European Converts to Terrorism

by Milena Uhlmann
Middle East Quarterly
Summer 2008, pp. 31-37
http://www.meforum.org/article/1927 

Conversion to Islam among native Europeans is on the rise. Many converts
live at peace within their native societies; some convert only for marriage,
and reject neither contemporary culture nor Europe's Judeo-Christian values.
A minority, however, embraces radical interpretations of Islam and can pose
a security risk. The involvement of Muslim converts in recent terrorist
attacks has raised concern in Europe about these "converts to terrorism."
While intelligence agencies and security services track international
communications and guard borders, such homegrown terrorists pose just as
potent a threat to the security of Western democracies. European security
services and politicians remain unprepared to handle this growing
phenomenon.


A Growing Problem


In Europe, there is very little hard data on conversion to Islam due to the
difficulty of gathering proper statistics. Because Muslim communities
usually have an informal structure and no formal clergy, most do not keep
records. In France, for instance, state agencies do not record citizens'
religious affiliations; to do so, French officials say, would counter
France's commitment to secularism. In German registration offices, Muslim
residents are included in a pool of "diverse religious affiliations."[1]
German converts apparently account for only a small portion—between 12,000
and 100,000—of Germany's total Muslim population of 2.8-3.2 million,[2]
which itself comprises less than 4 percent of the total population of
Germany. In 2006, the Federal Ministry of the Interior commissioned a study
from the Zentralinstitut Islam-Archiv Deutschland (ZIIAD) to determine the
number of converts, but amid suspicion over the ZIIAD's methodology,
discounted as exaggerated its findings and ended its relationship with the
institute.[3]

Nevertheless, it appears that both conversions and Islamist outreach to
converts is increasing. Thomas Hamza Fischer, founder of the Islamisches
Informationszentrum (IIZ) in Ulm, a city in Baden-Württemberg known for its
radical Islamist scene, died fighting in Chechnya.[4] The IIZ's journal,
Denk mal Islamisch (Think Islamic) is geared to converts, addressing issues
such as emotional and personal support. The police, the German Federal
Office for the Protection of the Constitution (FOC), as well as the
Islamisches Informationszentrum's neighbors say that more German converts
have visited the center since summer 2007 than they had in seasons past.[5]
Apparently anticipating a ban by the Bavarian Ministry of Interior, the IIZ
dissolved in October 2007.[6]

In recent years, police and intelligence services have become increasingly
aware of the threat of homegrown terrorism. In 2003, Judge Jean Louis
Bruguière, the former French investigating magistrate in charge of
counterterrorism affairs, observed that Al-Qaeda had increased its
recruiting efforts in Europe and in particular was on the lookout for women
and converts to Islam.[7] In March 2004, the Dutch General Intelligence and
Security Service (AIVD) released an analysis of jihadi recruits'
backgrounds,[8] and the following year, the British Home and Foreign Offices
released a similar study.[9] In August 2007, the New York Police Department
released a report on radicalization within Western societies, focusing on
trends in homegrown terrorism and emphasizing the increasing role of
converts in terror plots.[10] Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany's federal minister
of the interior, argues that the prevalence of homegrown jihadis is
increasing.[11]

         <http://www.meforum.org/pics/large/9.jpg> 

Germaine Maurice Lindsay, also known as Abdullah Shaheed Jamal, was one of
four terrorists who detonated bombs on the London Underground and on a bus
in central London, July 7, 2005, killing fifty-six (including themselves)
and injuring more than 700. Lindsay, who changed his name after his
conversion to Islam, was born in Jamaica.

        
                
The 2004 murder of Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, the Madrid train bombings
the same year, and the following year's attacks on London's Tube and bus
system demonstrate that European citizens and residents can conduct
horrendous acts against their respective countries. The culmination of this
trend will be the planning of and participation in such attacks by European
converts to Islam.

