http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/cops-not-generals-should-spearhead-the-war-on-t
error/


Should Cops or Generals Spearhead the War on Terror?

July 30, 2008 - by Richard Fernandez

An [1] Associated Press
<http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5ihmILMXDSyifnMSZu2NK3vNWSazgD9279SB00>
article quotes Seth Jones, a RAND political scientist and author of a study
on fighting terrorism, as saying that intelligence operations and police
work, not military operations, are the most effective tools against
terrorism.

terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy
warriors, and our analysis suggests there is no battlefield solution to
terrorism. … The United States has the necessary instruments to defeat
al-Qaida, it just needs to shift its strategy.

One component of that strategy would be to end the “War on Terror” and
transform it into a police action. The AP writes that “nearly every ally,
including Britain and Australia, has stopped using ‘war on terror’ to
describe strategy against the group headed by Osama bin Laden and considered
responsible for the Sept. 11, 2001 suicide attacks at the World Trade Center
in New York and the Pentagon.” Why shouldn’t America do the same?

A closer reading of the RAND study shows it doesn’t wholly disparage
military force. The monograph, [2] How
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.pdf> Terrorist Groups
End, points out that terror groups often become susceptible to political
reconciliation or police action only after the neutralization of their
geopolitical and state sponsors, a process in which military force plays a
preeminent role.

Based on a study of “648 groups that existed between 1968 and 2006″, RAND
finds “the evidence … indicates that most [terrorist] groups have ended
because (1) they joined the political process or (2) local police and
intelligence arrested key members.” Yet this is often made possible only by
the decline in the fortunes of their international sponsors. The RAND report
gives a number of examples.

Page 15 says “a number of terrorist groups that advocated the creation of
an independent Armenian state, such as the Armenian Resistance Group,
disbanded after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Page 21 says “the
collapse of the Soviet Union meant that a number of groups, such as the FMLN
in El Salvador, saw their outside assistance quickly begin to dry up.” Page
69 cites the “end of the Cold War” and the “Soviet Union’s withdrawal of
support for Marxist movements in Latin America” as a key factor in the the
Salvadoran insurgency’s decision to negotiate a peace settlement.

Nor did police action itself take place in a vacuum. The RAND report points
out that military protection is required for the police to go about their
work. Without an Army to protect police and informants from heavily armed
groups, neither law enforcement nor intelligence can long survive. RAND
cites the case of al-Qaeda in Anbar as an example of where military force is
necessary to enable law enforcement (page 109).

US operations in al Anbar province provide a useful illustration of when
military forces can be appropriate against terrorist groups … such groups
are often well equipped, well organized and well motivated, and police
acting alone would be quickly overpowered.

The critical relationship between the police and the military was
demonstrated in other settings, like Kosovo. On March 17, 2008 [3] several
hundred Serb rioters
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/17/europe/kosovo.php>  fired weapons
and threw grenades at the UN police headquarters in Mitrovica. “The rioters
had freed 21 Serbs detained in the raid, stopping the UN cars that were
carrying them. At least four UN and NATO vehicles were burned . . . and the
police were eventually forced to pull out of northern Mitrovica, leaving
NATO troops to face the rioters.”

What the RAND study actually criticizes is a strategy which overly relies on
military force without a corresponding police, intelligence and political
component. It claims the campaign in Iraq drained away resources that could
have been better used to fund intelligence and political initiatives against
terror. As proof of the inefficacy of military responses, the report on
pages 137-138 cites the rise in total al-Qaeda attacks after the US
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence that military action didn’t
slow the AQ down.

