"Revelation" - Dirty Bomb Vulnerability 
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While admitting that the likelihood of a nuclear attack on a U.S. remains
low, officials admit that they are not zero. But, we are finding out that
defending cities against dirty bombs is difficult. That's the conclusion
reached by the Department of Homeland Security after an NYPD helicopter
fashioned with sensitive radiation detection equipment flew over Lower
Manhattan in December. The fly over was actually a block-by-block hunt to
find a black SUV in the Wall Street area carrying the components of a
homemade radiological dirty bomb. As written by The Washington Post's
Spencer
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/02/AR200802020
2220.html> Hsu, the half hour training exercise failed to identify the SUV
despite the fact that the vehicle had a purposely planted "sample" of
cesium-137.

However, earlier in the day, a ground unit operating three kinds of vehicle
sensors successfully detected the test sport-utility vehicle carrying
cesium-137 on 42nd Street near Eighth Avenue, close to Times Square. The
ability to detect even a radiological weapon is impacted by the sensitivity
of the detector and the concentration of the material when a sample is
taken. Being close to the "subject" and being able to detect the material is
not really surprising.

The implication of this material in the context of a "dirty bomb" is that an
explosion with cesium-137 would paralyze the Wall St. financial district,
not so much with a high casualty rate, but on the infrastructure (the
materials could fuse with asphalt and concrete and prevent access to
critical urban areas such as buildings, train stations, or tunnels).

With time running short, police operators blamed technical glitches, and the
pilot turned back to a West Side landing pad. The test sweep, which followed
a secret, concerted search for radioactive materials in Manhattan by
hundreds of local, state and federal officers before the city's New Year's
Eve celebration, underscores the government's determination to prove this
year that it can detect and disrupt nuclear threats to major cities.

Once again it seems to be a question of evaluating the cost benefit
relationships of defending against a low threat that might have enormous and
catastrophic consequences if the "unlikely event" actually occurred.

This is related to a program begun back in 2006 under the leadership of Vayl
Oxford, director of DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. Called
"Securing the  <http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf> Cities,"
the program is intended to enhance the protection and response capabilities
in and around the Nation's highest risk urban areas by helping state and
local officials to develop urban and regional deployment and operations
strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the
necessary support infrastructure, and develop incident management protocols
to respond to a small scale "dirty bomb" attack.

However, it should be noted that in some of the references on this program
that some officials recognize that it isn't a perfect program, and that it
needs to evolve. While that is true of almost any research program looking
into uncharted areas, there has been a considerable amount of money spent on
radiation detectors for our ports and transportation depots. But the
question of addressing the threat of urban nuclear terrorism

To date, the Securing the Cities program has cost approximately $90 million,
with critics raising questions about its value in light of its expansion
without any clear and specific threat of urban nuclear terrorism.
Additionally, while the "plan" is to use the New York City detection system
as a model for other cities, as shown by the fly over episode, the program
faces significant technical challenges. Frankly, developing sensors to
detect things, even radiological materials, is not a simple task, especially
given variable and unpredictable dispersal patterns of weapons components.

Michael Levi, a Council on Foreign Relations scholar and the author of the
recently published book "On Nuclear Terrorism," said the Securing the Cities
program may be useful but that its backers should be more open about its
goals and limits. He also worries that too much is being spent on technology
and not enough on coordination.

Thus, while acknowledging that the program is not perfect, supporters like
Jonah Czerwinski, an IBM homeland security consultant believe that it will
evolve over time (that seems to be a reasonable assumption). Oxford's
position, also reasonable, is that you don't want to wait for an attack on
"a city with a nuclear weapon or dirty bomb and wait to figure that out.
Together with the high risk New York always faces, we feel this is a prudent
step to help secure that city, as well as to determine, 'Does this model
work?' " 

In preparation for this unimaginable event, the DHS, NYPD, the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey, and officials from three states and 91
localities have created a partnership in which local officers have been
trained in radiation detection operations, and basic, hand-held radiation
detectors have been distributed to thousands of police officers and others
whose daily work has them crisscrossing the region. Additional funds have
been allocated to purchase six half-million dollar trucks equipped with
detectors distinguish different radioactive materials

The problems are many. Some experts comment that current detection equipment
would have a difficult time finding a lead-shielded improvised nuclear bomb
with weapons-grade uranium. This type of a device would emit a much smaller
radioactive signal. Additionally, continuing difficulties in communications
and data transfer to manage monitoring efforts and in developing new
investigative procedures remain challenges.

