Has anyone read our long, sorry history of cutting defense spending?

 

Not that there's anyone literate in the Obama cabinet anyway.


B

 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/07/29/AR2010072905
005_pf.html

 

Impact of past defense cuts should warn of risks

By Max Boot
Friday, July 30, 2010; A19 

The prospect of an exit from Iraq and Afghanistan has sparked rumblings on
Capitol Hill that it's time to cut the defense budget. Daniel Inouye
(D-Hawaii), chairman of the Senate Appropriations Committee, says, "I'm
<http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2010/07/23/128716044/pentagon-budget-co
uld-be-target-for-cuts>  pretty certain cuts are coming -- in defense and
the whole budget." Defense Secretary Bob Gates is already pushing to cancel
some big-ticket programs and to wring savings out of the existing budget. 

If there were ever evidence that it's impossible to learn from history -- or
at least that it's difficult for politicians to do so -- this is it. Before
they rush to cut defense spending, lawmakers should consider the
consequences of previous attempts to cash in on a "peace dividend." 

After the American Revolution, our
<http://www2.census.gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/CT1970p2-12.pdf>  armed
forces shrank from 35,000 men in 1778 (plus tens of thousands of militiamen)
to just 10,000 by 1800. The result was that we were ill-prepared to fight
the Whiskey Rebellion, the quasi-war with France, the Barbary wars and the
War of 1812 -- all of which might have been averted if the new republic had
had an army and a navy that commanded the respect of prospective enemies,
foreign and domestic. 

After the Civil War, our armed forces shrank from more than a million men in
1865 to just 50,000 in 1870. This made the failure of Reconstruction
inevitable -- there were simply too few federal troops left to enforce the
rule of law in the South and to overcome the ruthless terrorist campaign
waged by the Ku Klux Klan and other white supremacist groups. Segregation
would remain a blot on U.S. history for another century. 

After World War I, our armed forces shrank from 2.9 million men in 1918 to
250,000 in 1928. The result? World War II became more likely and its early
battles more costly. Imagine how Hitler might have acted in 1939 had several
hundred thousand American troops been stationed in France and Poland. Under
such circumstances, it is doubtful he would ever have launched his
blitzkrieg. Likewise, Japanese leaders might have thought twice about
attacking Pearl Harbor if their homeland had been in imminent danger of
being pulverized by thousands of American bombers and their fleet sunk by
dozens of American aircraft carriers. 

After World War II, our armed forces shrank from 12 million men in 1945 to
1.4 million in 1950. (The Army went from 8.3 million soldiers to 593,000.)
The result was that ill-trained, ill-armed draftees were almost pushed off
the Korean Peninsula by the North Korean invasion. Kim Il Sung was probably
emboldened to aggression in the first place by the rapid dissolution of
America's wartime strength and indications from parsimonious policymakers
that South Korea was outside our "defense perimeter." 

After the Korean War, our armed forces as a whole underwent a smaller
decline -- from 3.6 million men in 1952 to 2.5 million in 1959 -- but the
Army lost almost half its active-duty strength in those years. President
Dwight Eisenhower's New Look relied on relatively inexpensive nuclear
weapons to deter the Soviet Union and its allies, rather than a large,
costly standing army. The Army that was sent to Vietnam was not prepared to
fight guerrillas -- an enemy that could not be defeated with a hand-held
Davy Crockett nuclear launcher. 

After the Vietnam War, our armed forces shrank from 3.5 million personnel in
1969 to 2 million in 1979. This was the era of the "hollow army," notorious
for its inadequate equipment, discipline, training and morale. Our enemies
were emboldened to aggression, ranging from the anti-American revolutions in
Nicaragua and Iran to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We are still
paying a heavy price for the Iranian Revolution, with Iran on the verge of
going nuclear. 

After the end of the Cold War and the Persian Gulf War, our armed forces
shrank from 2.1 million personnel in 1989 to 1.3 million in 1999; the Army
went from 769,000 soldiers to 479,000. The result: an Army desperately
overstretched by its subsequent deployments. Part of the reason too few
troops were sent to stabilize Iraq in 2003 was that senior officials thought
there simply weren't enough to go round. 

We are still suffering the consequences of the post-Cold War drawdown. The
Navy is finding it hard to fight Somali pirates, police the Persian Gulf and
deter Chinese expansionism in the Western Pacific. The Army and Marine Corps
are forced to maintain a punishing operational tempo that drives out too
many bright young officers and NCOs. The Air Force has to fly decades-old
aircraft until they are falling apart. 

It might still make sense to cut the defense budget -- if it were
bankrupting us and undermining our economic well-being. But that's not the
case. Defense spending is less than 4 percent of gross domestic product and
less than 20 percent of the federal budget. That means our armed forces are
much less costly in relative terms than they were throughout much of the
20th century. Even at roughly $549 billion, our core defense budget is
eminently affordable. It is, in fact, a bargain considering the historic
consequences of letting our guard down. 

The writer is the Jeane J. Kirkpatrick senior fellow in national security
studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. 

 



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