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While Pakistan Burns            
By
<file:///C:/Program%20Files/Common%20Files/Microsoft%20Shared/Stationery/aut
hors.aspx?Name=Daveed Gartenstein-Ross> Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
The Weekly Standard | Monday, October 22, 2007 

If there were any doubt about the reach of militants in Pakistan, last
week's events should have put them to rest. The ostentatious procession
celebrating the return home of former prime minister Benazir Bhutto was
tragically cut short by twin bombs that killed over 130 and wounded several
hundred more on Thursday night. The attackers almost succeeded in killing
Bhutto as well. The blast shattered the windows in her vehicle and set a
police escort car ablaze. The sophistication of the attack was apparent from
the outset, and the bombs may have been accompanied by sniper fire. 

But extremist violence in Pakistan is hardly news. The raids against the
militant Lal Masjid mosque on July 11 occurred in Islamabad, the capital
city. Supporters of al Qaeda exist in the military and intelligence
services; indeed, there may prove to be a link between militant infiltrators
of these institutions and the attempt on Bhutto's life. The mysterious fact
that the streetlights were off and the phone lines dead during the attack
further raises the possibility of collaboration with ideologically
sympathetic low-level government officials. Still, the stronghold of
militant activity in Pakistan is clearly the remote and mountainous
Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on the border with Afghanistan,
where Pakistan has ceded more and more ground to al Qaeda and its allies
over the past year.

The government's successive concessions to militants have not always been
viewed as defeats; indeed officials tried to spin them as successes. A year
ago, after the signing of one agreement, Pakistan's ambassador to the United
States told a network reporter, "The Waziristan accord is not a good
thing--it's a very good thing. It's a new step." Although the accords ceded
control over significant portions of the FATA to tribal leaders aligned with
al Qaeda and the Taliban, Washington was slow to sound the alarm. Some State
Department officials defended the agreements, and President Bush himself
offered tepid support during a September 2006 press conference with
Pakistani president Pervez Musharraf.

One year and three more accords later, all concede that the tribal areas are
now the stronghold of al Qaeda's senior leadership--probably including Osama
bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. As in Afghanistan under the Taliban,
terrorist training camps operate freely, believed by U.S. intelligence to
number almost 30. The 9/11 Commission Report warned that to carry out a
catastrophic act of terror like 9/11, an organization requires "time, space,
and the ability to perform competent planning and staff work," as well as "a
command structure able to make necessary decisions and possessing the
authority and contacts to assemble needed people, money, and materials." Al
Qaeda now enjoys both of these in Pakistan.

One result is the heightened terrorist threat manifest in the attack on
Bhutto, but also in recent plots against the West. Last year U.S. and
British authorities announced the disruption of an ambitious scheme to blow
up airliners en route from Britain to the United States with liquid
explosives. The operatives had trained at al Qaeda's FATA camps and met with
high-level operatives Matiur Rehman and Abu Ubaydah al-Masri in Pakistan.
Homeland security secretary Michael Chertoff recently told ABC News that the
plot, if successful, would have killed thousands. One day last month,
authorities in Europe arrested two terrorist cells in Denmark and Germany.
Both cells were allegedly planning attacks; both were in touch with
high-level extremists in Pakistan and had members who had trained there.
While these arrests represent a success for law enforcement, they also
signal al Qaeda's regeneration.

Al Qaeda's rebound was several years in the making. After the U.S. invasion
of Afghanistan in October 2001 toppled the Taliban, most of al Qaeda's
central leadership relocated to the FATA. Prompted by assassination attempts
against Musharraf, Pakistan's military mounted a campaign to flush al Qaeda
out of the tribal areas--but it suffered so many losses that by September
2006 Musharraf felt he had no option but to deal with his would-be killers.
His solution was the Waziristan accords, peace agreements that essentially
ceded North and South Waziristan to the Taliban and al Qaeda. As part of the
accords, Pakistan's military agreed that it would no longer carry out air or
ground strikes in the tribal areas, that it would disband its human
intelligence network, and that it would abandon outposts and border
crossings throughout Waziristan. The accords even allowed non-Pakistani
militants to continue to reside in Waziristan if they made an unenforceable
promise to "keep the peace." 

The failure of these accords was predictable and almost immediate. Shortly
after the accords were signed, a U.S. military official told the Associated
Press that "American troops on Afghanistan's eastern border have seen a
threefold increase" in cross-border attacks from Pakistan. Since then,
Pakistan has entered into similar treaties over the tribal areas of Bajaur,
Swat, and Mohmand.