On September 4, 2007, the German security services arrested three men for
plotting car bomb attacks in Germany targeting the U.S. military base at
Ramstein and pubs and nightclubs frequented by Americans.[12] Two of the
three were German-born converts to Islam.[13] This plot was not the first
involving German converts. In 1997, Israeli security services detained
Steven Smyrek at Ben Gurion International Airport as he tried to enter
Israel to survey possible Hezbollah terror targets.[14] Christian
Ganczarski, a Polish immigrant of German descent who had converted to Islam
in 1986, played a major role as the intermediary between Al-Qaeda's
leadership and the suicide bomber who carried out the 2002 bombing of a
Tunisian synagogue in Djerba, which killed twenty-one people.[15] In 2006,
the German police arrested Sonja B., a 40-year-old German convert who sought
to travel to Iraq with her 1-year-old son and to carry out a suicide
attack.[16]

For Islamist terrorists, the European convert is a prized recruit, at ease
in society, cognizant of informal rules and opportunities, and able to move
freely without arousing suspicion. Their citizenship enables them to travel
freely under the terms of the European Schengen agreement and, in many
cases, the U.S. visa waiver program.[17] Richard Reid, a British convert to
Islam who attempted to blow up an airliner with explosives hidden in his
shoes and boarded a flight to the United States under the visa waiver
program, highlighted the threat of European converts to terrorism to both
their own homelands and U.S. security. Short of requiring visas for British,
French, and German passport holders, U.S. authorities have requested that
airlines provide detailed passenger rosters for incoming flights to the
United States. European carriers have followed suit.


Identifying Terrorist Converts


European security services are unsure of how to address the problem of
radicalized converts largely due to their uncertainty about how to integrate
competing security and civil liberties interests. On one hand, the
abandonment of passport control posts along internal European borders—the
heart of the European integration process—needs to be addressed; EU states
must adjust to the fact that criminal enterprises span borders. On the other
hand, the European public distrusts any measure that might lead European
institutions, let alone a European intelligence service, to increase
surveillance, especially given the opacity of EU decision-making.

At the national level, however, there is perhaps a greater sense of urgency
in monitoring converts to terrorism. In September 2007, Günther Beckstein,
the Bavarian minister of the interior, proposed registering and observing
every convert to Islam in Germany in order to determine whether the future
Muslim would pursue a liberal or an Islamist orientation.[18] This
suggestion provoked an uproar. Critics said it put converts under general
suspicion, undercut religious dialogue, and contradicted the principle of
religious freedom. Such populist tactics, though, are likely to be
counterproductive. Nothing is gained by placing converts under surveillance
simply because they married a Muslim or found religious satisfaction through
Islamic theology. Such tactics might backfire if they alienate the convert,
and they would require a massive investment in intelligence gathering for a
questionable return. They would also be domestically unpopular: Europeans
would certainly argue that turning all converts to Islam into terrorism
suspects runs counter to the ideals of European liberalism.

Profiling potential terrorists, however, should not be taboo. Doing so
requires an understanding of the mentality of both the individual convert
and of the group into which the individual converts. Many converts embrace
their new faith with zeal, and Islamist groups can channel this fervor into
a process of quick radicalization.[19] New converts are often less
proficient in religious matters than religious leaders but are eager to fill
in the gaps, making them susceptible to indoctrination by organizations like
the Islamisches Informationszentrum.

In larger cities such as Berlin, advocates of various Islamic trends often
recruit new converts. Among the most aggressive are the Salafists.[20]
Converts wanting to explore and learn more about their new religion are
often attracted to fundamentalist interpretations as they seek "pure" and
"true" Islam. Jihadi websites reinforce this search—indeed, this was how
Sonja B., the would-be Iraq suicide bomber, discovered militant Islam.[21]

Foreign scholarships also provide a means of recruitment. After his
conversion but prior to becoming involved in terrorism, Ganczarski, the
German Al-Qaeda intermediary, studied Islam on a scholarship at the
University of Medina, described by the Deutsches Orient-Institut as a
"recruiting pool" for Islamists.[22] After his arrest, Ganczarski said there
had been a recruitment wave for such scholarships in Germany in the
mid-1990s, focusing on young converts. After he returned from Saudi Arabia
where he probably became radicalized, he went on to Chechnya and Pakistan as
well as Afghanistan[23] where he met Osama bin Laden.[24] Apparently, Saudi
Arabia provided thousands of such scholarships.[25]

The background of the convert is as important as the nature of the absorbing
group. Those who convert to Islam for practical purposes, for example, to
marry a Muslim woman, seldom become extremists. Others are predisposed to
radicalism. Smyrek is an extreme example: He was always a radical and
actively sought out Islamist terror groups in order to become a suicide
bomber.

