<http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/reports/NETworked%20Radicalization_A%20Counter%20Strategy.pdf> NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy (PDF; 1.59 MB) Source: Homeland Security Policy Institute >From press <http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/news/index.cfm?d=4098> release:
Through a compelling ‘call to action’ based on myths and falsehoods, terror networks have made savvy use of the Internet to radicalize potential recruits worldwide. With the “war” now shifting to one of ideology, cyberspace is the battlefield, and the United States has not yet developed an effective narrative as part of its counter strategy. That’s the conclusion of a new report issued by The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) titled, “NETworked Radicalization: A Counter-Strategy.” The report is the second in a series addressing the issue of terrorist radicalization. Frank J. Cilluffo, Director of HSPI, presented the report’s findings and recommendations before the May 3 hearing of the Senate on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, to address extremist use of the Internet to spread radical ideology and the impact of those efforts on potential followers. He described how terror networks have moved from using the Internet for operational planning (such as 9/11) and propaganda (videos of beheading of Nicholas Berg and Daniel Pearl) to a means of social networking to radicalize new recruits. According to the report, Internet chatrooms are now major venues for recruitment and radicalization by terrorist groups like al Qaeda, and video-hosting websites like YouTube broaden the outreach. The report also indicates that websites are being used more and more to feature extremist interpretations of religious doctrine with little being done on the other end to refute, counter, or when appropriate, shut down the dialogue. _____ HOMELAND SECURITY POL IC Y IN S T I T U T E A Special Report by The George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute The University of Virginia Critical Incident Analysis Group NETworked Radicalization: A Counter Strategy Homeland Security Policy Institute (HSPI) and Critical Incident Analysis Group (CIAG) Task Force on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization* ... TASK FORCE SPECIAL REPORT ON INTERNET-FACILITATED RADICALIZATION Introduction Savvy use of the Internet has empowered terror networks to expand their reach beyond national borders by enabling wide distribution of a compelling message and social connectivity with new audiences. Use of computer-mediated communication (CMC) has made a range of terrorist operational activities cheaper, faster, and more secure, including communications, fundraising, planning and coordination, training, information gathering and data mining, propaganda and misinformation dissemination, and radicalization and recruitment. The list is long, and not even complete. Before the Internet, terrorists seeking to communicate with one another through electronic means used telephones or radios, which could be tapped. Terrorists seeking to offer training meant congregating trainers and trainees in a fixed training location, exposing the group to capture or worse. Terrorists or their supporters engaged in fundraising or recruitment often pursued these aims in public settings. And terrorists researching a potential target often did so at public libraries and bookstores, subjecting them to surveillance in these public spaces. Now, with the Internet, all of these same activities can be conducted in relative anonymity from safe locations across the globe: Terrorists can draft an email message and save it as a draft rather than sending it, so that anyone with access to that email account can log in and read the message. Known as “dead drops,” these communications are less subject to interception.1 Terrorists can post training manuals online or even hack into a legitimate website and hide training materials “deep in seemingly innocuous subdirectories of the legitimate site,” a process known as “parasiting.”2 Terrorists can conduct research on potential targets online, where both text and imagery, including satellite photography, is frequently available. Google Earth, for instance, has been used to target British soldiers in Iraq with increasing accuracy.3 Terrorists can appeal anonymously for donations of financial or other support via websites. Planning and preparations for the 9/11 attacks were facilitated by the Internet. Operatives engaged in the attack used it to communicate. Flight schools were researched through it, as were targets. Its uses have evolved over time and to increasingly gruesome creative effect – witness the videotaped beheadings of Nicholas Berg and Daniel Pearl circulated online to the four corners of the earth. These uses of the Internet, horrific as they may be, are fundamentally static – one way communication directed at a global audience. 1 See Appendix A. All information provided, without a pinpoint source, originates from task force briefings with subject matter experts and officials with personal experience in dealing with the issues under study. The task force received many briefings of a sensitive nature and some briefers wish to remain anonymous. 2 “Examining the Cyber Capabilities of Islamic Terrorist Groups,” Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, November 2003, http://www.ists.dartmouth.edu/TAG/ITB/ITB_032004.pdf. 3 Thomas Harding, “Terrorists 'use Google maps to hit UK troops',” Telegraph Online, January 13, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/01/13/wgoogle13.xml. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 1 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy What renders the Internet a particularly potent tool is its capacity to foster interaction. Virtual chat rooms make real time, two-way dialogue possible, permitting extremist ideas to be shared, take root, be reaffirmed and spread exponentially. For the post-Iraq (post-2003) generation especially, Internet chat rooms are now supplementing and replacing mosques, community centers and coffee shops as venues for recruitment. In short, cyberspace is now the battlefield, and the “war” is one of ideas. Our adversaries currently have firm possession of that battlefield because they understand this shift and have crafted and disseminated a narrative that resonates and that has served both to energize and expand their ranks. They have woven an effective tale of an imaginary “clash of civilizations” in which, supposedly, a monolithic West has been engaged in an aggressive struggle against a monolithic Islam for centuries, since the time of the Crusades. The messaging is meant to resonate with a younger generation, and reinterpret Islam to suit the agenda of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement. By its very nature, the Internet “enables groups and relationships to form that otherwise would not be able to, thereby increasing and enhancing social connectivity.” 4 As a new means of social interaction, it brings together people – friends, family members, or complete strangers – with similar interests and values, and fosters a sense of affiliation and identity. The “killer application” of the Internet is not so much its use as a broadcast tool, but its function as a communications channel that links people in cyberspace, who then meet and can take action in the physical world.5 And who are those individuals who will be receptive – or vulnerable – to an extremist message and “call to action” at that nexus where the cyber and physical realms meet? There is no one-size-fits-all explanation, and much still remains to be learned on this count. However, from Toronto to London, from Madrid to Morocco, and in Holland, America and beyond, we have witnessed the effects of radicalization. Some have termed these instances as the rise of “homegrown” terrorism, but the label is something of a misnomer. The Internet has created a largely borderless world and those who participate in terrorist acts are therefore perhaps best understood within this global context, rather than merely a national one. Preliminary Matters of Scope and Definition This report focuses on radicalization in the context of the transnational insurgency that is the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement. Further, the report explores the relatively delimited question of how to respond to and counter Internet-facilitated radicalization. It does not address wider policy questions, not because they are unimportant, but because they fall outside the scope of this particular study. Key terms are defined as follows: 4 John A. Bargh and Katelyn McKenna, “The Internet and Social Life,” Annual Review of Psychology, 55, 573- 590 (2001), p.2, http://pantheon.yale.edu/~jab257/internet_and_social_life.pdf. 5 Ibid, p. 3, citing J. Kang, “Cyber-race,” Harvard Law Review 113 (2000): 1150. 2 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization Radicalization is “the process of adopting an extremist belief system, including the willingness to use, support, or facilitate violence, as a method to effect societal change.”6 Recruitment is “the solicitation of individuals to commit terrorist acts or engage in behavior for a terrorism purpose.”7 The global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement is a transnational insurgency, perhaps best exemplified by al Qaeda but including other groups ascribing to the same ideology. The movement seeks to seize control of the countries of the Muslim world and unite them in a single state (caliphate) governed by the extremists’ literal interpretation of Islamic law. The terms “jihad” and “jihadi” appear in quotation marks because extremists have hijacked the concept of jihad, using it – wrongly – to justify acts of violence. Unfortunately, the media and government entities have adopted this incorrect usage, and it has now become part of common parlance. In its true sense, however, jihad refers either to inner struggle (striving for righteous deeds), or to external struggle against aggression and injustice in which strict rules of engagement concerning the protection of innocents apply.8 Radicalization is not unique to Islam nor is it a new phenomenon. Historically, extremist beliefs have been used to subvert the ideals of every major religion in the world and Islam is only one of several that terrorists may invoke to justify acts of violence (though such acts run counter to the very tenets of Islam). Indeed, terrorist organizations of all stripes, adhering to any number of extremist belief systems, are present on the Internet and have used it to radicalize and recruit others. Virtual Propaganda and Radicalization: Connecting the Dots in the Real World Propaganda and radicalization matter, whether online, offline or a mixture of the two. Propaganda fuels the radicalization process, and evidence of the effects of that process is disturbing: Adam Gadahn. An American citizen from California, Gadahn now serves as al Qaeda’s English-language spokesman under the name Azzam al Amriki. He has produced propaganda videos, circulated over the Internet, which extol Muslims to join the global 6 Charles E. Allen, “The Threat of Islamic Radicalization to the Homeland,” testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, delivered on March 14, 2007, p. 4. 