http://www.tamileelamnews.com/news/publish/tns_6083.shtml
LTTE'S AIR STRIKE---AN ASSESSMENT

The Sri Lankan Government has imposed a total black-out on the losses
suffered by it from the conventional air strike launched by the Tamil Eelam
Air Force (TAF) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) on the air
base of the Sri Lankan Air Force (SLAF) at Katunayake outside Colombo on
March 26,2007. The air base is located adjoining the international airport.
The black-out is meant to hamper any damage assessment by the media and
other analysts----from Sri Lanka as well as outside. One has to,therefore,
depend on source reports. 


2. The only information which the Government has given out is that two
helicopters were damaged. It has tried to create an impression as if there
was no damage to its fighter aircraft. Source reports, on the other hand,
indicate that the TAF air strike has severely damaged, if not destroyed, at
least a half of the aircraft holdings of the SLAF. The truth will be known
only if and when the SLAF resumes its operations in the Tamil areas. If the
Government's contention that there was no damage to its fighter aircraft is
correct, then there would be no impact on its air operations in the Tamil
areas. If the source reports' contention is correct, one would see a marked
decrease in the SLAF's air operations in the days to come. 


3. The TAF's air strike was well-planned and equally well-executed. It was a
night operation taking advantage of the weak capability of the SLAF for
night operations. It was a precision attack, which carefully avoided causing
any casualty or damage in the international airport, which could have roused
international ire. There were no civilian casualties----targeted or
collateral. As a result, it would not be possible to characterise the attack
as an act of terrorism. It was pure and simple a conventional air strike.
The bombs targeted the hangar or hangars at the base inside which the
aircraft of the SLAF are normally parked at night. Three SLAF personnel were
killed and about 20 injured. It is not yet known whether they were the
maintenance people or whether any of them were pilots. Maintenance
casualties can be easily replaced, but not pilot casualties. 


4.Some worrisome questions arise. Even professional pilots of a State Air
Force need regular flying practice. You can't just assemble or take out an
aircraft from a hide-out and fly out on a bombing mission. Where were the
TAF pilots doing their flying practice? How come the Air Force intelligence
set-ups of Sri Lanka as well as India missed detecting these training
flights of the TAF? One needs fuel for the aircraft. From the way the LTTE
has been warning of more air attacks, it seems to have an adequate reserve
of fuel. Where from it got the fuel? Hopefully, not from India. Since April
last year, when the Government of President Mahinda Rajapakse started using
the SLAF, the latter has been claiming that it had repeatedly bombed the air
strip of the TAF. When an air strip is bombed, it takes time to repair it.
How did the LTTE manage to repair it without any problem? Or, does it have
another air strip, which has not come to the notice of the Sri Lankan
intelligence? 


5. The air strike was a daring operation. The TAF aircraft were air-borne
for a little over two hours.There was every danger of the aircraft being
intercepted and destroyed by the SLAF. The fact that the LTTE leadership
decided to face this risk speaks of a certain desperation behind the
decision to launch the air strike. One could detect a similar desperation in
its efforts to smuggle material required for improvised explosive devices
(IEDS) from Tamil Nadu. Since November,2006, a number of consignments of
ball bearings, aluminium and similar material intended for smuggling to the
LTTE-controlled areas have been intercepted by the Tamil Nadu Police and the
Coast Guard. "The Hindu" of March 24,2007, has reported that one of the
arrested persons admitted during the interrogation that one consignment had
managed to reach Sri Lanka. (see item titled " Two Held in Iron Balls
Seizure Case" on Page 8). Two conclusions emerge: First, the LTTE is so
desperate for replenishments from Tamil Nadu that it is prepared to face the
risk of the arrest of some of its collaborators in Tamil Nadu. Second, if
one consignment managed to avoid detection and interception and reach the
LTTE, there is a strong possibility of more consignments having reached the
LTTE. This reveals gaps in our counter-LTTE security measures. 


6.This desperation has arisen from the LTTE's fears that the Sri Lankan
Armed Forces were planning to launch an offensive in the Northern Province
after having ejected the LTTE from nearly 85 per cent of the total territory
in the Eastern Province. If the SL Armed Forces score similar successes in
the Northern Province, that could deal a severe blow to the LTTE's political
objectives. LTTE spokesmen have been repeatedly hinting that any offensive
in the North would lead to a blood-bath in areas outside the Eastern and
Northern Provinces.The Sri Lankan Armed Forces and their Foreign Office were
treating these warnings casually as the dying gasp of the LTTE. Through its
daring air strike, the LTTE has conveyed a credible message that it may be
down, but not out. It still has a lot of daring, fight and innovative
ability left in it. 


7.The Sri Lankan Armed Forces would be stupid to over-estimate the
significance of their successes in the Eastern Province and under-estimate
the LTTE's capabilities in the Northern Province. The successes in the
Eastern Province were largely due to the role played by Karuna and his men,
and the ruthless use of the SLAF and the heavy artillery of Pakistani
origin. Karuna is a former commander of the LTTE from the Batticaloa
District of the Eastern Province, who deserted from the LTTE in March 2004
due to differences with Prabakaran. The LTTE did not consider it necessary
to use the TAF to prevent the set-backs in the Eastern Province. It is
facing a serious shortage of anti-aircraft weapons and ammunition, but still
has some, which have been kept in the reserve for use in the North and to
prevent a decapitation strike against Prabakaran. The Sri Lankan Army will
have to operate in the North without the support of Karuna and his men, who
are detested there as Sinhalese quislings. Moreover, the LTTE's soldiers
will be fighting in their own area with which they are familiar. Any
operations in the North will see the LTTE fighting ferociously----possibly
making full use of its air and anti-aircraft capability. It will hit out
against the Sinhalese in the rest of Sri Lanka. It is not doing so presently
due to fears of a backlash against the Tamils living in the Sinhalese
majority areas, but a desperate LTTE will not be inhibited by such
considerations. 


