Caitlin Talmadge

        Caitlin Talmadge is a doctoral candidate and member of the Security
Studies Program in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology. In preparing this article, she benefited from the
advice of Charles Ferguson, Brendan Green, Stephanie Kaplan, Steven
Lehotsky, Jon Lindsay, Austin Long, Andrew Marshall, Whitney Raas, Steve
Rosen, James Schlesinger, Paul Staniland, and other individuals who did not
wish to be thanked by name.

        http://www.twq.com/07spring/docs/07spring_talmadge.pdf

        Deterring a Nuclear 9/11

        THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 24 

Can the United States deter a nuclear terrorist attack? Two conventional
wisdoms prevail on this question. One contends that Cold War ideas about
deterrence are utterly irrelevant to coping with an enemy such as al Qaeda,
whose members are unafraid of earthly punishments and whose leaders lack a
return address at which to direct retaliation.1 The other suggests, more
optimistically, that nuclear forensics make it possible for the United
States to determine the origin of nuclear bombs and thus credibly threaten
retaliation against any state that transfers nuclear material, weapons, or
knowledge to terrorists.2 Following this logic, the United States need only
combine modern nuclear physics with concepts of deterrence honed in the Cold
War to solve its most worrisome present-day threat.

Both arguments are half correct. Deterring a suicidal, transnational
terrorist enemy is a dubious proposition and by itself hardly a comforting
strategy for protecting the country. Nevertheless, nuclear terrorism is not
like other forms of terrorism because states have to be involved at some
stage in the decision chain leading to this type of attack. It is possible
to deter nuclear terrorism by threatening retaliation against regimes or
military establishments that either deliberately transfer nuclear materials,
weapons, or knowledge to terrorists, as North Korea might do, or that turn a
blind eye to substate organizations or actors engaged in such activities, as
Pakistan did when the father of its nuclear program, A. Q. Khan, began to
sell secrets.3 Engaging in what Robert Gallucci has called "expanded
deterrence" against these actors, however, depends not only on developing
appropriate nuclear forensic techniques but also on overcoming important
strategic, political, diplomatic, and organizational challenges that have
yet to garner sufficient attention from those who invoke the Cold War legacy
of deterrence.4

Deterrence Theory Revisited

Classical deterrence theory is a product of the Cold War, a period in which
the superpowers’ vast nuclear arsenals made it imperative to avoid direct
conflict. Thomas Schelling, writing in an era of nascent strategic parity
between the United States and the Soviet Union, defined deterrence as
"persuading a potential enemy that he should in his own interest avoid
certain courses of activity."5 According to Schelling, deterrence worked by
convincing the enemy that the costs of taking some action outweighed the
benefits. Whether the enemy was convinced or not would depend on the
credibility of the threats made against him.

As other theorists later observed, credibility depends on whether the
country making threats has the ability to carry them out and an interest in
doing so.6 In short, military capabilities alone do not confer deterrent
power. For a threat to be effective, those capabilities have to be combined
with communication about the interests at stake and how military
capabilities would be used to serve those interests.

As Schelling noted, deterrence "involves confronting [the enemy] with
evidence that our behavior will be determined by his behavior."7 To the
extent that the United States could make itself appear irreversibly
committed to carrying out its threats in the event that the enemy took a
proscribed action, its deterrent would be more effective. Conversely,
however, the object of the threat also had to be convinced that he would
avoid the feared consequences by refraining from the proscribed behavior.
Deterrence required reassurance. If an opponent believed he would suffer the
consequences regardless, then he had little incentive to alter his behavior.
8

Glenn Snyder usefully divided deterrence into two types: deterrence by
punishment and deterrence by denial.9 Deterrence by punishment threatened to
impose costs on the adversary if he committed a proscribed action. For
example, during the Cold War the United States tried to deter the Soviet
Union by making it clear that an attack on New York would be met with an
attack on Moscow. Deterrence by denial threatened to reduce the benefits
that an adversary could expect to gain from committing a proscribed action.
This form of deterrence usually involved defensive efforts or shows of
resolve. During the Cold War, for example, the United States built missile
defenses partly in an attempt to convince the Soviet Union that a first
strike would not achieve its goals, and it created an immense military
presence in Western Europe as a way of displaying its intention to defend
the territory from Soviet attack.

