http://www.mackenzieinstitute.com/2010/reviewing-jihad041510.htm
April 2010 Reviewing the Jihad By John C. Thompson Introduction The Western World's scarcely recognized war with the Islamic Jihad stumbles on; handicapped by the unwillingness of most Muslims to engage in the war (so far, anyway) and by our own common inability to correctly name or identify the enemy. As we get lost in the minutia of homegrown Jihadists, airport security and fighting in Afghanistan, we are losing sight of the forest on account of the trees. Periodically, we should sit back and try to remember what the conflict is about, how it began, and where it is going. Most importantly, we should examine our own war aims and how to achieve them. Examining the Jihad movement is not easy. It is a large and complex series of interrelated activities that join several impulses together. Any statement in this article will be a generalization -- true enough in the broad sense and often not in the specifics. Regardless, this is supposed to be a briefing on a complex subject and not a multivolume analysis. This paper will review the true "root cause" of the Jihad; its modern emergence; the ideological fronts that are the other dimension to the threat; and examine trends among the elements of the Jihad today. The "Root Cause" of the Jihad Terrorists need a violent ideology; Islam has been used that way for centuries. At heart, terrorism is always an individual choice. Most people who commit terrorism do so because they want to, often to compensate for their own personal inadequacies and shortcomings. Others do so to express themselves or to redefine or protect their self-identity. Some people become terrorists out of boredom or to vent their own interior violence. These arguments are as true for the leaders as they are for the spear-carriers who tote guns and strap on belt bombs for the cause. The latter elements of a terrorist group can include people who get trapped in an ideological construct and can be argued into proving their sincerity or devotion to a cause. Terrorist leaders and their supporters in front groups are always on the look-out for the impressionable or the coercible. The Tamil Tigers and the Jihadists of Hamas and Fatah have used many dupes, the suicidal and even the mentally handicapped to deliver their attacks. This might make some terrorists deserving of pity too, but should reinforce our scorn and resolve towards those who directed them. Terrorism is always shaped by an ideology. Classical Marxist terrorism was underlain by theories about revolution and 'National Liberation' movements welded Marxism onto their identity politics. The Jihad, without question, is defined and shaped by Islam. Its leaders constantly seek guidance and sanction from Islamic writings and scholars, past and present, for its current and future actions. Islam is readily adaptable for use by those who would be terrorists or insurgents. Its violent messages and history readily give credence to militant interpretations of Islamic doctrine and the more peaceful accomplishments of Muslim people have often been achieved by ignoring many components of their faith (this is a point argued at some length by Ibn Warriq and a handful of brave -- though very isolated -- reform-minded Muslims). Inside Islamic societies, dissent was often legitimized by clinging to dogmatic Islam whereas governing elites who hoped for a quiet rule usually ignored the religion's inconveniences. As a result, any ruler -- particularly one who was tolerant of non-Muslims or open to outside influences -- would almost invariably find himself attacked by his critics on unassailable religious grounds. This has had two effects. One is to explain the innate conservatism of the Muslim world. The other explains the 'two-track' policy still practiced by many of today's Middle Eastern governments: The habit of paying lip service to the Jihad by offering militants a carrot to go elsewhere while ruthlessly using a stick on them at home if they threaten existing rulers. For example, Syria has a long history of providing support to Hezbollah and has frequently been implicated in the passage of al Qaeda recruits through its territory into post-Saddam Iraq. However, when Assad senior was threatened by the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1980s, it is believed that around a thousand members of the organization were then tortured and killed in his prisons and an Islamic rising in the city of Hama was brutally crushed by the Syrian Army with the loss of 10-40,000 lives. Saudi Arabia must tolerate Wahhabism -- their Royal family has long allied itself with the sect -- but it pays billions of dollars to encourage preachers and militants to leave the Kingdom and has frequently destroyed Wahhabi militants at home. Another basis for the Jihad movement is a combination of traditional Arab chauvinism and modern Arab nationalism. Islam was thrust -- often literally -- on many peoples outside of the Arabian Peninsula but Mohammed's followers firmly shackled their cultural baggage to