"Revelation" - Dirty Bomb Vulnerability Yesterday, February 09, 2008, 3:56:41 PM | Jay Fraser <http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/threatswatch/combined/~3/232388926/> Go to full article http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/threatswatch/combined/~3/232388926/
While admitting that the likelihood of a nuclear attack on a U.S. remains low, officials admit that they are not zero. But, we are finding out that defending cities against dirty bombs is difficult. That's the conclusion reached by the Department of Homeland Security after an NYPD helicopter fashioned with sensitive radiation detection equipment flew over Lower Manhattan in December. The fly over was actually a block-by-block hunt to find a black SUV in the Wall Street area carrying the components of a homemade radiological dirty bomb. As written by The Washington Post's Spencer <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/02/AR200802020 2220.html> Hsu, the half hour training exercise failed to identify the SUV despite the fact that the vehicle had a purposely planted "sample" of cesium-137. However, earlier in the day, a ground unit operating three kinds of vehicle sensors successfully detected the test sport-utility vehicle carrying cesium-137 on 42nd Street near Eighth Avenue, close to Times Square. The ability to detect even a radiological weapon is impacted by the sensitivity of the detector and the concentration of the material when a sample is taken. Being close to the "subject" and being able to detect the material is not really surprising. The implication of this material in the context of a "dirty bomb" is that an explosion with cesium-137 would paralyze the Wall St. financial district, not so much with a high casualty rate, but on the infrastructure (the materials could fuse with asphalt and concrete and prevent access to critical urban areas such as buildings, train stations, or tunnels). With time running short, police operators blamed technical glitches, and the pilot turned back to a West Side landing pad. The test sweep, which followed a secret, concerted search for radioactive materials in Manhattan by hundreds of local, state and federal officers before the city's New Year's Eve celebration, underscores the government's determination to prove this year that it can detect and disrupt nuclear threats to major cities. Once again it seems to be a question of evaluating the cost benefit relationships of defending against a low threat that might have enormous and catastrophic consequences if the "unlikely event" actually occurred. This is related to a program begun back in 2006 under the leadership of Vayl Oxford, director of DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Called "Securing the <http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf> Cities," the program is intended to enhance the protection and response capabilities in and around the Nation's highest risk urban areas by helping state and local officials to develop urban and regional deployment and operations strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the necessary support infrastructure, and develop incident management protocols to respond to a small scale "dirty bomb" attack. However, it should be noted that in some of the references on this program that some officials recognize that it isn't a perfect program, and that it needs to evolve. While that is true of almost any research program looking into uncharted areas, there has been a considerable amount of money spent on radiation detectors for our ports and transportation depots. But the question of addressing the threat of urban nuclear terrorism To date, the Securing the Cities program has cost approximately $90 million, with critics raising questions about its value in light of its expansion without any clear and specific threat of urban nuclear terrorism. Additionally, while the "plan" is to use the New York City detection system as a model for other cities, as shown by the fly over episode, the program faces significant technical challenges. Frankly, developing sensors to detect things, even radiological materials, is not a simple task, especially given variable and unpredictable dispersal patterns of weapons components. Michael Levi, a Council on Foreign Relations scholar and the author of the recently published book "On Nuclear Terrorism," said the Securing the Cities program may be useful but that its backers should be more open about its goals and limits. He also worries that too much is being spent on technology and not enough on coordination. Thus, while acknowledging that the program is not perfect, supporters like Jonah Czerwinski, an IBM homeland security consultant believe that it will evolve over time (that seems to be a reasonable assumption). Oxford's position, also reasonable, is that you don't want to wait for an attack on "a city with a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb and wait to figure that out. Together with the high risk New York always faces, we feel this is a prudent step to help secure that city, as well as to determine, 'Does this model work?' " In preparation for this unimaginable event, the DHS, NYPD, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three states and 91 localities have created a partnership in which local officers have been trained in radiation detection operations, and basic, hand-held radiation detectors have been distributed to thousands of police officers and others whose daily work has them crisscrossing the region. Additional funds have been allocated to purchase six half-million dollar trucks equipped with detectors distinguish different radioactive materials The