8. The demonstrated air attack capability of the LTTE poses immediate,
short, medium and long-term threats to Sri Lanka and medium and long-term
threats to India. The first immediate threat is to the security of President
Rajapakse and other VIPs. The ability to use an aircraft---either
conventionally or through a suicide mission--- will enable the LTTE to
circumvent access control measures.Without effective access control, there
is no effective VIP security. The second immediate threat is
psychological---the negative impact on foreign tourists and investors. This
impact will be enhanced if the TAF carries out attacks on economic targets. 


9. The third immediate impact is also psychological on the minds of the Sri
Lankan Tamils. Prabakaran is stated to be a voracious reader. He reads
everything that is available on guerilla warfare, covert actions etc. A
favourite quote of his from one of these books is:" Those, who dare, win".
It is said that this quote is exhibited in all training centres of the LTTE.
The TAF dared on the morning of March 26 against tremendous odds. It
succeeded. There was elation among the Sri Lankan Tamils all over the world.
Many champagne bottles were broken by members of the Sri Lankan Tamil
diaspora. An added reason for this elation is stated to be the fact that all
the TAF pilots are from the diaspora. One could see a fresh flow of
volunteers to join the LTTE from Sri Lanka itself as well as from the
diaspora. And a fresh flow of funds. 


10. To neutralise these psychological impacts, the the SLAF has to
demonstrate quickly that its capability and morale have not been affected.
Can it do so? It is very important. 


11.The short, medium and long-term threats to Sri Lanka will arise if as a
result of this demonstrated air capability of the TAF, the SLAF loses its
present air superiority. If that happens, the SL Armed Forces and the LTTE
will be more evenly matched on the ground than they are today. That means
continuing bloodshed and the danger of Tamil Eelam becoming a reality one
day.The statements of the close advisers of Rajapakse before the air raid
including those of his Foreign Minister show considerable naivete. They seem
to think the LTTE can be defeated militarily. The only instances in recent
history where terrorist organisations have collapsed without achieving any
of their stated objectives are those of the Khalistanis and of the Western
ideological groups such as the German Red Army Faction. They collapsed or
withered away because they had no support from the people for whose cause
they claimed to be fighting. The LTTE has considerable support from the Sri
Lankan Tamils---in Sri Lanka as well as abroad. Unless they are weaned away
from the LTTE through appropriate political measures, a military victory is
doubtful. Repeated bombing raids by the SLAF on Sri Lankan Tamils in order
to intimidate them are not the way of winning over the Tamils. Barring the
US, which has been heavily using air strikes against the Neo Taliban in
Afghanistan and the terrorists and resistance-fighters in Iraq, without any
significant success, and Israel, which did so in the Lebanon in July last
year,no other country in the world uses air strikes for counter-insurgency
operations in such a ruthless manner as the Rajapakse Government has been
doing. At the least the US and Israel have been bombing foreign people in
foreign territory, but the Rajapakse Government has been bombing from air
its own people in its own territory. 


12. There is no immediate security threat to India. The medium and long-term
threats will arise from the likelihood of copy-cat terrorism and the LTTE
one day using it against an Indian target. India has any number of terrorist
and insurgent organisations active in different parts of the country. Some
of them might be tempted to emulate the LTTE. Successful development and use
of an independent air strike capability by a terrorist organisation is
largely conditional on its having territorial control over the rural areas.
Purely urban terrorist organisations would find it difficult to develop an
independent air capability. In India, the Naxalites (Maoists) have effective
control over large parts of rural areas. One has to be careful about them. 


13. India is no stranger to air terrorism. The plane hijackings by the Jammu
and Kashmir Liberation Front, the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and the Khalistanis,
the blowing-up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India by the Babbar Khalsa of
Canada and the clandestine air drop of weapons by a plane manned by a
mercenary crew in Purulia were instances of air terrorism. In the early
1990s, a member of the Babbar Khalsa trained by Pakistan's Inter-Services
Intelligence had stated during his interrogation that the ISI had asked him
to join the Mumbai Flyting Club, take a trainer aircraft up and crash it on
the Bombay High Oil platform. Such instances of air terrorism can be
prevented by effective physical security on the ground. 


14. But when an insurgent or a terrorist organisation acquires an
independent air strike capability, the task of countering it becomes much
more difficult. Preventive intelligence is an effective way, but it totally
failed in the case of the LTTE. It was able to hoodwink the intelligence
agencies of many countries---including those of India, Sri Lanka and the
European countries--- get its pilots recruited from the diaspora and trained
in foreign training institutions ---like Al Qaeda did-- and smuggle the
aircraft in dismantled forms to the areas controlled by it. 


15. The LTTE should not be allowed to retain its TAF. The matter should be
taken up in the UN Security Council under Resolution 1373 and an ultimatum
issued to the LTTE to surrender its planes to observers appointed by the
UNSC. If it fails do so, the bank accounts of all members of the Sri Lankan
Tamil diaspora suspected or known to be funding the LTTE should be frozen as
a first step to make it see reason. If it continues to be defiant, other
measures have to be considered like knocking them out. These measures have
to be combined with pressure on the Rajapakse Government to initiate a
political process towards a federal solution. Unilateral action only against
the LTTE without simultaneous action against the Rajapakse Government or
vice versa will prove counter-productive.

 



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