the new faith as they went forth to spread the word at sword point. Now 14 centuries later, the Quran is supposed to be fully understood only by resorting to 7th Century Arabic. Non-Arab Muslims still find themselves patronized by Arabs. As an aside, when today's Muslim activists proclaim tht their religion has a universal message for all of mankind and yet insist that the quirks and contrary messages of the Quran can only be properly understood in archaic Arabic; they are trying to have their cake and eat it too. When God is revealed in the Bible, it is as men understand his words. Buddha is a man trying to explain what he has learned to others. Islam maintains Mohammed was taking dictation from an Archangel. Since God's messenger spoke in the argot of 7th Century Arabia, the words are holy and thus unchangeable from the original script. This begs the question that since the Bible and the Tripitaka of Buddhism have been readily translated into dozens of languages -- is the Quran truly universal or was it really meant only for 7th Century Arabs? The Jihad we confront today arose from several sources. At its root is an admixture of uncompromising Islamic practices and interpretations expounded in the Saudi Wahhabi cult, itself a militant manifestation of traditional Arab chauvinism and the desire to reinforce traditional practices imposed on other Muslims. During the 19th Century, the Wahhabi missionary arm found fertile ground in the Indian subcontinent where it gave rise to the Deobandi interpretation of Islam. Shiites, a long suppressed minority outside of Iran, started to receive their own variation of militant traditionalism in the 1940s from the Ayatollah Khomeini. Khomeini was also reacting to two other trends that helped create the modern Jihad: These were the growing influences of the West (particularly after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as the gun-smoke cleared from the First World War) and the birth of Arab nationalism -- itself a reaction to the Ottoman retreat. Arab nationalism at first had room for Christian Arabs, but the uncompromising work of the Muslim Brotherhood (founded in Egypt in 1928) saw to it that the Arab identity was first and foremost a Muslim one. Christian Arab communities that had survived for centuries are in grave danger today. The 1920s also saw the bloody emergence of the Saudi Kingdom. Since the late 18th Century, the House of Ibn Saud had legitimized their rule through their partnership with the Wahhabis. In the 1920s, the Saudis embarked on a bloody war of conquest in the Arabian Peninsula and wrested control of Mecca away from the Hashemite family who had long been its custodians. Tens of thousands of Muslims who did not adhere to Wahhabi practices were murdered and numerous tribal enemies of the Saudis were ruthlessly purged. At the end of the conflict, emboldened Wahhabis also spilled into Iraq and murdered more Shiites in the thousands before being curbed by the British. A generation later the creation of Israel was a further spur to militant Arab Nationalism, although the Socialist Strongman approach -- so well used by Nasser in Egypt -- diminished the influence of Islamic ideology until the utter military failure of the 1973 surprise attack on Israel. The rapid growth in oil wealth, particularly in Saudi Arabia, resulted in more money for Wahhabi projects and enhanced the Dawa missionary movement the Wahhabis started early in the 19th Century. The Dawa's first focus was to encourage compliance with Arabian cultural practices throughout the Islamic world. Since then, it has also sought to inhibit the integration of young Muslims into Western societies and to perform conventional missionary work. It has a darker function that will be discussed later. The Emergence of the Modern Jihad The foundations for today's Jihad were carefully laid for some years. The critical year for the Jihad was 1979, the year of the Iranian Revolution. In the 14 Centuries since Mohammed, clerics had never run a Muslim state, although various rulers adopted the trappings of a Caliph (one title of the Ottoman Turkish emperor). Historically in Iran whenever the Mullahs made a bid for political power, they were violently suppressed. Unfortunately, the Shah was prevented from this traditional remedy by the appeasement instincts of President Jimmy Carter and the Islamic Revolution prospered. The Shah fled in January 1979 and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile in February. Shortly thereafter, the Mullahs purged their Marxist-oriented allies and created a state run under clerics according to Shiite interpretations of Sharia law. A revolutionary state, Iran has exported terrorism ever since, particularly with the creation of Hezbollah in Lebanon in the early 1980s. In November 1979, the Saudis were rocked by a Wahhabi takeover of the Grand Mosque in Mecca in which over a thousand people were killed. This is an incident that the Saudis would prefer the world to forget, especially as the last of the gunmen were flushed from underneath the