This is just another chink in our defensive armor. Its not a criticism so
much as it is a realization of the difficulties involved in detecting things
like a radiological weapon in a densely populated area. None of this even
touches on the very real question of air dispersion following an attack
using a radiological, chemical or biological weapon. Attempts at modeling
the air flow over the canyons in Manhattan have been performed. The actual
results of course are classified. But imagine the difficulties in
determining the direction in which a plume of just about any airborne toxin
or agent, given the always variable wind directions up and down the avenues
and the cross streets, and then stirred by the passing traffic or the
subterranean rush of air up the Avenue of the Americas as a subways passes
beneath.


  _____  

Securing the Cities No Easy Task
Developing System for Detecting 'Dirty Bombs' Hits Snags, Criticism
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/02/AR2008020202
220_pf.html

By Spencer S. Hsu
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, February 3, 2008; A03




NEW YORK -- A New York City Police Department
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York+City+Police+Depart
ment?tid=informline>  helicopter with an ultra-sensitive radiation detector
affixed to its tail whipped through a wintry sky over Lower Manhattan
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Manhattan?tid=informline>
last month, hunting block by block through the concrete canyons of Wall
Street
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Wall+Street?tid=informline>
for a black SUV containing the components of a homemade radiological "dirty
bomb."

The 30-minute training exercise failed to detect a deliberately planted
chunk of radioactive cesium-137, a material that -- if dispersed by an
explosive -- could paralyze the nation's financial nerve center. With time
running short, police operators blamed technical glitches, and the pilot
turned back to a West Side landing pad.

The test sweep, which followed a secret, concerted search for radioactive
materials in Manhattan by hundreds of local, state and federal officers
before the city's New Year's Eve celebration, underscores the government's
determination to prove this year that it can detect and disrupt nuclear
threats to major cities.

At an estimated cost of $90 million, the Securing the Cities program absorbs
a small fraction of the Bush administration's overall national security and
counter-proliferation expenditures. But critics have raised questions about
its value, noting its rapid growth in the absence of a specific threat of
urban nuclear terrorism, as well as the program's technical challenges and
operational limitations.

Its aims, Senate appropriators warned in a report last year, may be
technologically unfeasible. The attempt to create a detection system in New
York
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/New+York?tid=informline>
as a model for other cities is based on assumptions "that run counter to
current intelligence in this threat arena, and has no measure of success,
nor an end point," they said.

Michael A. Levi, a Council on Foreign Relations
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S+Council+on+Foreign+Rela
tions?tid=informline>  scholar and the author of the recently published book
"On Nuclear Terrorism," said the Securing the Cities program may be useful
but that its backers should be more open about its goals and limits. He also
worries that too much is being spent on technology and not enough on
coordination.

Supporters say that however slight the odds, the risks of a nuclear-related
attack on New York or another U.S. city are not zero. And such an attack's
consequences on the nation's economy, society and psyche would be too
extreme to neglect a goal-line defense, they say.

Securing the Cities may not be perfect, but it will evolve, "and the only
way to evolve it over time is to test it," said Jonah J. Czerwinski, an IBM
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/IBM+Corporation?tid=informl
ine>  homeland security consultant who pushed for its creation. The United
States spends $11 billion on missile defense each year, so "it seems
lopsided to . . . not spend $40 million on programs like this."

Vayl S. Oxford, director of the Department of Homeland Security
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/U.S.+Department+of+Homeland
+Security?tid=informline> 's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, which
directs the program, said that his office hopes to complete in the next year
a cost-benefit analysis of the New York effort to determine whether it can
offer lessons to other cities based on resources, operational needs "and the
likelihood of success."