7 Frank Cilluffo, Gregory Saathoff, et al., Out of the Shadows: Getting Ahead of Prisoner Radicalization, Special report by The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute and the University of Virginia’s Critical Incident Analysis Group, September 19, 2006, p. 3. 8 See Appendix A. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 3 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement and take part in “slitting the throats of the infidel.”9 Adept at building networks offline, he was able to carry that ability – along with a sense of moral outrage – to the online environment. Hassan Abujihaad. Formerly known as Paul R. Hall. “[A]n American-born Muslim convert,” Abujihaad was arrested in March and charged with disclosing secret information about the location of Navy ships to terrorist groups. Abujihaad was in contact with extremists online and had ordered from them videos “that promoted violent jihad.” 10 Christopher Paul. In April 2007, Paul, an American from Ohio, was charged with providing training to al Qaeda operatives, and planning terrorist attacks overseas. He is alleged to have trained with al Qaeda operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and recruited for al Qaeda in Germany. He is also believed to have provided equipment and money to terrorists plotting attacks overseas.11 It is further alleged that Paul watched propaganda videos showing violence against Muslims.12 The Madrid Bombings. On March 11, 2004, terrorists detonated a series of explosives placed on Madrid’s commuter trains, killing one hundred ninety-one people. The terrorists are believed to be members of an autonomous network active in North Africa, connected to al Qaeda only by ideology and drawing no more than inspiration from other terrorist groups. The Internet is known to have played a role in promoting extremist ideology among the group. Specifically, among propaganda circulated by the Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF) was speculation as to the impact of an attack prior to Spanish elections.13 The London Bombings. On July 7, 2005, four suicide bombers killed themselves and fiftytwo others in a series of coordinated attacks on London’s public transportation system, targeting crowded commuter trains and a bus. Three of the bombers were born and raised in Britain. There is no indication that the attacks were planned or supported by al Qaeda or other foreign extremist groups.14 Instead, the group appears to have formed, planned, and acted on its own. The Toronto Case. In June 2006, Canadian authorities arrested seventeen people (later eighteen) suspected of plotting a series of terrorist attacks including truck bombings against the Toronto Stock Exchange, a strike on Parliament, the murder of Prime Minister Stephen Harper, and other acts of mass murder. The group appears to have sprung up on its own, its 9 Raffi Khatchadourian, “Azzam the American: The Making of an Al Qaeda Homegrown,” The New Yorker, January 22, 2007, http://www.newyorker.com/fact/content/articles/070122fa_fact_khatchadourian. 10 “Judge Orders Terror Suspect Held without Bond” International Herald Tribune, March, 23 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/03/23/america/NA-GEN-US-Navy-Terror.php. 11 Peter Selvin, “Jury Indicts Ohio Man for Conspiring With Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Post, April 13, 2007, p. A09, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/12/AR2007041200689.html. 12 Kevin Bohn, “Ohio Man Charged With Helping al Qaeda,” CNN, April 12, 2007, http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/04/12/terrorism.charges/index.html. 13 Geoff Pingree and Lisa Abend, “Judge Assesses Madrid Attacks,” The Christian Science Monitor, April 13, 2006, http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/0413/p06s02-woeu.html. 14 “Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,” United Kingdom House of Commons, May 11, 2006, p. 21, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/11_05_06_narrative.pdf. 4 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization members radicalized in part by extremist “jihadist” videos downloaded from the Internet and viewed as a part of training exercises.15 Radicals in the Netherlands. These include the Hofstad Group, which plotted to conduct suicide bombings and assassinate Dutch politicians. One operation allegedly considered was an assault on a nuclear power plant. The Group included immigrants, the descendants of immigrants to the Netherlands, and indigenous Dutch converts to extremist “jihadi” Salafist beliefs; one person who helped provide safe houses to the Group was a former policewoman. Dutch police have identified several examples of Dutch Muslims, mostly young and not religiously trained, who have adopted extremist “jihadi” Salafist beliefs to which they were exposed over the Internet.”16 Casablanca. In March 2007, a Moroccan man was killed in Casablanca when the explosives he had strapped to his body exploded inside an Internet café. The man and his companions often visited the café to view “jihadist” websites. It appears that the bomb detonated during a struggle with the café’s owner, who wanted to stop the men from downloading and viewing propaganda materials in his shop.17 The pace of “transformation” is striking and has been accelerating.18 London police chief Ian Blair has said that the suspects in the plot to bomb airliners in the United Kingdom during the summer of 2006 went “from what would appear to be ordinary lives in a matter