The Arab World and South Sudan: A case of unfairness
Sunday 11 March 2007 03:23. 
By Riang Yer Zuor
http://www.sudantri <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article20700>
bune.com/spip.php?article20700

March 10, 2007 — In its issue No. 832 covering the period between 15 
and 21 February 2007, Al-Ahram Weekly magazine published a piece of 
writing authored by Abdullah Al-Ashaal, former assistant to the 
Egyptian foreign minister. The title of the article was "Splitting 
Sudan: Egypt and the Arab world have not understood the telltale 
signs that litter the road to secession for South Sudan". In his 
article, the former assistant to the Egyptian top diplomat identifies 
three things that Egypt and the Arab world have not understood 
concerning the past and the current state of affairs in what he 
identifies as the "Arab-Muslim" Sudan. Al-Ashaal's points include the 
following: partition process in the Sudan, Bashir's political defeat 
and Egypt's failure to see the signs of split. Below is the analysis.

I. PARTITION PROCESS IN THE SUDAN

According to Abdullah Al-Ashaal, the "partition process" in the 
Sudan "began with the Machakos negotiations" in 2003. This statement 
makes me wonder who Al-Ashaal's audience is, for it is either shallow 
of him or self-misleading to make such a statement. He could not have 
made a statement further away from the truth than this.

As far as I know, the current unity between the North and the South 
of the Sudan began in 1946 with the Administrative Conference for 
North Sudan. Southerners did not take part in that gathering. 
Nevertheless, they were illegally decided for and their fate was tied 
together with that of the Northerners. This decision was affirmed a 
year later at the 1947 Juba Conference in which the Southerners were 
informed of the 1946 decision. But partition process began soon after 
with the formation of the Legislative Assembly in which the South was 
politically underrepresented by only 13 out of the 65 members. That 
act of under-representation was an indication that the new unity that 
had just been entered into was not going to be viable. It should have 
been known that without rectification, partition would be inevitable. 
Instead of reversing, the sectarian parties in the North worked 
harder to maintain the status quo. The following revealed what they 
had in mind.

1. Before Independence

After the 1947 Juba Conference, but before Independence, the 
following happened:

A. In 1952, the Constitutional Amendment Commission (CAC) was 
formed. Only one person (Both Diew) was made to represent the 
interest of the South. The CAC refused to consider Both's position on 
behalf of the South on the federal arrangement between the North and 
the South. It also refused to consider the South's position on the 
formation of a special ministry for the Southern affairs; 
B. On January 10, 1953, the Egyptian-Sudanese Agreement was signed 
on the Sudanese self-government behind the back of the Southerners on 
the pretext that the South had no political party. That was not true. 
Southern Political Committee (SPC) had been in existence since 1947; 
C. On February 12, 1953, an Anglo-Egyptian Agreement was signed on 
the Sudanese self-government with only the northerners as observers; 
and 
D. In 1954, the Sudanization of the 800 civil service positions 
that had been held by expatriates gave the South only 6 junior 
positions.

2. After Independence

The January 1, 1956 independence declaration was basically a direct 
result of an agreement between the Southerners and the northerners 
that a federal arrangement in the country would be given "due 
consideration" after independence. However, things started to change 
as soon as Sudan became independent. No Northern politician had any 
willingness to act on the 1955 promise on federation. The promise 
turned out to be a deception. To make matters worse, the first 
military government of general Abboud embarked on uniting the country 
at gun point. The gunman favored a military solution to what was a 
political problem. In addition, the successive government in Khartoum 
signed and dishonored agreements on unity. Some of those agreements 
include the following: 
A. Round table conference of 1965; 
B. Addis Abeba Peace Agreement of 1972; 
C. Koka dam Declaration of 1986; 
D. DUP-SPLM Accord of 1988; and 
E. The 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement. All of the aforementioned 
events are responsible for what the former assistant to the Egyptian 
foreign minister calls the "partition process" in the Sudan. Blaming 
the 2003 Machakos negotiations is unfair, unreasonable, and 
defenseless. And this might explain why Al-Ashaal does not give his 
readers facts to justify his position.

II. BASHIR'S POLITICAL DEFEAT

Al-Ashaal raised a rather interesting issue that reaching a political 
settlement between Khartoum and the SPLM is a "political defeat" for 
al-Bashir. It is interesting because I believe it reflects a thought 
process represented by many sectarian leaders in Khartoum. To them 
South Sudan is an inferior part of the country whose people should 
remain under their feet forever, and that conceding to even some of 
their demands amounts to nothing less than a defeat. I see this 
position as the worst case of irrationality.

