This is really wishful thinking.  Iran-backed Sadr is biding his time.
 
B


A Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Wane 
By
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/t/sabrina_tavern
ise/index.html?inline=nyt-per> SABRINA TAVERNISE
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/world/middleeast/27mahdi.html?ref=world
<http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/27/world/middleeast/27mahdi.html?ref=world&p
agewanted=print> &pagewanted=print

BAGHDAD - The militia that was once the biggest defender of poor Shiites in
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ir
aq/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> Iraq, the
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/m/mahdi_a
rmy/index.html?inline=nyt-org> Mahdi Army, has been profoundly weakened in a
number of neighborhoods across Baghdad, in an important, if tentative,
milestone for stability in Iraq. 

It is a remarkable change from years past, when the militia, led by the
anti-American cleric
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/moktada_al_sad
r/index.html?inline=nyt-per> Moktada al-Sadr, controlled a broad swath of
Baghdad, including local governments and police forces. But its use of
extortion and violence began alienating much of the Shiite population to the
point that many quietly supported American military sweeps against the
group.

Prime Minister
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/nuri_kamal_al-
maliki/index.html?inline=nyt-per> Nuri Kamal al-Maliki struck another blow
this spring, when he led a military operation against it in Baghdad and in
several southern cities. 

The shift, if it holds, would solidify a transfer of power from Mr. Sadr,
who had lorded his once broad political support over the government, to Mr.
Maliki, who is increasingly seen as a true national leader. 

It is part of a general decline in violence that is resonating in American
as well as Iraqi politics: Senator
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/m/john_mccain/in
dex.html?inline=nyt-per> John McCain argues that the advances in Iraq would
have been impossible without the increase in American troops known as the
surge, while Senator
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/o/barack_obama/i
ndex.html?inline=nyt-per> Barack Obama, who opposed the increase, says the
security improvements should allow a faster withdrawal of combat troops. 

The Mahdi Army's decline also means that the Iraqi state, all but impotent
in the early years of the war, has begun to act the part, taking over
delivery of some services and control of some neighborhoods.

"The Iraqi government broke their branches and took down their tree," said
Abu Amjad, a civil servant who lives in the northern Baghdad district of
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/ir
aq/sadr_city/index.html?inline=nyt-geo> Sadr City, once seen as an
unbreachable stronghold for the group. 

The change is showing up in the lives of ordinary people. The price of
cooking gas is less than a fifth of what it was when the militia controlled
local gas stations, and kerosene for heating has also become much less
expensive. In interviews, 17 Iraqis, including municipal officials, gas
station workers and residents, described a pattern in which the militia's
control over the local economy and public services had ebbed. Merchants say
they no longer have to pay protection money to militiamen. In some cases,
employees with allegiances to the militia have been fired or transferred.
Despite the militia's weakened state, none of the Iraqis interviewed agreed
to have their full names published for fear of retribution.

In a further sign of weakness, Shiite tribes in several neighborhoods are
asking for compensation from militia members' families for past wrongs. 

The changes are not irreversible. The security gains are in the hands of
unseasoned Iraqi soldiers at checkpoints spread throughout Baghdad's
neighborhoods. And local government officials have barely begun to take hold
of service distribution networks, potentially leaving a window for the
militia to reassert itself. 

The militia's roots are still in the ground, Abu Amjad said, and "given any
chance, they will grow again."

A Criminal Enterprise

At the peak of the militia's control last summer, it was involved at all
levels of the local economy, taking money from gas stations, private minibus
services, electric switching stations, food and clothing markets, ice
factories, and even collecting rent from squatters in houses whose owners
had been displaced. The four main gas stations in Sadr City were handing
over a total of about $13,000 a day, according to a member of the local
council. 

"It's almost like the old Mafia criminal days in the United States," said
Brig. Gen. Jeffrey W. Talley, an Army engineer rebuilding Sadr City's main
market.

Um Hussein, a mother of 10 in Sadr City, the largest Shiite district in the
capital and one of the poorest, said her family's fuel bill had dropped so
far that she could afford to buy one of her daughters a pair of earrings
with the savings. Others interviewed listed simpler purchases that had now
become possible: tomatoes, laundry detergent, gasoline. 

One young man said that even though his house was right across from a
distribution center that sold cooking gas, he was not allowed to buy it
there at state prices, but instead was forced to wait for a
militia-affiliated distributor who sold it at higher prices.

"We had to get our share of the cooking gas from Mahdi Army people," Um
Hussein said. "Now, everything is available. We are free to buy what we
want." 

Before, the Mahdi Army controlled the 12 trucks that made daily deliveries
of cooking gas canisters for the district, because the leader of the Sadr
City district council, who was affiliated with the militia, was the one who
handled the trucks' documents.

"We had no idea when they were coming or where they were going," the council
member said, referring to the trucks. 

Those who questioned the militia's authority were dealt with harshly. A gas
station worker from Kadhimiya recalled a man in his 60s being beaten badly
for refusing to pay the inflated gas price last year. The Sadr City council
member described his relationship with the militia by touching his hand to
his face.

"I was kissing them here, here and here," he said pointing to his right
cheek, his left cheek and then his forehead.

A spokesman for the movement in Sadr City, Sayeed Jaleel al-Sarkhy, defended
the Mahdi Army, saying in an interview that it was not a formal militia and
denying the charges that it had taken control of local services. He said the
militia had been infiltrated by criminals who used the name of the Mahdi
Army as a cover. 

