http://ussneverdock.blogspot.com/2006/12/saddams-iraq-and-islamic-terror\
ism.html
<http://ussneverdock.blogspot.com/2006/12/saddams-iraq-and-islamic-terro\
rism.html>


Monday, December 04, 2006

"Saddam's Iraq and Islamic Terrorism: What We Now Know"
Stephen Hays reports.
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1747697/posts>

http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1747697/posts
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1747697/posts>



"Saddam's Iraq and Islamic Terrorism: What We Now Know" 
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1747697/posts>
Imprimis/Hillsdale College ^
<http://www.freerepublic.com/%5ehttp:/hillsdale.edu/imprimis/>  |
December 2006 | Stephen F. Hayes

Posted on 12/02/2006 8:24:26 PM PST by Nasty McPhilthy
<http://www.freerepublic.com/%7Enastymcphilthy/>

I woke up early on the morning of October 26, 2003. I was in Baghdad,
staying at the famous al Rashid Hotel. From that hotel, CNN broadcast
images of the first Gulf War to the entire world. In January 1993, as
George H.W. Bush prepared to leave office and Bill Clinton prepared to
assume the presidency, an American-made missile (TK) crashed into the
lobby of the al Rashid, destroying the piano in the Western-style
lounge.

On this day, I prepared for another long day hopping from helicopter to
helicopter following Paul Wolfowitz around. Wolfowitz, regarded by many
as the intellectual architect of the war, was in Iraq for the second
time since the beginning of the war. I had also been with him on his
first trip in July, when Iraq was still relatively calm, and attacks
against coalition troops were sporadic and usually unsuccessful. We had
even walked through downtown Mosul, in northern Iraq, without our
bulletproof vests and helmets.

It was a false sense of stability. Things had gotten worse in the three
months between that trip and this one. The night before we arrived at
the al Rashid, a Black Hawk helicopter had been shot out of the sky by
insurgent rockets. I spoke with my wife from Tikrit, Saddam Hussein's
hometown, and she was nervous. Her colleagues at CNN had heard rumors of
threats against the al Rashid and she knew we were headed to Baghdad.
"You're not staying at the al Rashid, are you?" I told her we
were. There's nothing to worry about, I said. I'm traveling with the No.
2 official from the Defense Department. If ever a location would be
under the tightest of security, it would be the al Rashid.

At 5:59 a.m., we got our wake-up call. My roommate, James Kitfield from
the National Journal, volunteered to take the first shower. I had been
out later than he had the night before, sipping a few Heineken tallboys
at the al Rashid bar with other reporters, officials from the Coalition
Provisional Authority, and Iraqis such as Kanan Makiya, who had returned
to their country with the hope of making it hospitable to democracy.

As Kitfield headed to the shower, I found that I couldn't sleep. I stood
at the picture window of our room on the 11th floor. In the distance on
my left, I could see Saddam Hussein's old parade grounds. I had long
been fascinated by the monuments that mark the beginning and end of the
parade route—identical sets of arms holding two swords that cross
over the street. The blades form arches, maybe ten stories high. The
street below those swords is paved with the helmets of dead Iranian
soldiers—casualties of the Iran-Iraq War that consumed much of the
1980s. The burly arms that hold the swords were said to be exact
replicas of Saddam Hussein's—down to the hair follicles.

I surveyed this hideous manifestation of Saddam's megalomania and began
to devise a plan. We were not scheduled to visit the parade
grounds—an oversight, in my view. So I thought about the best way to
convince Wolfowitz and his aides that a short side-trip would be worth
the time.

As I looked out over downtown Baghdad, I noticed a bright blue box
sitting under some trees just beyond the wall that separates the al
Rashid Hotel grounds, along with the secure Green Zone, from the rest of
Baghdad. That it was out of place—a small patch of color in a
landscape that was otherwise desert brown to the horizon—seemed
curious but not threatening.

A moment later, I watched as the first rocket left the blue trailer and
whizzed over the wall toward the hotel. Then came another, and another,
and another, and another, and another—flares of orange on a
straight-line trajectory into the lower floors of the hotel. I suppose I
expected them to stop, figuring whoever was shooting would have to pause
and reload. So for probably 15 or 20 seconds, I stood at the window and
watched. I looked in vain for the people firing at us. And the rockets
just kept coming.

