http://www.commentarymagazine.com/cm/main/viewArticle.html?id=10128
 

Guests of the Ayatollah by Mark Bowden

By Reviewed by Gabriel Schoenfeld From issue: October 2006 

Iran I: The Revolution
Guests of the Ayatollah: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant
Islam
By Mark Bowden
Atlantic Monthly Press. 704 pp. $26.00

What goes around, comes around. In the case of Iran, however, this has so
far not been the case. The outrage committed against the American diplomats
who in 1979 were kidnapped and held hostage lasted 444 days, and the
Khomeinist perpetrators never paid any sort of price. Now that Iran is
working assiduously to acquire nuclear weapons, is the time ripe to settle
this longstanding open account? From Mark Bowden’s Guests of the Ayatollah,
the moment would appear overdue.

A former reporter for the Philadelphia Inquirer and now a national
correspondent for the Atlantic, Bowden is the author of the highly regarded
Black Hawk Down, which traced the American debacle in Mogadishu in the
summer of 1993. In Guests of the Ayatollah he turns his close-up lens on
Year One of Iran’s Islamic revolution. Drawing upon numerous interviews and
meticulous documentary research, with his own quietly effective running
commentary interspersed throughout, Bowden reconstructs all the different
facets of the hostage crisis, creating a series of disjunctive images that
resolve into a coherent and riveting whole.


Bowden begins by narrating the story of the Iranian revolutionaries’
takeover of the American embassy in Tehran on November 4, 1979. This act,
ostensibly provoked by President Jimmy Carter’s decision to admit the ailing
Shah to the United States for medical treatment, was actually the first
manifestation of an irrepressible large-scale phenomenon. Like the
revolution itself, the hostage drama was a sudden parting of the clouds that
revealed a “subterranean ocean of Islamic outrage.”

>From these explosive beginnings, Bowden proceeds to trace the individual and
collective fates of the Americans in captivity, recounting in painful detail
the terror of their initial capture, the endless days of torture,
uncertainty, and fear, the ill-fated rescue mission, Operation Eagle Claw,
launched by Carter on April 24, 1980, through to the exhilaration of their
release in January 1981 coincident with the inauguration of Ronald Reagan as
President.

Few books succeed as well as this one at conveying such experiences
vicariously. But the more significant value of Guests of the Ayatollah lies
elsewhere. For one thing, Bowden has done a remarkable job of portraying the
Iranian university students who planned and executed the storming of the
embassy. One shadowy figure among them is Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, then a
fanatical member of an Islamic student group and today the even more
fanatical president of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another, no less
interesting though destined never to rise so high in the theocracy, is
Hussein Sheikh al-Islam, “a radical filled with the absolute certainty of
divine purpose” who turns out to have been educated at the University of
California at Berkeley. There, al-Islam had


digested the fervent rhetoric of those activist years [the 1970’s], the
rants against the “tyrannical,” “racist,” “imperialist” American
establishment, and now, back in Iran, where there had been a real tyrant to
oppose, he had taken part in something the old fire-breathers at Berkeley
only dreamed about—an actual revolution. And here, at his mercy, were the
very agents of American imperialism denounced in that old homegrown
rhetoric. He would make the most of it.


Not all the Iranian captors spouted New Left slogans; indeed, as Bowden
tells it, al-Islam was an exception. Others were infected by older European
ideas. Most of the students holding the Americans “believed, simply, that
the United States government was controlled by a rich Jewish cabal that
acted, in Iran, in Vietnam, in the Middle East, strictly out of corrupt
self-interest and often for the sheer pleasure of torturing and killing
Muslims and other ‘inferior’ races.” 


If the Iranian actors in Guests of the Ayatollah inhabited a lethally
delusional world, so too did many of the Americans, both the hostages
themselves and those in and out of government seeking to secure their
release. These delusions, however, were lethal mainly to the Americans
themselves and their own interests. Only bitter experience—and in some cases
not even that—would suffice to puncture their fixed ideas of reality.

Bruce Laingen, the chargé d’affaires in the embassy, spent his fourteen
months in captivity locked inside the Iranian foreign ministry. A diplomat
with a foreign-service worldview bred into his bones, Laingen believed
passionately “in the power of polite dialogue between nations.” The first
entry in the diary he kept during his confinement struck a note of perplexed
exasperation: 


Why? To what end? What purpose is served? We have tried by every available
means over the past months to demonstrate, by word and deed, that we accept
the Iranian revolution, indeed, that we wish it well—that a society strongly
motivated by religion is a society we, as a religious nation, can identify
with.