Through these sorts of policies, the United States and Soviet Union managed
to deter each other for more than 40 years. Although few ever felt truly
comfortable with the concept of mutually assured destruction, deterrence
emerged from the Cold War with a vaunted reputation for having helped to
avert a nuclear exchange.

Deterrence Theory Restored

The end of the Cold War, the rise of transnational terrorism, and the
devastating attacks of September 11, 2001, led many to see deterrence as
passé. It was said no longer to apply because terrorists are irrational
fanatics who seek martyrdom and/or because they lack return addresses. The
2002 National Security Strategy stated outright that "[t]raditional concepts
of deterrence will not work against a terrorist enemy whose avowed tactics
are wanton destruction and the targeting of innocents; whose so-called
soldiers seek martyrdom in death and whose most potent protection is
statelessness."10 Richard Betts enunciated a similar logic, concluding that
"both deterrence and defense are weaker strategies against terrorists than
they were against communists."11 Even a recent study that identified
strategies for deterring terrorism, such as threatening to intervene in
local political conflicts of concern to terrorists and their supporters,
conceded that this strategy would have little utility against a highly
motivated transnational group such as al Qaeda.12

These analysts have in effect urged the United States to focus on deterrence
by denial: massive investment in homeland security to convince individual
terrorists that their efforts to attack the United States will be fruitless.
Few really believe, however, that homeland security serves a deterrent
function. No matter the level of protection, a creative and determined
terrorist is likely to believe, correctly, that he can find some way to
attack. His means are nearly limitless, and he need kill only a few people
to frighten many more.

Because terrorists lack return addresses, analysts have dismissed even more
firmly the possibility of deterrence by punishment, or the threat to impose
unbearable costs on those who would do the United States harm. This
disheartening conclusion stems from a failure to appreciate the many steps
terrorists must take before committing an actual attack. Many of these steps
depend on assistance from people and organizations that may not be as
impervious to deterrence by punishment as individual terrorists are. If the
United States can broaden the range of actors it seeks to deter and convince
these other actors that cooperating with terrorists is not in their
interests, it may be able to reduce the likelihood of a terrorist attack
substantially.13

Nowhere is this approach more plausible than in the case of nuclear
terrorism.14 Unlike other forms of terrorism in which terrorists are more or
less self-sufficient, it is virtually impossible for terrorists to create
their own nuclear material, regardless of which ingredient they use.
Producing plutonium requires sophisticated, expensive reactors, as well as
reprocessing facilities. Enriching uranium to a weapons-grade level can be
done through several techniques; all require relatively large buildings and
advanced technologies.15 Both paths to nuclear material require a sizable
and scientifically knowledgeable labor force, significant industrial
resources, and time. Weapons design and delivery pose additional obstacles.
States such as Argentina, Iran, Iraq, and Libya have tried to produce
nuclear weapons and failed. Aum Shinrikyo, one of the best-funded terrorists
groups in history and instigator of the 1995 sarin gas attacks in Tokyo, was
also unable to create its own nuclear material and had to attempt to buy it
from Russia.16

As such, it is extremely likely that states or substate military
organizations would have to be involved in the tacit or overt provision of
nuclear material to terrorists. A state could directly and deliberately
transfer a weapon or materials to terrorists. It could refuse to halt or
punish those in the military or scientific community who sell material or
weapons to terrorists. It could willfully neglect nuclear security or choose
not to alert the international community to suspected thefts of material or
weapons. It could turn a blind eye to terrorist activities occurring on its
territory.