of some weeks and months, not years, to a position where they were allegedly prepared to commit suicide and murder thousands of people.”19 This toxic combination of speed and potential consequences brings into stark relief the urgent need to better understand how and why radicalization occurs, either in person or via the Internet or chat rooms, so that it may be countered. Online Propaganda and Virtual Radicalization: The Medium, the Message and Reasons for its Appeal The Internet facilitates radicalization because it is without peer as a tool for both active and passive communication and outreach. Online chat rooms are interactive venues where aberrant attitudes and beliefs may be exchanged, reinforced, hardened and validated (at least 15 See Appendix A. 16 S.J. van Hulst, “Violent Jihad in the Netherlands: Current Trends in the Islamist Terrorist Threat,” Netherlands Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, 2006, p. 47. 17 Craig S. Smith, “Companion of Suicide Bomber Questioned over Casablanca Internet Café Blast,” International Herald Tribune, March 12, 2007, http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/12/news/morocco.php. 18 Stewart Bell, “Jihadization of Youth a 'Rapid Process',” The National Post, January 26, 2007, http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=25e76872-b309-47a7-841b- 938bdd9ffd71&k=76582. 19 Michael Holden, “Bomb Suspects ‘Radicalized in Weeks’,” Reuters, January 24, 2007, http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=topNews&storyID=2007-01- 24T175436Z_01_L24334309_RTRUKOC_0_UK-BRITAIN-SECURITY.xml. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 5 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy in the minds of participants). This mutual affirmation in turn gives rise to a sense of community and belonging – a virtual ummah (worldwide Muslim community). Even those who simply lurk in these forums may be at risk, although they may not realize it. As extremist viewpoints are continuously reaffirmed by the like-minded, the doubts of observers/listeners may be assaulted and eroded. CMC has been shown to increase conformity to group norms.20 In studies of racial violence and hate crime over the Internet, it has been demonstrated that the anonymity of the Web and the culture of chat rooms leads to an increased level of endorsement for violence than is actually felt by participants.21 As a mechanism to exert influence and mold opinion, the Internet is powerful because it gives voice to potentially everyone and does so in distinctly egalitarian fashion. The case of “Irhabi (Terrorist) 007” offers a powerful illustration. Under this pseudonym, and while barely into his twenties, Younis Tsouli rose from obscurity to a position of leadership by participating frequently and enthusiastically in online extremist forums. The sheer volume of Tsouli’s postings began to earn him the trust of other participants and, when he responded positively and energetically to the beheading videos posted on the Web by al Qaeda in Iraq, that group in turn praised and endorsed Tsouli.22 Indeed, any extremist group, no matter how small, can create a professional-looking website that may reach a wide, geographically dispersed audience of potential recruits. Neo-Nazi groups, for example, “were among the first to seize upon the benefits of cyberspace,”23 establishing websites, bulletin boards, newsgroups, mailing lists, and chat rooms.24 Just a few years ago, hundreds of websites served terrorists and their supporters.25 Now, ten to twentyfive such sites are thought to generate new material which is mirrored in several thousand others.26 These developments mirror those in society writ large, where use of the Internet is continually expanding and evolving as a means of social networking and mobilization. For example, a number of candidates running for president in 2008 announced their candidacy not at rallies or press conferences, but through videos broadcast on their websites. Almost every top contender is turning to social networking sites, such as MySpace, as “a method of reaching people who are historically not interested in voting.”27 Politicians now maintain blogs, conduct web chats with constituents, and hold virtual town hall meetings to shape public opinion and mobilize popular support. 20 Bargh, supra note 4 at p. 8, citing T. Postmes and R. Spears, “Deindividuation and Anti-Normative Behavior: A Meta-Analysis,” Psychological Bulletin 123 (1998): 238-259. 21 Jack Glaser, Jay Dixit, and Donald P. Green, “Studying Hate Crime with the Internet: What Makes Racists Advocate Racial Violence?” Journal of Social Issues 58, no. 1 (2002): 177-193. 22 See Appendix A. 23 Michael Whine, “Cyberspace – A New Medium for Communication, Command, and Control by Extremists,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 22 (1999): 233. 24 Phyllis B. Gerstenfeld, et al., “Hate Online: A Content Analysis of Extremist Internet Sites,” Analysis of Social Issues and Public Policy 3, no. 1 (2003): 30. 25 Gabriel Weimann, “www.terror.net: How Modern Terrorism Uses the Internet,” United States Institute of Peace, March 2004, p. 2. 