2005/04/16

There is a continuous apparent phenomenon in Iran which is the historical
competition between the religious institution - be it Zoroastrian or Shiite
- and the Monarchy. It seems that the Iranians or at least the rejuvenating
generation started to criticize these two traditional institutions (the
clergy and the Monarchy) or any other institution that adopts inheritance in
the governing process. With regards to the establishment of the Monarchy,
some Iranian intellects believe that the concept of Wilayat Al Faqih is a
continuation for the idea of the Tsarist charisma, which was the unifying
factor for the Persian Empire prior to Islam. Had this enormous popular
force which overthrew the despotic Monarchy and established the Iranian
revolution been in another country this force would have resulted in the
establishment of an electoral republican system. 

If we exclude the period that Iran was under the influence of the Islamic
empire, the religious institution was very close to the political authority
where the Shah Ismail the Safavid in the 16th century established the first
Shiite empire in Iran. However, the role of the religious institution was
diminished during the reign of Shah Reza Al Pahlavi (1941-1925). Shah
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, son and successor advocated the policy of carrots and
sticks in dealing with the religious institution. Nonetheless, during the
sixties period with the expansion of the Islamic tide, the religious
institution started to strengthen its posture among the public until it was
finally able not to oust the Shahs regime but the Monarchy in Iran.

After the Islamic revolution, the leader of this revolution took Qum as his
headquarters in order to administer the religious school that he had
established in that city. Later on, this religious institution lost its
trust in the Islamic liberal forces that it had appointed in order to
administer the country. Accordingly the religious institution introduced
changes to the proposed draft constitution that the Islamic liberal forces
had formulated and the issue of the Wilayat Al Faqih was introduced under
the direct order of Al Khomeini himself. As a result, the religious clergy
controlled the three main authorities in the country and they administered
these authorities during the war with Iraq.

The first feature of Persian proclivity started to appear among the
religious clergy during the beginning of the revolution; however these
tendencies needed at least two decades in order for it to become a central
establish for the official policies in Iran. Rafsanjani during his reign
tried to open a breathing window by allowing cultural openness, however the
agitated situation almost resulted in a revolution inside the Islamic
revolution, had it not been for the emergence of the reformist political
movement which resulted in the election of Mohammad Khatami as president.
The arrival of the religious clergy to power in Iran resulted in important
changes in the sociological, political and intellectual lives of these
religious clergy.

The religious institution in Iran, with its Shiite majority and Sunni
minority, was solid on the eve of the Islamic revolution in Iran because of
the weakness of the other leftist, liberal and democratic parties. The
Shiite religious institution after the Islamic revolution expanded, as
before this revolution this institution was reduced to two main Hawza
(religious schools) Qum (in the center) which is the most important and the
Mashhad (north east). After that many Hawza were established not only in the
provinces and the cities but nearly in every district in Iran. The important
feature in the religious Hawza especially the one on Qum was the fact that
modernization and change was bolstered by the youth more than the religious
clergy. Some analysts consider that this is an unprecedented feature in the
Islamic world. The religious clergy that exercised their power in Iran
became secularists because of the employment of their efforts in the
political realm; we could consider these clergy to be politicians rather
than being religious men.

The religious Hawza during the past two decades were separated into two
intellectual and political movements: the traditional movement and the
modernization movement. Certain Nationalist (Persian) sentiments dominated
over some the religious schools. These movements that included religious
clergy who were judiciary and government officials in the Iranian government
apparatus played an important role in the religious and political scene
especially during the presidential and parliamentary elections in Iran.
Despite the efforts of the Islamic intellectual it seems that the occurrence
of change towards the modernization of the structure of the Hawza will not
happen unless these changes stimulate the core of these religious schools,
advocated by enlightened religious clergy with strong influence. This is
what we are seeing today even though this process is still slow, as the
traditional movement is showing an obstinate resistance towards religious
and intellectual modernization. No doubt that the destiny of modernization
and the sociological, political, and intellectual development in Iran is
strongly attenuated to the degree of success of this process?

http://english.daralhayat.com/opinion/contributors/04-2005/Article-20050416-
4ac48377-c0a8-10ed-001a-14114f809687/story.html





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