INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT

Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries 


Jakarta/Brussels, 23 October 2007: Thailand’s increasing reliance on poorly
trained and loosely supervised paramilitary and militia forces is
complicating its efforts to tackle the insurgency in the South.


Southern Thailand: The Problem with Paramilitaries


Asia Report N°140 
23 October 2007 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Thailand’s increasing reliance on paramilitary forces and civilian militias
is hindering efforts to tackle the insurgency in its majority Muslim
southern provinces. A bewildering array of paramilitary organisations works
alongside and often in parallel to the regular military and police. There
are advantages to using irregular forces. They are quicker and cheaper to
train and deploy and tend to have more flexible command structures. Locally
recruited volunteers have better local knowledge than troops brought in from
outside. But they are also inadequately trained and equipped, confuse
already difficult command and control arrangements and appear in some cases
to make communal tensions worse. While paramilitaries are likely to continue
to be deployed in the South, the government should move toward consolidating
security arrangements and, in the longer term, concentrate on improving its
regular security forces. 

Paramilitary organisations and village militias have played significant
roles in policing and counter-insurgency throughout Thai history,
particularly against communist and separatist guerrillas during the 1970s
and 1980s. Over the last decade, these forces have taken on new roles, from
controlling refugee camps on the border with Myanmar/ Burma to prosecuting
the “war on drugs” in 2003. But the most significant expansion has been for
the suppression of separatist violence in the South.

The army has tripled the strength of the paramilitary “ranger” force (Thahan
Phran) in the South since violence surged in 2004, despite its well-deserved
reputation for brutality and corruption. It has made some reforms,
particularly in screening recruits, since the 1980s and on the whole is a
more professional force than twenty years ago, but serious problems with
discipline and human rights abuses remain.

The military’s key rationale for recruiting new ranger units in the South
was to create a local force familiar with the terrain, language and culture.
In practice, however, no more than 30 per cent of new recruits are local
Malay Muslims. The overwhelming majority of southern Muslims continue to
fear and mistrust the rangers. Several suspected extrajudicial killings in
2007 have confirmed their suspicions and played into the hands of militant
propagandists. Insurgents are also believed to have carried out attacks
dressed in ranger uniforms, in order to whip up anti-state sentiment. 

The interior ministry has its own paramilitary force, the Or Sor (Volunteer
Defence Corps). Known to be fiercely loyal to its ministry bosses, though
less problematic than the rangers, it is widely viewed as the armed enforcer
of the ministry’s district officers.

The largest armed force in the South – after a massive expansion in
2004-2005 – is a civilian militia, the Village Defence Volunteers (Chor Ror
Bor). Though senior government and military officials have questioned their
effectiveness, the Chor Ror Bor still constitute the main form of security
in most villages. Poorly trained, isolated and vulnerable, they are often
unable to protect themselves and their weapons, let alone their communities.
Militants have stolen the guns of hundreds since 2004. Some Chor Ror Bor
have also turned their guns on fellow villagers when local security
incidents have gone beyond control. Yet a plan was announced in July 2007 to
recruit an additional 7,000 by the end of 2009.

Despite the evident problems with existing village militias, the Royal
Aide-de-Camp department, under Queen Sirikit’s direction, established a
parallel volunteer scheme, the Village Protection Force (Or Ror Bor) in
September 2004. Its volunteers receive ten- to fifteen-days military
training, an improvement on the Chor Ror Bor’s three days, but hardly
adequate for confrontations with well-armed and organised militants. Unlike
the Chor Ror Bor militia, whose make-up broadly reflects the demographic
balance of the region, the Or Ror Bor is almost exclusively Buddhist, often
stationed in temple compounds and tasked with protecting Buddhist
communities. 

The Buddhist minority in the South feels increasingly threatened. Muslim
militants have attempted to drive Buddhists from several areas. Officials,
civilians and even monks have been targeted in gruesome killings apparently
designed to provoke retaliation. Many Buddhists, frustrated with the
government’s failure to provide adequate protection, are taking matters into
their own hands. Private militias are being established throughout the
South, with varying degrees of official sanction and support. 

The proliferation of poorly trained, loosely supervised militias in a
volatile conflict in which civilians are the main victims confuses command
and control arrangements, weakens accountability and heightens the risk of
wider communal violence. However, the inability of the regular army to cope
with the security threat posed by the Muslim separatist militants suggests
that Thailand will continue to use paramilitaries for the foreseeable
future. Nevertheless, the government should:

*       

        review the effectiveness of each paramilitary and militia force as
the first step toward consolidating security arrangements;
*       

        provide additional military and humanitarian law training and
supervision to the Thahan Phran “rangers”, to improve discipline and curb
abuses;
*       

        work to phase out, disarm and disband the various village militias,
whose impact on security is negligible;
*       

        tighten controls on guns and gun licenses;
*       

        prevent the operation of private sectarian militias, whose emergence
is an extremely worrying trend, and bring their sponsors within the
government and security forces into line; and 
*       

        shift emphasis over time and concentrate on improving the
professionalism and strength of its regular military and police rather than
arming untrained and jumpy civilians. 

Jakarta/Brussels, 23 October 2007 

  _____  

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 2 541 1635
Giulia Previti (Washington) 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here
<http://www.icg.org/home/index.cfm?action=form&fid=16&l=1> 
*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website:
<http://www.crisisgroup.org/> http://www.crisisgroup.org 
  _____  


The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit,
non-governmental organisation covering some 60 crisis-affected countries and
territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and
high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict. 

  _____  





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