In all of these cases, the United States does have a target against which it
can direct threats of retaliation: the governments or military and
scientific establishments that actively or passively assist aspiring nuclear
terrorists. Even if the United States cannot deter individual terrorists, it
can create strong incentives for these other actors to block terrorist
acquisition of the ingredients required for a nuclear attack. They have
addresses, lives, and property that the United States can hold hostage to
their wholehearted cooperation. As Paul Davis and Brian Jenkins of RAND have
argued, "The United States could announce credibly that … it would punish
not only active supporters, but even those states and factions that merely
tolerate the terrorists or indirectly facilitate their acquisition of
[weapons of mass destruction (WMD)]. The purpose would be to so alarm heads
of state and heads of substate organizations that they would work actively
to get rid of elements that might bring destruction down upon them."17

Bush threatened as much after the North Korean test, warning that the United
States would hold the regime "fully accountable" if it passed nuclear
materials or weapons to terrorists.18 The 2006 version of the U.S. National
Security Strategy reflects a similar logic, suggesting a subtle shift from
the 2002 document. In describing "a new deterrence calculus," the current
strategy declares, "States that harbor and assist terrorists are as guilty
as the terrorists, and they will be held to account." That document, along
with analysts such as Gallucci who argue that a form of "expanded
deterrence" against nuclear terrorism is possible, points to the crucial
importance of being able to "define the nature and source of a
terrorist-employed WMD. Should a WMD terrorist attack occur, the rapid
identification of the source and perpetrator of an attack will enable our
response efforts and may be critical in disrupting follow-on attacks."19

In other words, nuclear forensics is the linchpin of any attempt at a
deterrence-by-punishment strategy against governments, militaries, or other
organizations that might actively or passively assist terrorists in a
nuclear attack on the United States.20 Although forensics is the first step
toward making credible threats of retaliation against these actors, using it
as the basis of a new deterrence posture will require solving a related
series of strategic as well as political challenges and will necessitate
careful consideration of the countermeasures terrorists may take in
response.

A Primer on Nuclear Attribution

Nuclear attribution is the process of identifying the source of nuclear or
radioactive material. It involves integrating multiple forms of nuclear
forensic information with other intelligence and traditional investigative
work.21 Nuclear forensics is possible because weapons-grade materials do not
occur naturally in quantities large enough to make weapons. Natural uranium
contains only 0.7 percent U-235; it must be enriched to at least 20 percent
U-235 in order to become fissile and to 90 percent to become bomb-grade.
Similarly, plutonium exists naturally only in trace amounts; nuclear
reactors are needed to produce quantities of Pu-239 large enough to make a
weapon, and even then varying trace amounts of Pu-240 remain. Because of
these basic facts, the choice of one material over the other and the
processes used to make that material weapons-grade reveal clues about the
origins of the weapon itself.

As such, every weapon has signatures―physical, chemical, elemental, and
isotopic properties that reveal something about what the weapon contained
and how it was made. For example, physical signatures would depend on the
nuclear material’s texture, size, and shape, while chemical signatures 

l Caitlin Talmadge THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 26 

would come from its unique molecular components.22 Different reprocessing
techniques also leave behind trace amounts of certain organic compounds or
elements that then point to particular technical approaches used. Isotopic
signatures of the material can "indicate that the material has been in a
nuclear reactor and serve as a fingerprint for the type and operating
conditions of a given reactor."23 They can also help determine the
material’s age, providing further clues about its origins.

In combination, these various signatures may help narrow the type of reactor
from which the plutonium came or suggest the enrichment process used to make
the uranium. When compared against a database of known reactor types or a
sample of known highly enriched uranium stockpiles, it may become possible
to determine the material’s origins or at least to exclude certain sources
and then identify the culprit through a process of elimination when combined
with other intelligence and data about the situation.24

Additionally, analyzing the airborne debris left after a nuclear explosion,
known as fallout, can help the forensic analyst estimate the efficiency of
the bomb design, which in turn can help reveal who might have built it.25
Modern thermonuclear weapons have a higher efficiency than the sort of
first-generation nuclear weapons used at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Existing
computer programs can help estimate the predetonation isotopic mixture,
which, combined with analysis of the postdetonation isotopic mixture, may
make it possible to infer the bomb’s efficiency and thus its design.26 The
bomb design can further narrow the possible origins of the weapon. It is
extremely implausible that a terrorist group would be able to construct a
thermonuclear (hydrogen) or boosted implosion (tritium and deuterium) bomb
on its own without state assistance. If the forensic analysis suggested this
sort of bomb, it would be clear either that the weapon was stolen from a
state’s poorly secured stockpiles or that a state directly assisted the
terrorist group in assembling it. Meanwhile, a crude, gun-type uranium
device with a relatively low efficiency would more likely point to terrorist
construction.