The convert's socioeconomic background is another vital factor. Conversion
is, in part, a migration from one worldview to another,[26] described by
sociologist Thomas Luckmann as a decision to go shopping in a supermarket of
religious goods.[27] As the individual tries to reconcile his old and new
belief systems, he selects explanations that best meet his needs. Sometimes,
this involves the endorsement of terrorism as a means of righting perceived
wrongs.


Motives to Convert


There seem to be three dominant motives behind the decision to convert to
Islam: First is the search for a group that will provide the convert with
meaning and guidance—for example, by adherence to Shari‘a (Islamic law),
which provides rules that the convert believes are "not arbitrary," like
man-made laws.[28] The assumption of religious faith often involves a
person's search for a higher purpose, a desire to cease living "from one
party to the next or one basketball game to the next."[29] The quest for
social integration is another important factor: "When I meet brothers I have
never seen before, I feel at home right away and accepted,"[30] explained
one convert.

Second, a convert may seek a means by which he can articulate his criticism
of Western society or share with others his sense of alienation from the
dominant culture: "I became Muslim when communism collapsed, and I didn't
want capitalism. And you have to do something."[31]

Third, he may desire a way of life that allows the individual to express his
views in his everyday routine if only by praying five times a day. ("I feel
like I am living in a parallel society. But I feel marvelous."[32])

Because Islam often has a negative reputation in Europe, conversion to Islam
enables the convert to project sentiments of rebellion. Indeed, Olivier Roy
from the French Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique has suggested
that radical Islam is tantamount to a protest identity.[33] Some converts
emphatically champion Islam as the best alternative to post-industrial
Western society. Such is the rationale for Murad Wilfried Hofmann,[34] a
former German diplomat who converted to Islam in 1980 and has since acted as
an intellectual leader for German converts. Ayyub Axel Köhler, the current
chairman of the Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland, who converted to
Islam in 1963, has remarked that Islam is a way of life and thus offers its
adherents the chance to avoid the alienation of life in Western
societies.[35] If the numbers of conversions to Islam in the West are on the
rise, the cultural criticism underlying such conversions becomes especially
relevant. Identity issues play an important role, as does globalization and
modern communications, which have allowed the exploration of new identities.
When societies lose their coherence, threats increase from within.[36]


Conclusions


The European Union member states face a new challenge today, one that
transcends the traditional national security paradigm that separates
internal and external threats. In a federation of states on a scale as large
as the EU, the aim of promoting peace and stability is intertwined with the
national interests of the member states and their ability to collaborate on
ensuring the security of the larger whole.[37] The answer to questions about
how to balance civil liberties with legitimate security concerns remains
elusive.

What makes a common policy so hard to achieve when it comes to the
jurisdiction of the European Justice and Home Affairs Council is the fact
that judicial matters and law enforcement policy remain national rather than
transnational efforts.

The independent framework for cooperation on justice and home affairs, set
up with the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, has remained intergovernmental;
decisions must be unanimous, creating a situation in which negotiations
often carry on for years and lead to complex legal restrictions. Even though
the 9-11 attacks changed priorities and created the impetus for
institutional restructuring, EU member states remain unwilling to surrender
sovereignty over internal security matters.

Another problem is that differing national judicial systems create
structural disincentives to collaboration.[38] The upshot is that there
remains significant, informal cross-border cooperation,[39] and, for that
matter, informal intelligence collection and sharing. As long as the
Constitutional Treaty—which would centralize the Justice and Home Affairs
portfolios so that European Union institutions and law would become
paramount to state law in these cases—remains un-ratified, this is not
likely to change.