This leaves us with the present alarming picture: relative security for al
Qaeda's senior leadership, greater instability in Afghanistan, a steady flow
of skilled terrorists coming out of training camps, and a systemic risk of
catastrophic attack reminiscent of the risk we faced before 9/11. This
occurs against the backdrop of Musharraf's political impotence. Despite his
electoral victory in October, Islamic extremists have sworn to topple him
from power, and his clumsy handling of conflicts with his supreme court has
destroyed his already dwindling support among liberal elites. Even the
Bhutto assassination attempt has fueled anti-Musharraf propaganda, as rumors
quickly spread that he was behind the attack--intending to use it as a
pretext to impose martial law. Shadowy figures like Gen. Hamid Gul and Gen.
Mirza Aslam Beg, whose ideological sympathies lie with the Taliban and al
Qaeda, lurk in the background. All of which conjueres up the "nightmare
scenario": a nuclear-armed state openly aligned with our terrorist enemies.

Thus far, American policy toward Pakistan has amounted to unconditional
support for Musharraf, coupled with occasional air strikes against
high-level al Qaeda targets in the tribal areas. Emblematic of the latter is
an October 30, 2006, strike against a madrassa in a Bajaur village that
allegedly served as an al Qaeda training camp. While Zawahiri may have been
the strike's target, the madrassa was affiliated with another key al Qaeda
confederate, Faqir Mohammed, who had contracted a strategic marriage with a
woman from the local Mamoond tribe. A U.S. Predator strike destroyed the
school, but it hardly slowed down Mohammed, who gave an interview with NBC
at the scene of the wreckage and later spoke at the funeral for the victims.

Nor is any satisfactory alternative military strategy on offer. One senior
American military intelligence officer said it would take a sustained air
campaign to deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven in the FATA. "We're talking
about a Serbia-style prolonged campaign," he said. NATO's air campaign
against Serbia's military lasted from March 24 through June 11, 1999, and
comprised over 38,000 missions involving approximately 1,000 aircraft and a
barrage of Tomahawk missiles. Such a campaign in Pakistan's tribal areas,
the officer said, would "heavily degrade" but not eliminate al Qaeda. "Their
camps won't be actively producing terrorists," he said, "but they'll survive
the air campaign." Furthermore, a campaign on that scale might result in the
toppling of Musharraf--who, in the vivid phrase of retired Air Force Lt.
Gen. Thomas McInerney, is already "dancing on razor blades."

No analyst I spoke with thought we could do much better than the strategy of
covert pinprick strikes that the United States and Pakistan are currently
employing, wherein Pakistan frequently takes responsibility for U.S.
strikes. This will not deprive al Qaeda of its safe haven, although it may
occasionally yield important kills.

What about covert action? American Special Operations forces are already
engaging in actions coordinated with the air strikes. The most notable
achievement in this regard occurred in southern Afghanistan, where NATO and
Afghan forces killed Mullah Dadullah Lang, the Taliban's top military
commander, back in May. There are barriers, though, to expanding the Special
Operations forces' role. The topography makes it difficult to insert and
remove forces without being detected. Within the military, there is a real
desire to avoid another Operation Eagle Claw--the ill-fated attempt to
rescue hostages held at the U.S. embassy in Tehran during President Carter's
term.

Unfortunately, the potential for things going awry is high if Special
Operations missions are increased. Special Operations forces act in small
teams and are lightly armed, so could be overwhelmed by larger contingents
of al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Enemy forces in Pakistan are better armed
and trained than the Somali forces in the Black Hawk Down incident, and they
have SA-18 surface-to-air missiles capable of downing American helicopters.

There is always the option of a full-scale counterinsurgency operation in
the FATA, including the insertion of American ground troops. Some
commentators favor this approach. Steve Schippert, the managing editor of
Threats-Watch, told me, "At the end of the day, there is no getting around
that if al Qaeda is going to be defeated in Pakistan, it will take our boots
on the ground." Military affairs analyst Bill Roggio agrees that in an ideal
world we would conduct counterinsurgency operations jointly with Pakistan's
armed forces, but deems this not feasible in the current political context:
We lack both resources and the will to take the casualties it would require.
Roggio is almost certainly right--and, again, the insertion of American
ground forces would heighten the risk of Musharraf's being toppled from
power.

Pakistan's military, meanwhile, does not appear to be up to the task of
confronting the militants. It is unclear what level of casualties caused
Musharraf to call off the attempt to control the tribal areas and make a
deal with the extremists; the numbers are secret and estimates vary widely.
Most observers believe Pakistan has lost about 1,000 men in its fight to
control the FATA, but some believe it has lost more soldiers in this fight
than the United States has lost in Iraq. Then, too, Pakistani soldiers have
shown reluctance to fight their "Muslim brothers." This unwillingness was
bolstered by a fatwa issued in 2004 by clerics Mohammed Abdul Aziz and Abdur
Rashid Ghazi stating that Pakistani soldiers killed in South Waziristan
deserved neither a Muslim funeral nor burial in a Muslim cemetery.