The United States’ Nuclear Emergency Search Team also maintains a database
of known weapons designs against which these findings could be compared.27
Forensic analysts could examine debris to "find traces of bomb components
such as the casing, the reflector, and the conventional high explosive" that
would provide further clues about the construction process.28 As such,
nuclear forensics does have the potential to provide a number of clues that
might help to narrow down the origin of a bomb. Yet, clues are just that;
they alone cannot necessarily identify the culprit in the absence of other
intelligence.

Current U.S. Attribution Capabilities

The United States developed considerable attribution capabilities during the
early Cold War period in an effort to determine the size, type, and location
of Soviet nuclear tests.29 This research largely stagnated after aboveground
nuclear tests went out of style in the 1960s, and today few scientists are
trained in nuclear forensic techniques.30 The United States retains a lone
aerial collection aircraft from that era, the WC-135W Constant Phoenix,
recently deployed to "sniff out" radiation in the aftermath of the North
Korean nuclear test.31 In the future, the United States may want to acquire
additional specialized aircraft, equipped with air-sampling devices that
operate like vacuums to suck in particles as the aircraft crosses paths with
a nuclear plume. Sandia National Laboratories has begun development of
improved sensors to place on board this sort of aircraft. Robots or other
unmanned vehicles may be able to do some of this work as well.

In 2002 the Pentagon established a team of forensic analysts to improve the
country’s nuclear attribution capabilities. This team, in combination with
the ongoing research at the national labs, is promising. It claims to have
forged an "initial integrated operational capability for rapid and accurate
attribution."32 The current National Security Strategy obliquely refers to
these efforts, stating, "We will ensure that our capacity to determine the
source of any attack is well-known, and that our determination to respond
overwhelmingly to any attack is never in doubt."33

Many technical experts nevertheless remain less than optimistic about the
current U.S. capability to identify the origin of a terrorist nuclear
weapon. The problem is not just technical but also organizational.
Noticeably, there is still no single institution with responsibility for
nuclear attribution. In late 2006, the Department of Homeland Security did
launch the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center in an attempt to
integrate national capabilities across interagency lines in this area.34
Work, however, is still spread across the Departments of Energy, State,
Defense, and Justice as well as eight national laboratories. As Jay Davis,
former director of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, has noted, "We in
fact have many of the technical and operational tools we need, but they have
not been focused on the issue of terrorism and its associated forensics and
attribution needs along event timelines. These tools may not easily
reconfigure across organizational and authority boundaries."35

Additionally, the officials who must orchestrate the political and
diplomatic aspects of any deterrence policy may not have considered how to
evaluate 

l Caitlin Talmadge THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 28 

technical uncertainties inherent to the attribution process. The advent of
fingerprinting and, later, the discovery of DNA forced the criminal justice
system to decide what sorts of standards such evidence had to meet to form
the basis for determinations of guilt or innocence. This decision was for
those in the courtroom, however, not just those in the crime laboratory.
Likewise, with the advent of improved nuclear forensics, leaders outside the
technical community will have to participate in the process of setting some
standards about what types of evidence will justify which sorts of U.S.
retaliation. Technical experts could disagree on how to interpret forensic
evidence just as two expert witnesses might look at the same fingerprint and
assign different levels of probability to a proposed match. The technical,
policy, and operational communities will have to unite to consider and
resolve these potential problems.

Political leaders also must understand that it is extremely unlikely that
the United States would be able to identify the origin of a detonated
nuclear weapon based on technical information alone, as those who advocate
crash programs in forensics have sometimes implied. Political leaders making
decisions about retaliation would need to corroborate any technical findings
with other intelligence, such as evidence that terrorists had recently
traveled to the country from which the nuclear material was believed to have
originated.