"We don't want to wait until someone has attacked a city with a nuclear
weapon or dirty bomb and wait to figure that out," Oxford
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Oxford?tid=informline>
said. "Together with the high risk New York always faces, we feel this is a
prudent step to help secure that city, as well as to determine, 'Does this
model work?' "

To New York leaders, the dirty bomb threat is real. Before New Year's Day in
2004, the U.S. government dispatched scores of nuclear scientists with
covert detection gear to scour five major cities including New York for
radiation, based on intelligence intercepts of al-Qaeda
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Al+Qaeda?tid=informline>
operatives discussing an unspecified new attack. On Aug. 10, New York
authorities briefly increased their detection efforts after a Web site that
monitors jihadist Internet sites reported a dirty-bomb threat, which was
subsequently discredited.

"We have to take it seriously -- because New York is at the top of
al-Qaeda's target list, and we are the last line of defense," said Richard
A. Falkenrath, NYPD's deputy commissioner for counterterrorism and a former
Bush White House
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/The+White+House?tid=informl
ine>  homeland security aide.

Although a dirty bomb spewing nuclear materials would kill far fewer people
than an improvised nuclear explosive, the materials could fuse with asphalt
and concrete and prevent access to critical urban areas such as buildings,
train stations or tunnels for years, causing a catastrophic economic impact,
he said.

The DHS, New York police, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Port+Authority+of+New+York+
and+New+Jersey?tid=informline> , and officials from three states and 91
localities have responded by forging a partnership that participants and
outside experts have praised. More than 1,400 local officers have been
trained in radiation detection operations, and basic, hand-held radiation
detectors have been distributed to thousands of police officers and others
whose daily work has them crisscrossing the region.

Half a dozen advanced, $500,000 trucks with detectors capable of
distinguishing different radioactive materials are also in use in Manhattan,
along with classified vehicles, and more are on the way. Additional funds
have been designated for training, field exercises, security improvements at
hospitals and other high-risk sites where radioactive materials are present,
and research into the effectiveness of using scanners at fixed points such
as transportation nodes, Oxford said.

The results were illustrated when hundreds of local, state and federal
agents fanned out on highways and other approaches to Manhattan searching
for telltale radiation signatures before New Year's Eve. Officers scanned
warehouses, garages and other buildings as much as 80 miles away. On Dec.
31, authorities also set up checkpoints and monitored radiation sensors
deployed on bridges, tunnels, boats and waterways around the island.

In addition to conducting periodic aerial screening, New York police
routinely set up checkpoints twice a day on Manhattan roadways as a
defensive, training and deterrence measure. On the day the helicopter search
failed, a ground unit operating three kinds of vehicle sensors successfully
detected the test sport-utility vehicle carrying cesium-137 on 42nd Street
near Eighth Avenue, close to Times Square
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Times+Square?tid=informline
> .

But independent experts warn that existing detectors are far less capable of
finding an improvised nuclear bomb with lead-shielded, weapons-grade
uranium, which would emit a much smaller radiation signal. Policymakers in
Washington regard that as a far more serious threat than dirty bombs. New
York worries just as much about the latter, and believes the program can
provide an effective defense.

Falkenrath said the New York system still has three pressing needs: better
detection technology to find the most dangerous and shielded devices; better
communications and data transfer links for managing monitoring efforts; and
better procedures allowing police officers to investigate all alarms without
disrupting traffic, which they can do in Manhattan but not on the
approaching highways.

"It's a difficult thing to do, and I'll be frank about it. . . . It requires
really constant vigilance and effort to maintain it," Falkenrath said.
"Certainly, if this model goes nationwide, they need a lot more help,
because most other parts of the country are not going to have the ability to
devote these sorts of resources" without cutting into everyday
crime-fighting.

New York paid the Department of Energy $800,000 in 2005 to map background
radiation sources in the city -- a critical baseline requirement for
detection efforts. The survey found 80 unexpected hot spots, including a
public park on Staten Island
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Staten+Island?tid=informlin
e>  that was subsequently shut down. The DHS and the DOE were told to
advertise their capability to other cities. So far, only Chicago
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Chicago?tid=informline>
and Washington have expressed interest, Oxford said.

The office that oversees Securing the Cities was created in 2006 with the
support of Vice President Cheney
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Dick+Cheney?tid=informline>
, and its $485 million 2008 budget is the largest part of the DHS's
shrinking research portfolio, which includes aviation security, explosives
and bio-defense.

