Al-Qaeda and WMD: A Primer

By Tiina <http://jamestown.org/terrorism/analysts.php?authorid=279>
Tarvainen

Al-Qaeda's peculiar constitution as an organization and its proven ability
to plan and execute mega-terror attacks makes it the most likely candidate
to pull off the world’s first serious terrorist attack involving weapons of
mass destruction. [1] Al-Qaeda’s attempt to cause massive destruction would
serve all the traditional purposes of terrorism: symbolism, propaganda and
psychological impact, irrespective of the failure or success of the mission.
Precisely because of pervasive speculation surrounding WMD terrorism, it
would be more surprising if terrorists didn’t try to acquire these weapons.
While it is generally agreed that a mass-casualty terrorist attack involving
WMD is inevitable, the precise timing of the assault depends on the dynamics
determining the balance between motivation and capabilities. 

Weapons of mass destruction – biological, chemical, radiological and nuclear
weapons – are not easy tools to handle. Consequently there have only been
two cases of attacks involving WMD: the Aum Shinrikyo case in Tokyo in 1995,
and the anthrax letters in the United States in the fall of 2001. These
basic and crude attacks neither resulted in mass casualties nor had a
massive political impact. A successful attack causing mass casualties and
generating catastrophic political and social instability is dependent on
acquiring high technical expertise and having the motive and capability to
destroy masses of civilians and possibly obliterating entire human
communities. There is little doubt that al-Qaeda qualifies for the latter
requirement, but its ability to acquire in-depth technical expertise is much
in doubt, not least because for now at least the organization is on the
defensive. 

Invisible weapons

The most suitable weapon of mass destruction for terrorist purposes would be
biological, radiological or chemical. Nuclear weapons are more difficult to
develop, or to obtain by buying. In March 2005, a jihadist forum al-Ma'sada
published a-do-it-yourself plan to make a dirty bomb. [2] This is an
indicator that the broader Salafi-Jihadist tendency that takes inspiration
from al-Qaeda’s ideological and methodological example is exhorting
jihadists everywhere to endeavor to develop WMD. But given the sheer
complexity of developing or acquiring WMD and then successfully deploying it
against suitable targets, it is unlikely that freelance jihadists or even
associated organizations will be able to execute a WMD attack. The attack
will likely be carried out by the hardcore of al-Qaeda for primarily two
reasons: firstly the network has nearly 15 years experience of being at the
cutting edge of terrorism and secondly it alone has access to the most
competent and accomplished human resources. 

Nuclear or radiological weapons don't have the same fear-effect as
biological and or chemical weapons. Moreover chemical weapons are easier to
produce than biological weapons, but their capacity to cause mass-casualties
is much smaller. A biological weapon would be the best choice for al-Qaeda,
considering its potential to cause mass casualties and spread infectious
over vast distances. 

The employment of mass-casualty terrorism conforms to the agenda and
worldview of the increasingly rootless global Jihadism theorized by the
al-Qaeda ideologue, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri. A few decades ago the main
purposes of terrorists were to gain attention and propagandize, while
causing mass destruction was simply not an option. In the worldview of
rootless Jihadists however, the audience is now superfluous; what matters is
to cause mass casualties and create the greatest amount of instability
possible, irrespective of the consequences . In this context discussions
about motives to deploy WMD are irrelevant. No matter how complex the deep
principles or incentives behind WMD terrorism, the only reliable motive is
an unflinching desire to slay blindly. 

Motivations and capabilities: Present imbalance

The most important capabilities of terrorist groups could be divided into
three parts: financial, technological and psychological. Al-Qaeda’s
liquidity situation is thought to be favorable, not least because the
network continues to receive funding from various sources. [3] A successful
WMD attack would also require enormous technological resources.
Globalization facilitates access to advanced technologies in a dualistic
way: both terrorists and counter-terrorism agents benefit from this.
Psychological capability is the third prerequisite for a successful attack
and at the same time, a compulsory quality for terrorists. In the case of
WMD terrorism, psychological incentives have to be immense. 

Given the difficulty of developing WMD, al-Qaeda may opt to buy these
weapons from rogue arms merchants or other criminal networks. But even in
the event of acquiring these weapons, their successful dispersion requires
sophisticated technical capabilities. In the case of biological or chemical
weapons, a small blush of wind or other disturbing factor can destroy the
whole project. 

Al-Qaeda & WMD

Although Al-Qaeda clearly has an interests in WMD, the group hasn’t directly
threatened a WMD attack. The first Islamist ruling about the use of WMD was
published in May 21, 2003 by the Saudi Sheikh Naser bin Hamad al-Fahd. [4]
Al-Fahd is one of the young leading Salafi clerics of the Saudi Islamist
opposition who supports the culture of global jihad led by Osama Bin Laden. 

There has been at least one relatively well documented case of an al-Qaeda
directed and funded plot to attack the U.S. homeland with a “dirty” bomb.
The plot revolved around Jose Padilla (also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir), a
U.S. citizen of Puerto Rican origin, who was detained by U.S. federal agents
at Chicago’s O’Hare airport in May 2002. Padilla was allegedly flying into
Chicago from Pakistan to conduct a reconnaissance mission on behalf of his
al-Qaeda task-masters in Karachi. Much confusion surrounds the Padilla case,
but it has been repeatedly claimed that the mission had been originally
commissioned by Abu Zubaydah, al-Qaeda’s former senior operational planner,
who was arrested in March 2002. It is unclear if information gleaned from
Abu Zubaydah’s interrogation directly led to the abrupt disruption of
Padilla’s mission. 

