<http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/10/a_caliphs_frustration_with_his.php>
A Caliph's frustration with his emirs

Yesterday, October 22, 2007, 9:08:10 PM | Walid Phares
<http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/10/a_caliphs_frustration_with_his.php>
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http://counterterrorismblog.org/2007/10/a_caliphs_frustration_with_his.php

Yes, Bin Laden’s latest audiotape aired on al Jazeera is somewhat unique.
Not in its ideological party line or in the Salafi doctrinal roots. That
hasn’t changed nor is it expected to. Surely, in a previous speech he
inserted some neo Marxist and Trotskyite stuff; but that was part of his
“American” rhetoric, and possibly at the request of his Gringo advisers.
Today’s audio wasn’t concerned about Berkeley’s approval but was dedicated
to whip the chaotic commanders of Jihad in Iraq. Usama’s message was more so
the expression of a frustrated (self appointed) “Caliph” trying to reign in
on his emirs gone wild in the deserts of Middle Earth. The “Lord” is upset
with how al Qaeda Iraq has administered the struggle, the people and the
image. Incredibly, the number one of al Qaeda said the ÇáãÌÇåÏíä
“Mujahidins” in Iraq committed ÃÎØÇÁ “mistakes.” I purposely quoted the
words in Arabic because this was indeed the first time the man used them in
this context: self criticism. In fact he criticized the “emirs” for the
recklessness of their Jihad in the land of the two rivers. If one reviews
the public statements of Bin Laden, at least since 1996, this would be the
first time he would talk about the Jihadists’ mistakes, not the errors by
Muslim rulers in general: Now these are his own fighters who are at fault.
The last time an al Qaeda leader came close to this attitude was the shy
warning by Ayman Zawahiri to Zarqawi demanding that the killing of Shiia
stops in Iraq. But the top leader at the time wasn’t addressing the mistakes
of the emirs. He dealt with “higher geopolitical matters” per the comments
of Abdel Bari Atwan on al Jazeera tonight. “Sheikh Bin Laden, said Atwan
deals with high level issues, such as the confrontation with the United
States, India etc, but this time the Sheikh is dealing with issues on the
ground.”

Maybe not so comparable in context, but see it as a summoning by the
“Fuhrer” to his Generals after losing Libya, Stalingrad or Normandy. The
plan of the high commander was excellent, but the commanding officers messed
it up, would be a possible analogy. Indeed since that speech delivered on
February 11, 2003 in which Usama asked his worldwide Jihadists to prepare
for Iraq and form the expeditionary corps to fight the Kuffar (infidels) for
Baghdad, the Terror activities were scoring points: instability, bloodshed,
sectarian violence, further recruitment, and political chaos behind enemy
lines, that is within the West, particularly in America. But things began to
change as the “generals” started to act as owners of the land. Again on al
Jazeera (swiftly after the tape was released), another commentator
Abdelwahhab al Qassab, said the reason of the set back was the interference
of al Qaeda (foreign fighters) in Iraqis daily lives. Qassab is right, I’d
argue, the emirs went wild in Iraq with the Sunni population, particularly
with the tribes. They went a la Khmer Rouge with traditional communities and
even with local Islamists. On al Jazeera, other commentators said al Qaeda
and its competitors committed the errors “of Algeria.” Interestingly this
statement means loads to the analysts who have observed the civil war in
Algeria in the 1990s. The mainstream Front Islamique du Salut (Slavation
Islamic Front) first, then its first off shoot, the “Armed Islamic
Groupings” and lastly the second generation off shoot “Salafi Group of Call
and Combat;” all of them going from extreme to more extremism, got
themselves involved in a mass bloodshed with the Algerian population.
Ironically the academic elite in the West, lost in the labyrinth of
interpretation, portrayed the Algerian Jihadists as an interim force for
change (!) Stunningly, it is al Qaeda today -in the words of Bin Laden-
which is stating that the Algerian type of reckless Jihadism is
irresponsible. This is so telling in terms of the Western failure in reading
the barbarism of the Salafists in the 1990s, and in doubling this failure of
analysis by asserting since 2003 that al Qaeda Iraq is an expression of the
Iraqis opposing the “foreign occupation.” 

Well, here we have the chief of the organization telling the world that
excesses were committed in Iraq, which led to divisions and to alienating
tribes and urban communities. Indeed, in his letter to the “Iraqi people”
Bin Laden is asking -ironically- for a change of direction by his own
followers. Actually, for more precision the audio message’s title doesn’t
use the term ÔÚÈ ÇáÚÑÇÞ Shaab al Iraq , accurately translated into the
people of Iraq but the term áÃåá ÇáÚÑÇÞ “ahl al Iraq” which would translate
into: population, communities or even the inhabitants, as an ideological
indication that Iraqis aren’t a people of their own but a segment of the
Umma (Islamic Nation). His linguistic game aims at telling his audience that
local and transnational Jihadis are in fact one in their struggle. In short
here are his points:

1. All Jihadists -read also Islamists- in Iraq must unify; meaning all power
struggles should cease. 

2. “Mistakes” were made indeed and they need to be corrected. 

3. The “tribes” cannot be marginalized and made into enemies. They should be
recuperated.

4. Clerics, with strong fatwas should be the mentors of the reunified Jihadi
movement. 

5. The main new direction is that the Jamaa (read the collectivity) primes
over the selfish leadership of one or multiple emirs. That’s the bottom
line. 

6. Last but not least, all Jihadists must come to a center of gravity where
everyone has to make a concession.

Always on al Jazeera, yet another commentator Dhaya' Rashwan said that Bin
laden is telling his supporters in Iraq to make concessions on few things
and unite with all other insurgents to defeat the US. And as in magic,
Abdelrahman al Jabburi -the spokesperson of the “Iraqi resistance,” a
competitive group, called in (al Jazeera) and declared that “indeed local
Jihadists must seize the opportunity and reorganize, unite.” Almost as in a
captivating movie, in about three hours, the master of al Qaeda had his
message aired, the commentators were ready to make very focused analysis -of
what it means- and leaders from inside Iraq calling in and approving. The
audio message was few minutes long while the whole back and forth debate was
few hours long. 

At the end of the day, this tape show -as I have argued since last summer-
that al Qaeda central feels that their strategic initiative in Iraq is
lagging behind. Two things went wrong for al Qaeda: One was the misbehavior
of its own barons on the ground, and two -one can see it clearer now- the
(US led) surge has worked so far. The Jihadi combat machine is flying low
and is going through turbulences. Any major decision in Washington can
accentuate this direction down or release it up. Ben Ladin has taken the
risk of exposing this reality to his foes. It should be read thoroughly and
responsibly inside the beltway. 

*****

Dr Walid Phares is the Director of the Future Terrorism Project at the
Foundation for the Defense of Democracies in Washington and the author of
The War of Ideas.

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