http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=18330&c=206
Testimony of Acting Director Gregory T. Nojeim and National Security
Policy Counsel Timothy H. Edgar At An Oversight Hearing on Sections
505 and 804 of the USA PATRIOT Act
May 26, 2005
American Civil Liberties Union
Testimony at an Oversight Hearing on the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001:
Section 505 (National Security Letters) and Section 804
(Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction) and the Material Witness Statute
Before the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security of
the House Judiciary Committee
Submitted by
Gregory T. Nojeim
Acting Director, Washington Legislative Office
and
Timothy H. Edgar
National Security Policy Counsel
Chairman Coble, Ranking Member Scott and Members of the Subcommittee:
I am pleased to appear before you today on behalf of the American
Civil Liberties Union and its more than 400,000 members, dedicated to
preserving the principles of the Constitution and Bill of Rights. This
is an oversight hearing on sections of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
expanding national security letter powers and extraterritorial
jurisdiction for federal criminal prosecutions,[1] as well as the very
important topic of the Justice Department�s use of the material
witness statute.[2]
This statement�s main focus is on national security letters and
material witness detention. While these powers are not set to expire
at the end of the year, their unrestricted use poses a serious threat
to basic civil liberties and should be the subject of this
subcommittee�s careful scrutiny. The statement also briefly addresses
extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Secret Records Searches Without Judicial Review, Probable Cause or an
Ability to Challenge: National Security Letters
Perhaps no sections of the Patriot Act have become more controversial
than the sections allowing the government secretly to obtain
confidential records in national security investigations �
investigations �to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.�
National security investigations are not limited to gathering
information about criminal activity. Instead, they are intelligence
investigations designed to collect information the government decides
is needed to prevent � �to protect against� � the threat of terrorism
or espionage. They pose greater risks for civil liberties because they
potentially involve the secret gathering of information about lawful
political or religious activities that federal agents believe may be
relevant to the actions of a foreign government or foreign political
organization (including a terrorist group).
The traditional limit on national security investigations is the focus
on investigating foreign powers or agents of foreign powers. Indeed,
the �foreign power� standard is really the only meaningful substantive
limit for non-criminal investigations given the astonishing breadth of
information government officials might decide is needed for
intelligence reasons. The Patriot Act eliminated this basic limit for
records searches, including the FBI�s power to use a �national
security letter� to obtain some records without any court review at all.
Section 505 of the Patriot Act expanded the FBI�s power to obtain some
records in national security investigations without any court review
at all. These �national security letters� can be used to obtain
financial records, credit reports, and telephone, Internet and other
communications billing or transactional records. The letters can be
issued simply on the FBI�s own assertion that they are needed for an
investigation, and also contain an automatic and permanent
nondisclosure requirement.
Although national security letters never required probable cause, they
did require, prior to the Patriot Act, �specific and articulable facts
giving reason to believe� the records pertain to an �agent of a
foreign power.� The Patriot Act removed that standard.
As a result, a previously obscure and rarely used power can now be
used far more widely to obtain many more records of American citizens
and lawful residents. Because the requirement of individual suspicion
has been repealed, records powers may now be used to obtain entire
databases of private information for �data mining� purposes � using
computer software to tag law abiding Americans as terrorist suspects
based on a computer algorithm.
In Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), a federal
district court struck down a �national security letter� records power
expanded by the Patriot Act, agreeing with the ACLU that the failure
to provide any explicit right for a recipient to challenge a national
security letter search order violated the Fourth Amendment and that
the automatic secrecy rule violated the First Amendment. The case is
now on appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.
There has been some confusion about whether Doe v. Ashcroft struck
down a provision of the Patriot Act. In fact, Doe v. Ashcroft struck
down, in its entirety, 18 U.S.C. � 2709(b), the national security
letter authority for customer records of communications service
providers, as amended by section 505(a) of the Patriot Act. The court
referred repeatedly to the Patriot Act in its opinion. To be clear,
the court invalidated all of section 505(a) of the Patriot Act.[3] It
is simply inaccurate to imply that the court�s decision was unrelated
to the Patriot Act, or that it did not strike down a provision of the
Patriot Act. If the court�s decision is sustained on appeal, section
505(a) of the Patriot Act will no longer have any force or effect.[4]
National security letters can be used to obtain sensitive records
relating to the exercise of First Amendment rights. A national
security letter could be used to monitor use of a computer at a
library or Internet caf� under the government�s theory that providing
Internet access (even for free) makes an institution a �communications
service provider� under the law.