I consider the conflicts in the Sudan as ones fought over what is 
wrong and what is right. For more than half a century, Khartoum has 
been on the wrong side that equality in the Sudan should not be based 
on citizenship. Rather, it maintains, it should be based on such 
factors as religion and ethnicity (Islamism and Arabism). It has been 
militarily successfully defending that position. This is wrong. 
Successfully defending a wrong position is not necessarily a victory, 
for it is a pointless, irrational, and temporary.

On the other side, it is the proposition that equality of all 
Sudanese ought to be based on citizenship without consideration of 
one's religion or ethnicity. This is the position that the South has 
been representing. Conceding to it should not reasonably be seen as a 
defeat. Rather, it would be a victory because it would break down the 
barriers standing in the way of unity. I do not see why Mr. Al-Ashaal 
should see it as part of what he calls the "scheme" to split the 
Sudan.

The author of the articles also talks about the SPLM objective 
as "the liberation of Sudan, in its entirety, from the Arabs and 
Muslims, whom it would drive northwards into Egypt, thereby 
abolishing Sudan's Arab-Muslim identity and making it possible to 
bring the country into the fold of regional alliances hostile to 
Egypt and to the Arab world." This is an attempt to confuse the 
readers by mixing up truth and falsehood. This newly created Egyptian 
version of the SPLM objective can be broken up into three parts: (1) 
driving the Arabs and Muslims northwards into Egypt, (2) "abolishing 
Sudan's Arab-Muslim identity", and (3) bringing the Sudan "into the 
fold of regional alliances hostile to Egypt and to the Arab world."

As to the first component, there is no truth to it. I have read the 
SPLM manifesto and heard many SPLM leaders making political speeches. 
None of these sources ever mentions driving Arabs and Muslims of the 
Sudan to any country, let alone Egypt. The whole of that component is 
a handiwork of Mr. Al-Ashaal who may have considered himself as a 
good fabricator of things of that nature.

Yes, there is some truth to the second element, though not 
necessarily the way Mr. Al-Ashaal wants it understood. The SPLM 
believes that Sudan is as an Arab as it is an African and that it is 
as Islamic as it is non-Islamic. Simply put, the country is diverse 
religiously and ethnically. Presenting this Afro-Arab country as 
homogeneously Arab-Muslim is a very dangerous distortion of its true 
identity. Its true identity should be one that reflects its diverse 
realities.

As to the third element, the author is not clear. He is not clear as 
to the regional alliances that are hostile to Egypt. He might be 
referring to the hydro-politics of the Nile valley. But since 
explicity is lacking in this area, I would rather not speculate on it.

III. EGYPT'S FAILURE TO SEE THE SIGNS OF SPLITTING SUDAN

In his article, Mr. Al-Ashaal accuses Egypt of not discerning the 
plan to divide the Sudan. He supports his argument by identifying 
seven signs that Egypt allegedly either misses or misinterpret. The 
following are his excerpts:

First, the SPLM's involvement in Darfur and the Eastern Sudan crisis 
betrays its determination to rebel against the notion of one 
government over a united and indivisible Sudan, even though the SPLM 
attained the office of vice-president and became a partner in 
national decision-making processes. 

First of all, SPLM as a Sudanese organization and a junior partner in 
the government in Khartoum has more rights and interests than Egypt 
to see to it that a resolution is found to the conflicts in Darfur 
and Eastern Sudan. Second, the SPLM does not "rebel against the 
notion of one government over a united and indivisible Sudan…" But it 
rebels against a united Sudan that discriminates against its own 
citizens on the basis of race and religion.

Second, the SPLM has been furnishing arms, rumoured to come from 
Israel, to the rebels in Darfur and encouraging other rebel movements 
to reject the Abuja Treaty despite the many concessions offered by 
Khartoum. There is no evidence supporting this assertion. It is the 
author's attempt to bring in Israel, the most hated by the Arabs, 
just to make South Sudan look to the Arabs as a real enemy. Also 
there is no evidence that the SPLM encourages rebel movements in 
Darfur to reject the Abuja Treaty. As a matter of fact, the SPLM 
chairman has been working to harmonize the positions of the parties 
so that the peace agreement can last.