Where does the dearth of military options leave us? Pakistan's government
could still play an important role despite its military's weakness. Seth
Jones, of the RAND Corporation, argues that the centerpiece of U.S. strategy
should be diplomatic pressure on Islamabad, once the political situation in
Pakistan is calmer. "We need a clear diplomatic message," Jones said. "Al
Qaeda is regenerated, and a number of recent terror plots are linked back to
its tribal areas. Pakistan faces a choice not too different from what it
faced on 9/11."

U.S. assistance, Jones says, should be tied directly to the arrest or
killing of key al Qaeda leaders such as Ayman al-Zawahiri. "The threat then
would be that if we can't get clear progress in a measurable timeframe, this
would leave the United States in the unfortunate position of having to
significantly decrease its assistance to Pakistan and move in the direction
of India," he says. Jones thinks this pressure should be aimed at getting
Pakistan's military and intelligence services to undertake a "clear and hold
strategy" against al Qaeda safe havens--not as a military offensive, but a
police and intelligence operation.

Others favor an even more aggressive Pakistani role, beginning with a
declaration that the treaties concerning the tribal areas are dead. There is
ample justification for renouncing the accords, which the Taliban violated
from the outset by killing Pakistani troops, sending its fighters into
Afghanistan to fight coalition forces, and setting up separate governmental
entities.

If Pakistan nullified the FATA agreements, there are aggressive measures it
could take without risking its troops in the tribal areas. Musharraf could
treat the FATA as a hostile province and impede militants' movements by
erecting fences along the perimeter (as Pakistan has done on parts of its
border with India) and establishing an internal passport system. Anybody who
traveled out of the FATA could be treated as though he were entering from an
enemy nation, and would be subject to search and questioning. Impeding the
movement of FATA-based extremists would not only hinder their efforts, but
also help coalition forces in Afghanistan to track who had visited the
high-risk FATA. As one senior American military intelligence officer put it,
"FATA should become Taiwan to Pakistan's China."

The major problem with this approach is that it hinges on Musharraf. He was
presented with a sterling opportunity to cancel the accords earlier this
summer, after Pakistani forces raided the Lal Masjid. That mosque had been a
center for the recruitment of fighters and suicide bombers to combat
coalition forces in Afghanistan. Militants in the tribal areas responded to
the raid with rage and vows of revenge. A number of attacks on Pakistani
forces were launched from the FATA thereafter, in clear violation of the
accords. Musharraf talked tough talk, but he never declared the accords
dead--and ultimately reaffirmed his commitment to withdraw all Pakistani
troops from tribal areas by year's end.

Musharraf's reluctance to abandon the accord framework does not mean he will
never do so. The United States has not applied sustained pressure on this
issue, and it should. It should develop a basket of incentives to persuade
Musharraf to junk the agreements. Still, even as it hopes for the best from
Pakistan, Washington should be prepared for continuing inaction.

American successes in Iraq over the past year may hold some lessons for
tackling the problem in Pakistan. A critical factor in the turnaround during
the tenure of Gen. David Petraeus as the top U.S. commander in Iraq has been
our improved ability to align with tribal elements that oppose the brutality
of al Qaeda. The Anbar Salvation Front--a collection of Sunni tribesmen,
Iraqi nationalists, ex-Baathists, and others united in the goal of driving
al Qaeda from their country--has been a vital ally in destroying the safe
haven al Qaeda had enjoyed in Iraq's Anbar province. We won't quickly find
an ally in Pakistan as capable as the late Abdul Sattar al-Rishawi, who led
the Anbar Salvation Front, but the broader lesson is the need to understand
local actors and rely on more than our sheer military might.

One expert on irregular warfare who frequently consults with the federal
government argues that the Anbar Salvation Front model should be considered
for Pakistan. Though her ideas are "the starting point for a conversation"
rather than a well-developed proposal, she notes surface similarities
between Iraq and Pakistan. "You have multiple tribes," she said, "some of
which have been in conflict and some of which have been aligned. The way
people make their living is also similar. There are settled tribes that live
by agriculture, and tribes that have lived by smuggling, banditry, and
tribal warfare." The Pakistani tribes apparently differ in their approach to
al Qaeda, too, the northern tribes being more welcoming than the southern
tribes.