26 See Appendix A. 27 Alex Williams, “The Future President, on Your Friends List,” The New York Times, March 18, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/fashion/18myspace.html. 6 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization The media posture of the global extremist “jihadi” Salafist movement is, similarly, sophisticated and multidimensional. By way of illustration, al Qaeda has its own official production arm (As-Sahab), for which the GIMF serves as clearinghouse.28 The GIMF itself is a multipronged operation, which to date has used many of the tools of a major public relations effort including television, websites/chat rooms, and word of mouth. Indeed, al Qaeda as we now know it is both an inspirational and operational force. And the movement it has spawned is fuelled by ideology propagated in a range of ways, from simple word of mouth to sophisticated technological means. The Internet facilitates the spread of that ideology and inspiration in various ways, including by serving as a distribution vehicle for videos, songs, videogames and radio broadcasts.29 The primary focus of the movement’s efforts online appears to be youth, including those living in the West. Websites are often flashy and colorful, apparently designed to appeal to “a computer savvy, media-saturated, video game-addicted generation.”30 One site features a game called “Quest for Bush” in which the player fights Americans and proceeds to different levels including “Jihad Growing Up” and “Americans’ Hell.”31 These so-called games amount to a dynamic form of propaganda, whose purpose is to transform a generation into radicalized foot soldiers of a global insurgency.32 Videos circulated through websites serve the same purpose, spreading a simple but seemingly compelling message: Islam is under attack and young Muslims have a personal duty to fight in defense of the ummah. 33 The images presented in these videos are graphic and calculated to provoke, issue a call to arms and motivate. News footage is included from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Iraq, Lebanon, Chechnya, Bosnia, Kosovo, and other “hot spots” around the world. U.S. and allied troops are framed as invaders, occupiers, and destroyers. Civilian casualties of these conflicts, especially Muslim women and children, are depicted as victims of Western aggression, with blood, gore, and tears often emphasized. Exposed to these images over and over again, the viewer may internalize the message, becoming frustrated and enraged over the enormous injustice he perceives to be occurring. 34 Once produced only in Arabic, videos are being dubbed, subtitled, or produced in a wider range of languages in order to reach a broader audience.35 Some now include hip-hop and rap musicians whose catchy, melodic messages contain calls to violence. In one such video, 28 Sebastian Usher, “Webcast News Gives Al-Qaeda View,” BBC News, September 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4298206.stm. 29 Weimann, supra note 25 at p. 4. See also Frank J. Cilluffo, Sharon L. Cardash and Andrew J. Whitehead, “Radicalization: Behind Bars and Beyond Borders,” Brown Journal of World Affairs (2007), referencing select concepts/passages in the present report. 30 Bruce Hoffman, “The Use of the Internet by Islamic Extremists,” testimony before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives, May 4, 2006, p. 5. 31 Jose Antonio Vargas, “Way Radical, Dude,” The Washington Post, October 9, 2006, p. C01, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100800931.html. 32 See Appendix A. 33 Hoffman, supra note 30 at p. 6. See also Weimann, supra note 25 at p. 6. 34 See Appendix A. 35 Frank Gardner, “The Growth of ‘Online Jihadism’,” BBC News, October 25, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6086042.stm. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 7 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy titled “Dirty Kuffar [Non-believers],” the rapper “Sheikh Terra” sings with a gun in one hand and a Qur’an in the other; images of Iraqis being killed by American troops are displayed, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are lauded, and viewers/listeners are called on to fight back.36 Videos were crudely produced, sold for a few cents and in limited distribution before the Internet. Raids of “safe houses” often yield stacks of DVDs, CDs, VHS tapes, and VCDs. The Worldwide Web has made it increasingly easy to produce and circulate these videos globally.37 All of these visuals are accompanied or underpinned, either explicitly or implicitly, by a carefully crafted narrative depicting the Islamic world under siege or attack. New video-hosting websites like YouTube broaden potential audience reach further. The site receives tens of thousands of new videos daily, and users watch over a hundred million per day, making content difficult to monitor. Though authorities have identified a number of “jihadist” propaganda items on the site – some being viewed by thousands – these are often replaced almost as soon as they are removed.38 Extremists themselves confess the importance of the video as tool. As one said of his radicalization, the “first time I saw an al- Qaeda video, I was ready to go… I wanted to kill the disbelievers.”39 Extremist interpretations of religious doctrine feature prominently on websites, where articles, pamphlets and even libraries of books appear. These texts are devoted to finding justifications, within the context of Islam, for the movement’s violent ideology and acts. This is intended to assure potential recruits, and to reassure those already recruited, of the righteousness of both the cause and the means adopted to further it.40 By way of example, consider the following fatwa (religious ruling) published online by an Egyptian declaring suicide terrorism to be legitimate within Islam (contrary to the traditional Islamic jurisprudence that it is a violation of the religion and forbidden by God): He who commits suicide kills himself for his own benefit, while he who commits martyrdom sacrifices himself for the sake of his religion and his nation. While