Ironically, the intelligence is likely to be best in cases where the United
States is least interested in retaliating. The United States is likely to
have the best intelligence about the arsenals, behavior, and intentions of
its allies, such as the United Kingdom and Israel, who also are the least
likely to have provided either passive or active assistance to terrorists
and against whom retaliation would be inconceivable. The United States is
likely to have the least reliable corroborating intelligence in regard to
the countries it would mostly deeply suspect of actively or passively
assisting terrorists, such as Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan. This
conundrum greatly complicates the attempt to turn nuclear forensics, a set
of technical findings, into an attribution capability that could underlie
credible threats of retribution.

Attribution also depends fundamentally on a database against which to
compare the information discovered in the forensic process. Identifying the
signatures of any particular weapon is of little value in itself if the
United States lacks information on the signatures of other weapons and
supplies of fissile material worldwide. Some databases already exist through
the Nuclear Smuggling International Technical Working Group (ITWG), formed
to assist in predetonation forensic analysis of smuggled nuclear material.36
The ITWG is also developing a set of standardized methods that can be used
to handle 

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 Deterring a Nuclear 9/11 l 29 

samples of fissile material and to perform forensic tests.37 For its part,
the United States has been working since at least the mid-1990s to establish
an even larger international database of nuclear and radiological materials.
38 It is not clear that any of these databases are configured in such a way
as to facilitate rapid analysis in the aftermath of an attack.

Additionally, the databases are incomplete. The United States should focus
in particular on compelling cooperation from China, India, Israel, North
Korea, and Pakistan, who have resisted participation. The United States may
want to emphasize that it considers countries that do not provide samples
for the databases to be admitting that they have not ruled out a clandestine
attack on the United States through a terrorist intermediary. States that
are serious about keeping their material and weapons from terrorists will
have little to fear from contributing to the database. Indeed, they stand to
benefit if they themselves are attacked or by being quickly ruled out in the
event of an attack on another state. The United States should issue a
standing invitation to assist states wishing to provide information relevant
to the attribution process and to states needing assistance in securing
their weapons and materials. It could also encourage states to "tag" their
nuclear materials by making small but uniquely identifiable changes to the
isotopic mixtures used in weapons.39

Gallucci has suggested that the United States could grease the wheels of
this process by sharing its own signatures as a sign of good faith.40 With
the same goal in mind, other experts have proposed that the database housing
such material "would need to avoid any suspicion of political bias by
conducting chemical and physical analyses in several laboratories in
different countries under the international auspices of a body such as the
[International Atomic Energy Agency]."41 Concerns about such bias may be
particularly acute in light of recent U.S. intelligence failures. For now,
however, the United States appears to be pursuing a more unilateral approach
to building a database, including potentially gathering samples covertly in
foreign countries.42 There are no signs that it plans to share its own
signatures.

>From Attribution to Deterrence

Even once the United States develops appropriate forensic techniques,
acquires the assets needed for fallout collection and forensic analysis, and
gathers enough information from other countries to engage in a plausible
process of elimination after an attack, the deterrent value of any resulting
attributing capability is far from assured.

Deterrence will depend on convincing other states and even skeptics in the
U.S. government that the United States actually has the ability to identify
the origins of a nuclear weapon detonated on its soil. The United States
could exaggerate this capability in an attempt to deceive its adversaries,
and it might want to do so in the short to medium term.43 Ultimately,
however, the most persuasive means of convincing the world of a U.S.
attribution capability is actually to have one and then to publicize it.
Some avenues for such discussion are obvious: national strategy documents,
presidential or other high-level statements, and strategically placed media
leaks. Other opportunities would be more subtle: encouraging members of the
U.S. scientific community to disseminate credible information to their
colleagues overseas, emphasizing the capability in bilateral or multilateral
talks with countries of concern, and using third parties to convey the
information through diplomatic back channels. Whatever the approach, the
United States would want to send a credible, recurring message that it could
and would find a return address for any nuclear bomb.