Bowden’s comment on this outburst is a blend of pity and acid: “Laingen’s
sympathetic spin on the revolution was of no use now. . . . [T]he hardest
part of his predicament was being rendered irrelevant.”

No less blind were the American visitors who streamed into the compound
where the hostages were being brutalized. The first to arrive, to celebrate
Christmas in 1979, were three American clergymen—all chosen, in the words of
a spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Council, for “their militant history
against imperialism.” Among them was the Reverend William Sloan Coffin of
New York’s Riverside Church, who back in the United States had been
defending the hostage-takers. Following the three came a procession of
similar spirits, including a Native-American activist who led an Iranian
crowd in chants of “Death to Carter” and urged the students to put the
hostages on trial for espionage.


At the summit of American power were delusions of another sort. President
Carter comes out of Bowden’s story looking somewhat more human but even more
bungling than was suggested by newspaper stories at the time. Even before
the hostage drama began, Carter had helped set the stage for the ensuing
calamity through inconsistent policies ineffectually advanced. On the one
hand, there was his new emphasis on human rights, which stirred the hopes of
millions living under tyranny around the world. On the other hand, there was
the mindless and destabilizing selectivity in the way the policy was carried
out.

At a state dinner in Tehran in 1977, Carter had toasted the Shah of Iran for
his “wisdom,” “judgment,” “sensitivity,” and “insight.” The Iranian leader,
said the U.S President, was “an island of stability” in the Middle East. But
in short order, and thanks in part to expectations of sweeping change raised
by Carter’s own emphasis on human rights, the island of stability
disappeared. The President was forced to shift abruptly into reverse gear.

Carter’s first reaction to the Islamists’ seizure of American diplomats was
to send two emissaries bearing an olive branch. The more famous of the two
was Ramsey Clark, a former attorney general of the United States but by 1979
already well along the path to left-wing lunacy. In the first of a long
series of embarrassing misfires, news of the secret mission leaked out to
the media even before Clark, stuck on the tarmac in a Turkish airport, had
won permission to enter Iran. Permission never came.

Seeking new ways to conciliate the Iranians, Carter eventually acquiesced in
a demand that he refrain from making “hostile statements” about either the
hostage takers or the Ayatollah Khomeini’s regime. “I am amazed at the
naiveté of the American authorities,” remarked the Iranian president, Bani
Sadr, in the wake of another of Carter’s futile concessions. In the end,
after abject abasement had led nowhere, the President once again reversed
gears and set in motion Operation Eagle Claw.

For the embattled White House, a rescue attempt had become, in an election
year, a temptation impossible to resist. The “prospect of a precise,
relatively bloodless liberation from this dilemma was a joy to contemplate,”
writes Bowden. “Success would demonstrate remarkable daring, capability, and
resolve, and would in one deft stroke deprive Iran of its trump card.” But
Eagle Claw—Bowden provides a full account—was one of the most improbable
military operations ever conceived and, given its inordinate complexity,
almost bound for failure. In a spectacular blaze in the Iranian desert, the
United States lost seven helicopters, one C-130 transport plane, and eight
soldiers, along with any hope of a future rescue attempt as the hostages
were rapidly dispersed across Iran.


The denouement would come only many months later, with the election and then
the inauguration of a tough new American President. As Bowden makes plain,
the Iranian captors were initially in the dark about Ronald Reagan, although
during the campaign they were quickly brought up to speed on what his
ascension to power might mean:


In Teheran, the guards . . . took a straw poll one evening to see who the
hostages would elect for President. . . . Most . . . wanted Reagan, as did
the guards [themselves], who considered the hated Carter’s electoral woes a
great victory for Iran, and preened with satisfaction that their actions
were shaping big events in the United States. They were convinced that
anyone other than Carter would understand their reasons for seizing the
embassy and would admit the great wrongs America had committed in Iran.

Lieutenant Colonel Dave Roeder asked one of them, “Do you know who Ronald
Reagan is?”

“He was a movie star,” the guard said.

“Do you know what will happen to Iran if Reagan wins the election?” Roeder
asked. The white-haired prisoner with the deep-set eyes and heavily-lined
face leaned forward dramatically, made a sudden expanding gesture with his
hands, and said:

“Boom!”


On January 20, 1981, Reagan was sworn into office and within minutes all of
the hostages were released.

After so many months and so much groveling, what led to the Iranians’ sudden
reversal? In the answer to that question lies a significant moral. Bowden
ends his book without explicitly spelling out what the moral is, but his
entire narrative is one long case study in the perils of appeasing violent
fanatics. For our current efforts to effectuate another and even greater
reversal in Iran, few things are more vital than learning what his book has
to teach.


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