There are no reliable estimates - and no way to reliable assess - which
attacks in Afghanistan included a significant al Qa’ida component. …
Nonetheless, al Qa’ida’s direct role in the Afghanistan and Iraq
insurgencies, both of which occurred after September 11, 2001, strengthens
the argument that it was involved in more attacks in the first six years
after September 11, 2001, than it was before that date. …

After 2001, al Qai’da significantly increased its number of attacks which
spanned a wider geographic area across Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and
Africa. As Figure 6.2 indicates, al-Qai’da continued to conduct attacks in
several key locations, such as Saudi Arabia and Kenya. But it also expanded
into North Africa (Tunisia and Algeria), Asia (Bangladesh, Indonesia, and
Pakistan), the Middle East (Jordan, Turkey, and Egypt), and Europe (the
United Kingdom). …

The obvious problem with citing the rise in al-Qaeda attacks on US forces in
Iraq and Afghanistan between 2002 and 2007 as evidence of growing terrorist
strength is that it is correlated with combat operations between the two
forces. The number of clashes would be expected to grow in any case as both
sides came to grips. The intensity of fighting between the two sides in war
is not a good indicator of who is winning, but the end state is. The
increased clashes between the Imperial Japan and the United States between
1942 and 1945 didn’t prove that Japan was gaining strength, but the
surrender on the battleship Missouri proved Japan had lost. Similarly,
whatever the intensity of combat between al-Qaeda and the coalition may have
reached between 2003 and 2006, the growing stability in Iraq which has
prompted [4] Joe Klein of
<http://www.time-blog.com/swampland/2008/07/mccain_meltdown.html> Time to
write that “the reality is that neither Barack Obama nor Nouri al-Maliki
nor most anybody else believes that the Iraq war can be “lost” at this
point” should call into question the argument that simply because al-Qaeda
was fighting hard in Iraq, it was therefore gaining in strength.

RAND’s citation of increased al-Qaeda attacks in Saudi Arabia, Kenya,
Tunisia, Algeria, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan, Jordan, Turkey, Egypt and
the United Kingdom after 2001 as proof of growing strength is devalued by
the curious fact that there have been no significant attacks against the
United States homeland since 9/11. If al-Qaeda were indeed gaining
capability over that period - which the increase in the number of attacks is
intended to prove - then why should it expend most of its ferocity upon
Muslim majority countries or European countries with large Muslim
populations rather than upon its hated enemy, the United States? One
alternative hypothesis to explain the same data is that al-Qaeda was
fighting to maintain support among Muslims who were less confident of global
victory after observing the American response; that the attacks on Saudi
Arabia, Pakistan, Egypt and the United Kingdom were attempts to keep their
base in line even as it proved unable to strike at the American homeland.

There is other evidence to suggest that military action has had some
political effect on al-Qaeda. [5] Carl Ciovacco
<http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf> ’s study of the
evolution of al-Qaeda’s policy toward attacking noncombatants describes how
al-Qaeda went from punctilious observance of noncombatant immunity in 1991
to declaring American civilians as legitimate targets in 1997 during the
period before the American military response. He notes the moment when Bin
Laden declared it was licit to attack US civilians.

This phase begins in March, 1997, with a CNN interview of bin Laden in
Afghanistan. In a dramatic change to bin Laden’s view of noncombatants, he
hints that civilians may not be as shielded as they were in the past. …

By 1998 al Qaeda declared it was not only permissible for attack civilians,
it was actually their holy duty.

Bin Laden moved from lukewarm approval of noncombatant immunity to overtly
declaring that noncombatants were legitimate targets. On February 22, 1998,
bin Laden released a signed statement on behalf of the World Islamic Front.
… In this statement, bin Laden, and the rest of the alliance, not only
sanctioned the killing of civilians, but also elevated it to level of a holy
duty, or fatwa.

By June, 2002, before the invasion of Iraq, every vestige of restraint for
taking civilian life was already gone. Suleiman Abu Ghaith, al Qaeda’s
official spokesman, said in an essay on al Qaeda’s web site al Neda:

We have the right to kill four million Americans - two million of them
children - and to exile twice as many and wound and cripple hundreds of
thousands. Furthermore, it is our right to fight them with chemical and
biological weapons, so as to afflict them with the fatal maladies that have
afflicted the Muslims because of [Americans’] chemical and biological
weapons. America knows only the language of force. America is kept at bay by
blood alone.