But its efforts have hit turbulence. Homeland Security Secretary Michael
Chertoff
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/related/topic/Michael+Chertoff?tid=inform
line>  in October delayed the deployment of as much as 1,400 advanced
spectroscopic portal radiation detectors as part of a $1.2 billion program
announced in July 2006 to screen trucks, cars and cargo containers at border
crossings and ports. Congress withheld funds this year to buy the $377,000
machines amid concerns about the DHS's cost-benefit analysis used to justify
their development.

 


  _____  

1    http://hsgac.senate.gov/_files/STMTDNDOOxford.pdf

The Nuclear and Radiological Threat: Securing the Global Supply Chain

Opening Statement

of

Mr. Vayl S. Oxford

Director

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office

Department of Homeland Security

Before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations

March 28, 2006

2

Introduction

Good morning, Chairman Coleman, Ranking Member Levin and distinguished
members of the

subcommittee. I am Vayl Oxford, the Director of the Domestic Nuclear
Detection Office (DNDO),

and it is my pleasure to come before you today to discuss how we are
responding to the threat of

nuclear or radiological terrorism. I would like to thank the committee for
the opportunity to share

the progress we are making at DNDO and within the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS).

Today, I will discuss several topics related to the use of technology to
detect nuclear and

radiological materials that could be used in a terrorist attack. I will
review DNDO accomplishments

in the past year, some of our program priorities for the upcoming years, and
key, long-term

challenges that we face. I will specifically touch upon the progress we have
made with Customs

and Border Protection (CBP) regarding the deployment of Radiation Portal
Monitors (RPMs) at

U.S. ports of entry (POEs), and how DNDO, and DHS as a whole, is considering
innovative ideas

like the Integrated Container Inspection System, or ICIS, which is being
piloted at the Hong Kong

Modern Terminal.

Before describing our efforts, I would like to point out that protecting the
United States from

nuclear threats is a job that extends beyond the work of DHS, and I would
like to thank our partners,

in particular the Department of Energy (DOE) and CBP, who are here with me
today, as well as the

Departments of Defense (DOD) and State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for their tireless dedication to this
mission and for their

contributions to our interagency office.

DNDO Founding, Accomplishments, and the Road Ahead

Combating the threat of catastrophic destruction posed by terrorists
possessing nuclear or

radiological weapons is one of the most critical priorities of not only DHS,
but the U.S.

Government. In order to integrate the Department's efforts against this
threat under a singular

direction, as well as coordinate these efforts with relevant partners across
the government, Secretary

Chertoff provided notification, in accord with Section 872 of the Homeland
Security Act, of his

3

intent to establish the DNDO to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security
and Government

Affairs on April 13, 2005.

On April 15, 2005, the President signed a joint presidential directive
NSPD-43/HSPD-14,

"Domestic Nuclear Detection," establishing the office. DNDO was assigned the
responsibility to

direct nuclear and radiological detection technology development programs,
and serve as the focal

point of all radiological detection research and development collaboration
between DHS, DOE, and

other related Federal agencies. Full-time detailees from these agencies have
since solidified our

working relationship through their participation in all aspects of the DNDO
mission.

In the short time since its founding, the DNDO has taken major steps towards
achieving its stated

mission. We completed the first ever global nuclear detection architecture
analysis that identified

vulnerabilities and priority initiatives across Federal, State, and local
governments. The architecture

study was completed four months ahead of schedule and briefed to partner
agencies and the White

House in October and November of 2005. This architecture effort was funded
and led by DNDO,

but involved considerable interagency participation to deliver a consensus
strategy to be

implemented across the Federal government.

It should be noted that the DNDO will not be responsible for implementing
all, or even most,

elements of the proposed architecture. We are responsible for implementing
domestic components,

but will work with other agencies, to include DOD, DOE, State, and the
Department of Justice, to

ensure the implementation of the entire architecture. In particular, the
DNDO has been working

with the DOE in the development of the international portion of the global
architecture, which

incorporates DOE programs such as Second Line of Defense. We are also in
ongoing discussions

about how next-generation detectors developed by DNDO may be deployed
through the Megaports

Initiative. As previously mentioned, full-time detailees from agencies such
as DOE enable us to

maintain an open and productive dialogue with our partners so that we may
make strides towards

the complete implementation of the proposed architecture.