Third, the vast arsenals being accumulated in the south by groups 
falling under the SPLM umbrella are further indication of the 
movement's resolve to secede, by any means, beneath the façade of a 
local government that is being surreptitiously equipped for 
statehood. 

The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) allows the SPLA to serve as 
the South Sudan army during the interim period. In order for it to be 
an effective army, it has to be armed. So, why would the Egyptian 
expect an army not to accumulate arsenals? The point of keeping the 
SPLA armed is not to guarantee secession. Rather, it is to protect 
the agreement so that Khartoum, which is known for dishonoring 
agreements, does not unilaterally abrogate the current one.

Fourth, it is suspiciously odd that the SPLM vice- president of Sudan 
should adopt stances diametrically opposed to those of the president, 
especially as pertains to the presence of an international force in 
Darfur. Obviously, the US and Israel are using every means possible 
to weaken the position of the Sudanese government, including the 
tactic of encouraging its vice president to break ranks. 

First, the CPA provides that the President and the Vice-President 
should work together. But since the government in Khartoum came into 
being, the president has been acting unilaterally. He opposed the 
presence of the international force in Darfur without first 
consulting his partner. He also evicted Jan Prong, the UN General 
Secretary's envoy to the country, without consulting the SPLM for its 
opinion. Basically, the President's position is that of the National 
Congress Party (NCP), and not necessarily that of the government. On 
his part, the SPLM chairman has a right and an obligation to express 
his party's position on those issues. The SPLM should not be expected 
to be a partner without inputs in designing government policies. 
After all, the President has failed to protect the people of Darfur. 
In fact, he is believed to have been arming those killing and maiming 
in that region. Salva has a duty to oppose Omer because the 
international force has the capacity to stop what Omer has miserably 
failed to stop since 2003.

Fifth, the south has established full-fledged embassies in more than 
25 countries and has invited countries to establish consulates in the 
capital of the south. Although the government of Sudan approves these 
consulates, it will be only a short step to elevate them to embassies 
in the event the south declares its independence. In addition, a 
southerner heads the Sudanese embassy in Washington, in deference to 
the demands of various international powers, thereby facilitating the 
smooth coordination of the conspiracy with the US and its unsubtle 
projection as policy officially sanctioned by the Sudanese 
government. Little wonder, therefore, that when clamour erupted over 
the establishment of an SPLM mission in Washington alongside the 
already existing Sudanese embassy, the Sudanese ambassador stepped in 
to voice his approval and to deny that that mission enjoyed 
diplomatic status. His simultaneous silence on the legal status of 
similar SPLM missions in 25 other countries was very telling. 

The author uses a double standard when it comes to judging South 
Sudan. Yes, South Sudan government has established mission stations 
in a number of countries. But, these are not "full-fledged embassies" 
as he calls them. I call it a double standard because these offices 
that the author condemns are not any where near diplomatic missions 
established by the Palestinian authority. He should have started by 
condemning the Palestinian authority for establishing embassies 
throughout the world. The allegation that "a southerner heads the 
Sudanese embassy in Washington, in deference to the demands of 
various international powers, thereby facilitating the smooth 
coordination of conspiracy with the US…" is not true. Khartoum badly 
needs that portfolio to go to its internationally trusted partner. It 
is for the same reason that the ministry of foreign affairs went to a 
Southerner: Khartoum wants its tattered image repaired.

Sixth, the south's media and official rhetoric leaves no shadow of a 
doubt that they have made secession their only option. Furthermore, 
they more than hint that there is a conspiracy afoot in support of 
this objective, towards which end Darfur and the Eastern Province are 
being incited to revolt against the central government. 

What are the evidence supporting the charges that the media in the 
South "have made secession their only option"? What does Al-Ashaal 
say about the Arab media regarding their coverage of the events in 
South Sudan? Concerning the assertion that the South's media incite 
the peoples of Darfur and Eastern Sudan, there is no truth to it. The 
South is not inciting any one to revolt against any government 
whether central or peripheral. In fact, the conflicts in those 
regions precede the formation of most of the existing media in the 
South. The truth is that Darfur and Eastern Sudan are responding on 
their own to injustices done to them by Khartoum.