someone who commits suicide has lost hope with himself and with the spirit of Allah, the Mujahid [struggler] is full of hope with regard to Allah’s spirit and mercy. He fights his enemy and the enemy of Allah with this new weapon, which destiny has put in the hands of 36 This video was viewed on March 29, 2007 at http://youtube.com/watch?v=5mcSbUQc3hU. See also Antony Barnett, “Islamic Rappers’ Message of Terror,” The Guardian, February 8, 2004, http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk_news/story/0,6903,1143499,00.html. 37 See Appendix A. 38 Tariq Panja, “Militant Islamic Groups Turn to YouTube,” The Washington Post, February 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/11/AR2007021100956.html. 39 Stewart Bell, “Making of a Zealot,” National Post, June 30, 2006, http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/news/story.html?id=04c78d5f-8003-4d21-b845-d17f47852b71&p=1. In online images, “jihadist” leaders are depicted as either heroic or angelic. Fighters are juxtaposed with images of lions, horses, falcons, and other animals to emphasize their bravery, strength, and ferocity. Those who died while fighting are depicted as martyrs for the cause; their images – in life and, sometimes, after death – are juxtaposed with images of flowers, waterfalls, Korans, and beams of light in order to depict the holiness of their sacrifices and the paradise expected to await them after death. See “The Islamic Imagery Project: Visual Motifs in Jihadi Internet Propaganda,” Combating Terrorism Center, U.S. Military Academy, March 2006, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/CTC%20--%20Islamic%20Imagery%20Project.pdf. 40 See Appendix A. 8 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization the weak, so that they would fight against the evil of the strong and arrogant.41 The virtual world cannot be divorced from the physical realm in which it is grounded, however. It is the complex, iterative and dynamic interplay between the two that helps explain why the extremist narrative resonates and how it spreads. There is no set formula that explains why someone is vulnerable to radicalization, or why a radicalized individual goes on to become a terrorist. As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)’s Office of Intelligence and Analysis observes, the process of radicalization “varies across ideological and ethno-religious spectrums, different geographic regions, and socioeconomic conditions.”42 Social bonds play an important role in the radicalization process. Some argue that they “are the critical element and precede ideological commitment.”43 This is especially true for diaspora communities around the world, which often turn inward to seek mutual support, a sense of identity, and an enhanced sense of dignity. Youth in these communities, including second- and third-generation descendants of immigrants, may feel alienated both from their parents’ culture and from the surrounding culture of the country in which these youth live. They may therefore rely on each other to provide a sense of community, making it considerably easier for a single radicalized individual to influence others. Shaming of a group or community is transmitted by first-generation immigrants fleeing economic and social conditions elsewhere to the next generations (second, third and fourth) who may not feel part of either their new land or the land that their parents fled. Their ambivalence about their parents and their new country may lead to disturbance in them as a group and sometimes to violent actions that their individual personal profiles would not immediately have suggested.44 While particularly evident in Europe, similar senses of alienation exist within American Muslim communities – although barriers to assimilation are on average much lower in the United States.45 American Muslim community leaders have expressed their perception of “the roll back of basic civil liberties in America” since 9/11. Of specific concern is the perception of how the USA PATRIOT Act was implemented, and the subsequent “imprison[ment of] well over 1,200 Muslim and Arab men using the pretext of immigration violations.”46 41 Gabriel Weimann, “Virtual Disputes: The Use of the Internet for Terrorist Debates,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (2006): 634. 42 Allen, supra note 6 at p. 5. 43Angela Gendron, “Militant Jihadism: Radicalization, Conversion, Recruitment,” Canadian Centre for Intelligence and Security Studies, The Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, Carleton University, April 2006, p. 9, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/en/itac/itacdocs/2006-4.pdf. 44 Lord Alderdice, “The Individual, the Group and the Psychology of Terrorism,” International Review of Psychiatry (June 2007), in press. 45 Cilluffo and Saathoff, supra note 7 at pp 9-10. 46 Parvez Ahmed, “Terror in the Name of Islam: Unholy War not Jihad” (paper presented at the ‘Sacred Violence: Religion and Terrorism’ conference held by the Institute for Global Security, Law and Policy at the Case Western University School of Law, Cleveland, Ohio, March 30, 2007), citing figures in “The September 11 Detainees: A Review of the Treatment of Aliens Held on Immigration Charges in Connection with the Investigation of the September 11 Attacks,” Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, April 1, 2003. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 9 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy Terror networks target young men by giving them “interpretations of Koranic verses that have been chosen so as to lead them to rebel against their parents, their families, and even against the society in which they live.”47 Veterans of combat – in Iraq and other places – are particularly useful for recruiting youth, who respect the veterans’ anti-authoritarian attitude and “street credibility.” Therefore, there may also be an element of youthful rebellion in all of this, as some may be swept up by the romanticism of joining an “international brigade.”48 Through social network analysis, a remarkably complex array of interactions – between terrorists, their supporters, potential recruits and targeted audiences, and many others relevant to understanding this movement – is rendered easier to understand. Social network analysis offers “a way to visualize the nodes in the network and how things move through that network such as weapons, pieces of knowledge or people…”.49 The Internet, by virtue of being the preferred mode of social connectivity among this generation, coupled with an understanding of social networking can better inform our understanding of the radicalization process and what moves one from sympathizer to activist. A psychological understanding of radicalization via the Internet includes an appreciation of large and small group psychology.50 An important means of understanding large group psychology is through the prism of cultural identity. Historically, geography was a major determinant of cultural, ethnic and religious identity. Whether contained within a country of origin or within ethnic or immigrant communities, spread of these large group identities was only as effective as the limited transportation possibilities at that time. If jet transportation has accelerated the process of large group identity formation, it may be that the Internet is transforming large group identity formation from a lateral, physical process to a metastatic, technological process. Previous boundaries have little relevance. Now, through chat rooms and websites, boundaries are formed and broken instantaneously, so that persons in Seattle, Singapore and Stockholm can meet, establish and maintain ideologic bonds, perhaps even stronger than if they had been forged in face-to-face encounters. Extremist radicalization, whether secular or religious, is inherently a group phenomenon. This can begin in open environments such as universities, or closed environments such as prisons. For large groups, there is a resonance to shared cultural, ethnic and religious symbols. Real events that can be perceived as oppressive or humiliating – described in psychiatric literature as “chosen traumas”51 – may be memorialized through language, images and music, and may then powerfully resonate within the intended audience and in subsequent generations. An understanding of small group psychology and sociology is also vital. According to Atran, members of individual cells usually show remarkable in-group homogeneity (age, place of 47 Gendron, supra note 43 at p. 9. 48 See Appendix A. 49 Bryan Bender, “Antiterrorism Agency Taps Boston-area Brains,” The Boston Globe, March 27, 2007, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2007/03/28/antiterrorism_agency_taps_boston_area _brains/. 50 Emerging neuropsychiatric research is also important to a psychological understanding of this process. 51 V. Volkan, Bloodlines (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1997) 48-49. 10 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization origin, residence, educational background, socioeconomic status, and so on).52 This homogeneity can be established and shaped by extremists through initial and subsequent interactions on the Internet, using aliases as the initial identifying feature and progressing in a give-and-take process. A Snapshot of Countering Efforts To-Date To generate a sense of context, a sampling (albeit unscientific) of noteworthy and creative initiatives—many of which are not very well known—are highlighted below. Admittedly, some of these measures may be limited in their ability to counteract the impact of the extremist narrative, which is being accepted and adopted by an important minority around the world. It is also important to recognize that certain countries and institutions may be sending mixed messages by simultaneously engaging or acquiescing in other activities that would seem to undercut the efforts referenced. Britain. • An important grassroots effort directed against radicalization in the U.K. is “the Radical Middle Way,” an initiative aimed at articulating a mainstream understanding of Islam that is dynamic and relevant, particularly to young British Muslims. Partially funded by the government, the project is a collaboration among several British Muslim organizations. It seeks to undermine the extremists’ message that violence is a legitimate way of practicing Islam. To this end, the Radical Middle Way maintains a website that features presentations by scholars of religion on the tenets of Islam. The project has also held roundtables with radical groups in Britain, seeking to establish dialogue as a way of encouraging extremists to renounce their radical beliefs. • Pursuant to a recently announced UK government initiative, Muslim “opinion formers” (imams and others) will be offered “special training in how to face down extremism and be role models for moderation and tolerance.” There is also to be “a major increase in the number of `forums against extremism’—regional groups which meet regularly and which were set up in the wake of the July 7 London bombings to enable Muslims to discuss ways of tackling extremism.”53 • In the wake of 9/11, UK intelligence officials posted messages on websites known to be accessed by extremists, to appeal for information about the perpetrators. The requests emphasized that people of all faiths, including Muslims, were murdered that day.54 52 Scott Atran, “Commentary: A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs and ‘Virtual Jihad’),” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29 (2006): 263-278. 