U.S. leaders also would want to emphasize that retaliation, perhaps in kind,
perhaps through devastatingly precise conventional attacks, would be
strategically necessary and politically unavoidable in the aftermath of a
terrorist nuclear detonation. The U.S. government could not sit idly by,
knowing the origin of a terrorist nuclear weapon detonated on its soil, and
not retaliate against the state(s) or substate organization(s) responsible
for it, especially if those states or organizations had a history of
supporting terrorism. To do otherwise would be to invite follow-on attacks
and to allow the deaths of hundreds of thousands of Americans to go
unanswered. The American public would demand retribution, especially if the
terrorists themselves were nowhere to be found.

Or so U.S. leaders could claim, whether it is true now or not. The more that
U.S. leaders publicly emphasize the possession of an attribution capability
and a willingness to retaliate against those who assist terrorists, the more
the public will in fact expect such retaliation. The more that other
countries sense this domestic expectation, for instance, in polling data
that the U.S. government might want to disseminate, the more politically
credible the U.S. threat to retaliate in such cases will seem. This
credibility will ultimately strengthen deterrence, making it plain that U.S.
leaders would have little choice but to wreak destruction on governments,
militaries, or other substate organizations that are found to have assisted
aspiring nuclear terrorists.

Still, the United States must act with caution. In communicating its
augmented attribution capability, the United States must strike a balance
between providing enough information to be credible and providing so much
information that adversaries can devise countermeasures. In this regard,
nuclear attribution 

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 Deterring a Nuclear 9/11 l 31 

presents a classic dilemma of deterrence, not unlike those of the Cold War.
In that era, the United States advertised some of the capabilities it was
developing for conflict with the Soviets while it hid others. Washington
announced the intention to develop missile defenses long before the
technology was ready, for example, because even the prospect of this weapons
system had the potential to convince the Soviets that they could not win the
strategic arms race. The United States hid other capabilities, such as
stealth aircraft, until they were actually deployed, fearing that if the
Soviets learned too much too soon, they would counter the innovation.
Likewise, the more terrorists or collaborating states understand about the
specific forensic techniques the United States favors, the more they may
adjust their choices of nuclear material and bomb designs accordingly. U.S.
statements should say as much as possible about what the United States can
do while revealing as little as possible about how it can do it.

Well-publicized exercises are one of the best ways to demonstrate
capabilities and a willingness to use them while controlling exactly which
technical or operational details are released. The United States has used
this approach in other areas, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative
(PSI). PSI members conduct periodic, mock ship boardings and other
exercises, and the participating governments issue press releases in order
to remind the international community that the capability and intent to
perform interdictions continues. Although the occurrence of these exercises
is always reported, projecting an image of continued commitment to the PSI
and growing interdiction capabilities, no information is released that could
assist the targets of the PSI in evading interdiction.

The Department of Homeland Security takes a similar approach with its annual
TOPOFF exercises that bring together top officials from federal, local, and
state organizations to practice how to respond to various types of national
emergencies. Although the press always reports the exercises’ general
parameters and their outcomes, media accounts studiously avoid any mention
of exactly how the participants overcame the exercise’s challenges.44
Exercises in nuclear attribution could be handled similarly, greatly
enhancing the capability’s deterrent value while carefully controlling the
information released.

If too much information is released, terrorists could take dangerous
countermeasures. They could intentionally choose material or a bomb design
that fools the United States into assigning responsibility to the incorrect
party or clouds the U.S. ability to assign any responsibility at all. An
overly rigid deterrence policy could also encourage one state to attempt to
make a bomb appear as though it originated from a different state, in an
effort to ignite a U.S. conflict with that other state. The belief that the
United States could trace nuclear material back to a pariah regime might
stimulate terrorists to set their sights on nuclear material in Europe
instead. Of course, such a scenario is a reason to secure nuclear material
in Europe.

Nevertheless, these sorts of problems underscore why political leaders must
understand the technical limitations of forensic analysis well enough to
make credibly nuanced threats of retaliation. They also show why any serious
attribution effort must be part of a broader campaign to secure all supplies
of nuclear material worldwide, so that if a nuclear bomb goes off, the list
of potential sources of fissile material is as short as possible.