Other accomplishments include our acceleration of several technology
development programs. We

have completed the initial engineering development phase of the Advanced
Spectroscopic Portal, or

4

ASP, program. This system development and acquisition program is improving
current generation

radiation portal monitors with the ability not only to detect the presence
of radiation, but to identify

the materials causing the alarms so that we can dismiss non-threatening
sources. This enhanced

capability will provide significant improvement for CBP secondary inspection
operations, as well as

greatly reduce secondary referral rates when operated as a means of primary
inspection. Last fall,

these engineering development programs culminated in the first ever high
fidelity test and

evaluation campaign to measure the true improvement in performance provided
by these nextgeneration

systems. The test data collected is now being used to support the selection
of up to five

vendors that will begin low-rate initial production, or LRIP. Additionally,
these vendors will

continue the development of the technology so we can deliver enhanced
capabilities and additional

design variants for unique operational venues. Twenty-four of the ASP LRIP
units will be

delivered to CBP for operational test and evaluation in the fall of this
year, with full-rate production

expected to begin in early 2007.

We have recently begun the Cargo Advanced Automated Radiography System, or
CAARS,

development program to deliver imaging systems that will automatically
detect, within cargo, highdensity

material that could be used to shield threat materials from detection by
radiation portal

systems like ASP. The automated image processing techniques envisioned for
CAARS will also

substantially improve throughput rates over current generation radiography
systems. These

improved throughput rates will, in turn, enable CBP and other operators to
effectively scan a much

higher portion of cargo. The DNDO vision is to ultimately deploy ASP and
CAARS systems

together to ensure our ability to detect either unshielded or shielded
materials across the entire threat

spectrum.

While cargo security remains one of our top priorities, the DNDO is also
taking steps to improve

nuclear detection capabilities within our Nation's borders. We have launched
the Southeast

Transportation Corridor Pilot program to deploy radiation detectors to truck
weigh stations and

other sites. These deployments will be at locations agreed to by our
regional partners in accordance

with the domestic detection architecture developed by the DNDO. Included in
the pilot program

will be the necessary training, technical reachback and operational
protocols to ensure that detection

5

technology is being operated properly and that alarms are escalated as
appropriate. I will speak

more about this alarm escalation process shortly.

We are also launching a "Securing the Cities" initiative aimed at enhancing
protection and response

capabilities in and around the Nation's highest risk urban areas. Starting
with New York City, we

will work with State and local officials to develop urban and regional
deployment and operations

strategies, identify appropriate detection equipment, establish the
necessary support infrastructure,

and develop incident management protocols to respond to a small scale "dirty
bomb" attack.

These two initiatives, when integrated, form the basis for the DNDO vision
for an interior layer

nuclear detection framework. As these initiatives mature, the lessons
learned will be exported to

other regions and cities to enhance our overall preparedness against nuclear
and radiological threats.

Moreover, we offer assistance to State and local officials developing grant
applications, ensuring

that short-term detection pilots support long-term capabilities.

The DNDO plans to support the training of approximately 1,500 State and
local operators in the use

of rad/nuc detection equipment through fiscal year 2007. Our collaborative
partnership with the

DHS Office of Grants and Training allows us to administer funds and oversee
the design, delivery,

evaluation, and continual improvement of preventative rad/nuc training
curriculum. Because of the

varying levels of resident expertise encountered in State and local venues,
the DNDO has developed

a modular training curriculum that can be easily and rapidly tailored to the
appropriate audience.

The training modules span a range of topics, and currently include modules
that cover "radiation

101," nuclear threat awareness, response protocols and specific equipment
operation. As State and

local operations increase, the DNDO will continue to work with the DHS
Office of Grants and

Training to deliver additional training options, such as "radiation
detection for commercial vehicle

inspection" or "radiation detection surge programs."

