Fukuyama's fabrication

By Charles Krauthammer
Mar 28, 2006
WASHINGTON -- It was, as the hero tells it, his Road to Damascus moment.
There he is, in a hall of 1,500 people he has long considered to be his
allies, hearing the speaker treat the Iraq War, nearing the end of its first
year, as "a virtually unqualified success." He gasps as the audience
enthusiastically applauds. Aghast to discover himself in a sea of comrades
so deluded by ideology as to have lost touch with reality, he decides he can
no longer be one of them. 
And thus did Francis Fukuyama become the world's most celebrated
ex-neoconservative, a well-timed metamorphosis that has brought him a piece
of the fame that he once enjoyed 15 years ago as the man who declared, a
mite prematurely, that history had ended.
A very nice story. It appears in the preface to Fukuyama's post-neocon
coming out, "
<http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0300113994/ref=nosim/townhallcom>
America at the Crossroads.'' Last Sunday it was repeated on the front page
of The New York Times Book Review in Paul Berman's review.
I happen to know something about this story, as I was the speaker whose 2004
Irving Kristol lecture to the American Enterprise Institute Fukuyama has now
brought to prominence. I can therefore testify that Fukuyama's claim that I
attributed "virtually unqualified success'' to the war is a fabrication. 
A convenient fabrication -- it gives him a foil and the story drama -- but a
foolish one because it can be checked. The speech was given at the
Washington Hilton before a full house, carried live on C-SPAN and then
published by the American Enterprise Institute under its title "Democratic
Realism: An American Foreign Policy for a Unipolar World.'' (It can be read
<http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.19912,filter.all/pub_detail.asp>
here.)
As indicated by the title, the speech was not about Iraq. It was a fairly
theoretical critique of the four schools of American foreign policy:
isolationism, liberal internationalism, realism and neoconservatism. The
only successes I attributed to the Iraq War were two, and both self-evident:
(1) that it had deposed Saddam Hussein and (2) that this had made other
dictators think twice about the price of acquiring nuclear weapons, as
evidenced by the fact that Gaddafi had turned over his secret nuclear
program for dismantlement just months after Saddam's fall (in fact, on the
very week of Saddam's capture).
In that entire 6,000-word lecture, I said not a single word about the course
or conduct of the Iraq War. My only reference to the outcome of the war came
toward the end of the lecture. Far from calling it an unqualified success,
virtual or otherwise, I said quite bluntly that "it may be a bridge too far.
Realists have been warning against the hubris of thinking we can transform
an alien culture because of some postulated natural and universal human will
to freedom. And they may yet be right.''
We do not yet know. History will judge whether we can succeed in
"establishing civilized, decent, nonbelligerent, pro-Western polities in
Afghanistan and Iraq.'' My point then, as now, has never been that success
was either inevitable or at hand, only that success was critically important
to "change the strategic balance in the fight against Arab-Islamic
radicalism.'' 
I made the point of repeating the problematic nature of the enterprise: "the
undertaking is enormous, ambitious and arrogant. It may yet fail.''
For Fukuyama to assert that I characterized it as "a virtually unqualified
success'' is simply breathtaking. My argument then, as now, was the
necessity of this undertaking, never its assured success. And it was
necessary because, as I said, there is not a single, remotely plausible,
alternative strategy for attacking the root causes of 9/11: "the cauldron of
political oppression, religious intolerance, and social ruin in the
Arab-Islamic world -- oppression transmuted and deflected by regimes with no
legitimacy into virulent, murderous anti-Americanism.''
Fukuyama's book is proof of this proposition about the lack of the plausible
alternative. The alternative he proposes for the challenges of 9/11 -- new
international institutions, new forms of foreign aid and sundry other forms
of "soft power'' -- is a mush of bureaucratic make-work in the face of a
raging fire. Even Berman, his sympathetic reviewer, concludes that "neither
his old arguments nor his new ones offer much insight into this, the most
important problem of all -- the problem of murderous ideologies and how to
combat them.''
Fukuyama now says that he had secretly opposed the Iraq War before it was
launched. An unusual and convenient reticence, notes Irwin Stelzer, editor
of "The Neocon Reader,'' for such an inveterate pamphleteer, letter writer
and essayist. After public opinion had turned against the war, Fukuyama then
courageously came out against it. He has every right to change his mind at
his convenience. He has no right to change what I said.
Charles Krauthammer is a 1987 Pulitzer Prize winner, 1984 National Magazine
Award winner, and a columnist for The Washington Post since 1985.
Copyright C 2006 Townhall.com 
  _____  

Find this story at:
http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/charleskrauthammer/2006/03/28/191505
.html
 
 
 
Accessed 29 Mar 2006,
http://www.townhall.com/opinion/columns/charleskrauthammer/2006/03/28/191505
.html
 
 


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