http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=12358
 
A Real Intelligence Estimate, By Numbers: Terrorism and Conflict Not Up
Worldwide
With most of the “opposition” still in the throes of post-NIE euphoria, few
have bothered to give a politically uncompromised analysis of the report’s
unsupportable and dissonant claims on a global, empowered jihad. Indeed,
Democrats and proxy pundits have found the rather obvious conclusions of the
National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq to be so politically convenient that
they have utterly forfeited the opportunity to question its remaining flaws,
which are of far-reaching consequence to the country.

To put it simply, the numbers do not back up the report’s assertions on
jihad. A rigorous, empirical analysis proves that both terrorist attacks
(excluding Iraq) and casualties from armed conflict—all part of the public
record—have not significantly increased in recent years. If, for example,
the number of terrorist incidents, injuries, and fatalities from the Iraq
War are deducted from worldwide totals, domestic terrorist incidents have
been only marginally higher than they were during the three years prior to
September 11, 2001.

Even without conducting a rigorous scrutiny of publicly available data as
described and plotted on graphs below, there are some assertions in the
report that any person with an ounce of commonsense would question. The NIE
maintains, for example, that America’s combined intelligence assets cannot
measure the extent to which “self-identified” jihadists have increased or
spread geographically, but it categorically affirms that such increases and
expansion has occurred. The secrecy associated with such assessments must be
justified on the grounds that we do not want our enemies to know how poorly
informed we remain. (See supporting graphs provided in appendix.)

Terrorist attacks not up worldwide—just in Iraq

According to calculations derived from the “Terrorism Knowledge Base”
(www.tkb.org/AnalyticalTools.jsp), the actual number of international
terrorist incidents worldwide between 1970 and 2005 ranged from a high of
452 during 1985 to a low of 104 during 2000, while only 112 incidents have
been recorded during the first nine months of 2006. The total number of
injuries and deaths resulting from international terrorist incidents between
1996 and 2005 ranged from highs of 5,350 during 1998 and 3,188 during 2001
and lows of 85 and 43 during 2000.

“Domestic” terrorist incidents worldwide remained essentially flat at plus
or minus 1,300 a year from 1998 through 2001, rose to 2,362 during 2002, and
dropped again to 1,625 during 2003. But in 2004 the number of incidents
increased again to almost 2002 levels and then more than doubled during
2005—a doubling accounted for almost entirely by Iraq.

Almost half of all domestic terrorist incidents worldwide during 2005
occurred in Iraq. Further, that country alone accounted for 49 percent of
injuries and a full 60 percent of fatalities worldwide from January 2003
through December 2005. And that trend appears to be worsening—Iraq accounts
for 63 percent of terrorist incidents worldwide recorded through September
27, 2006, as well as 73 percent and 78 percent of injuries and fatalities.
Similar data no doubt contributed to the NIE’s conclusion that Al-Qaeda “is
exploiting the situation in Iraq to attract new recruits and donors and to
maintain its leadership role….[while] other affiliated Sunni extremist
organizations…are likely to expand their reach and become more capable of
multiple and/or mass-casualty attacks outside their traditional areas of
operation.”

The NIE is also, no doubt, correct that “fighters with experience in Iraq
are a potential source of leadership for jihadists … [that deploy]
“improvised explosive devices and suicide attacks.” But the report’s
conclusion that those groups will work together to target the United
States—to the exclusion of more local goals—appears to be no more than
unsubstantiated conjecture.

The world is not more dangerous

Despite the headlines and eruptions of violence in Lebanon, Darfur, and the
subways in London and Madrid, the world as a whole is becoming safer.
According to a database on “Major Episodes of Political Violence 1946-2005”
(members.aol.com/cspmgm/warlist.htm), the number of “major armed conflicts”
has been declining steadily since the peak year of 1991—to essentially the
same level as during the height of the Cold War.  And that decline does not
have anything to do with anti-terror measures undertaken by the United
States either before or after 9/11. It is true that life remains dangerous
in several countries in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. However, even
within most of those countries, threats to life and limb are localized,
sporadic, and arise from long-standing domestic civil and ethnic conflicts.
Thus, a full 83 percent of major armed conflicts between 1946 and 2005 were
intra-state rather than inter-state.