While national security letters cannot be issued in an investigation
of a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident if the
investigation is based �solely� on First Amendment activities, this
provides little protection. An investigation is rarely, if ever, based
�solely� on any one factor; investigations based in large part, but
not solely, on constitutionally protected speech or association are
implicitly allowed. An investigation of a temporary resident can be
based �solely� on First Amendment activities, and such an
investigation of a foreign visitor may involve obtaining records
pertaining to a United States citizen. For example, a investigation
based solely on the First Amendment activities of an international
student could involve a demand for the confidential records of a
student political group that includes United States citizens or
permanent residents.
The government defends national security letters as analogous to a
administrative subpoenas, which they point out do not require probable
cause and can be issued without prior review by a judge. As explained
above, national security letters are dramatically different from both
administrative and grand jury subpoenas because they provides no
explicit right to challenge and contain an automatic, permanent gag
order that even the Attorney General concedes should be amended to
ensure it permits conversations with attorneys.
Moreover, this argument fundamentally misunderstands the difference
between foreign intelligence investigations, criminal investigations,
and administrative agency regulation, and the impact of that
difference on First Amendment freedoms. Foreign intelligence
investigations are domestic investigations of the activities of
foreign governments or organizations, including foreign terrorist
organizations. Foreign intelligence investigations may involve
investigation of criminal activities, such as espionage or terrorism,
but may also involve intelligence gathering for foreign policy or
other purposes involving lawful activities. The guidelines for
conducting foreign intelligence investigations (including what level
of suspicion is required for certain intrusive techniques) are classified.
As Justice Powell, writing for the Supreme Court in a landmark case
involving intelligence gathering, observed:
National security cases, moreover, often reflect a convergence of
First and Fourth Amendment values not present in cases of 'ordinary'
crime. . . History abundantly documents the tendency of
Government--however benevolent and benign its motives--to view with
suspicion those who most fervently dispute its policies. . . .
The price of lawful public dissent must not be a dread of
subjection to an unchecked surveillance power.[5]
Moreover, as a result of section 203 of the Patriot Act, information
properly obtained in a criminal investigation of terrorism (including
information obtained with a grand jury subpoena) can be freely shared
with intelligence agents. National security letters are an entirely
different, and more intrusive, power � a power for intelligence agents
to obtain highly personal records unbounded by any need to show
relevance to any criminal investigation.
The administration has disclosed little useful information about the
use of national security letters. For example, in response to repeated
requests for information about the use of national security letters
under the Freedom of Information Act, the government has responded
with page after page of heavily redacted documents that do not provide
the public with any way to judge how the power is being used.[6]
The disclosure of information about how often a different
controversial intelligence records power (section 215 of the Patriot
Act) has been used, and the types of records it has been used to
obtain, calls into serious question the government�s longstanding
position that similar information about the use of national security
letters is properly kept secret.
We do not ask that you repeal section 505 of the Patriot Act. Rather,
we ask that you restore the �agent of a foreign power� requirement and
that you amend the statute to time limit the gag, exempt
attorney-client communications from it, and allow for court
challenges. If these changes are made to the NSL statute, they would
satisfy the court that struck down that statute under the First and
the Fourth Amendment.
The SAFE Act (�Security and Freedom Ensured Act,� H.R. 1526) would
subject section 505 to the Patriot Act�s sunset provision, thus
restoring the requirement of �specific and articulable facts giving
reason to believe� the records �pertain to a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power� for national security letters. Restoring this
requirement is needed to ensure section 505 of the Patriot Act is not
used to obtain the personal records of ordinary Americans.
