Why does Turkey hate America?
By Spengler 
 <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IJ23Ak01.html>
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/IJ23Ak01.html

With Turkish troops poised to invade the Kurdish sector of Iraq over 
Washington's protests, it seems helpful to understand why Turks hate 
America more than any other people in the world. This is surprising 
given the 60-year history of military alliance, a thriving Turkish 
economy and functioning democratic institutions. 

In June 2007, the Pew Research Center polled citizens of 47 
countries on their attitude toward the US. Turkey turned up at rock 
bottom, with 83% of respondents holding an unfavorable view
of the United States and only 9% of Turks expressing a favorable 
view, compared to 21% of Egyptians and 29% of Indonesians. [1] In 
2000, 52% of Turks expressed a favorable view of the United States. 
This is not a general result. Only 46% of Nigerians held a favorable 
view of the United States in 2000, for example, compared to 70% in 
2007. 

A national tantrum against the United States is in full flourish, 
expressed in popular culture through such things as the rabidly anti-
American film Valley of the Wolves. Wildly successful, and hailed by 
most of Turkey's leading politicians, the film shows American 
soldiers shooting Iraqi civilians in order to harvest their organs 
for sale to Jewish doctors. From the American way of looking at 
things, the Turks seem to have gone barking mad. 

There are many obvious reasons for Turkish discomfort about America, 
but the intensity of Turkish hatred had me puzzled - until I read a 
two-year-old paper by Omar Taspinar, the resident Turkey expert at 
the Brookings Institution. [2] The culprit, he argued convincingly, 
is Washington's misguided promotion of Turkey as a model 
of "moderate Islam". The abominable stupidity of American policy 
towards the region - I would use stronger words if I could find 
them - is in large measure responsible for the looming catastrophe. 

Professor Taspinar, who also teaches at the National War College, is 
one of America's best-known experts on his native country, and I am 
chagrined to have overlooked his analysis until now. He places most 
of the blame on Washington's portrayal of Turkey as a paragon of 
the "moderate Islam" it wants to sell to the rest of the Muslim 
world. 

As I wrote last week, the humiliating spectacle of Washington trying 
to squelch a congressional resolution on the Armenian genocide 
points up fundamental failings in American foreign policy, as well 
as foundational flaws within Turkey itself. Taspinar's paper in the 
main reinforces my view of Turkey's weakness; Turkish rage and 
paranoia express conflicts in its national identity. 

Dr. Taspinar writes, 
As the Cold War came to an end, so did the era of ideology. It was 
as if Turkey had suddenly once again returned to its formative 
decades of the 1920s and 1930s, during which Ataturk's Ankara faced 
multiple Kurdish-Islamic rebellions challenging the secularist and 
nationalist precepts of Kemalism. This is mainly because the central 
point that I would like to emphasize is that Turkey's anti-
Americanism essentially stems from Turkey's own identity dilemma. At 
its roots, Turkey's current wave of distrust of the United States is 
Kemalist identity problem.

By promoting "moderate Islam" on the Turkish model, Taspinar adds, 
America undermined the secular state founded by Kemal Ataturk, the 
founder of the modern Turkish state after the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire after World War I. That is why secular Turkish 
nationalists hate America just as much as Turkish Islamists. 

Taspinar writes: 
America's advocacy of "moderate Islam" against the "radical Islam" 
in the Middle East worries Turkey the most. Turkey being portrayed 
as a model within the moderate Islam project has been conceived as a 
support for the moderate Islam in Turkey, thereby led to a clash 
between America's approach and Turkey's laic and Kemalist identity. 
Already alarmed over the landslide victory of Justice and 
Development Party (AKP), the Republic's laic reflexes have become 
overwhelmingly concerned with the "model" expression of the US, 
which allegedly promoted Turkey's moderate Muslim identity. In the 
aftermath of his victory, Washington's invitation to the AKP 
Chairman Tayyip Erdogan, who was not confirmed as a prime minister 
then, was perceived [by the Turkish intellectuals] as the weakening 
of the secular foundations of Ataturk's republic by the United 
States.

Ataturk suppressed Islam ruthlessly, banning Islamic dress, 
emancipating women, requiring universal secular education, and 
crushing armed Islamist resistance to his reforms. Ultimately he 
failed; the artificial secular culture of Turkishness that Ataturk 
sought to conjure from the pre-Islamic Anatolian past left a vacuum 
which the new Islamism gradually has filled. Nobel Prize winner 
Orhan Pamuk, as I reported earlier, portrays this vividly in his 
novel, Snow. 

Turkey is enmeshed in a terrible battle for its national identity, 
in which neither the secular nor the Islamist parties have any use 
for "moderate Islam". The Islamists do not wish to be moderate, and 
the Kemalists know that the Islamists are not moderate. By pursing 
the phantasm of a "moderate" Islam as harmless as George W Bush's 
Methodism, Washington's strategists have succeeded in enraging both 
sides in the battle. 

