http://www.isn.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?id=17329

Al-Qaida's China problem

Al-Qaida has a China problem, and no one is watching. Despite al-Qaida's
significant efforts to support Muslim insurgents in China, the Chinese
government has succeeded in limiting popular support for anti-government
violence.

Commentary by Martin I Wayne (07/03/07 PacNet #8A)

The latest evidence came on 5 January when China raided an alleged
terrorist facility in the country's Xinjiang region, near borders with
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. According to reports,
18 terrorists were killed and 17 were captured, along with 22 improvised
explosive devices (IEDs) and material for thousands more. Chinese
reportage on terrorism is notoriously problematic, at times imprecise,
or simply fabricated. For the skeptics, photos of the policeman killed
in the raid were also released, showing emotional relatives amid a sea
of People's Armed Police paying their final respects. Ironically,
China's ability to successfully kill or capture militants without social
blowback demonstrates the significant degree to which China has won the
population's "hearts and minds," however begrudgingly.

China's successful efforts to keep the global jihad from spreading into
its territory present a real challenge for al-Qaida. The organization
reportedly trained more than 1,000 Uyghurs, a Turkic ethnic group that
is predominantly Muslim, in camps in Afghanistan prior to 11 September.
In late December, al-Qaida's number two, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri, called
for action against "occupation" governments ruling over Muslims,
including reference to the plight of Uyghurs in western China. Yet
despite this commitment of resources and rhetorical energy, Uyghurs
across Xinjiang's social spectrum explain that violent resistance is no
longer a viable path. Many Uyghurs in Xinjiang believe that insurgents
worsen Uyghurs' plight by making the Chinese more fearful, thereby more
repressive. Uyghurs today increasingly participate in the Chinese system
as local government and Party officials, educators, informants, and police.

Since the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, China has been confronting the
self-described threats of "extremism, separatism and terrorism" in its
Alaska-sized Xinjiang region in the country's far northwest. Where the
region was once predominantly populated by Uyghurs, this group is now a
minority in its own "autonomous region." The perception of economic
discrimination as well as resentment at Chinese rule have helped fuel a
low level insurgency in Xinjiang for nearly two decades. Local men who
traveled to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets returned home with new
skills and attempted to ply their trade. Young Uyghurs were inspired by
the power of men, armed with Allah and AK-47s, to defeat a superpower.

Political challenges in Xinjiang took many forms: some Uyghurs worked
for greater autonomy, others for greater political freedom or democracy,
and still others sought secession from China. As in many similar
situations with Muslims fighting against local regimes, al-Qaida
reportedly attempted to lend support by training fighters and funding a
local affiliate, the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). Uyghur
groups fighting against Chinese rule assassinated local officials and
engaged in bombing campaigns that reportedly included a 1997 explosion
outside Zhongnanhai, the enclosed compound in Beijing where China's top
leaders work. This period was separatism's high-water mark. The massive
1997 Yining riot involving over 1,000 Uyghurs, in which over 150
reportedly died from security force excesses, has not been repeated.
While there has been ongoing low-level violence in Xinjiang since 11
September, Chinese government claims that this is the result of Uyghur
separatists are suspect.

China's initial actions were brutal, and credible reports of security
force excesses and torture persist. However, success came as China
reduced the brutality of its repression and pulled the military out of
direct confrontation with society. China built up more restrained,
effective and specialized police forces and tactics and reinvigorated
political and educational projects in Xinjiang. The Chinese government
purged separatist sympathizers from local governments and attempted to
remove political dissent from religious worship. At the same time,
availability of Uyghur language education was broadened and Beijing
sought to expand economic development in Xinjiang, which was viewed as
the key to success. Uyghurs in Xinjiang repeatedly explained in
interviews that these changes made participation in the Chinese state
more attractive, despite perceptions that economic opportunities
primarily benefited the Chinese.

After an initial period of repression, China has used political means to
keep the insurgency in Xinjiang to a remarkably low level. Beyond simply
killing or capturing suspected insurgents, China has created a path for
young Uyghurs - one achieved through participation in the system rather
than fighting it. China's proactive approach, reshaping society from the
bottom up, has been so successful that much of the current debate
centers on whether China really confronts a serious threat of terrorism
in Xinjiang. Zawahiri's call to arms in late December and the People's
Armed Police raid in early January highlight what some China-watchers
miss in reading the latest Chinese defense White Paper: despite China's
more confident role on the world stage, its primary concern is still
internal security. The English language China Daily argued that the
January raid in Xinjiang is a "wake-up call that the threat of terror is
not only clear and present but more dangerous than ever."

The raid in Xinjiang upon a group taking mining explosives and building
IEDs represents a threat similar to the attacks of Madrid and London:
home-grown individuals, radicalizing, building weapons with supplies
at-hand. Yet the most important fact is that China was able to stop this
group before it acted. According to government reporting, security
forces have repeatedly interdicted arms and disrupted plots in this
county, while insurgents have not recently been able to carry a single
plot to fruition. This success is partly due to China's ability to
provide an alternative path for Uyghurs which limits their willingness
to support or tolerate violence.

The contrast between China's project in Xinjiang and US' actions in Iraq
is stark: where China realized that local politics was a key factor for
strategic effectiveness, the US has focused on targeting an ever-growing
pool of insurgents and terrorists. China's ultimate success in
frustrating al-Qaida's designs on Xinjiang rests upon its recognizing
and responding to the political nature of the threat.


Dr Martin I Wayne is the China Security Fellow at the National Defense
University's Institute for National Strategic Studies. The opinions
expressed in this article are his own and do not represent the views of
National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the United
States government. In 2005, Dr. Wayne conducted extensive fieldwork in
Xinjiang; his book, "Understanding China's War on Terrorism" is forthcoming.

Republished with permission from Pacific Forum CSIS, 1001 Bishop Street,
Pauahi Tower, Suite 1150, Honolulu, HI 96813 Tel: (808) 521-6745 Fax:
(808) 599-8690, Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

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