The Senate version of the SAFE Act (S. 737) makes additional
improvements which should be added to the House version should the
SAFE Act move forward to committee consideration. S. 737 makes
explicit the right to file a motion to quash the national security
letters because they are unreasonable, contrary to law, or seek
privileged information. The Senate bill also sets standards for a
judicially-imposed, temporary secrecy order that can be challenged by
the recipient of a national security letter. Finally, the Senate bill
provides a right to notice, and an opportunity to challenge, before
information from a FISA records search or national security letter
search can be used in a court proceeding.
Secret Detention Without Charge: The Misuse of the Material Witness
Statute
This subcommittee�s oversight of the Justice Department�s use of the
material witness statute to arrest and detain scores of people without
charge is long overdue. Since September 11, the abuse of the material
witness law has thrust many into a world of secret detention, secret
evidence, and baseless accusations of terrorist links. The prolonged
incarceration of hundreds of immigrants on routine visa violations
until cleared by the FBI of presumed terrorist connections is well
documented.[7] Less well known is the misuse of the federal material
witness law to arrest and imprison scores of people � including United
States citizens � indefinitely without criminal charges.
The Justice Department has tried to keep hidden its use of the
material witness law, refusing to respond to Congressional inquiries
and keeping courtroom doors closed and material witness cases off
court dockets. This testimony draws from results of extensive research
by the ACLU and Human Rights Watch (HRW), which will be released
shortly in a joint report detailing the experiences of scores of
individuals whom the federal government arrested as material witnesses
in connection with its anti-terrorism investigations.
That report will identify serious, systemic abuses of civil liberties
that occurred as a direct result of the Justice Department�s policy of
abusing the material witness law for purposes Congress never intended,
and will make detailed recommendations for corrective action. The
report is based on interviews, affidavits, and court records of scores
of individuals who were detained as material witnesses.
The material witness statute, 18 U.S.C. � 3144, comprises a single
paragraph that simply states if it appears from an affidavit that a
witness has testimony that is �material� to a �criminal proceeding,�
the witness may be arrested and held �if it is shown that it may
become impracticable to secure the presence of the person by
subpoena.� A deposition is required, instead of detention, if a
deposition would �adequately� secure testimony and if �further
detention is not necessary to prevent a failure of justice.�
Congress enacted the material witness law to enable the government, in
narrow circumstances, to secure the testimony of witnesses who might
otherwise avoid testifying in a criminal proceeding. If a court
accepts an affidavit that says a person has information �material� to
a criminal proceeding and is otherwise unlikely to appear, the witness
can be locked up until he testifies or is deposed.
Since September 11, however, the Department of Justice has misused the
law for a very different purpose: to secure the indefinite
incarceration of those it wanted to investigate as possible terrorist
suspects. This allowed the government to evade public scrutiny and to
avoid the constitutional protections guaranteed to suspects, including
probable cause to believe the individual committed a crime and
time-limited detention.
The report will show that the post-September 11 material witnesses
were incarcerated for periods ranging from a few days to upwards of a
year. Many spent at least two months in jail. Witnesses were typically
held round the clock in solitary confinement, subjected to the harsh
and degrading high security conditions typically reserved for the most
dangerous inmates accused or convicted of the most serious crimes.
Indeed, they were often arrested at gunpoint in front of families and
neighbors and transported to jail in handcuffs; any time they were
taken out of their cells they were handcuffed and shackled. They were
interrogated without counsel about their own alleged wrongdoing.
While the government has contended that almost all material witnesses
had useful information, our report will show that a large number of
witnesses were never brought before a grand jury or court to testify.
More tellingly, in repeated cases the government has now apologized
for arresting and incarcerating the �wrong guy.� The material
witnesses were victims of the federal investigators and attorneys who
were to quick to jump to the wrong conclusions, relying on false,
unreliable and irrelevant information. By evading the probable cause
requirement for arrests of suspects, the government made numerous
mistakes.