Deterring a Nuclear 9/11

If the United States develops a credible nuclear attribution capability,
states that wish to protect their citizens, territory, and interests are
more likely to refrain from providing assistance to terrorists in the first
place. Some might even find that they have a newly discovered interest in
securing their nuclear materials, weapons, or expertise. It is difficult to
imagine that the Pakistani government would turn a blind eye to a future A.
Q. Khan if it believed that nuclear material or technology could be traced
definitively back to Pakistan and that its people and infrastructure would
suffer the consequences if those items were used in an attack against the
United States. A similar logic might caution Iran against transferring such
items to Hizballah, a long-standing recipient of conventional Iranian
military technology and armaments, or warn North Korea against selling parts
of its emerging nuclear arsenal to the highest bidder.

Still, deterring this sort of attack is neither as impossible nor as simple
as most analysts have argued. The United States should invest heavily in an
augmented attribution capability, which does hold the power to help deter
states from providing crucial passive or active assistance to aspiring
nuclear terrorists. Nuclear forensics also offers the morally comforting
prospect that the United States can avoid wantonly retaliating against
innocent parties, just as DNA reduced the risk of executing an innocent
defendant. Yet, here, as in the courtroom, users have to be aware of the
potential limitations of this new form of evidence and to develop rules
governing its use. Forensics does not work in a vacuum or provide a
technical solution to what remain fundamentally strategic, political, and
organizational problems.

        Political leaders must understand the technical limitations of
forensic analysis.

        THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 Deterring a Nuclear 9/11 l
33 

Notes

        1. Richard K. Betts, "The Soft Underbelly of American Primacy:
Tactical Advantages of Terror," Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 1
(2002): 31.

        2. Graham Allison, "Deterring Kim Jong Il," Washington Post, October
27, 2006, p. A23.

        3. Bill Powell and Tim McGirk, "The Man Who Sold the Bomb," Time,
February 14, 2005, pp. 23�C31.

        4. Robert L. Gallucci, "Averting Nuclear Catastrophe," Harvard
International Review 26, no. 4 (Winter 2005),
http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1303/.

        5. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1960), p. 9.

        6. Daryl Press, "The Credibility of Power: Assessing Threats During
the ‘Appeasement’ Crises of the 1930s," International Security 29, no. 3
(Winter 2004�C05): 136�C169.

        7. Schelling, Strategy of Conflict, p. 13.

        8. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1966), chaps. 2 and 3; Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary
Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," The Washington Quarterly 25,
no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 7�C21.

        9. Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of
National Security (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961).

        10. "The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,
" September 2002, chap. 5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/nss5.html.

        11. Betts, "Soft Underbelly of American Primacy," p. 31.

        12. Robert F. Trager and Dessislava P. Zagorcheva, "Deterring
Terrorism: It Can Be Done," International Security 30, no. 3 (Winter 2005�C
06): 105�C106, 122.

        13. Michael J. Powers, "Deterring Terrorism With CBRN Weapons:
Developing a Conceptual Framework," CBACI Occasional Paper, no. 2 (February
2001), pp. 5, 7,
https://www.hsdl.org/homesec/docs/nonprof/nps08-091704-01.pdf.

        14. Robert L. Gallucci, "Averting Nuclear Catastrophe: Contemplating
Extreme Responses to U.S. Vulnerability," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science, no. 607 (September 2006): 57�C58; David
Ignatius, "We Need a New Deterrent," Washington Post, October 11, 2006, p.
A19 (quoting Graham Allison).

        15. Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb (New York: Simon &
Schuster, 1988).

        16. Jessica Stern, The Ultimate Terrorists (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 64�C65.

        17. Paul K. Davis and Brian M. Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in
Counterterrorism: A Component in the War on al Qaeda (Santa Monica, Calif.:
RAND, 2002), p. 40.

        18. Tanalee Smith, "Bush Warns North Korea Against Nuclear
Proliferation," Associated Press Worldstream, November 16, 2006.