It finally occurred to me that standing in front of a window was not a
good place to be, so I turned and ran out of the room. In the time it
took for me to get from the window to the door—maybe two
seconds—one of the rockets hit our floor. The hallway was filled
with smoke, so, taking my cues from two soldiers crawling on their knees
and elbows, I dropped to the floor. The door to my room shut behind me.
Remembering that Kitfield was still in the shower, I pounded on the door
to get his attention, but he was already on his way out, wearing only a
towel. He joined me in the hallway, and we waited until the concussive
blasts had ended.

The hallway had already begun flooding. Six rooms down from ours, an
internal wall had been blown into the hall by the rocket. The smoke
seemed to be getting thicker, and there were shouted warnings of a
"big fire," though I never saw one. I stopped in the room next
door to ours, where NBC News cameraman Jim Long and veteran Pentagon
correspondent Jim Miklaszewski were standing in front of the window.
Long was shooting video of the smoke near the blue trailer.

I walked down the hall to survey the damage. It was restricted to one
room, but extensive. Water on the 11th floor was more than ankle-deep.
The man staying in the room that was hit, Lt. Col. Charles Buehring, was
a top adviser to L. Paul Bremer, the civilian administrator of Iraq.
Buehring did not survive his injuries. As I walked down the 11 flights
of stairs to the lobby, I noticed a small drop of blood near the
fourth-floor landing. By the time I reached the ground floor, the white
tiles were mostly covered with red footprints—some showing the
treads of shoes, others the imprints of bare feet. In all, 16 al Rashid
guests were injured.

The preliminary investigation would reveal that the attack could have
been far worse. The blue trailer held 40 anti-tank rockets—20
Russian and 20 French. Just 29 of the 40 rockets fired. Seventeen of
those 29 hit the building. And only six of the 17 rockets that hit the
building exploded. So six out of 40 did what they were supposed to do.

The subsequent investigation at first focused on a senior Iraqi regime
official and his contact at the hotel, the head of catering at the al
Rashid, who, it turns out, had long been an informant for Iraqi
intelligence. But then came a surprise: Everywhere investigators looked,
they turned up evidence that pointed to a collaborative effort between
Saddam loyalists and Islamic fundamentalists affiliated with al Qaeda.
It was the kind of cooperation—between secularists and Islamic
radicals—that the U.S. intelligence community had long assured us
would never happen. And yet it did. Again and again and again. And it is
still happening throughout Iraq today.

I did not come here today to defend the Iraq War, although I am
certainly willing to do that. I know people of goodwill disagree about
the necessity and conduct of that war—and President Bush was
reminded of that fact on November 7. Rather, I'd like to look at a
fundamental misconception about that war—particularly among
elites—and consider what it says about our conduct of the Global War
on Terror and our prospects for winning.

For five years, beginning just days after the attacks on September 11,
one question has dominated the national debate: Is Iraq part of the War
on Terror or a distraction from it? This was debated prior to the 2002
elections, when Congress voted by heavy margins to authorize war. It was
a central issue in the 2004 presidential campaign. And, in a sense, it
was one of the primary issues in the recent congressional elections. And
yet, as much as this is the fulcrum of the national debate on U.S.
foreign and defense policy over the last half decade, few people have
addressed it seriously.

War opponents have taken to making claims that are demonstrably false.
Representative Jack Murtha, a longtime hawk and leading critic of the
Iraq War, appeared on Meet the Press last spring. He told Tim Russert:
"There was no terrorism in Iraq before we went there. None. There
was no connection with al Qaeda. There was no connection with terrorism
in Iraq itself." Before that, a Kerry campaign spokesman told us,
"Iraq and terrorism had nothing to do with one another. Zero."
Network television anchors tell us the same thing. A high-profile
Washington Post columnist described Iraq's connections to terrorism as
"fictive." And on it goes.

The Bush Administration has neglected to respond to those challenges.
What is the truth about Iraq and terrorism? Why doesn't the public hear
about it? And why does it matter?

Failed Intelligence In the months and years before the Iraq invasion,
the U.S. intelligence community—with a few notable
exceptions—believed that secularist Iraqis would never work with
radicals like Osama bin Laden and that fundamentalists would never
cooperate with an infidel like Saddam Hussein.

On what did they base these opinions? Not much.

Before 9/11, the U.S. intelligence community never penetrated the senior
leadership of either Iraq or al Qaeda—two of America's most
dangerous and determined enemies. Think about that. Bob Woodward
interviewed the head of the Iraq operations group at the CIA, who told
him that CIA reporting sources inside Iraq before the war were thin. How
thin? "I can count them on one hand," he said, "and still
pick my nose."