I have never believed that such a thing as "moderate Islam" exists, 
any more than I believe that "moderate Christianity" exists. Either 
Jesus Christ died to take away the sins of the world, or he did 
not; if one believes that Jesus was just another preacher with a 
knack for parables, one quickly will be an ex-Christian. Either God 
dictated a final revelation to Mohammed which invalidates the 
corrupted scriptures of Jews and Christians, and the sign of the 
crescent should rise above the whole world, or he did not. Turkey's 
Islamists are not moderates; they are Islamists, and they despise 
the United States for religious and cultural reasons, as much as 
Turkish nationalists despise the United States for making Turkey 
into a laboratory rat for religious reform. 

The common hatred of Kemalist nationalists and Turkish Islamists for 
America bears on why Turks have the worst opinion of Christianity of 
any people in the world. According to a 2005 Pew survey, only 21% of 
Turks have a favorable opinion of Christianity, compared to 33% of 
Moroccans, 58% of Jordanians, and 58% of Indonesians. [3] The 
Kemalists dislike Christians because the Kemalists are atheists, and 
the Islamists dislike Christians because they are Islamists. 
Christian America gets no sympathy from either side. 

That is only part of the story; Kemalism defined as Turks the 
Kurdish fifth of Turkey's population, suppressing their language and 
customs as brutally as it suppressed Islamic dress. As a leader of 
the "Young Turk" government, Ataturk bore at least some 
responsibility for the genocide against the Anatolian Armenians 
starting in 1915. The Turkish government enlisted Kurdish tribes to 
do most of the actual killing, in return for what formerly was 
Armenian land. It is this crime that made the Kurds preponderant on 
Turkey's Eastern borders, and left them to threaten Turkey's 
territorial integrity. 

That is where Taspinar's analysis converges with the thoughts I 
published last week. He wrote in 2005, 
The debate on Turkey's role in the promotion of "moderate Islam" and 
as a "model" had already created anti-Americanism within the Turkish 
elite. The Kurdish issue, in contrast, has carried this anti-
American sentiment to public and rejuvenated nationalist reactions. 
Today almost everyone in Turkey - of course we also include the 
intellectuals in this category - thinks that Washington supports a 
Kurdish state in Iraq. The ones who do not necessarily believe that 
Washington pursues this policy on purpose are nevertheless inclined 
to think that America's policies will eventually result in a similar 
scenario.

As I wrote last week, the prospect of a tri-partite division of 
Iraq, endorsed by the US Senate in a 75-23 vote last month, 
confirmed Ankara's worst fears. Virtually all the Senate Democrats 
and half the Republicans now endorse partition as an exit strategy 
for the United States. No one but the most abject toady of the 
Washington administration or a blinkered ideologue can come up with 
an exit strategy for Washington other than partition. Partition 
implies the realization of Turkey's worst nightmare (and one of the 
nastier nightmares for Iran and Syria), namely an independent 
Kurdish state with its capital at Kirkuk, the "Kurdish Jerusalem", 
sitting on abundant oil revenues. 

In this respect Turkey is far from paranoid: a Kurdish state does 
threaten Turkey's territorial integrity, because the state that 
Kemal fashioned 80 years ago was badly made to begin with. That is 
something that today's Kemalists cannot admit, for their only weapon 
against the encroachment of political Islam is the integrity of 
Ataturk's secular constitution. 

As Taspinar observed in 2005, "that the Kurds refer to Kirkuk 
as 'our Jerusalem' causes disturbance. In this context, not only 
Turkey's reaction evokes fear, but there is also a legitimate 
anxiety over a potential civil war following from Kirkuk's 
uncertainty." His analysis is correct, but nowhere is it written 
that Washington must try to avert a Turkish civil war. America's 
civil war was the best and bravest thing it ever accomplished; it 
washed away the stain of slavery with an ocean of blood. The cost 
was terrible, but human freedom is beyond price. If Turkey requires 
a civil war to choose between a Western and Islamic identity, who is 
to say that what was good for America is not the cure for Turkey as 
well? 

Kurdish independence cannot long be prevented; Iraqi Kurdistan is 
independent in all but name, and the devolution of Iraq is only a 
matter of time. In a well-ordered world the Kurds of eastern Turkey 
would be able to vote on whether to remain in Turkey or to join 
Kurdistan, just as the Saarland chose to join France rather than 
Germany in 1947. But Kurdish secession would tear apart the fragile 
bonds that hold the Kemalist state together, and for that reason the 
Islamists and the Kemalists will unite to prevent it by almost any 
means necessary. 

It does not matter whether the US Congress passes a resolution on 
the Armenian genocide. Irregardless, the tragedy will proceed. I 
would vote for such a resolution if asked, because my religion 
forbids me to bear false witness, and the governments of world 
powers must stand as witnesses to the fate of peoples. But the 3 
million citizens of the small surviving state of Armenia are not 
actors in this tragedy; rather, the ghosts of their murdered 
brethren in western Armenia haunt the geopolitical stage as a silent 
chorus. 

Notes 
[1] Global Unease With Major World Powers Pew Global Attitudes 
Project, June 27, 2007. 
[2] The Anatomy of Anti-Americanism in Turkey The Brookings 
Institution, October 22, 2007. 
[3] Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western Publics 
Pew Global Attitudes Project, July 14, 2005 



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