Currently the central question revolves around the operational viability of
al-Qaeda after the consistent and catastrophic setbacks the organization has
had to contend with since late 2001. While the long silence since the
mega-terror attacks of 9/11 have been interpreted in the context of
al-Qaeda’s possible operational demise, it is worthwhile to remember that
al-Qaeda follows a logic of its own and is not influenced by any particular
audience, let alone a western one. Moreover, the recent video and audio
messages of Bin Laden could be interpreted as completing a WMD warning
cycle. In other words, al-Qaeda is giving the West a final chance to correct
its behavior in the Muslim world before it launches a catastrophic attack. 

In recent months much speculation has surrounded the nature of the
relationship between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s insurgent organization in Iraq
and the hardcore of al-Qaeda. Besides his now legendary exploits in Iraq,
Zarqawi has been accused of organizing a failed millennium attack in Amman,
organizing the assassination of the American diplomat Lawrence Foley in
October 2002 and masterminding a foiled plot to attack the headquarters of
the Jordanian intelligence service with crude chemical weapons. [5] If
Zarqawi survives the Iraqi insurgency, he may be a likely candidate to lead
an al-Qaeda backed WMD attack on the United States homeland or on U.S.
interests in different parts of the world. There are two reasons to be
fearful: firstly Zarqawi, despite all the legend and misinformation that
surrounds him, has proven himself an extraordinarily accomplished and
resourceful terrorist; secondly the Zarqawi organization is now staffed
mainly by local Iraqis who have more reason than most Islamists to hate the
United States. Indeed the radicalizing experience of the Iraq conflict and
the fact that a substantial element in Iraq’s Arab Sunni community harbors
revenge against the United States for the humiliation which they believe has
been inflicted on their country, may lead some Iraqis to take drastic action
against their tormentors. While it may only be a matter of time before
radicalized and revenge-seeking Iraqis attack U.S. interests outside of
Iraq, the real potential for a catastrophic WMD attack planned and executed
by this constituency is a sobering thought indeed. 

There is already some reports that Iraqis have begun to deploy crude WMD
weapons against U.S. forces in Iraq. In the beginning of 2005, the Iraqi
correspondent of Mafkarat al-Islam reported that fighters fired mortar
rounds containing chemical substances at the U.S. al-Habbaniyah base. [6]
There has also been speculation that Iraqi guerrillas fired rockets loaded
with Sarin gas at a US base near Falluja in February 2005. [7] While neither
of these reports have been confirmed, there can be little doubt that Iraq is
still a repository of some WMD material, despite the fact that none have
been found since the ouster of Saddam Hussein. In an ironic twist of
catastrophic proportions the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq may result
in exactly the kind of attack that it was purportedly designed to prevent in
the first place; namely a WMD attack on U.S. interests by Iraqis. 

Conclusion

New threats by rootless jihadis to attack Western interests are appearing on
jihadist forums more frequently than ever. For instance, in April 2005 the
Jihadist website La Voix des Opprimés (the Voice of the Oppressed) published
a direct warning to Americans, Europeans, Russians and “other Westerners,”
threatening them with biological or chemical attacks. [8] These warnings may
be dismissed as the helpless rantings of armchair mujahideen, but there is
little doubting the overwhelming desire of committed Jihadists to acquire
and deploy weapons of mass destruction against western targets. Currently
the disconnect between motivation and capabilities is far too wide, making
an attack in the foreseeable future highly unlikely. But in the mid- to
long-term three factors in particular; namely increasing Muslim alienation
with U.S. policies, growing proliferation of knowledge and technology and
the increasingly rootless and ubiquitous nature of global jihad, are likely
to converge, thus rendering a WMD attack all but inevitable.

Notes:

1. See e.g. Salah, Muhammad. 1999. Bin Laden Front Reportedly Bought CBW
>From East Europe. Al-Hayat 20/4/1999.

2. Al-Matrafi, Saad. 2005. Terrorist Website Drops Dirty Bomb. Arab News
11/03/2005.
http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1§ion=0&article=60255&d=11&m=3&y=2005.

3. For more information on Saudi financing see Bahgat, Gawdat. 2004.
Saudi-Arabia and the War on Terrorism. Arab Studies Quarterly 26:1., pp. 51
– 64.

4. See al-Fahd, Naser. 2003. Risalah fi hukm istikhdam aslihat al-damar
al-shamel didh al-kuffar, Rabi` Awwal 1424H
http://www.al-fhd.com/rsayl/doc/rsayl.damar.doc.

5. Hisham al-Qarwi, "Bin Ladin's Local Deputies," Al-Arab al-Alamiyah
8/11/2002.

6. Abu Nasr, Muhammad. 2005. Chemical Warheads Suspected In Attack on US
Base. Free Arab Voice 24/02/2005.

7. Al-Faris, Omar and Abu Nasr, Muhammad. 2005. Use Of Sarin Gas Suspected
In Fallujah Withdrawal. Free Arab Voice and Islam Memo 18/02/2005.

8. La Voix des Opprimés 29.4.2005 http://www.stcom.net/.

http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369714


 





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