http://www.canada.com:80/ottawacitizen/news/arts/story.html?id=f75532d3-93c3
-4da0-a0e3-600f153a366e
<http://www.canada.com:80/ottawacitizen/news/arts/story.html?id=f75532d3-93c
3-4da0-a0e3-600f153a366e&k=69908> &k=69908
 
Deeper and deeper into Afghanistan
How Canada's 'exit strategy' brought our troops to the killing fields of
Kandaha
        
Peter McKenna   
The Ottawa Citizen      

 


 Canadian Soldiers on Patrol in Northern Kandahar
<http://media.canada.com/idl/otct/20071028/96810-31675.jpg?size=l>      
CREDIT: John D Mchugh, Agence France-Presse, Getty Images       
Canadian Soldiers on Patrol in Northern Kandahar        

The Book

The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar

By Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang

Viking Canada, $35

If you were to listen to former prime minister Jean Chrétien tell it, the
reason Canadian soldiers are dying in bloody Kandahar province is because of
Paul Martin's dithering. Had Martin moved more swiftly, instead of waiting
until all the other Afghan sectors had been claimed by Canada's
casualty-averse NATO allies, members of our armed forces would be
peacekeeping in the north today instead of warring in the dangerous south.

But in their new book, The Unexpected War, University of Toronto professor
Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang, a former chief of staff to two Liberal
defence ministers, have a different take on the Kandahar deployment. They
argue that it wasn't so much Martin's indecision that was to blame as it was
the year-long bureaucratic infighting between the Department of National
Defence and the Department of Foreign Affairs over the precise location and
mandate of Canada's Afghan commitment.

Additionally, no one in either government department expected that southern
Afghanistan would turn into a deadly war zone. This critical point about an
unexpected war, and what that says about our foreign and defence policy
establishment, is hammered home over and over again by Stein and Lang. As
they put it, "Canada slipped into war in Afghanistan, step by step,
incrementally, without fully understanding that it was going to war, until
it woke up to mounting casualties and grim battles."

The authors also make clear that if this was anyone's war, it was Chief of
the Defence Staff Gen. Rick Hillier's Afghan adventure--and not Paul
Martin's. The former PM disagreed with much of Hillier's selling job and
didn't think that Afghanistan was something the Canadian military should be
involved in, especially when humanitarian calamities in Darfur and Haiti
were more pressing.

>From the beginning of the book, it becomes very clear that senior Canadian
military officials pushed very hard for the federal government to make a
military contribution to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 and to
avoid joining the Kabul-based International Security Assistance Force like
the plague. The military brass felt Canada would find it difficult to get
its forces out of the ill-defined, semi-peacekeeping Kabul mission once they
committed to ISAF. Instead, they pushed very hard to join the American
forces in Kandahar province.

We also learn that these same officials knew precious little about
Afghanistan's troubled history of tribal warfare, resistance to outside
invaders or foreigners, or Afghan expertise in guerrilla insurgency.
Shockingly, no one at DND or Foreign Affairs had anticipated what former
defence minister Bill Graham would later describe as the eventual
"Iraqization of Afghanistan," with its suicide bombings and heavy fighting
-- preferring instead to label it "a more robust peace support role" for
Canada's armed forces.

More controversially, Stein and Lang inform us that former U.S. secretary of
defence Donald Rumsfeld and the Pentagon had no objections to Canada sitting
out the Iraq invasion -- as long as it took up the leadership of ISAF in the
Kabul region for one year and thus freed up U.S. forces for the Iraq
campaign. The Canadian government agreed to the Kabul commitment its
military leaders had strenuously opposed. As the authors rightly point out:
"This was a real opportunity for Canada to show international leadership,
and it would help get Canada off the hook on Iraq." Thus was spawned the
so-called "Afghanistan solution" to Canada's sticky political problem of
avoiding a military commitment in Iraq.

In terms of Afghanistan, they write that both the U.S. and Canadian
militaries embraced the Pentagon-inspired Provincial Reconstruction Team
(PRT) model for the Afghan provinces. The U.S. saw it as a way to get the
allies in and the Americans out and the Canadian military viewed it as an
exit strategy from its ISAF leadership role in Kabul. From DND's standpoint,
it would permit Canada to reduce its military deployment to 200 from its
ISAF commitment of 2,000 and to find a more manageable spot for its mission.

"What no one realized at the time was that, far from being an exit strategy
to a smaller, safer mission, the PRT would lead the Canadian Forces deeper
and deeper into the most dangerous part of Afghanistan," write the authors.

Eventually, the military recommended Kandahar for the PRT in late 2004 -- at
the time, it was not the violence-prone province that it would soon turn out
to be. According to Stein and Lang, though, it would be the newly-appointed
chief of defence staff, Gen. Hillier, who would persuade Paul Martin "to
send Canada's military deeper and deeper into the conflict in Afghanistan."
They also argue that Hillier convinced Stephen Harper to continue the combat
mission in Kandahar beyond the initial 2007 withdrawal date.

There is an uncomfortable and prickly thread that the authors weave
throughout the book -- namely, that Canada must undertake certain actions
internationally, often with the forceful prodding or manipulation of
Canada's military leadership, so as to please the White House and the
Pentagon.

In the words of the authors: "Canada's military missions were largely, if
not exclusively, determined on the basis of Ottawa's relationship with the
United States ... Afghanistan could have been anywhere. It was no more than
a spot on the map."

They go on to make the disturbing point that DND is now largely driving
foreign policy in Ottawa, that Foreign Affairs has badly lost its way and
influence, and that greater civilian oversight of the military is
desperately needed today.

The Unexpected War is a fine piece of work -- well-written, engaging,
informative and thorough (supported by inside information and insightful
personal interview material). For anyone interested in a first-hand account
of Canada's road to Kandahar -- and the political and bureaucratic
machinations that accompanied it -- this book is a must read.

As such, my criticisms of the narrative are mostly piddling: It could have
made a better effort to utilize Paul Cellucci's book, Unquiet Diplomacy, on
his tenure as U.S. ambassador to Canada; formulated a more revealing
analysis of why Harper wanted to extend the mission to 2009; discussed DND's
$25-million PR budget for selling the war to Canadians; and provided a
stronger concluding chapter to tie all the key points together.

Before the Harper government and members of Parliament vote on any extension
of Canada's Afghan mission to 2011, they should first read The Unexpected
War. More to the point, they should take careful heed of what the authors
warn: "The life cycles of insurgencies are not a year or two or three, but a
decade or a generation, and the Canadian Forces are now on the frontlines of
that insurgency."

Peter McKenna is an associate professor in the department of political
studies at the University of Prince Edward Island in Charlottetown.

© The Ottawa Citizen 2007

 



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