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Al Qaeda's generational split
Gregory D. Johnsen - Gregory D. Johnsen is an analyst for the Jamestown
Foundation and a PhD candidate in Near Eastern Studies at Princeton.
RECENT CONFUSION over the status of Jamal al-Badawi, one the masterminds of
the attack on the USS Cole in Yemen in 2000, illustrates the difficulties of
containing an increasingly fractured jihadist movement. Badawi, who escaped
from prison early last year, had surrendered to the Yemeni government in
early October, only to be released as part of a plea deal. These events have
sparked confusion and anger in the United States.
In Yemen, meanwhile, authorities have continued to make misleading and
ambiguous statements about his whereabouts. It would be easy to assume, as
many have done, that the country's reaction was that of a reluctant ally
eager to shirk its responsibility in the war against Al Qaeda. This reading,
as Rudy Giuliani suggested, demands that the United States threaten Yemen
with a reduction in aid.
But what to the United States is a cohesive organization bound together by a
common hatred is to Yemen a fragmented movement that is rife with infighting
and dissension.
Over the past several months, a generational schism has emerged within Al
Qaeda's ranks in Yemen, pitting younger, more radicalized members against
the more experienced old guard. Since 2003, the Yemeni government and Al
Qaeda in Yemen have reached what could best be described as a tacit
nonaggression pact. Through a combination of military action and
negotiation, Yemen has attempted to convince the militants not that their
beliefs are incorrect, but rather that they would hurt their own cause and
base of operations by acting violently within the borders of the state.
These negotiations have led to the release of numerous Al Qaeda operatives,
who have pledged not to carry out attacks within the country. Yemen has a
long tradition of co-opting its enemies; the government used this technique
to buy off southern officers after a secession attempt in 1994.
To the new generation of Al Qaeda in Yemen, many of whom have been
radicalized in Iraq, this arrangement is tantamount to a treasonous alliance
with tyrants. This summer, under the leadership of Nasir al-Wuhayshi - Osama
bin Laden's former secretary and a fellow escapee of Badawi's - the new
generation issued a statement articulating its policy.
The statement, which was aimed at Al Qaeda's old guard, warned that jihad
could not be paused in order to seek the release of prisoners. Indeed, the
new generation showed little interest in the worldly fate of those
prisoners. "If they are killed," the statement said, "they end up as
martyrs."
This rare, public outburst spoke volumes about the levels of dissension
current among Al Qaeda in Yemen. The old guard had advised younger members
to have patience and allow for negotiations with the Yemeni government to
continue. They were also concerned that any attacks within Yemen could lead
to a government crackdown on its leadership, much like what happened in the
aftermath of the USS Cole attack and the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.
The break between the two generations was finalized later in the summer
when, on July 2, a suicide bomber struck a caravan of tourists in Marib,
killing 10 people. After the attack Yemen has attempted to drive a wedge
between the two generations. Those members who agree to negotiate and pledge
not to carry out attacks in Yemen are rewarded with their freedom, while
authorities hunt down those who refuse, such as the four Al Qaeda members
who were killed in a raid on a safe house a month later.
The four months of negotiation and subsequent release of Badawi is coherent
with this strategy. Obviously, any policy that includes releasing terrorists
responsible for US deaths, especially a policy that is as opaque and
personalized as the Yemeni one, is not one that is designed to please the
United States. But the solution is not to try to change Yemen's priorities
by threatening to withdraw aid at a time when it is struggling with a host
of economic and security problems. An insistence on viewing all jihadists as
part of the same organization will not help either.
Yemen's effort to play two generations of Al Qaeda off against each other is
a nuanced and local response to a complex problem. The United States has to
realize that a one-size-fits-all approach to the war on terrorism is not in
its long-term interests. Diplomatic carrots rather than threatening sticks
are the only way to convince Yemen to pursue a counterterrorism strategy
that benefits both countries.
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