"There are people within the Pakistani tribes who don't buy into the
Taliban's concept of Islam," this analyst said. "They don't believe this is
the correct way to practice the religion. To me this suggests that there are
fissures, both ideological and tribal, that can be exploited." But
exploiting them will take a good deal of time, give our lack of cultural and
institutional understanding. "Before you start getting involved in these
situations," a senior American military intelligence officer told me, "you
need to know who is whose enemy, which groups are backing the Taliban and al
Qaeda. At the clan and tribal level, we don't have a good idea of this."
Such knowledge could perhaps be gleaned from our Afghan allies, since
neither Pashtun nor Baluch society recognizes the artificial border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While working to develop local allies, the United States can also implement
tactics other than pinprick bombing. This is especially important at a
micro-level. Al Qaeda draws its strength from specific individuals and clans
inside Pakistan, including powerful allies in the military and intelligence
service, tribal sheiks, and figures in the underground economy. We need to
better understand the patronage networks that al Qaeda and the Taliban
benefit from, and undermine them.

On the one hand, the United States can use a variety of sticks. It can
support tribal groups that oppose al Qaeda and the Taliban against rivals
who favor them. It can work with Pakistani and other intelligence services
to shut down the businesses of individuals involved in the financial
apparatus that backs our enemies--such as organized crime kingpin Dawood
Ibrahim--obtaining blackmail information on them and arresting their
operatives.

David E. Kaplan, who investigated the nexus between organized crime and
terrorism for U.S. News & World Report, believes there is no easy way to
stop the flow of money to the Taliban and al Qaeda. Although it is known
that al Qaeda benefits from the drug trade, controlling smuggling routes
from Afghanistan to Pakistan and taxing each shipment, a solution to
regional drug trafficking remains elusive. "If you go after opium growers,"
he said, "you'll undercut [Afghan president Hamid] Karzai's government
because a lot of these guys back him." Kaplan says attempts are being made
now to go after factions involved in the narcotics trade that back al Qaeda
and the Taliban rather than those that back Karzai, "but the lines aren't
always clear. The narcotics industry is diffuse, with lots of different
players."

Kaplan does think that attempting to shut down sources of al Qaeda and
Taliban funding within Pakistan's underground economy holds promise, given
the American authorities' experience with combating multinational criminal
organizations. "Look at how we broke the U.S. mafia in the past twenty
years," he said. "But the bad news is that these guys are in Afghanistan and
Pakistan. The DEA didn't even have an office in Afghanistan until after
9/11, so they have a lot of catching up to do."

The senior U.S. military intelligence officer quoted above believes we
should be ready to undermine support for the Taliban and al Qaeda within
Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and military. "A large number
of ISI agents who are responsible for helping the Taliban and al Qaeda
should be thrown in jail or killed," he said. "What I think we should do in
Pakistan is a parallel version of what Iran has run against us in Iraq:
giving money, empowering actors. Some of this will involve working with some
shady characters, but the alternative--sending U.S. forces into Pakistan for
a sustained bombing campaign--is worse."

Seth Jones of RAND is cautious about this approach because of the heavy
support for the Taliban within the ISI. He notes that militants are
supported not just by rogue elements but seemingly at the top levels as
well. Certainly top leaders of ISI show little interest in arresting their
own.

Not only sticks, of course, but also carrots could be used to entice actors
in Pakistan to turn against al Qaeda. For example, the United States could
enhance the prestige of commanders and units within Pakistan's military who
willingly cooperated in efforts to root out extremism in the tribal areas.
America could make sure they had the best equipment by earmarking aid for
specific regiments or commanders. Similarly, U.S. military training could
focus on units and commanders who had demonstrated their willingness to
undertake military or policing efforts against extremist groups.

Whatever road we take in Pakistan will involve a substantial time
commitment, and progress is likely to be slow. American policymakers and
analysts still have a state-centric orientation, and have poorly
incorporated non-traditional actors into their strategic thinking. The long
process of improving our understanding of the Pakistani political scene at a
granular level is essential to success.

Every option for moving forward has its associated challenges and pitfalls.
But, contrary to some pessimistic views, we do have options. We are not
doomed to remain on our present course--supporting Musharraf no matter what
he does and bombing targets of opportunity, with no plan for destroying al
Qaeda's new safe haven. That course is plainly ineffective. Worse, it may be
preparing the way for another catastrophic terrorist attack on the United
States--an attack that would inevitably lead to major military action.
Rather than continue to drift toward a wholesale air campaign or ground
invasion that threatens to bring still greater instability and danger, we
would do far better to act now, using every means at hand to craft an
alternative strategy.

 



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