Drug Trafficking and Middle Eastern Terrorist Groups: A Growing Nexus?  
  <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/siteImages/spacer.gif>    
Featuring Michael Braun
July 25, 2008 
  
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2914
 


On July 18, 2008, Michael Braun, assistant administrator and chief of
operations at the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), addressed a
special policy forum at The Washington Institute. Mr. Braun, a career
special agent and a longtime participant in the DEA's counterterrorism
efforts, spoke about the nexus between drugs and Middle East terrorist
groups and the growing challenge this relationship poses to U.S. national
security. The following is a rapporteur's summary of his remarks. 

The nexus between drugs and terror is growing at light speed. This is not a
new trend -- there have been numerous links identified between drugs and
terror over the last twenty-five years. Of the forty-three officially
designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) has linked nineteen of them to some aspect of the
global drug trade, and believes that up to sixty percent of terror
organizations are connected with the illegal narcotics trade. 


Terrorist organizations have chosen to participate in the narcotics market
for several reasons. State sponsorship of terrorism is declining, and the
Department of Treasury, Central Intelligence Agency, Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, and FBI have done a very good job at identifying private donors
and disrupting the flows of terror financing. The United States has worked
with its allies and significantly disrupted al-Qaeda's ability to
communicate with their cells and nodes around the globe. Partly for this
reason, al-Qaeda has shifted from a corporate to a franchise leadership
model in recent years. 


Terrorist groups, therefore, are increasingly in need of new sources of
funds. The drug business fills this need perfectly. The UN estimates that
the international drug trade generates $322 billion per year in revenue,
making drugs by far the most lucrative illicit activity. According to the
UN, revenues from other types of illicit transnational activity, such as
arms trafficking and alien smuggling, are small by comparison. Drugs provide
many different avenues of revenue, including the taxing of farmers and local
cartels, and the provision of security for all aspects of production, trade,
and distribution. Terror organizations do not, in general, require massive
sums of money for their operations, but must finance training,
infrastructure needs, equipping their members, bribing local officials,
recruiting, and logistics. The al-Qaeda or affiliate cell that carried out
the Madrid train bombing funded that operation in almost its entirety
through the sale of illicit drugs. 


There are many similarities between a terrorist organization and a global
drug cartel. Both oppose nation-state sovereignty, function best in
ungoverned spaces, depend on mutual shadow facilitators, have no regard for
human rights, rely on the hallmarks of organized crime such as corruption,
intimidation, and violence, and are highly sophisticated organizations that
operate with the latest technology. Most analysts believe that FTOs copied
their decentralized structure of cells and nodes from drug cartels. Both
FTOs and drug cartels often rely on the same money launderers and have a
capacity to regenerate themselves when dealt a blow, often reemerging in a
new or unrecognizable form. The main difference is motivation; drug cartels
are motivated entirely by profit, whereas terrorist organizations have
political or ideological motivations. 


One of the most prominent regions where the drug-terror nexus is at its
strongest is the tri-border area in Latin America, where the borders of
Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay join. Both Hamas and Hizballah are active in
this region, where it is possible to make a profit of $1 million from the
sale of fourteen or fifteen kilos of drugs, an amount that could be
transported in a single suitcase. The cost of drugs is far lower in this
region and can be resold in other countries for a far greater price. A
package of this size does not necessarily attract the notice of an
organization like the DEA, which intercepts much larger shipments routinely.
Illustrating how profitable the drug trade can be, a drug ledger seized in
Afghanistan showed ten months of transactions yielding $169 million from the
sale of eighty-one tons of heroin. Whether in Afghanistan or the tri-border
area, drugs facilitate massive revenues that go into the pocket of FTOs. 


As FTOs become more heavily involved in the drug trade, hybrid organizations
are emerging. These hybrids are foreign terrorist organizations that have
morphed into one part terrorist organization, one part global drug
trafficking cartel. The Taliban and FARC are two perfect examples, and they
are, in essence, the face of twenty-first century organized crime -- meaner
and uglier than anything law enforcement or militaries have ever faced. They
represent the most significant security challenge facing governments
worldwide. The DEA has tracked the evolution of drug cartels and terrorist
organizations for a long time, and estimates that the Taliban is currently
at the organizational level of operations at which the FARC operated ten
years ago. 


To combat this threat, the DEA is operational in eighty-seven offices in
sixty-three countries and now plays an important role in the war on terror.
It has briefed more three- and four-star generals and admirals in the last
eighteen months than in the last thirty-five years. The Department of
Defense estimates that the war on terror will last for another thirty to
fifty years, but it lacks the organizational infrastructure and know-how to
attack terrorist and insurgent groups that are engaged in global drug
trafficking. The Defense Department therefore asks the DEA for advice on how
to wage a war that is similar to the war on drugs, and is increasingly
becoming a shared fight. With the exception of those U.S. forces in uniform
throughout the world, the DEA plays as important a role in the war on terror
as any other agency. 


The DEA contributes to the war on terror in seven major ways. It undertakes
communications intercepts through court orders, and is increasingly using
judicial wiretaps that can be used as evidence in courts around the globe.
For example, much of the investigation of arms dealer Viktor Bout was
supported by wiretaps. The DEA also uses unique, extraterritorial "long-arm"
jurisdiction to ensure robust sentencing of individuals around the world. It
conducts extraordinary complex undercover operations with foreign
counterparts and works in conjunction with its local affiliates to carry out
regional operations. Since the mid-1980s, the DEA has focused on attacking
and disrupting entire organizations, rather than individuals. It uses human
intelligence and confidential sources that it maintains around the world. It
has a strong foreign presence and focuses on a financial attack strategy
based on a "follow-the-money" approach. In 2007, the DEA seized $3.4 billion
from intercepted drug transactions, and it expects to seize $4 billion this
year. Every dollar that the DEA seizes is a dollar not in the hands of these
transnational terrorist organizations or drug cartels. Many drug and terror
organizations share shadow facilitators, so eliminating these facilitators
deals a severe blow to both types of organization. 


This rapporteur's summary was prepared by Washington Institute research
assistants. 


Mr. Braun's speech was the eighth event in a special Washington Institute
lecture series featuring senior U.S. counterterrorism officials. Read
<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC11.php?CID=485>  about previous
events in the series, including audio recordings and transcripts of
presentations by Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence Donald
Kerr, Undersecretary of Homeland Security Charles Allen, Assistant Secretary
of the Treasury Patrick O'Brien, National Counterterrorism Center Director
Michael Leiter, State Department Counterterrorism Coordinator Dell Dailey,
Deputy National Security Advisor Juan Zarate, and Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, the
director of the Department of Energy's Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence.


 
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