In July 2004, a report from the Senate Intelligence Committee concluded:
"The Central Intelligence Agency did not have a focused human
intelligence collection strategy targeting Iraq's links to terrorism
until 2002. The CIA had no [redacted] sources on the ground in Iraq
reporting specifically on terrorism." And that same report quoted an
unnamed Intelligence Community official who made this breathtaking
admission: "I don't think we were really focused on the
[counterterrorism] side, because we weren't concerned about the [Iraqi
Intelligence Service] going out and proactively conducting terrorist
attacks. It wasn't until we realized that there was the possibility of
going to war that we had to get a handle on that."

Again, think about that. Saddam Hussein claimed that the Mother of All
Battles, as he called the Gulf War, never ended. His government harbored
several of the world's most notorious terrorists—Abu Abbas and Abu
Nidal among them. Within days of the 1993 attack on the World Trade
Center, his government facilitated the escape from U.S. authorities of
the Iraqi who mixed the chemicals for that bombing. Less than two months
later, his intelligence service botched an attempt to assassinate George
H.W. Bush on a visit to Kuwait. By the late 1990s, he was supplying
chemical weapons expertise to terrorist-friendly Islamic fundamentalists
in Sudan. He wired $150,000 to his intelligence chief in Prague to blow
up the U.S. government's headquarters of Radio Free Europe. An Iraqi
government-run newspaper called Osama bin Laden an "Arab and Islamic
hero" and there were several credible reports—including some
from open sources—that Saddam Hussein offered bin Laden safe haven
in 1998.

All of this, and yet the U.S. intelligence community wasn't "really
focused on the [counterterrorism] side" of the threat from Iraq. I'd
submit to you that that was an oversight.

Let's spend a moment on two of those matters:

On October  2, 2002, a young Filipino man rode his Honda motorcycle up a
dusty road to a shanty strip mall just outside Camp Enrile Malagutay in
Zamboanga City, Philippines. The camp was host to American troops
stationed in the south of the country to train with Filipino soldiers
fighting terrorists. The man parked his bike and began to examine its
gas tank. Seconds later, the tank exploded, sending nails in all
directions and killing the rider almost instantly.

The blast damaged six nearby stores and ripped the front off of a
caf� that doubled as a karaoke bar. The caf� was popular with
American soldiers. And on this day, SFC Mark Wayne Jackson was killed
there and a fellow soldier was severely wounded. Eyewitnesses
immediately identified the bomber as a known Abu Sayyaf terrorist.

One week before the attack, Abu Sayyaf leaders had promised a campaign
of terror directed at the "enemies of Islam"—Westerners and the
non-Muslim Filipino majority. And one week after the attack, Abu Sayyaf
attempted to strike again, this time with a bomb placed on the
playground of the San Roque Elementary School. It did not detonate.
Authorities recovered the cell phone that was to have set it off and
analyzed incoming and outgoing calls.

As they might have expected, they discovered several calls to and from
Abu Sayyaf leaders. But another call got their attention. Seventeen
hours after the attack that took the life of SFC Jackson, the cell phone
was used to place a call to a top official in the Iraqi embassy in
Manila, Hisham Hussein. It was not Hussein's only contact with Abu
Sayyaf.

One Philippine government source told me: "He was surveilled, and we
found out he was in contact with Abu Sayyaf and also pro-Iraqi
demonstrators. [Philippine Intelligence] was able to monitor their cell
phone calls. [Abu Sayyaf leaders] called him right after the bombing.
They were always talking."

A subsequent analysis of Iraqi embassy phone records by Philippine
authorities showed that Hussein had been in regular contact with Abu
Sayyaf leaders both before and after the attack that killed SFC Jackson.
Andrea Domingo, immigration commissioner for the Philippines, said
Hussein ran an "established network" of terrorists in the
country. Hisham Hussein and two other Iraqi embassy employees were
ordered out of the Philippines on February  14, 2003.

Interestingly, if the Iraqi regime had wanted to keep its support for
Abu Sayyaf secret, the al Qaeda-linked group did not. Twice in two
years, Abu Sayyaf leaders boasted about receiving funding from
Iraq—the second time just two weeks after Hisham Hussein was
expelled. The U.S. intelligence community discounted the claims.