The DNDO is also working with the State and local community, as well as
nuclear experts in the

National Labs, to establish regional technical reachback capabilities to
support their operations. As

alarms escalate, this program will provide technical expertise to operators
to ensure that alarms are

resolved properly or, if necessary, that alarms are elevated to the
appropriate response assets. As

6

part of this support effort, the DNDO recently completed the development of
a comprehensive U.S.

Government process for alarm resolution that brings our procedures in line
with the drastically

altered security environment that we now face. This new alarm resolution
process represents the

first restructuring of the Federal alarm resolution and response protocols
in over a decade.

Even with all of the accomplishments I have outlined, there are still key,
long-term challenges and

vulnerabilities in our detection architecture that require a well-supported
research and development

program. These challenges include detecting threat materials from greater
distances, in highly

cluttered backgrounds, or in the presence of shielding and masking
materials. We are launching

initiatives to develop technologies to meet these challenges, as well as
commencing a broad basic

research program across private industry, National Labs, and academia to
stimulate the entire field

of nuclear detection sciences.

RPM Deployment Strategy

This committee has expressed particular interest in the progress of RPM
deployment at U.S. POEs.

I would like to take the opportunity to address this topic in detail.

In its report entitled, "Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress
Deploying

Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports of Entry, but Concerns Remain,"
the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the "the Secretary of Homeland
Security working

with the Director of DNDO, in concert with CBP and Pacific Northwest
National Laboratory, or

PNNL, devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and
the rate to complete

deployments by September 2009." DNDO concurred with this recommendation and
now proposes

a deployment strategy that will result in screening 98% of all containerized
cargo crossing the

southern border by fiscal year 2006 and at seaports by fiscal year 2007.
This strategy will result in

full coverage of all incoming containerized cargo by the end of fiscal year
2011.

In this same report, the GAO also recommended that "once cost and
capabilities of advanced

technology portal monitors are well understood, and before any new equipment
is purchased, the

Secretary of Homeland Security will work with the Director, DNDO to analyze
the benefits and

7

costs of deploying advanced portal monitors." Again, we fully concur with
the need for a deliberate

process to ensure that public funds are used in a responsible manner, and
that ASP systems, which

do have a higher initial procurement cost, are deployed in a cost-effective
manner. DNDO testing of

ASP systems at the Nevada Test Site has since validated the systems'
spectroscopic capabilities

when compared with plastic-based systems and demonstrated, in some cases, a
four-fold

improvement in performance against threat-like objects and a 60% reduction
in nuisance alarms

generated by naturally occurring radioactive materials (NORM).

This information is now guiding a joint DNDO-CBP analysis in support of a
revised RPM

deployment strategy that is an optimized mix of current- and next-generation
technologies,

balancing our need for better capability with coverage concerns and their
associated costs. This

new joint deployment strategy is predicated on placing ASP systems at the
highest throughput ports,

where reductions to secondary inspection rates will have the greatest
benefit. Current-generation

systems will continue to be deployed to lower volume ports, where operations
can be easily

sustained while still meeting detection threshold requirements. Initial
results of this analysis

support the decision to acquire over 600 detection units in fiscal years
2006 and 2007, including 184

current-generation RPMs and 106 next-generation portal systems this year,
and 131 currentgeneration

and 142 next-generation systems in fiscal year 2007.

As I have mentioned, the DNDO relies heavily on the ability to obtain high
fidelity, defendable test

data in support of development, acquisition, and deployment decisions. DNDO
testing activities are

conducted throughout the product development process, and involve the
National Labs, private

industry and academia. The construction of the DNDO Radiological and Nuclear
Countermeasures

Test and Evaluation Complex (Rad/NucCTEC) is expected to be complete this
September and will

offer the opportunity for further high-fidelity test and evaluation. The
facility will provide the

capability for handling of special nuclear material, or SNM, for the purpose
of testing technologies

against actual samples of materials that could be readily used in a nuclear
attack. Until the

construction of this facility, no location existed which allowed access to
SNM while maintaining the

flexibility to place these materials into relevant threat scenarios and
cargo configurations. Through

the Rad/NucCTEC, the DNDO will be able to gather performance data and
conduct independent

evaluations of prototypes and products in support of a fair and open
acquisition process.