53 Patrick Hennessy, “Muslim Leaders Helped to Tackle Extremists,” Sunday Telegraph, February 2, 2007, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2007/04/01/nislam01.xml. 54 Maura Conway, “Terrorist ‘Use’ of the Internet and Fighting Back,” (paper prepared for presentation at the “Cybersafety: Safety and Security in a Networked World: Balancing Cyber-Rights and Responsibilities” conference held by the Oxford Internet Institute, Oxford, United Kingdom, September 8-10, 2005), p. 24. GW HSPI • UVA CIAG 11 NETWORKED RADICALIZATION: A Counter-Strategy Egypt. • The Muslim Brotherhood has denounced terrorist attacks committed by “jihadists,” accusing them of having no “conscience or religion.”55 • Ali Gomaa, Grand Mufti of Egypt, has issued a statement declaring that “women have equal political rights in Islam,” and that nothing in Islamic principles prevents women from holding high institutional positions including “the highest office in Muslim nations.”56 This is a direct challenge to the extremists, who seek to enforce incredibly strict restrictions on women. Indonesia. • Kyai Haji Abdurrahman Wahid, the country’s first democratically elected president, now serves as head of a major Muslim congregation and as senior advisor to the LibforAll Foundation; in those capacities he advocates religious tolerance, pluralism and democracy for all.57 • Ahmad Dhani, an Indonesian rock star, has used both his music and his stardom to counter calls to violence with a message of peace and tolerance. His 2004 album, titled “Laskar Cinta” (Warriors of Love) was a direct challenge to “Laskar Jihad” (Warriors of Jihad), a violent militia in Indonesia.58 Jordan. • In July 2005, 170 leading Muslim clerics issued a fatwa (Islamic legal pronouncement) in Amman denouncing all acts of terrorism committed in the name of Islam. A little known but notable fact, the fatwa was issued a day before the bombings in London on 7/7.59 Saudi Arabia. • Public television aired a five-part series titled “Jihad Experiences: The Deceit.” Among other things, the series featured renunciations of terrorism by former “jihadists.” The series also showcased scholarly rebuttals to extremist propaganda.60 • Huge banners and signs have been hung throughout the capital to illustrate the human costs of terrorism.61 Similar broadcasts have occurred on television and even on the screens of automated teller machines. 55 Fawaz A. Gerges, “The End of the Islamist Insurgency in Egypt?: Costs and Prospects,” The Middle East Journal (Autumn 2004): 594. 56 “Women Have Equal Rights in Islam and Can Be Rulers, ” Gulf News, February 5, 2007, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/07/02/05/10101999.html. 57 See LibforAll Foundation <http://www.libforall.org/home.html>. 58 Daveed Gartenstein-Ross, “Warrior of Love: An Unlikely Champion of Moderate Islam,” The Weekly Standard, November 15, 2006, http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/932fifqs.asp?pg=1. 59 Kenneth Ballen, “The Myth of Muslim Support for Terror,” The Christian Science Monitor, February 23, 2007, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0223/p09s01-coop.html. 60 See “TV Seminar Offers an Overview of the Series titled Jihad Experiences,” Al-Riyadh Newspaper, Issue No. 13700, December 27, 2005, http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/12/27/article118422.html. See also “TV broadcasts a five part series titled ‘Jihad Experiences, the Deceit…’,” Al-Riyadh Newspaper, Issue No. 13672, November 25, 2005, http://www.alriyadh.com/2005/11/29/article111369.html. 12 GW HSPI • UVA CIAG Special Report on Internet-Facilitated Radicalization • The Interior Ministry is developing a plan (to include lectures and seminars) to portray extremist “jihadi” Salafism as a deviant form of Islam to students in schools and universities.62 Textbooks and curriculum are being audited to ensure that schools are not used to radicalize students.63 • As part of a government-supported “Tranquility Campaign,” volunteers including scholars of religion, psychiatrists, and sociologists have visited websites, chat rooms and forums to engage in dialogue with extremists. According to government figures, almost 700 individuals have recanted their beliefs as a result. As part of the Campaign, there is an ongoing effort to establish a website to help counter extremist ideology.64 • Under a new law to fight cyber-crime, approved on April 13, 2007, it is a punishable offence (up to ten years in prison and/or a fine of up to 5 million Saudi riyal, which equates to approximately $1.3 million) to create a website for a terrorist organization.65 United States. • Immediately following September 11, 2001, a fatwa condemning terrorism and extremism was issued by American Muslim jurists and ultimately was endorsed by more than one hundred and twenty U.S. Muslim groups, leaders and institutions. The fatwa deemed terrorism or involvement in terrorism by any individual or group as haram (forbidden) and stated “it is the civic and religious duty of Muslims to cooperate with law enforcement authorities to protect the lives of all civilians.”66 • (F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with "Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research." 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