        19. "National Security Strategy of the United States of America,"
March 2006, sec. 5, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/sectionV.html
(hereinafter 2006 National Security Strategy).

        20. Graham Allison, "Making Good on Bush’s Vow Will Require
Detective Work," New York Times, October 13, 2006, p. 12.

        21. "Nuclear Forensics Support," IAEA Nuclear Security Series, no. 2
(2006): 10. For the best textbook on this subject, see Kenton J. Moody, Ian
D. Hutcheon, and Patrick M. Grant, Nuclear Forensic Analysis (New York:
Taylor & Francis, 2005).

        l Caitlin Talmadge THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007 34 

        22. For this and all subsequent examples in the paragraph, see
"Nuclear Forensics Support," p. 30.

        23. Ibid.

        24. Jay Davis, "The Attribution of WMD Events," Journal of Homeland
Security, April 2003,
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/davis.html.

        25. Dwight L. Williams, "Characterizing Nuclear Weapons Explosions
Based Upon Collected Radionuclide Effluents," memorandum, MIT Department of
Nuclear Science and Engineering, October 21, 2006.

        26. Charles D. Ferguson, "Can Nuclear Forensics Trace a Detonated
Nuclear Weapon to Its Source?" (working paper, American Political Science
Association Conference, August 31, 2006),
http://64.112.226.77/one/prol/prol01/index.php?cmd=Download+Document&key=unp
ublished_manuscript&file_index=1&pop_up=true&no_click_key=true&attachment_st
yle=attachment&PHPSESSID=20a7317a3c52a7cf6f77a07e959a053c.

        27. Jeffrey T. Richelson, "Defusing Nuclear Terror," Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists 58, no. 2 (March/April 2002),
http://www.thebulletin.org/print.php?art_ofn=ma02richelson.

        28. Ferguson, "Can Nuclear Forensics Trace a Detonated Nuclear
Weapon to Its Source?"

        29. Jeffrey T. Richelson, Spying on the Bomb: American Nuclear
Intelligence From Nazi Germany to Iran and North Korea (New York: W.W.
Norton, 2006), pp. 77�C87.

        30. Michael Levi, "Deterring Nuclear Terrorism," Issues in Science &
Technology 20, no. 3 (Spring 2004), http://www.issues.org/20.3/levi.html.

        31. William Broad and Mark Mazzetti, "Small Blast May Be Only
Partial Success, Experts Say," New York Times, October 10, 2006, p. A8;
Bryan Bender, "Pentagon Hunting for Clues on Power, Makeup of Weapon,"
Boston Globe, October 10, 2006, p. A1.

        32. William Broad, "New Team Plans to Identify Nuclear Attackers,"
New York Times, February 2, 2006, p. 17.

        33. 2006 National Security Strategy, sec. 5.

        34. Department of Homeland Security Press Office, "U.S. Department
of Homeland Security Addresses the Technical Nuclear Forensics Mission With
the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center," October 19, 2006.

        35. Davis, "Attribution of WMD Events."

        36. "Nuclear Forensics Support," p. 10.

        37. Michael May et al., "Preparing for the Worst," Nature, October
26, 2006, pp. 907�C908.

        38. Ferguson, "Can Nuclear Forensics Trace a Detonated Nuclear
Weapon to Its Source?"

        39 . P. Gilfoyle and J. A. Parmentola, "Using Nuclear Materials to
Prevent Proliferation," Science and Global Security 9, no. 2 (2001): 81�C92.

        40. Gallucci, "Averting Nuclear Catastrophe," p. 57.

        41. May, "Preparing for the Worst," p. 907.

        42. "U.S. Creates Nuclear Forensics Center," Defense News, October
23, 2006, p. 1.

        43. See National Defense University Center for Counterproliferation
Research, "At the Crossroads: Counterproliferation and National Security
Strategy," April 2004, p. 37.

        44. "U.S. Department of Homeland Security Announces Completion of
Topoff 4 Command Post Exercise," States News Service, June 22, 2006.

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