<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/> http://www.khouse.
org/articles/ 1997/11/print/


Lessons from the Sudetenland


by Benjamin Netanyahu 

History teaches us that man learns nothing from history. 

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel

[Editor's Note: Forty-nine years ago last month, the nation Israel was
reestablished in the Land. Thirty years ago this month, as a result of the
famed Six Day War, Israel regained Biblical Jerusalem, as well as Gaza, the
Sinai, and the Golan Heights. Although these areas were part of the original
mandated land, and are undeniably essential for Israel's defense, it has
become strangely "politically correct" to assume that peace in the Middle
East is dependent upon their yielding these lands-the so-called "West
Bank"-back to their enemies which are openly committed to their eventual
extermination.

The strategic dilemma in the Middle East is strikingly parallel to the
tragic and painful lessons of Czechoslovakia. The following is presented in
the words of Benjamin Netanyahu, Prime Minister of the State of Israel.1
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes> ]

Their Strategic Barrier 

Czechoslovakia was strategically placed in the heart of Europe, and its
conquest was central to Hitler's plans for overrunning Europe. Though small,
Czechoslovakia could field over 800,000 men (one of the strongest armies in
Europe), and it had a highly efficient arms industry. 

To complicate matters from Hitler's point of view, it possessed a formidable
physical barrier to his designs in the shape of the Sudeten mountains, which
bordered Germany and guarded the access to the Czech heartland and the
capital city ! of Pragu e only miles away. 

A system of fortifications and fortresses had been built in the mountains
over many years, making passage by force a very costly proposition, perhaps
even impossible. We now know from the Nuremberg trials and other sources
that Hitler's generals were utterly opposed to an assault on the Czech
fortifications. 

Worse from Hitler's point of view, the Western powers had promised at
Versailles to guarantee the Czech border against any aggressive attack.
France, which in 1938 could field one hundred divisions (an army 50% larger
than Germany's), had agreed in writing to come to the Czech's defense, and
Britain and Russia were committed to joining in if France did so. 

Propaganda vs. Reality 

Since an outright military victory seemed impossible, Hitler embarked on an
unprecedented campaign to politically force the Czechs to give up the land,
and with it any hope of being able to defend their capital or their country.


The inhabitants of the Sudetenland, Hitler said, were predominantly German,
and these three million Sudeten Germans deserved-what else?-the right of
self-determination and a destiny separate from the other seven million
inhabitants of Czechoslovakia; this despite the fact that the country was a
democracy and that the Sudeten Germans enjoyed economic prosperity and full
civil rights. 

To buttress his claim, Hitler organized and funded the creation of a new
Sudeten political leadership that would do his bidding, which was, in the
words of Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein, to "demand so much that we can never
be satisfied."2 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

William Shirer, who was a reporter in Europe at the time, succinctly
summarized it: 

Thus the plight of the German minority in Czechoslovakia was merely a
pretext ... for cooking up a stew in a land he coveted, undermining it,
confusing and misleading its friends and concealing his real purpose ... to
destroy the Czechoslovak state and grab its territories .... The leaders of
France and Great Britain did not grasp this. All through the spring and
summer, indeed almost to the end, Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier
Daladier apparently sincerely believed, along with most of the rest of the
world, that all Hitler wanted was justice for his kinsfolk in
Czechoslovakia.3 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

In addition, Hitler backed the establishment of a Sudeten liberation
movement called the Sudeten Free Corps, and he instigated a series of
well-planned and violent uprisings that the Czechs were compelled to quell
by force.4 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>   Hitler's
propaganda chief, Goebbels, orchestrated a fearful propaganda campaign of
fabricated "Czech terror" and oppression of the Sudeten Germans. 

The Czech refusal to allow the Sudeten territories to return to their
"rightful" German owners, Hitler prattled, was proof that the Czechs were
the intransigent obstacle to peace. For what choice would Germany have but
to come to the assistance of its oppressed brethren living under intolerable
Czech occupation? 

Moreover, the Germans reversed causality, claiming that the Czechs were
trying to precipitate a European crisis in order to prevent the breakup of
their state, that the choice between war and peace in Europe was in Czech
hands, and even that "this petty segment of Europe is harassing the human
race."5 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

But there was a simple way to simultaneously avoid war and achieve justice,
Hitler said. The Western powers-meaning Britain and France-could force the
Czechs to do what was necessary for the sake of peace: Czechoslovakia had to
relinquish the "occupied territories. " 

The Fickle West 

And it worked. With astonishing speed, the governments and opinion-makers of
the West adopted Hitler's point of view. Throughout 1937 and 1938, mounting
pressure was exerted on Czechoslovakia by the leading Western powers "to go
to the utmost limit" to meet Sudeten demands.6
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  Czech leader Edvard
Benes was reviled as intransigent. 

The Western press published articles lamenting Czech shortsightedness and
its total disregard for the cause of peace in Europe, as well as the
injustice of not allowing the Sudetenland to be "returned" to Germany
(despite the fact that it had never been part of Germany). 