Then there is the case of Abdul Rahman Yasin, an Iraqi who had come to
the United States six months before the bombing of the World Trade
Center in 1993. In the days after the attack, Yasin was detained twice
by the FBI. Although he offered investigators details of the plot, he
was released on the assumption that he would be a cooperative witness.
Released. Twice. The second time the FBI even drove him home. According
to the bipartisan Senate Intelligence Committee report, Yasin promptly
"fled to Iraq with Iraqi assistance." His travel was arranged by
the second secretary of the Iraqi embassy in Amman, Jordan. In 1994, a
reporter for ABC News went to the home of Yasin's father in Baghdad and
spoke with neighbors who reported that Yasin was free to come and go as
he pleased and was "working for the government." So an Iraqi
participant in an al Qaeda attack on the U.S. mainland fled to
Iraq—with Iraqi government assistance—after those attacks.

These are just two examples among hundreds of things that we knew about
Iraq and terrorism before the war. And we knew these things despite the
woeful state of our intelligence operations in Iraq. You might say these
are things we learned almost by accident.

Ignorance as Policy We now know much more about Iraq and terrorism. In
the three-and-a-half years since the war began, the U.S. government has
collected more than two million "exploitable items" from Iraq.
That's a term of art to describe documents including payroll logs, audio
and videotapes, strategy memos between senior Iraqi regime officials,
letters between government agencies and computer hard drives of top
Iraqi ministers. In these documents we have an extraordinary history of
prewar Iraq. In these documents we can get answers to the many
outstanding questions of what Saddam Hussein was doing in the years
leading up to the most recent Iraq War and, in some cases, what he was
doing once the war began. It is such a potential treasure trove that you
would think the U.S. government would have doubled or tripled its teams
of analysts and translators in order to mine this information for clues
about Saddam's weapons, his secret allies, and his relations with a wide
variety of terrorists.

But the U.S. intelligence community, now led by John Negroponte, has
steadfastly resisted serious attempts to exploit and release the
information captured in postwar Iraq. As of March, three years after the
war began, the U.S. intelligence community had fully translated and
analyzed less than five percent of the documents captured in postwar
Iraq. In some cases, they actually fought efforts to increase their
budgets—something that is unheard of in the intelligence
bureaucracies. At one point, a little more than a year into the document
exploitation project, senior intelligence officials tried to have the
project shut down altogether.

Why is this? Why would our intelligence community choose ignorance?
There are several complicated reasons. But I suspect the most important
one is simple. In those years that the U.S. intelligence community
wasn't "really focused" on Iraqi terrorism, the Iraqi regime had
been.

Consider just a couple examples of what we have learned from a review of
just the small percentage of documents that have been translated.

In 1995, a senior Iraqi intelligence official met with Osama bin Laden.
After the meeting, Saddam Hussein agreed to broadcast al Qaeda
propaganda on Iraqi government-run television and to let the
relationship develop through discussion and agreement. In 1998, a
confidante of bin Laden visited Baghdad as a guest of the Iraqi regime,
staying in the Iraqi capital for two weeks at government expense. The
document corroborated telephone intercepts the U.S. government had not
previously been able to understand. And what about the two items I
mentioned before—Iraq's support for Abu Sayyaf and its relations
with Abdul Rahman Yasin? A fax from the Iraqi Embassy in the Philippines
to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry in Baghdad, dated June 6, 2001, confirms
that the Iraqi regime had been providing arms and weapons to Abu
Sayyaf—the al Qaeda affiliate in the Philippines responsible for the
death of Mark Wayne Jackson. Iraqi financial records confirm that the
government supported, harbored and financed Abdul Rahman Yasin, the 1993
World Trade Center bomber, throughout the 1990s.

Who Cares? Skeptics ask: Isn't this just history? Why does this matter
now?

To answer that question, let us return to Baghdad. It is April 2003,
just days after U.S. Marines toppled the statue of Saddam Hussein in
Firdos Square. David Dunford, a career foreign service officer, was
working alongside other Americans and several Iraqis in the old Ministry
of Foreign Affairs building. Dunford had been recruited to come to Iraq
to help the Iraqis set up a new Ministry.

The team sifted through the detritus of the bombed-out building. Walls
were black from smoke. One office had a pile of ashes in the middle, all
that was left of the files of one senior ministry official. Elsewhere,
they found employment records, personnel documents, and other relatively
unimportant documents.