*
Brandon Mayfield - When armed agents took Brandon Mayfield, a
lawyer in Oregon, into custody in May 2004 on the basis of a sealed
material witness warrant, a criminal indictment seemed likely to
follow. The FBI appeared to believe that Mr. Mayfield�a U.S. citizen,
veteran of the U.S. Army and a married father of three�himself was a
perpetrator of the bombing because their experts claim to have made a
�100% positive identification� of Mr. Mayfield�s fingerprint as being
the print found on a bag of detonators found near the Madrid bombing
site. For two weeks, the government held Mr. Mayfield, mostly in
maximum security conditions, and urged in closed court proceedings
that Mr. Mayfield was involved with the crime. Prosecutors threatened
him with capital charges and refered to him as a target in court
papers�even though there was no evidence that Mr. Mayfield had
traveled to Spain, or otherwise had been out of the country for more
than ten years. These logical gaps were explained when three weeks
after his arrest, the Spanish government apprehended an Algerian man
whose fingerprint accurately matched the print found near the site,
after weeks of the Spanish launching protests to the U.S. government
that Mr. Mayfield�s fingerprint was not a match. The Justice
Department has since apologized to Mr. Mayfield and has issued an
internal report sharply criticizing the FBI investigation and
fingerprint match.
*
Al Badr al-Hazmi - In the early morning of September 12, 2001,
five FBI agents visited the house of Dr. Albader al-Hazmi, a medical
doctor doing his residency in San Antonio, Texas, who lived with his
wife and young children. The government based its arrest of Dr.
al-Hazmi on the fact that he shared the last name as one of the
hijackers and had been in phone contact months earlier with someone at
the Saudi Arabian embassy with the last name �bin Laden.� After the
government held Dr. al-Hazmi in solitary confinement in Texas and New
York for two weeks, and restricted his lawyers� access to him, Dr.
al-Hazmi was released without ever testifying. The harrowing
experience prompted Dr. al-Hazmi to send his wife and children back to
Saudi Arabia. Although he was cleared of any involvement with the
September 11 investigation, the government never unsealed his records
or apologized to Dr. al-Hazmi.
These examples demonstrate the pattern of the abuse of the law to hold
a suspect to make an end-run around establishing probable cause, as
well as the dangers of circumventing criminal safeguards which protect
both rights and good government. These cases represent only two of a
much larger series of mistakes the government made in its secret
arrests of material witnesses.
In part, the abuses resulted from an absence of real judicial
scrutiny. Judicial scrutiny of arrest warrants was frustrated in part
because the Justice Department sought the arrest of most of the
witnesses in connection with grand jury investigations � although
material witness arrests, prior to September 11, had been used very
rarely in grand jury investigations. Because the government has broad
powers in grand jury investigations, courts often deferred to the
government�s requests for testimony. Moreover, the government urged
that witnesses urgently needed to remain detained for national
security reasons.
Public proceedings and records of arrests and detentions are another
criminal justice safeguard that was not available for the
post-September 11 material witnesses. Historically, proceedings about
whether to detain or release material witnesses � including
proceedings involving whether to detain grand jury witnesses � have
been public under the long-standing American principle that secret
arrests are odious to a democracy. Yet the Justice Department insisted
on conducting proceedings behind closed doors and sealing virtually
all documents connected with the witnesses� arrests and detentions,
including warrants, affidavits, transcripts, legal briefs, and court
rulings.
Although the Justice Department claimed some witnesses preferred not
to speak publicly, they nevertheless insisted on obtaining orders
gagging witnesses� attorneys and family members, barring reporters
from meeting with witnesses, and keeping witnesses off the public
docket altogether - so as to deny the basic fact of their
incarceration. For example, Brandon Mayfield�s family members and
lawyers were gagged, and Dr. Al-Hazmi�s court proceedings were not
publicly docketed.
Grand jury rules required such secrecy, the Justice Department
maintained, but those rules only prohibit revealing what happens
inside a grand jury room. Prior to September 11, the Justice
Department did not insist on secrecy; detention hearings for material
witnesses in grand jury proceedings were public. Had the proceedings
been open, the government�s mistakes would have come to light far more
quickly and the witnesses released much sooner.
While material witnesses (unlike immigration detainees) have a right
to court-appointed counsel if they cannot afford an attorney, the
Justice Department prevented attorneys for the material witnesses from
being able to adequately protect their clients� interests. It often
refused to give the witnesses or their attorneys a copy of the
affidavit supporting the arrest, or put constraints on their ability
to review this crucial document. Some were even restricted from
revealing the contents of the affidavits to their clients � which made
preparing an effective response next to impossible.