The British envoy who was dispatched to investigate the situation even went
so far as to demand that Czechoslovakia "so remodel her foreign relations as
to give assurances to her neighbors that she will in no circumstances attack
them or enter into any aggressive action against them."7
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

Land For Peace 

On September 18, 1938, under the gun of Hitler's September 28 deadline, a
meeting was held between the British Cabinet and the French prime minister
and foreign minister, in which it was determined that democratic
Czechoslovakia must accede to Hitler's demands.

Despite the fact that the West had promised in writing at Versailles to go
to war to defend Czechoslovakia' s borders, it agreed that the Czechs must
give up the Sudetenland for "the maintenance of peace and the safety of
Czechoslovakia' s vital interests."

In return, the Czechs would receive from Britain and France "an
international guarantee of the new boundaries.. . against unprovoked
aggression."8 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

If the Czechs did not accept the plan and thereby save the peace of Europe,
they were informed by the leaders of the free world, they would be left to
fight Hitler alone.  In Neville Chamberlain' s immortal words: "It is up to
the Czechs now."9 <http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

But in fact it was not even left to the Czechs.  Chamberlain realized that
if the Czechs were to fight, France and Britain might be forced to fight
too.  As the Czechs and Germans mobilized, Chamberlain became increasingly
hysterical about averting war by buying off Hitler with the Czech defensive
wall.  He shuttled repeatedly to Germany to try to arrange the pay-off.
Finally, minutes before his September 28 deadline, Hitler "agreed" to
Chamberlain' s proposal for an international peace conference to bring peace
to Central Europe.

At Munich, Britain and France pleaded with Hitler for 11 hours to
"compromise" and take the Sudetenland peacefully.  In the end Hitler agreed.

Having grasped the fact that his supposed democratic allies had allowed
themselves to become tools in Hitler's hand, Prime Minister Benes announced
Czechoslovakia' s capitulation to the demands of the totalitarians.  "We
have been basely betrayed," he said.10
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  

The Western leaders returned in triumph to London and Paris.  In government,
in parliament, and in the press, Chamberlain and Daladier were praised,
cheered, and thanked for having traded land for peace.  "My friends," said
Chamberlain, "I believe it is peace in our time."

For when they shall say, 'Peace and safety'; then sudden destruction cometh
upon them, as travail upon a woman with child; and they shall not escape.  -
1 Thessalonians 5:3

Phase Two 

On September 30, the Czech army began its withdrawal from the Sudetenland -
from the strategic passes, the mountain fortresses, and the major industrial
facilities that would have been the backbone of Czechoslovakia' s effort to
defend itself.  But this was only Phase One of Hitler's plan.

The German annexation of the Sudetenland was followed by a renewed list of
demands on the Czechs.  The Nazis continued to invent incidents of violence
and oppression against the ethnic German minority in what was left of the
Czech state.

Less than six months later, on March 15, 1939, the Nazi war machine rolled
through the rest of Czechoslovakia.  Shorn of their defenses in the Sudeten
mountains, the Czechs were now powerless to resist.  Phase Two had been
implemented.

The Western powers again did nothing.  Once more, all their assurance proved
worthless.

Grave and Present Danger 

Unfortunately, the parallels to today's effort to gouge Judea and Samaria
out of Israel are all too easy to see.

Like Czechoslovakia, Israel is a small democracy with a powerful army much
aided by defensive terrain.  Like the Sudeten district, the West Bank is
mountainous territory, a formidable military barrier that guards the slender
and densely populated Israeli shoreline and Israel's capital city.

Like the Germans, the Arabs11
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes>  understand that as
long as Israel controls these mountains, it will not be overrun.  They
understand too that a military campaign to seize these mountains is at
present unthinkable, and that Israel's removal from them can be achieved
only by the application of irresistible political pressure by the West on
Israel to withdraw.

The Arab regimes have therefore embarked on a campaign to persuade the West
that these Arab inhabitants of these mountains (like the Sudeten Germans,
comprising roughly a third of the total population) are a separate people
that deserve the right of self-determination - and that unless such
self-determination is granted, the Arab states will have no choice but to
resort to war to secure it.

As in the case of Czechoslovakia, Israel's insistence on not parting with
territories strategically vital for its defenses is presented as the
obstacle to peace.

Echoing Munich, the Arabs repeatedly advocate "active" American (and
European) involvement, in the hope that an American Chamberlain can be found
to force "the intransigent party" to capitulate where it is otherwise
unwilling to compromise its own security.

That the Arabs have borrowed directly from the Nazis in this, as in so many
of their other devices against Israel, is not surprising.

What is surprising, or at least disappointing, is the speed and readiness
with which this transparent ruse has been received, digested, and
internalized by the elite of the Western world.  Not a day passes without
some somber editorial or political comment from august quarters in America
and Europe asking Israel to voluntarily accept the same decree that
Czechoslovakia was asked to accept.

In 1938, the London Times, the leading newspaper of the world at the time,
published a celebrated editorial that summed it all up:

It might be worthwhile for the Czechoslovak government to consider whether
they should exclude altogether ... making Czechoslovakia a more homogeneous
state by the secession of that fringe of populations who are contiguous to
the nation with which they are united by race... The advantages to
Czechoslovakia of becoming a homogeneous state might conceivably outweigh
the obvious disadvantages of losing the Sudeten German district.12
<http://www.khouse.org/articles/1997/11/print/#notes> 

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