problems are many. Some experts comment that current detection equipment would have a difficult time finding a lead-shielded improvised nuclear bomb with weapons-grade uranium. This type of a device would emit a much smaller radioactive signal. Additionally, continuing difficulties in communications and data transfer to manage monitoring efforts and in developing new investigative procedures remain challenges. This is just another chink in our defensive armor. Its not a criticism so much as it is a realization of the difficulties involved in detecting things like a radiological weapon in a densely populated area. None of this even touches on the very real question of air dispersion following an attack using a radiological, chemical or biological weapon. Attempts at modeling the air flow over the canyons in Manhattan have been performed. The actual results of course are classified. But imagine the difficulties in determining the direction in which a plume of just about any airborne toxin or agent, given the always variable wind directions up and down the avenues and the cross streets, and then stirred by the passing traffic or the subterranean rush of air up the Avenue of the Americas as a subways passes beneath. _____ Securing the Cities No Easy Task Developing System for Detecting 'Dirty Bombs' Hits Snags, Criticism http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/02/AR2008020202 220_pf.html By Spencer S. Hsu Washington Post Staff Writer Sunday, February 3, 2008; A03 NEW YORK -- A New York City Police Department <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York+City+Police+Depart ment?tid=informline> helicopter with an ultra-sensitive radiation detector affixed to its tail whipped through a wintry sky over Lower Manhattan <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Manhattan?tid=informline> last month, hunting block by block through the concrete canyons of Wall Street <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Wall+Street?tid=informline> for a black SUV containing the components of a homemade radiological "dirty bomb." The 30-minute training exercise failed to detect a deliberately planted chunk of radioactive cesium-137, a material that -- if dispersed by an explosive -- could paralyze the nation's financial nerve center. With time running short, police operators blamed technical glitches, and the pilot turned back to a West Side landing pad. The test sweep, which followed a secret, concerted search for radioactive materials in Manhattan by hundreds of local, state and federal officers before the city's New Year's Eve celebration, underscores the government's determination to prove this year that it can detect and disrupt nuclear threats to major cities. At an estimated cost of $90 million, the Securing the Cities program absorbs a small fraction of the Bush administration's overall national security and counter-proliferation expenditures. But critics have raised questions about its value, noting its rapid growth in the absence of a specific threat of urban nuclear terrorism, as well as the program's technical challenges and operational limitations. Its aims, Senate appropriators warned in a report last year, may be technologically unfeasible. The attempt to create a detection system in New York <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York?tid=informline> as a model for other cities is based on assumptions "that run counter to current intelligence in this threat arena, and has no measure of success, nor an end point," they said. Michael A. Levi, a Council on Foreign Relations <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S+Council+on+Foreign+Rela tions?tid=informline> scholar and the author of the recently published book "On Nuclear Terrorism," said the Securing the Cities program may be useful but that its backers should be more open about its goals and limits. He also worries that too much is being spent on technology and not enough on coordination. Supporters say that however slight the odds, the risks of a nuclear-related attack on New York or another U.S. city are not zero. And such an attack's consequences on the nation's economy, society and psyche would be too extreme to neglect a goal-line defense, they say. Securing the Cities may not be perfect, but it will evolve, "and the only way to evolve it over time is to test it," said Jonah J. Czerwinski, an IBM <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/IBM+Corporation?tid=informl ine> homeland security consultant who pushed for its creation. The United States spends $11 billion on missile defense each year, so "it seems lopsided to . . . not spend $40 million on programs like this." Vayl S. Oxford, director of the Department of Homeland Security <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Department+of+Homeland +Security?tid=informline> 's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which directs the program, said that his office hopes to complete in the next year a cost-benefit analysis of the New York effort to determine whether it can offer lessons to other cities based on resources, operational needs "and the likelihood of success." "We don't want to wait until someone has attacked a city with a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb and wait to figure that out," Oxford <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Oxford?tid=informline> said. "Together with the high risk New York always faces, we feel this is a prudent step to help secure that city, as well as to determine, 'Does this model work?' " To New York leaders, the dirty bomb threat is real. Before New Year's Day in 2004, the U.S. government dispatched scores of nuclear