Attorneys were not able to protect their clients in other ways, as
well, most notably while they were interrogated. While calling them
witnesses, the government clearly viewed most of these individuals as
suspects. Nevertheless, federal agents often refused to tell them of
their right to remain silent or to have an attorney present at their
custodial interrogations; interviewed witnesses without counsel; and
failed to honor witnesses� requests for an attorney or stop
interrogations when witnesses did ask for counsel. In many of the
cases where witnesses later faced criminal charges, the Justice
Department based the charges on statements the witnesses � including
unsworn statements made with no attorney present � made during such
interrogations.
After weeks and months of detention without charge had passed � in
some cases without the so-called �witness� ever being brought before a
grand jury � some courts� patience was exhausted. The result varied:
*
Many were released, and in more than a dozen cases, the Justice
Department apologized for arresting them in the first place;
*
Some were charged with criminal offenses unrelated to terrorism
(including, in some cases, the offense of allegedly lying to the grand
jury or even making false, unsworn statements during interrogations);
*
Some non-citizens left the country, either voluntarily or after
being ordered deported for immigration violations unrelated to terrorism;
*
Two (including one American citizen) were designated �enemy
combatants� and held in military brigs without charges, trial or
access to counsel;
*
A small minority were charged with terrorism crimes and were
convicted, pled guilty, or continue to await trial.
Apologies are poor compensation for loss of liberty. Material
witnesses were often arrested in highly public settings, with little
chance to clear their name because all substantive proceedings were
closed. All the information the public learned of these arrests was
what the government chose to leak. Even after their release, some
continued to face lasting repercussions to their reputations,
businesses, families and community lives.
Because of the serious abuses that have resulted from the material
witness law, Congress must take action that will ensure that the
investigation and arrest of persons suspected of having material
information to an investigation are conducted with regard for the
rights of all persons in the United States.
We specifically urge Congress to:
*
Request an investigation by the Inspector General on the
Department of Justice�s use of the material witness law since
September 11.
*
Renew its request to the Justice Department to inform Congress
of the names, basis, and detention details of material witnesses since
September 11.
We also urge Congress to amend the material witness law to:
*
Heighten the standard for arresting and detaining a material
witness. More than half of the state material witness laws have
greater protections for witnesses, permitting such detention only if a
witness has refused to guarantee that he or she will appear to testify
at a scheduled proceeding.
*
Limit the government�s ability to hold a witness for a grand
jury proceeding or trial to a specific, short period of time, such as
five days, that would allow testimony to be taken but would not allow
the statute to be abused for other purposes.
Congress should explicitly recognize rights for material witnesses,
including: requiring the government to inform witnesses of the basis
of their detention upon the arrest and providing a copy of the
warrant; informing witnesses of their immediate right to a lawyer upon
arrest; providing Miranda-type rights before any interrogation and
comply with witnesses� requests for lawyers.
In addition, Congress should also require that material witnesses be
detained in a separate detention center than criminal suspects and
defendants and prohibit detention of witnesses in conditions of high
security unless their specific and personal behavior in detention
warrants it.
Expanding Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction
Section 804 of the Patriot Act expands the �special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States� to include a criminal
offense by or against a United States national committed on the
premises of any diplomatic, consular, military or other United States
government mission or entity, or on a residence used for those
purposes or used by personnel assigned to those missions or entities.
Section 804 could be used as a basis for prosecuting terrorism crimes
committed abroad, but is not limited to terrorism crimes.
Section 804 is part of a trend in increased extraterritorial
application of American law. The federal criminal code now permits
United States courts to try criminal defendants for a wide variety of
crimes, including terrorism, war crimes, and other offenses, that are
committed overseas and over which the federal courts traditionally
have not had jurisdiction.
The ACLU does not object to the exercise of extraterritorial
jurisdiction in cases of terrorism, war crimes, crimes against
humanity or other grave offenses where there is a legitimate nexus to
the United States, as is required by section 804. Indeed, the wide
array of extraterritorial offenses calls into serious doubt any claim
by the Bush administration that United States district courts are not
the appropriate forum for terrorism trials.