The creation of the post of the EU coordinator for counterterrorism after
the 2004 Madrid attacks was a step in the right direction, but the
coordinator lacks the mandate and resources to span national boundaries. As
Wolfgang Münchau, associate editor of Financial Times, has noted,
"Terrorists in Europe think more European than many of Europe's homeland
security-related agencies."[40]

Ultimately, European states are responsible for their citizens. If
individual states remain unwilling to cede certain aspects of their
sovereignty to the kind of European institutions that could more effectively
monitor Islamist activities across Europe, their ability to collaborate on
security will suffer, and ultimately their security itself will suffer. In
order for this process to move forward, the EU needs to begin a dialogue
that addresses the security problems that arise from the Islamist community,
rather than denouncing discussions of the problem as "Islamophobic."

        Milena Uhlmann is a research associate at the Institut für
Europäische Politik in Berlin.

[1] See Thomas Lemmen, Islamische Organisationen in Deutschland (Bonn:
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2000), p. 18.
[2] Deutscher Bundestag, "Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Große Anfrage
der Abgeordneten Dr. Jürgen Rüttgers, Erwin Marschewski (Recklinghausen),
Wolfgang Zeitlmann, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion der CDU/CSU,"
Nov. 8, 2000, p. 4-5; Johannes Kandel, "Organisierter Islam in Deutschland
<http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/akademie/online/50372.pdf>  und
gesellschaftliche Integration," Politische Akademie der
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Referat Interkultureller Dialog, Bonn, Sept. 2004,
p. 1.
[3] Der Spiegel (Hamburg), Jan. 15, 2007; Süddeutsche Zeitung (Munich), Jan.
12, 2007; Mohammad Salim Abdullah, telephone interview with author, Jan. 27,
2007; Die Zeit (Hamburg), Apr. 19, 2007.
[4] "Islamisten-Szene. Die Radikalen von Ulm
<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,491463,00.html> ," Spiegel
Online, June 30, 2007.
[5] Ibid.
[6] Spiegel Online, Oct. 2, 2007
<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/deutschland/Islamismus-Ulm;art122,239193
9> .
[7] Robert Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad?
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global
_Jihad.pdf>  Immigration and National Security after 9/11 (Washington, D.C.:
The Nixon Center, 2004), p. 107.
[8] "Background of Jihad Recruits in the Netherlands
<https://www.aivd.nl/actueel-publicaties/andere_publicaties/background_of_ji
had> ," Algemene Inlichtingen-en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD), Mar. 10, 2004.
[9] Times (London), July 10, 2005
<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article542420.ece> .
[10] Mitchell D. Silber and Arvin Bhatt, "Radicalization in the West
<http://www.nypdshield.org/public/SiteFiles/documents/NYPD_Report-Radicaliza
tion_in_the_West.pdf> . The Homegrown Threat," New York Police Department
Intelligence Division, Aug. 2007.
[11] Der Tagesspiegel (Berlin), Sept. 5, 2007.
[12] "Terror-Razzia. Bombenbauer planten Terror-Anschlag mit vielen Toten,"
Spiegel Online, Sept. 5, 2007; "Terrorverdacht. Autobomben sollten
US-Einrichtungen treffen
<http://www.welt.de/politik/article1158299/Autobomben_sollten_US-Einrichtung
en_treffen.html> ," Welt Online (Hamburg), Sept. 5, 2007.
[13] "Terrorverdacht. Autobomben sollten US-Einrichtungen treffen
<http://www.welt.de/politik/article1158299/Autobomben_sollten_US-Einrichtung
en_treffen.html> ," Welt Online, Sept. 5, 2007.
[14] "Steven Smyrek. Vom Kleinkriminellen zum angehenden Gotteskrieger
<http://www.ndrtv.de/doku/20040114_fuerallah_smyrek.html> ," Das Erste
Online (German public television), Jan. 14, 2004.