scientists with covert detection gear to scour five major cities including New York for radiation, based on intelligence intercepts of al-Qaeda <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline> operatives discussing an unspecified new attack. On Aug. 10, New York authorities briefly increased their detection efforts after a Web site that monitors jihadist Internet sites reported a dirty-bomb threat, which was subsequently discredited. "We have to take it seriously -- because New York is at the top of al-Qaeda's target list, and we are the last line of defense," said Richard A. Falkenrath, NYPD's deputy commissioner for counterterrorism and a former Bush White House <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+White+House?tid=informl ine> homeland security aide. Although a dirty bomb spewing nuclear materials would kill far fewer people than an improvised nuclear explosive, the materials could fuse with asphalt and concrete and prevent access to critical urban areas such as buildings, train stations or tunnels for years, causing a catastrophic economic impact, he said. The DHS, New York police, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Port+Authority+of+New+York+ and+New+Jersey?tid=informline> , and officials from three states and 91 localities have responded by forging a partnership that participants and outside experts have praised. More than 1,400 local officers have been trained in radiation detection operations, and basic, hand-held radiation detectors have been distributed to thousands of police officers and others whose daily work has them crisscrossing the region. Half a dozen advanced, $500,000 trucks with detectors capable of distinguishing different radioactive materials are also in use in Manhattan, along with classified vehicles, and more are on the way. Additional funds have been designated for training, field exercises, security improvements at hospitals and other high-risk sites where radioactive materials are present, and research into the effectiveness of using scanners at fixed points such as transportation nodes, Oxford said. The results were illustrated when hundreds of local, state and federal agents fanned out on highways and other approaches to Manhattan searching for telltale radiation signatures before New Year's Eve. Officers scanned warehouses, garages and other buildings as much as 80 miles away. On Dec. 31, authorities also set up checkpoints and monitored radiation sensors deployed on bridges, tunnels, boats and waterways around the island. In addition to conducting periodic aerial screening, New York police routinely set up checkpoints twice a day on Manhattan roadways as a defensive, training and deterrence measure. On the day the helicopter search failed, a ground unit operating three kinds of vehicle sensors successfully detected the test sport-utility vehicle carrying cesium-137 on 42nd Street near Eighth Avenue, close to Times Square <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Times+Square?tid=informline > . But independent experts warn that existing detectors are far less capable of finding an improvised nuclear bomb with lead-shielded, weapons-grade uranium, which would emit a much smaller radiation signal. Policymakers in Washington regard that as a far more serious threat than dirty bombs. New York worries just as much about the latter, and believes the program can provide an effective defense. Falkenrath said the New York system still has three pressing needs: better detection technology to find the most dangerous and shielded devices; better communications and data transfer links for managing monitoring efforts; and better procedures allowing police officers to investigate all alarms without disrupting traffic, which they can do in Manhattan but not on the approaching highways. "It's a difficult thing to do, and I'll be frank about it. . . . It requires really constant vigilance and effort to maintain it," Falkenrath said. "Certainly, if this model goes nationwide, they need a lot more help, because most other parts of the country are not going to have the ability to devote these sorts of resources" without cutting into everyday crime-fighting. New York paid the Department of Energy $800,000 in 2005 to map background radiation sources in the city -- a critical baseline requirement for detection efforts. The survey found 80 unexpected hot spots, including a public park on Staten Island <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Staten+Island?tid=informlin e> that was subsequently shut down. The DHS and the DOE were told to advertise their capability to other cities. So far, only Chicago <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Chicago?tid=informline> and Washington have expressed interest, Oxford said. The office that oversees Securing the Cities was created in 2006 with the support of Vice President Cheney <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Cheney?tid=informline> , and its $485 million 2008 budget is the largest part of the DHS's shrinking research portfolio, which includes aviation security, explosives and bio-defense. But its efforts have hit turbulence. Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff <http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+Chertoff?tid=inform line> in October delayed the deployment of as much as 1,400 advanced spectroscopic portal radiation detectors as part of a $1.2 billion program announced in July 2006 to screen trucks, cars and cargo containers at border crossings and ports. Congress withheld funds this year to buy the $377,000 machines amid concerns about the DHS's cost-benefit analysis used to justify their development. _____ 1 http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf The Nuclear and Radiological Threat: Securing the Global Supply Chain Opening Statement of Mr. Vayl S. Oxford Director Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Department of Homeland Security Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations March 28, 2006 2 Introduction Good morning, Chairman Coleman, Ranking Member Levin and distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and it is my pleasure to come before you today to discuss how we are responding to the threat of nuclear or radiological terrorism. I would like to thank the committee for the opportunity to share the progress we are making at DNDO and within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). Today, I will discuss several topics related to the use of technology to detect nuclear and radiological materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. I will review DNDO accomplishments in the past year, some of our program priorities for the upcoming years, and key, long-term challenges that we face. I will specifically touch upon the progress we have made with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the deployment of Radiation Portal Monitors (RPMs) at U.S. ports of entry (POEs), and how DNDO, and DHS as a whole, is considering innovative ideas like the Integrated Container Inspection System, or ICIS, which is being piloted at the Hong Kong Modern Terminal. Before describing our efforts, I would like to point out that protecting the United States from nuclear threats is a job that extends beyond the work of DHS, and I would like to thank our partners, in particular the Department of Energy (DOE) and CBP, who are here with me today, as well as the Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for their tireless dedication to this mission and for their contributions to our interagency office. DNDO Founding, Accomplishments, and the Road Ahead Combating the threat of catastrophic destruction posed by terrorists possessing nuclear or radiological weapons is one of the most critical priorities of not only DHS, but the U.S. Government. In order to integrate the Department's efforts against this threat under a singular direction, as well as coordinate these efforts with relevant partners across the government, Secretary Chertoff provided notification, in accord with Section 872 of the Homeland Security Act, of his 3 intent to establish the DNDO to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs on April 13, 2005. On April 15, 2005, the President signed a joint presidential directive NSPD-43/HSPD-14, "Domestic Nuclear Detection," establishing the office. DNDO was assigned the responsibility to direct nuclear and radiological detection technology development programs, and serve as the focal point of all radiological detection research and development collaboration between DHS, DOE, and other related Federal agencies. Full-time detailees from these agencies have since solidified our working relationship through their participation in all aspects of the DNDO mission. In the short time since its founding, the DNDO has taken major steps towards achieving its stated mission. We completed the first ever global nuclear detection architecture analysis that identified vulnerabilities and priority initiatives across Federal, State, and local governments. The architecture study was completed four months ahead of schedule and briefed to partner agencies and the White House in October and November of 2005. This architecture effort was funded and led by DNDO, but involved considerable interagency participation to deliver a consensus strategy to be implemented across the Federal government. It should be noted that the DNDO will not be responsible for implementing all, or even most, elements of the proposed architecture. We are responsible for implementing domestic components, but will work with other agencies, to include DOD, DOE, State, and the Department of Justice, to ensure the implementation of the entire architecture. In particular, the DNDO has been working with the DOE in the development of the international portion of the global architecture, which incorporates DOE programs such as Second Line of Defense. We are also in ongoing discussions about how next-generation detectors developed by DNDO may be deployed through the Megaports Initiative. As previously mentioned, full-time detailees from agencies such as DOE enable us to maintain an open and productive dialogue with our partners so that we may make strides towards the complete implementation of the proposed architecture. Other accomplishments include our acceleration of several technology development programs. We have completed the initial engineering development phase of the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal, or 4 ASP, program. This system development and acquisition program is improving current generation radiation portal monitors with the ability not only to detect the presence of radiation, but to identify the materials causing the alarms so that we can dismiss non-threatening sources. This enhanced capability will provide significant improvement for CBP secondary inspection operations, as well as greatly reduce secondary referral rates when operated as a means of primary inspection. Last fall, these engineering development programs culminated in the first ever high fidelity test and evaluation campaign to measure the true improvement in performance provided by these nextgeneration systems. The test data collected is now being used to support the selection of up to five vendors that will begin low-rate initial production, or LRIP. Additionally, these