<http://www.washingtonpost.com/?nav=pf> washingtonpost.com

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/09/AR2007030901
839.html?nav=hcmodule
<http://ad.doubleclick.net/click;h=v8/3512/3/0/*/e;52035191;0-0;1;11526049;2
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RT/go/wpnxxaub0170000103mrt/direct/01/> 

The 'Surge' Is Succeeding

By Robert Kagan
Sunday, March 11, 2007; B07

A front-page
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/AR200703040
1321.html>  story in The Post last week suggested that the Bush
administration has no backup plan in case the surge in Iraq doesn't work. I
wonder if The Post and other newspapers have a backup plan in case it does.

Leading journalists have been reporting for some time that the war was
hopeless, a fiasco that could not be salvaged by more troops and a new
counterinsurgency strategy. The conventional wisdom in December held that
sending more troops was politically impossible after the antiwar tenor of
the midterm elections. It was practically impossible because the extra
troops didn't exist. Even if the troops did exist, they could not make a
difference.

Four months later, the once insurmountable political opposition has been
surmounted. The nonexistent troops are flowing into Iraq. And though it is
still early and horrible acts of violence continue, there is substantial
evidence that the new counterinsurgency strategy, backed by the infusion of
new forces, is having a significant effect.

Some observers are reporting the shift. Iraqi bloggers Mohammed and Omar
Fadhil, widely respected for their straight talk, say that "early signs are
encouraging." The first impact of the "surge," they write, was
psychological. Both friends and foes in Iraq had been convinced, in no small
part by the American media, that the United States was preparing to pull
out. When the opposite occurred, this alone shifted the dynamic.

As the Fadhils report <http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/> , "Commanders and
lieutenants of various militant groups abandoned their positions in Baghdad
and in some cases fled the country." The most prominent leader to go into
hiding has been Moqtada al-Sadr. His Mahdi Army has been instructed to avoid
clashes with American and Iraqi forces, even as coalition forces begin to
establish themselves in the once off-limits Sadr City.

Before the arrival of Gen. David Petraeus, the Army's leading
counterinsurgency strategist, U.S. forces tended to raid insurgent and
terrorist strongholds and then pull back and hand over the areas to Iraqi
forces, who failed to hold them. The Fadhils report, "One difference between
this and earlier -- failed -- attempts to secure Baghdad is the willingness
of the Iraqi and U.S. governments to commit enough resources for enough time
to make it work." In the past, bursts of American activity were followed by
withdrawal and a return of the insurgents. Now, the plan to secure Baghdad
"is becoming stricter and gaining momentum by the day as more troops pour
into the city, allowing for a better implementation of the 'clear and hold'
strategy." Baghdadis "always want the 'hold' part to materialize, and feel
safe when they go out and find the Army and police maintaining their posts
-- the bad guys can't intimidate as long as the troops are staying."

A greater sense of confidence produces many benefits. The number of security
tips about insurgents that Iraqi civilians provide has jumped sharply.
Stores and marketplaces are reopening in Baghdad, increasing the sense of
community. People dislocated by sectarian violence are returning to their
homes. As a result, "many Baghdadis feel hopeful again about the future, and
the fear of civil war is slowly being replaced by optimism that peace might
one day return to this city," the Fadhils report. "This change in mood is
something huge by itself."

Apparently some American journalists see the difference. NBC's Brian
Williams recently reported a dramatic change in Ramadi since his previous
visit. The city was safer; the airport more secure. The new American
strategy of "getting out, decentralizing, going into the neighborhoods,
grabbing a toehold, telling the enemy we're here, start talking to the
locals -- that is having an obvious and palpable effect." U.S. soldiers
forged agreements with local religious leaders and pushed al-Qaeda back -- a
trend other observers have noted in some Sunni-dominated areas. The result,
Williams said, is that "the war has changed."

It is no coincidence that as the mood and the reality have shifted,
political currents have shifted as well. A national agreement on sharing oil
revenue appears on its way to approval. The Interior Ministry has been
purged of corrupt officials and of many suspected of torture and brutality.
And cracks are appearing in the Shiite governing coalition -- a good sign,
given that the rock-solid unity was both the product and cause of growing
sectarian violence.

There is still violence, as Sunni insurgents and al-Qaeda seek to prove that
the surge is not working. However, they are striking at more vulnerable
targets in the provinces. Violence is down in Baghdad. As for Sadr and the
Mahdi Army, it is possible they may reemerge as a problem later. But trying
to wait out the American and Iraqi effort may be hazardous if the public
becomes less tolerant of their violence. It could not be comforting to Sadr
or al-Qaeda to read in the New York Times that the United States plans to
keep higher force levels in Iraq through at least the beginning of 2008. The
only good news for them would be if the Bush administration in its infinite
wisdom starts to talk again about drawing down forces.

No one is asking American journalists to start emphasizing the "good" news.
All they have to do is report what is occurring, though it may conflict with
their previous judgments. Some are still selling books based on the premise
that the war is lost, end of story. But what if there is a new chapter in
the story?

Robert Kagan, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace and transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund, writes a monthly
column for The Post. His latest book is "Dangerous Nation," a history of
American foreign policy.



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