Seventh, despite the fact that the government of Sudan gave the 
French-owned Total petroleum company exploration and drilling rights 
in the south, the government of the south concluded an exploration 
and drilling contract for the same area with rival British firms. 
Nothing could constitute clearer proof that the south intends to 
secure control over mineral resources in the south, and, undoubtedly, 
water resources there as well. 

The South has a government of its own that controls the land. It 
follows that it controls the minerals found on and below the surface. 
Khartoum signed an agreement with the French-owned company at a time 
when it was in animosity with the SPLM. Likewise, the SPLM signed its 
agreement with the White Nile at the same time when it was at war 
with Khartoum. Now that the two parties are at peace with each other, 
al-Ashaal tells us that the difference should be resolved by 
canceling the SPLM's agreement with the White Nile so that the 
agreement signed by those in Khartoum should be maintained. Why 
should agreements signed in Khartoum supersede those signed in Juba? 
Is that the perpetuation of the old mentality that any thing 
Northerner is superior to any thing Southerner? What is is wrong with 
the South controlling its minerals and water resources?

In light of the foregoing evidence, it is difficult to imagine that 
SPLM leaders have not already commissioned feasibility studies with 
the purpose of assessing the repercussions of secession, especially 
with regard to prospective relations between an independent South 
Sudan and its neighbours. 

Again, the question should not be whether the leaders in the South 
have started forming commissions for feasibility studies to assess 
the repercussions of secession. It is a question of whether they have 
started forming those commissions for the purpose of assessing the 
repercussions of either unity or secession, whichever the outcome of 
the 2011 decision. Both choices are legally there in the documents. 
It is in the best interest of the SPLM to know beforehand what to do 
with either secession or unity after the decision is made. I would 
even find it incompetent of the SPLM leaders not to have started 
commissioning feasibility studies regarding the repercussions of 
either unity or secession after the referendum, whichever might come 
out as the result.

Conclusion

There is no drop of fairness in Mr. Al-Ashaal's analysis of the 
situation in Sudan. His main goal is to shed a false light on South 
Sudan. It is even worse that the position that he takes is not 
supported with facts. For those well-informed Arabs concerning what 
is going on in Sudan , this particular article is nothing deserving 
of a serious look. The only goal that it would achieve would be to 
incite the ignorant elements in the Arab world to act in a way that 
would help the government in Khartoum to dishonor the CPA.

There is no truth to the assertion linking the partition process in 
Sudan to the 2003 Machakos negotiations. Events causing the current 
conflicts in the country are even as old as the country itself. There 
is also no rational reason that the author should call reaching a 
peaceful settlement of one of the region's deadliest conflicts a 
political defeat.

Al-Ashaal is also wrong in blaming Egypt and the Arab world for 
having failed to understand "…the telltale signs that litter the road 
to secession for South Sudan." What could Egypt have done other than 
what it did when it attempted to derail the IGAD peace process by 
proposing an Arab version of the process that came to be known as 
the "Libyan-Egyptian Initiative". Is he suggesting that Egypt and the 
Arab world should just have gone to the battlefields in South Sudan 
to help Khartoum to destroy the SPLA militarily? Well, Egypt and 
Libya have done that one time or another by bombing the people of 
South Sudan. However, this has changed nothing in the struggle.

My advice to the Egyptians as well as other Arabs in Africa is that 
you should approach the Sudanese conflict with caution. It has a 
potential for destroying the African unity, for there are black 
Africans on one side and Arabs on the other. Blindly supporting the 
Arabs of the Sudan would only precipitate blind support for the black 
Africans by the sub-Saharan Africa.

There is no doubt that you are the same ethnicity as the Arabs of the 
Sudan. Nor is there any doubt that black Africans in the country are 
of the same ethnicity as the rest of the black Africans. However, we 
are all united geographically as Africans. It is in our best interest 
that we remain united. African unity is very important because 
without it, the world will keep not taking Africa seriously. So, I 
suggest that when we look at the Sudanese conflict, we should look at 
it with geographical integrity of Africa in mind because geography, 
not ethnicity, unites us. Therefore, let us all promote what unites 
us over what divides us.

The author is a South Sudanese. He is the author of a book titled, 
Modern Sudan: Its History and the Genesis of the Current Crises, and 
co-authored another book with Dr. Hoth Giw Chan titled, South Sudan: 
A Legitimate Struggle. He can be reached at [EMAIL PROTECTED]
<mailto:ryzuor%40yahoo.com> com



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