vendors will continue the development of the technology so we can deliver enhanced capabilities and additional design variants for unique operational venues. Twenty-four of the ASP LRIP units will be delivered to CBP for operational test and evaluation in the fall of this year, with full-rate production expected to begin in early 2007. We have recently begun the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System, or CAARS, development program to deliver imaging systems that will automatically detect, within cargo, highdensity material that could be used to shield threat materials from detection by radiation portal systems like ASP. The automated image processing techniques envisioned for CAARS will also substantially improve throughput rates over current generation radiography systems. These improved throughput rates will, in turn, enable CBP and other operators to effectively scan a much higher portion of cargo. The DNDO vision is to ultimately deploy ASP and CAARS systems together to ensure our ability to detect either unshielded or shielded materials across the entire threat spectrum. While cargo security remains one of our top priorities, the DNDO is also taking steps to improve nuclear detection capabilities within our Nation's borders. We have launched the Southeast Transportation Corridor Pilot program to deploy radiation detectors to truck weigh stations and other sites. These deployments will be at locations agreed to by our regional partners in accordance with the domestic detection architecture developed by the DNDO. Included in the pilot program will be the necessary training, technical reachback and operational protocols to ensure that detection 5 technology is being operated properly and that alarms are escalated as appropriate. I will speak more about this alarm escalation process shortly. We are also launching a "Securing the Cities" initiative aimed at enhancing protection and response capabilities in and around the Nation's highest risk urban areas. Starting with New York City, we will work with State and local officials to develop urban and regional deployment and operations strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the necessary support infrastructure, and develop incident management protocols to respond to a small scale "dirty bomb" attack. These two initiatives, when integrated, form the basis for the DNDO vision for an interior layer nuclear detection framework. As these initiatives mature, the lessons learned will be exported to other regions and cities to enhance our overall preparedness against nuclear and radiological threats. Moreover, we offer assistance to State and local officials developing grant applications, ensuring that short-term detection pilots support long-term capabilities. The DNDO plans to support the training of approximately 1,500 State and local operators in the use of rad/nuc detection equipment through fiscal year 2007. Our collaborative partnership with the DHS Office of Grants and Training allows us to administer funds and oversee the design, delivery, evaluation, and continual improvement of preventative rad/nuc training curriculum. Because of the varying levels of resident expertise encountered in State and local venues, the DNDO has developed a modular training curriculum that can be easily and rapidly tailored to the appropriate audience. The training modules span a range of topics, and currently include modules that cover "radiation 101," nuclear threat awareness, response protocols and specific equipment operation. As State and local operations increase, the DNDO will continue to work with the DHS Office of Grants and Training to deliver additional training options, such as "radiation detection for commercial vehicle inspection" or "radiation detection surge programs." The DNDO is also working with the State and local community, as well as nuclear experts in the National Labs, to establish regional technical reachback capabilities to support their operations. As alarms escalate, this program will provide technical expertise to operators to ensure that alarms are resolved properly or, if necessary, that alarms are elevated to the appropriate response assets. As 6 part of this support effort, the DNDO recently completed the development of a comprehensive U.S. Government process for alarm resolution that brings our procedures in line with the drastically altered security environment that we now face. This new alarm resolution process represents the first restructuring of the Federal alarm resolution and response protocols in over a decade. Even with all of the accomplishments I have outlined, there are still key, long-term challenges and vulnerabilities in our detection architecture that require a well-supported research and development program. These challenges include detecting threat materials from greater distances, in highly cluttered backgrounds, or in the presence of shielding and masking materials. We are launching initiatives to develop technologies to meet these challenges, as well as commencing a broad basic research program across private industry, National Labs, and academia to stimulate the entire field of nuclear detection sciences. RPM Deployment Strategy This committee has expressed particular interest in the progress of RPM deployment at U.S. POEs. I would like to take the opportunity to address this topic in detail. In its report entitled, "Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain," the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the "the Secretary of Homeland Security working with the Director of DNDO, in concert with CBP and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, or