"The Mahdi Army is an army of believers," he said. "It was established to
serve the people." 

An employee in the Sadr City local government who oversees trash collectors
- daily laborers whose salaries he said were controlled by the militia -
said that had long stopped being true.

"I am sick all over," he said. "I am blind. I've got a headache. I've got a
toothache. My back hurts. All of this is from the Mahdi Army."

Signs of Weakness

A month after Mr. Maliki's military operation, strange things started to
happen in Shuala, a vast expanse of concrete and sand-colored houses in
northern Baghdad that was one of the Mahdi Army's main strongholds. Militia
members suddenly stopped showing up to collect money from the main gas
station, a worker there said. 

A member of the Shuala district council said: "They used to come and order
us to give them 100 gas canisters. Now it's, 'Can you please give me a gas
canister?' "

Then, several weeks later, 11 workers, guards and even a director, all state
employees with ties to the militia, were transferred to other areas.
Employees' pictures were posted so American and Iraqi soldiers could
identify impostors. 

The Iraqi Army now occupies the militia's old headquarters in Shuala.
Soldiers set up 18 checkpoints around the neighborhood, including at the gas
station. When the militia opened a new office, soldiers put a checkpoint
there, too, said an Iraqi major from the unit based there. Iraqi soldiers
recently distributed warning notices to families squatting in houses whose
rent had been collected by the Mahdi Army until May.

In Sadr City, the authorities closed the militia's radio station. The leader
of the district council was arrested by the American military. Cooking gas
delivery documents must now be approved by three officials, not just one,
the council member said. 

Another sign of weakness is the growing number of financial settlements
between powerful Shiites and Mahdi Army members' families over loved ones
who were killed by the militia. In Topchi, a Shiite neighborhood in western
Baghdad, a handwritten list of militia members' names was taped up in the
market this month, with the warning for their families to leave town.
Several of their houses were attacked. 

Some militia members' families went to the local council to ask for help.
They found none. Mahdi militiamen killed four local council members over
several weeks last fall. 

"I told them this isn't good, they must not be blamed," the council member
said. Even so, "if your brother has been killed, this is the time for
revenge."

Now neighborhoods are breathing more freely. A hairdresser in Ameen, a
militia-controlled neighborhood in southeast Baghdad, said her clients no
longer had to cover their faces when they left her house wearing makeup.
Minibuses ferrying commuters in Sadr City are no longer required to play
religious songs, said Abu Amjad, the civil servant, and now play songs about
love, some even sung by women. 

"They lost everything," said the Sadr City government employee. "The Sadr
movement has no power now. There is no militia control." 

Lingering Fears

The Mahdi Army might be weak, but it is not gone. 

Majid, a Sadr City resident who works in a government ministry, said several
Iraqi Army officers in his area had to move their families to other
neighborhoods after Mr. Maliki's military operation because the militia
threatened them. Bombs are still wounding and killing American soldiers in
the district. And early this month, one Iraqi officer's teenage son was
kidnapped and killed, his body hung in a public place as a warning, said
Majid, who gave only his first name because he feared reprisals. 

"People are still afraid of the Mahdi Army," he said. "You still get
punished if you talk bad about them."

While most of the Iraqi soldiers at the new checkpoints seem loyal to the
government, others have sympathies closer to the militia. A friend of
Majid's was obliged to pay a steep tribal settlement, after telling an army
patrol about his neighbor, a militia member. The patrol had been infiltrated
and leaked the tip to the neighbor.

"They are still trying to influence things," General Talley said, though his
overall assessment was that their control was receding. 

The shift comes at a crucial moment: Iraqis will vote in provincial
elections in December. The weakening of the Sadrists in national politics
clears the stage for the group's most bitter rival - a Shiite party led by
another cleric,
<http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/abdul_aziz_alh
akim/index.html?inline=nyt-per> Abdul Aziz al-Hakim. One of the party's
members, Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer, a sheik and a member of Parliament, is
arranging state aid for Sunni families willing to move back to Topchi.

The timing was not missed by the Sadr movement's spokesman, who said the
government had recently warned the group to vacate its office. He blames Mr.
Hakim's party for the attempts to marginalize his movement, whose members
have also been targets of a political crackdown in southern Iraq. 

"Some parties are occupying large buildings in Jadriya," he said, referring
indirectly to the headquarters of Mr. Hakim's party. "That's what makes us
suspicious. Why only us?"

He added, "The main motive is to exclude the Sadr movement from politics."

One indicator of whether the new gains will hold is whether local
governments can truly fill the gap that the militia left and deliver
services effectively and consistently. 

General Talley said his unit had recently spent $34 million to help
reconstruct a major market in Sadr City. But the district council has gotten
bogged down in arguments over who has the right to disburse $100 million
that Mr. Maliki promised Sadr City after the military operation. The
district council was given 90 days to come up with projects. More than 30
days have passed and not one proposal has been submitted, council members
said.

"To be honest with you, I find it very slow," said Haidar al-Abadi, an
adviser to Mr. Maliki who said that funds had been held back because
militia-affiliated companies had gotten involved. "There's a danger this
slowness could backfire."

The militia is painting its response on Sadr City walls: "We will be back,
after this break." 

The Iraqi Army is painting over it.

Reporting was contributed by Mohammed Hussein, Tareq Maher, Campbell
Robertson, Richard A. Oppel Jr. and Alissa J. Rubin. 

 
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