Muslims not the primary threat

However the data is sliced, diced, and recombined, the fact remains that
sovereign-states with majority Muslim populations—or organized non-state
groups with majority Muslim members—have been involved in less than half of
major armed conflicts worldwide between 1946 and 2005. And although the
percentage of all conflicts involving Muslims has increased since 2003, the
actual number has remained essentially constant during the last ten years.
Most importantly, there were only two major inter-state armed
conflicts—Afghanistan and Iraq—during 2004 and 2005. Although both involved
the United States and Muslim majority states, that compares with twenty-five
other major civil or ethnic armed conflicts within states—only thirteen of
which involved Muslims.

Islamic jihadists not a single worldwide movement

The preponderance of “domestic” over “international” armed conflicts and
terrorist incidents involving Muslims and non-Muslims alike suggests the
greatest threat to global security is driven by conflicting sectarian
interests among Muslims, rather than beliefs and objectives rooted in Islam.
Almost half of total “armed conflict years” involving Muslim-majority states
or groups between 1946 and 2005 were between Muslims themselves. Although
Hamas, Hizballah, and Al-Qaeda share the ignominious distinction of being
terrorist groups, they are not natural allies. Indeed, both Hamas and
Hizballah have criticized Al-Qaeda’s internationalist pretensions—Hamas
declaring that its ideology “is totally different from the ideology of Sheik
bin Laden." Most conflicts among Muslim groups do not differ fundamentally
from insurgencies, separatist movements, and civil wars conducted by
non-Muslim nationalists in such diverse countries as Angola, Burma, Peru, or
Sri Lanka.

The NIE correctly implies that differences between Muslim fundamentalists,
moderates, and political secularists will be played out within the borders
of Muslim-majority states. It also acknowledges that the jihadist threat is
“decentralized,” “lacks a coherent global strategy,” and is “diffuse.” Yet
it does not follow that logic to its most reasonable conclusion: terrorist
groups with Muslim members are not all part of a common “jihadist
movement”—except, perhaps, in ways that do not matter much. 
Democracy not likely to reduce terrorist incidents, casualties

The NIE assertion that “greater pluralism and more responsive political
systems in Muslim majority nations would alleviate some of the grievances
jihadists exploit” is the most platitudinous part of the declassified
portion. It is as if the negative American responses to the recent elections
of Hamas in West Bank/Gaza and Evo Morales in Bolivia, as well as electoral
advances of Hizballah in Lebanon and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, had
not occurred just months prior to the completion of the NIE itself. But more
importantly, it ignores the unfortunate fact that the Sarin Gas attack in
the Tokyo subway (1995) and the bombings in Kansas City (1995) and the
London subway system (2005) were all perpetrated by citizens of and within
democratic countries. Nor have jihadist appeals subsided in Gaza or Lebanon,
despite the demonstrated ability of Hamas and Hizballah to succeed through
the democratic process. And the fact that Thailand was a constitutional
democracy—at least until a few weeks ago—did not save it from ranking third
after only Iraq and West Bank/Gaza with respect to the number of terrorist
incidents during 2005.

Facing Reality

The authors of the NIE appear to have succumbed to the anti-jihad hysteria
that is substantially distorting assessments of the real security threats
facing the United States. Washington must recognize that conflicts involving
Muslims and non-Muslims alike are more conventionally “realistic” than
ideological. Distinctions should be made between aggressive internationalist
jihadists (Al-Qaeda and affiliates); nationalist jihadists (Hizballah); and
non-jihadist nationalists that happen to be Muslims (Malays in southern
Thailand). The nationalists present the greater threat to peace and security
for most people worldwide. Any movement that has only an abstract philosophy
in common, but lacks integrated planning and execution, is of little
consequence for our own counter-programming; the focus must be on
differentiated understanding of such diffuse threats.

And many Muslim nationalists will ultimately find that they need the support
or intermediation of the United States vis-à-vis other Muslim nationalists
or internationalists. But for that to occur, American decision-makers and
the intelligence analysts that support them will need to alter their current
assumptions about the sources and nature of the threats we face. We wrongly
accepted Chinese Defense Minister Lin Biao’s 1965 prediction that defeat of
U.S. forces in Vietnam would mean the triumph of “peoples’ war” throughout
Asia. We are likely to be equally misled if we allow Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri to determine our own view of what kind and how strong a
strategic—rather than tactical—threat they actually represent. 


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