But there were important ones, too. Dunford and his Foreign Ministry
team unearthed a memo from the director of Iraqi Intelligence to other
senior Iraqi regime officials. An Iraqi translated it for them on the
spot. Dated February 2003, a month before the beginning of the war, it
read like a blueprint for the insurgency. Dunford and his colleagues
turned it over to the CIA and heard nothing about it ever again, despite
several requests for more information.

This description comes from Paul Bremer, the former head of the
Coalition Provisional Authority, who saw a copy of the document months
after it was found. "The document," Bremer said, "listed
orders for point-by-point strategy to be implemented after the probable
collapse of the regime beginning with the order of �Burn this
office.'" Bremer continued: The document called for "a strategy
of organized resistance which included the classic pattern of forming
cells and training combatants in insurgency. �Operatives' were to
engage in �sabotage and looting.' Random sniper attacks and
ambushes were to be organized. The order continued, �Scatter agents
to every town. Destroy electric power stations and water conduits.
Infiltrate the mosques, the Shiite holy places.'"

Let's remember the chronology. The document was written shortly before
the U.S. invasion of Iraq and found immediately after. It was provided
the same day to an intelligence team called the "fusion cell" in
Baghdad. Thus we had documentation in April 2003 that an insurgency had
been planned. And yet Donald Rumsfeld and others said repeatedly
throughout that spring, and the following summer and fall, that there
was no insurgency.

I called David Dunford to talk about what he found. As an aside, I
should point out that Dunford is a strong critic of the Bush
Administration and its foreign policy. He has had harsh words for the
"ideological" components of the reconstruction.

I knew about the insurgency memo from an Iraqi who worked with Dunford.
The Iraqi told me about another document found in the same batch of
files. I did not mention the second document to Dunford when we spoke. I
started the conversation by asking about the insurgency memo. Dunford
remembered finding it, but told me that he did not recall details about
it. Then, without prompting, he added this: "I do remember one
document that we found that was a list of jihadists, for want of a
better word, coming into Iraq from Saudi Arabia before the war. That
suggested to me that Saddam was planning the insurgency before the
war."

The jihadist document listed "hundreds and hundreds" of fighters
who had come from several countries in the region, including Algeria,
Egypt, Jordan, Sudan and Syria. There were other similar lists found
throughout Iraq. I spoke to one intelligence official who described
footlockers full of such documents sitting untouched at a U.S. military
base in Baghdad.

A similar set of documents was examined by the Pentagon and discussed in
a long report called the "Iraqi Perspectives Project." That
book-length treatment of the former Iraqi regime, written by military
historians led by Dr. Kevin Woods, reported that the Saddam
Fedayeen—one of several domestic Iraqi terrorist groups—began
training young recruits in 1994. That year, they turned out 7,200
would-be Iraqi terrorists.

Four years later, the program expanded: "Beginning in 1998, these
camps began hosting Arab volunteers from Egypt, Palestine, Jordan,
�the Gulf,' and Syria." It is not clear from available evidence
where all of these non-Iraqi volunteers who were "sacrificing for
the cause" went to ply their newfound skills. Before the summer of
2002, most volunteers went home upon the completion of training. But
these camps were humming with frenzied activity in the months
immediately prior to the war. As late as January 2003, the Arab
volunteers participated in a special training event called the
"Heroes Attack."'

Who are these Arab volunteers? Are they still working with former Iraqi
regime officials? How many of them are in Iraq, taking shots at our
soldiers? And why doesn't anybody care to find out?

I'd like to finish with another paragraph from the "Iraqi
Perspectives Project," this one also based on a captured Iraqi
document. I hope you'll bear with me as I quote verbatim. As I read, I'd
like you to think about the conventional wisdom, as articulated by
Representative John Murtha and others, that until the U.S. invasion,
Iraq had nothing to do with terrorism.

The Saddam Fedayeen also took part in the regime's domestic terrorism
operations and planned for attacks throughout Europe and the Middle
East. In a document dated May 1999, Saddam's older son, Uday, ordered
preparations for "special operations, assassinations, and bombings,
for the centers and traitor symbols in London, Iran and the self-ruled
areas [Kurdistan]." Preparations for "Blessed July," a
regime-directed wave of "martyrdom" operations against targets
in the West, were well under way at the time of the coalition invasion.

"Reprinted by permission from IMPRIMIS, the national speech digest
of Hillsdale College, www.hillsdale.edu."




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