PNNL, devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and the rate to complete deployments by September 2009." DNDO concurred with this recommendation and now proposes a deployment strategy that will result in screening 98% of all containerized cargo crossing the southern border by fiscal year 2006 and at seaports by fiscal year 2007. This strategy will result in full coverage of all incoming containerized cargo by the end of fiscal year 2011. In this same report, the GAO also recommended that "once cost and capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are well understood, and before any new equipment is purchased, the Secretary of Homeland Security will work with the Director, DNDO to analyze the benefits and 7 costs of deploying advanced portal monitors." Again, we fully concur with the need for a deliberate process to ensure that public funds are used in a responsible manner, and that ASP systems, which do have a higher initial procurement cost, are deployed in a cost-effective manner. DNDO testing of ASP systems at the Nevada Test Site has since validated the systems' spectroscopic capabilities when compared with plastic-based systems and demonstrated, in some cases, a four-fold improvement in performance against threat-like objects and a 60% reduction in nuisance alarms generated by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM). This information is now guiding a joint DNDO-CBP analysis in support of a revised RPM deployment strategy that is an optimized mix of current- and next-generation technologies, balancing our need for better capability with coverage concerns and their associated costs. This new joint deployment strategy is predicated on placing ASP systems at the highest throughput ports, where reductions to secondary inspection rates will have the greatest benefit. Current-generation systems will continue to be deployed to lower volume ports, where operations can be easily sustained while still meeting detection threshold requirements. Initial results of this analysis support the decision to acquire over 600 detection units in fiscal years 2006 and 2007, including 184 current-generation RPMs and 106 next-generation portal systems this year, and 131 currentgeneration and 142 next-generation systems in fiscal year 2007. As I have mentioned, the DNDO relies heavily on the ability to obtain high fidelity, defendable test data in support of development, acquisition, and deployment decisions. DNDO testing activities are conducted throughout the product development process, and involve the National Labs, private industry and academia. The construction of the DNDO Radiological and Nuclear Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/NucCTEC) is expected to be complete this September and will offer the opportunity for further high-fidelity test and evaluation. The facility will provide the capability for handling of special nuclear material, or SNM, for the purpose of testing technologies against actual samples of materials that could be readily used in a nuclear attack. Until the construction of this facility, no location existed which allowed access to SNM while maintaining the flexibility to place these materials into relevant threat scenarios and cargo configurations. Through the Rad/NucCTEC, the DNDO will be able to gather performance data and conduct independent evaluations of prototypes and products in support of a fair and open acquisition process. 8 It is our belief that this testing environment, one which provides access to realistic threat scenarios in the spirit of independent assessment, provides a unique opportunity. While there are radiological and nuclear detection technology test activities at PNNL, Sandia, and Brookhaven National Laboratories, none currently have access to the quantities of materials available at the Rad/NucCTEC. The National Labs certainly possess other testing capabilities, such as the environmental test chambers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Therefore, the DNDO hopes to leverage, not duplicate these capabilities. Experts from the National Labs and the National Institute of Standards and Technology have and hopefully will continue to be members of the DNDO test teams. They help us scope our tests, conduct data analysis, and provide support personnel for operational evaluations at the DHS Science & Technology Countermeasures Test Beds. They have also worked with us on pilot deployments for CBP, as is the case with PNNL. Integrated Cargo Inspection While we have made great progress in the first year of our existence, including crafting a comprehensive strategy for technology development and deployment, the DNDO continues to aggressively seek innovative approaches to nuclear detection. Members of this committee traveled to Hong Kong this past December and were able to see a pilot project at the Hong Kong Modern Terminal called the Integrated Container Inspection System, or ICIS. I would like to applaud the private sector for creating new concepts for screening international containers like ICIS. Private sector container screening can be compatible with the U.S. Government's layered security strategy, and is another tool to further our ability to identify and address risks in an expedited manner. An integrated cargo inspection system, one that combines targeting, passive detection, radiographic imaging and information analysis would be a robust solution to the nuclear and radiological detection challenges that we face. The ICIS pilot at Hong Kong Modern Terminal demonstrates potential interest in private sector acquisition and operations of container screening technologies. It is a model for comprehensive passive