8

It is our belief that this testing environment, one which provides access to
realistic threat scenarios

in the spirit of independent assessment, provides a unique opportunity.
While there are radiological

and nuclear detection technology test activities at PNNL, Sandia, and
Brookhaven National

Laboratories, none currently have access to the quantities of materials
available at the

Rad/NucCTEC. The National Labs certainly possess other testing capabilities,
such as the

environmental test chambers at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Therefore, the
DNDO hopes to

leverage, not duplicate these capabilities. Experts from the National Labs
and the National Institute

of Standards and Technology have and hopefully will continue to be members
of the DNDO test

teams. They help us scope our tests, conduct data analysis, and provide
support personnel for

operational evaluations at the DHS Science & Technology Countermeasures Test
Beds. They have

also worked with us on pilot deployments for CBP, as is the case with PNNL.

Integrated Cargo Inspection

While we have made great progress in the first year of our existence,
including crafting a

comprehensive strategy for technology development and deployment, the DNDO
continues to

aggressively seek innovative approaches to nuclear detection. Members of
this committee traveled

to Hong Kong this past December and were able to see a pilot project at the
Hong Kong Modern

Terminal called the Integrated Container Inspection System, or ICIS.

I would like to applaud the private sector for creating new concepts for
screening international

containers like ICIS. Private sector container screening can be compatible
with the U.S.

Government's layered security strategy, and is another tool to further our
ability to identify and

address risks in an expedited manner. An integrated cargo inspection system,
one that combines

targeting, passive detection, radiographic imaging and information analysis
would be a robust

solution to the nuclear and radiological detection challenges that we face.

The ICIS pilot at Hong Kong Modern Terminal demonstrates potential interest
in private sector

acquisition and operations of container screening technologies. It is a
model for comprehensive

passive and active inspection, as well as a model for public-private
partnership. However, ICIS, as

9

deployed, is not an operational system. It utilizes currently available
technology that is not

optimized for radiation detection. DHS has sent teams to observe the ICIS
pilot and determined that

the technology they have used has potential, but still faces significant
limitations.

If ICIS, as it exists, is not a complete solution for nuclear detection,
then what type of system do we

think we need? The DNDO certainly favors an integrated system approach. At
international

seaports, every cargo container should be both passively and
radiographically scanned. This would

enable us to detect unshielded or lightly shielded materials with current
and next-generation RPMs

like ASP, as well as automatically detect highly-shielded threat materials
using a radiographic

scanner like CAARS. Detector data should be analyzed by the U.S. Government
prior to cargo

transit, with the CBP Automated Targeting System (ATS), manifest and
detector data integrated for

enhanced targeting capability. Additional targeted inspection utilizing
mobile advanced RPMs with

radiography systems could be performed upon arrival at a POE. Proposed
approaches could include

public-private partnerships with the mandate that the U.S. Government would
receive all raw data

streams.

As we strive towards the goal of full coverage, we must not lose sight of
our ultimate goal -

protecting this Nation against nuclear and radiological terrorism. Private
sector screening of

international cargo could further enable DHS' ability to resolve security
concerns related to

identified high risk containers. However, such efforts must supplement, not
replace, the need for

advance data reporting and targeted inspection at our POEs.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the DNDO is taking a comprehensive approach to addressing the
threat posed by a

terrorist nuclear attack. This approach, which begins with focused research
and development

programs that culminate in high fidelity test and evaluation campaigns,
provides the basis for the

Department to make informed and justifiable acquisition decisions. Equally
important is the

recognition on behalf of DNDO that the successful deployment of these
technologies must be done

as part of a larger strategy, one that extends to deployments executed by
other agencies. Ultimately,

10

all of these systems must be connected and work within an environment that
responds to

information obtained from intelligence, counterterrorism, and law
enforcement communities.

I am proud to have shared with you today how DNDO and its partners are
continuing to make

progress against this very real threat. I look forward to working with you
on this subcommittee in

an ongoing effort to protect the Nation.

This concludes my prepared statement. With the committee's permission, I
request my formal

statement be submitted for the record. Chairman, Senator Levin, and Members
of the

Subcommittee, I thank you for your attention and will be happy to answer any
questions you may

have.

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