Al Qaeda went to increasingly high levels of ferocity even when faced
largely with a political and intelligence response. These developments took
place before the invasion of Iraq. In fact, September 11 happened before the
first military response to al-Qaeda had taken place. But amazingly it was
al-Qaeda’s sad combat experience in Iraq that pushed them to reverse its
policy towards unlimited attacks on civilians. Ciovacco, a former officer in
Iraq who holds a Masters in Public Policy from the Harvard Kennedy School
described the political effect of the contrast between US military
operations and indiscriminate terrorist attacks on al-Qaeda’s image in the
Muslim world.

there is considerable evidence that al-Qaeda’s attacks on noncombatants are
having a deleterious effect on al-Qaeda’s support base both within the
organization and the mainstream Muslim community. The number of ex-jihadists
and formerly supportive Muslim clerics speaking out against al-Qaeda has
increased in the last several years precisely because of its targeting of
civilians. After al-Qaeda’s former chief in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
began targeting noncombatant Shia, support for al-Qaeda within the greater
Muslim community dropped precipitously. Al-Qaeda’s increased suicide
attacks on civilians within Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have also caused its
supporters to leave in droves. In fact, a recent Terror Free Tomorrow poll
in Pakistan shows that support for bin Laden has plummeted from 46% to 24%
and backing for al-Qaeda has dropped from 33% to 18% in the past six months.
In another survey from 2005, when suicide bombings against noncombatants
first peaked, the number of Pakistanis believing that suicide bombing was
justified dropped from 73% to 46%. …

In 2005, Zawahiri directed al-Qaeda in Iraq to stop killing Shia
noncombatants because it was hurting al-Qaeda’s greater cause. Furthermore,
a top al Qaeda strategist, Abu Yahya al-Libi, has written to al-Qaeda in
Iraq telling them that its killing of “too many civilians” was undermining
al-Qaeda’s global strategy.

Ciovacco cites the same attacks on Saudi Arabia and Pakistan that RAND does,
but reaches another conclusion from the evidence. This paints a somewhat
different picture from the portrait offered up by RAND. While it doesn’t
discount the importance of intelligence and police work, these bits of
evidence suggest that military action indeed has a legitimate role to play
against terrorism. First, military and diplomatic action is required to
neutralize state sponsors of terrorism, something which law enforcement
cannot achieve. Second, military action is necessary to protect policemen
and intelligence agents in lawless parts of the world, in failed states
where terrorism is commonly to be found and where it would be too dangerous
to venture otherwise. Finally, military action sends a signal which police
work cannot equal. And this last may prove vital. If Samuel P. Huntington
correctly predicted a long-term [6] Clash of Civilizations
<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930601FAESSAY5188-faarticles/samuel-p-hunti
ngton/the-clash-of-civilizations.html>  the world may need more than cops
and intel agents to deal with it. The RAND study has only looked at terror
groups that existed since 1968. The Jihad has been in existence for more
than a thousand years.

Maybe a more prudent announcement might be: Paging James Bond, Mr. District
Attorney and Sergeant Rock. Please report for duty against Islamic
terrorism. Even that may not be enough.

  _____

Article printed from Pajamas Media: http://pajamasmedia.com

URL to article:
http://pajamasmedia.com/blog/cops-not-generals-should-spearhead-the-war-on-t
error/

URLs in this post:
[1] Associated Press:
http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5ihmILMXDSyifnMSZu2NK3vNWSazgD9279SB00
[2] How Terrorist Groups End:
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG741.pdf
[3] several hundred Serb rioters:
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/03/17/europe/kosovo.php
[4] Joe Klein of Time:
http://www.time-blog.com/swampland/2008/07/mccain_meltdown.html
[5] Carl Ciovacco: http://smallwarsjournal.com/mag/docs-temp/67-ciovacco.pdf
[6] Clash of Civilizations:
http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19930601FAESSAY5188-faarticles/samuel-p-huntin
gton/the-clash-of-civili
zations.html




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