and active inspection, as well as a model for public-private partnership. However, ICIS, as 9 deployed, is not an operational system. It utilizes currently available technology that is not optimized for radiation detection. DHS has sent teams to observe the ICIS pilot and determined that the technology they have used has potential, but still faces significant limitations. If ICIS, as it exists, is not a complete solution for nuclear detection, then what type of system do we think we need? The DNDO certainly favors an integrated system approach. At international seaports, every cargo container should be both passively and radiographically scanned. This would enable us to detect unshielded or lightly shielded materials with current and next-generation RPMs like ASP, as well as automatically detect highly-shielded threat materials using a radiographic scanner like CAARS. Detector data should be analyzed by the U.S. Government prior to cargo transit, with the CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS), manifest and detector data integrated for enhanced targeting capability. Additional targeted inspection utilizing mobile advanced RPMs with radiography systems could be performed upon arrival at a POE. Proposed approaches could include public-private partnerships with the mandate that the U.S. Government would receive all raw data streams. As we strive towards the goal of full coverage, we must not lose sight of our ultimate goal - protecting this Nation against nuclear and radiological terrorism. Private sector screening of international cargo could further enable DHS' ability to resolve security concerns related to identified high risk containers. However, such efforts must supplement, not replace, the need for advance data reporting and targeted inspection at our POEs. Conclusion In conclusion, the DNDO is taking a comprehensive approach to addressing the threat posed by a terrorist nuclear attack. This approach, which begins with focused research and development programs that culminate in high fidelity test and evaluation campaigns, provides the basis for the Department to make informed and justifiable acquisition decisions. Equally important is the recognition on behalf of DNDO that the successful deployment of these technologies must be done as part of a larger strategy, one that extends to deployments executed by other agencies. Ultimately, 10 all of these systems must be connected and work within an environment that responds to information obtained from intelligence, counterterrorism, and law enforcement communities. I am proud to have shared with you today how DNDO and its partners are continuing to make progress against this very real threat. I look forward to working with you on this subcommittee in an ongoing effort to protect the Nation. This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's permission, I request my formal statement be submitted for the record. Chairman, Senator Levin, and Members of the Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any questions you may have. (F)AIR USE NOTICE: All original content and/or articles and graphics in this message are copyrighted, unless specifically noted otherwise. All rights to these copyrighted items are reserved. Articles and graphics have been placed within for educational and discussion purposes only, in compliance with "Fair Use" criteria established in Section 107 of the Copyright Act of 1976. The principle of "Fair Use" was established as law by Section 107 of The Copyright Act of 1976. "Fair Use" legally eliminates the need to obtain permission or pay royalties for the use of previously copyrighted materials if the purposes of display include "criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, and research." Section 107 establishes four criteria for determining whether the use of a work in any particular case qualifies as a "fair use". A work used does not necessarily have to satisfy all four criteria to qualify as an instance of "fair use". Rather, "fair use" is determined by the overall extent to which the cited work does or does not substantially satisfy the criteria in their totality. If you wish to use copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml THIS DOCUMENT MAY CONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [EMAIL PROTECTED] -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Unsubscribe: [EMAIL PROTECTED] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. OSINT, as a part of The Intelligence Network, is making it available without profit to OSINT YahooGroups members who have expressed a prior interest in receiving the included information in their efforts to advance the understanding of intelligence and law enforcement organizations, their activities, methods, techniques, human rights, civil liberties, social justice and other intelligence related issues, for non-profit research and educational purposes only. We believe that this constitutes a 'fair use' of the copyrighted material as provided for in section 107 of the U.S. Copyright Law. If you wish to use this copyrighted material for purposes of your own that go beyond 'fair use,' you must obtain permission from the copyright owner. For more information go to: http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/17/107.shtml Yahoo! Groups Links <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/ <*> Your email settings: Individual Email | Traditional <*> To change settings online go to: http://groups.yahoo.com/group/osint/join (Yahoo! ID required) <*> To change settings via email: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: [EMAIL PROTECTED] <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/