For example, the 1998 trial of Al Qaeda terrorists implicated in the
bombings of United States embassies in Africa resulted in convictions
even though the crimes occurred overseas, much of the evidence had
been obtained overseas in areas plagued by civil conflict, and much of
the evidence involved classified information requiring the use of the
special procedures of the Classified Information Procedures Act.
While the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction could be stretched
too far, the United States district courts are clearly the right forum
for the trial of terrorism suspects. The ACLU supports efforts by
Congress and the Justice Department to bring terrorists to justice in
the time-honored American way � through a criminal compliant alleging
terrorism crimes in a federal district court bound by all the
principles of the Bill of Rights.
The availability of extraterritorial jurisdiction for a wide array of
serious crimes, and the successful use of the criminal courts to try
and convict terrorism suspects in such cases, shows there is no
reasonable excuse for the government�s failure to provide justice in
the case of so many it is now holding as �enemy combatants� without
trial. It also calls into serious doubt the need for inadequate and
second-class substitutes for a full and fair trial, such as the
�military commissions� the Department of Defense has established.
Conclusion
This committee�s review of the Patriot Act and related legal measures
in the ongoing effort to combat terrorism is needed to ensure
continued public support for the government�s efforts to safeguard
national security. The controversy over the Patriot Act reflects the
concerns of millions of Americans for preserving our fundamental
freedoms while safeguarding national security.
Resolutions affirming civil liberties have been passed in 383
communities in 43 states including seven state-wide resolutions. These
communities represent approximately 61 million people. While these
resolutions are often called anti-Patriot Act resolutions, they also
take aim at other serious abuses of civil liberties, including the
detention without charge of many Americans through a variety of
pretexts such as the material witness laws.
A nationwide coalition under the banner �Patriots to Restore Checks
and Balances� has formed under the leadership of former Congressman
Bob Barr (R-GA), and includes groups as diverse as the ACLU, the
American Conservative Union, the Free Congress Foundation, and Gun
Owners of America.
Such widespread concern, across ideological lines, reflects the strong
belief of Americans that security and liberty need not be competing
values. As Congress considers renewal of the Patriot Act, we strongly
urge this subcommittee to look beyond the expiring provisions to
review other legal issues, both inside and out of the Patriot Act. Now
is the time for Congress to restore basic checks and balances to
Executive Branch powers.
Footnotes
[1] Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272.
[2] 18 U.S.C. � 3144. The material witness law provides in full:
Release or detention of a material witness. -- If it appears from an
affidavit filed by a party that the testimony of a person is material
in a criminal proceeding, and if it is shown that it may become
impracticable to secure the presence of the person by subpoena, a
judicial officer may order the arrest of the person and treat the
person in accordance with the provisions of section 3142 of this
title. No material witness may be detained because of inability to
comply with any condition of release if the testimony of such witness
can adequately be secured by deposition, and if further detention is
not necessary to prevent a failure of justice. Release of a material
witness may be delayed for a reasonable period of time until the
deposition of the witness can be taken pursuant to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. [3] Please see attachment A illustrating
precisely what the court in Doe v. Ashcroft struck down.
[4] While the use of national security letters are secret, the press
has reported a dramatic increase in the number of letters issued, and
in the scope of such requests. For example, over the 2003-04 holiday
period, the FBI reportedly obtained the names of over 300,000
travelers to Las Vegas, despite casinos� deep reluctance to share such
confidential customer information with the government. It is not clear
whether the records were obtained in part with a national security
letter, with the threat of such a letter, or whether the information
was instead turned over voluntarily or to comply with a subpoena.
[5] United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297,
313-14 (1972).
[6] Please see attachment B, a blacked-out list of NSL requests
provided to the ACLU in response to a request under FOIA. Even the
total number of NSLs issued is redacted.
[7] American Civil Liberties Union, America�s Disappeared: Seeking
International Justice for Immigrants Detained after September 11
(January 2004); Human Rights Watch, Presumption of Guilt: Human Rights
Abuses of Post-September11 Detainees (August 2002); U.S. Department of
Justice, Office of the Inspector General (OIG), The September 11
Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration
Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11
Attacks (April 2003).
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