[15] Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad?
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global
_Jihad.pdf>  p. 109; "Deutscher wegen Djerba-Attentats angeklagt," SWR
Online (Baden-Baden), Nov. 19, 2007.
[16] Der Tagesspiegel, Sept. 3, 2006.
[17] John L. Clarke, "European Homeland Security
<http://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/cps/rde/xchg/bst_engl/hs.xsl/prj_7072_70
84.htm> : Promises, Progress and Pitfalls," in Bertelsmann Stiftung
Foundation, ed., Securing the European Homeland. The EU, Terrorism and
Homeland Security (Gütersloh: Venusberg Group, 2005), p. 36.
[18] "Nach Fahndungserfolg. Beckstein will Islamübertritte überwachen lassen
<http://www.handelsblatt.com/News/Politik/Deutschland/_pv/_p/200050/_t/ft/_b
/1319422/default.aspx/beckstein-will-islamuebertritte-ueberwachen-lassen.htm
l> ," Handelsblatt (Nordrhein-Westfalen), Sept. 6, 2007.
[19] Marc Sageman, Understanding Terrorist Networks (Philadelphia:
University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004), p. 178-9.
[20] Author interview with Mujaheed, a 29-year-old convert, Berlin, Nov. 22,
2006.
[21] Der Tagesspiegel, Sept. 3, 2006.
[22] Ahmet Senyurt, "Djerba-Anschlag: Zentralrat der Muslime gerät ins
Zwielicht
<http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article692435/Djerba-Anschlag_Zentralrat_der_
Muslime_geraet_ins_Zwielicht.html> ," Welt Online, May 6, 2003.
[23] Senyurt, "Djerba-Anschlag: Zentralrat der Muslime gerät ins Zwielicht
<http://www.welt.de/print-welt/article692435/Djerba-Anschlag_Zentralrat_der_
Muslime_geraet_ins_Zwielicht.html> ."
[24] Leiken, Bearers of Global Jihad?
<http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/monographs/Leiken_Bearers_of_Global
_Jihad.pdf>  p. 109.
[25] Brian Eads, "Saudi Arabia's Deadly Export," Reader's Digest
(Australia), Feb. 2003.
[26] Stefano Allievi, Nouveaux protagonistes de l'islam européen. Naissance
d'une culture euroislamique? Le rôle des convertis (San Domenico di Fiesole,
Italy: European University Institute, 2000), p. 7.
[27] Thomas Luckmann, The Invisible Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1967), p.
98.
[28] Author interview with Taleb, a 27-year-old convert, Potsdam, Nov. 26,
2006.
[29] Author interview with Mujaheed, a 29-year-old convert, Berlin, Nov. 22,
2006.
[30] Author interview with Paul, a 53-year-old convert, Berlin, Dec. 1,
2006.
[31] Telephone interview with Salim, a convert from North Rhine-Westphalia
in his fifties and editor of a German-speaking Islamic newspaper run mostly
by converts, Dec. 19, 2006.
[32] Author interview with Alex, a 17-year-old-convert, Potsdam, Nov. 24,
2006.
[33] Olivier Roy, Der islamische Weg nach Westen. Globalisierung,
Entwurzelung und Radikalisierung (Munich: Pantheon, 2006), p. 308.
[34] For example, see Murad Wilfried Hofmann, Islam als Alternative (Munich:
Diedrichs, 1999), p. 8.
[35] Ayyub Axel Köhler, Islam Kompakt (Köln: Al-Kitab Verlag, 2000), p. 10.
[36] Gert-Joachim Glaeßner, "Nationale und europäische Politik im
Spannungsfeld von Sicherheit und Freiheit," in Erwin Müller and Patricia
Schneider, eds., Die Europäische Union im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus.
Sicherheit vs. Freiheit (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2006), p. 113.
[37] Ibid., p. 110.
[38] Wilhelm Knelangen, "Die innen- und justizpolitische Zusammenarbeit der
EU und die Bekämpfung des Terrorismus," in Müller and Schneider, eds., Die
Europäische Union im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, pp. 140-62.
[39] Daniel Keohane, The EU and Counter-terrorism (London: Centre for
European Reform, 2005), p. 2.
[40] Wolfgang Münchau, "Europe Must Tackle Terrorism
<http://news.ft.com/cms/s/930466c8-f16c-11d9-9c3e-00000e2511c8.html> ,"
Financial Times, July 10, 2005.



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