ancient mosque with lethal chemical weapons and French military help. The new mosque is much less likely to be so easily secured by hostile insurgents. Since this episode, the Saudis have increased their funding for the Wahhabi Dawa and encouraged the more militant among them to seek adventure elsewhere. Finally, in December of that year, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in the hopes of defeating the country's rural Islamic insurrection. The resulting conflict served a number of useful purposes for the Islamic World. Supported by money from the Dawa, the call went out for volunteers around the Islamic world to help defend the Afghans. This was a classic Holy War, the faithful were under direct and very real attack from unbelievers who hoped to subjugate them to a new faith -- that of Soviet Marxism. Volunteers and those who sent money were certainly fulfilling the requirements of Jihad. However, something else transpired among the volunteers who came to Pakistan's Northwest Frontier to answer the call. Between the Deobandis in Pakistan's government (and among the local Pashtun) and the Wahhabi clerics who came with the Saudi funding, many of the volunteers found themselves doing very little actual fighting in Afghanistan. Instead, they spent long months in training, networking with each other, and being conditioned by some of the most radical clerics in Islam. The Soviets killed hundreds of thousands of Afghans and lost one man for every 100 Afghans who died between their arrival in 1979 and departure in early 1989 -- largely due to the unrestrained Soviet use of firepower in all circumstances. As a result, the Islamic volunteers only made tentative forays into Afghanistan. They only went over the frontier in numbers when it was clear that the Soviets were winding down their effort and preparing to leave. One might suppose that the aspiring Jihadists were being saved for something else, something more important. This is a pattern that was repeated in several other conflicts, notably among the foreign volunteers who arrived to defend Bosnia's Muslims in the early 1990s. Additionally, from Morocco and Algeria in the west to Indonesia in the east, when the volunteers returned, local governments found that these 'Afghansi' had a new agenda. Even Libya's Qhadaffi found trouble at home. The worst result probably occurred in Algeria where the military government, prepared to lay down power after 30 years, found the first (and only) national election had ended up as a victory for Islamic militants. The resulting civil war cost well over 160,000 lives before it ended in 2002, although terrorism has continued. Moreover, in the Northwest Frontier many of the volunteers and the trainers never went home. They stayed and continued to indoctrinate all who showed up. The Northwest Frontier of Pakistan is an unsettled area where the grip of government has always been tenuous, but it is conveniently close to some major cities. A traveler can land at Islamabad on an airliner from London or Frankfurt, and be up in the hills in a couple of hours. Another element was slowly maturing. Even in the 19th Century, the Deobandis and Wahhabis had made a practice of offering free schooling -- only to boys, naturally -- if they came from the poorest families or were orphans. Naturally, this was classic Islamic education where the highly prized accomplishment is memorizing the Quran by rote, even if a student doesn't understand archaic Arabic. These schools turn out Talib, religious scholars. Among the many refugees and orphans produced out of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation, there were plenty of these Taliban available in Northwestern Pakistan. When the time came to send these scholars back into Afghanistan in 1996, they seemed competent in weapons handling and small unit tactics too. Osama Bin Laden is not the root of the Jihad, although his al Qaeda organization grew through the 1990s into the central nexus of the Sunni Jihad movement. The Western World was only barely aware of his group thanks to a number of near-misses. The 1993 World Trade Center bombing in New York failed to topple one of the towers (and the WTC's subsequent focus on evacuation procedures saved thousands of lives eight years later). Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Shaik Mohammed's Bojinka 1995 plot to kill 4,000 airline passengers in one day was likewise interrupted by police in the Philippines. Plans to crash aircraft into the CIA Headquarters and the Eiffel Tower were also aborted. The 1998 US Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania did kill hundreds of people, but Western news consumers -- as usual -- assumed that since the vast majority of the dead were Africans the implications of the attack could be safely ignored. Other preparatory work for the Jihad was largely ignored outside of intelligence agencies and a handful of academics. The work of Dawa-financed missionaries inside prisons was barely remarked on and, in many places, they still continue to recruit and indoctrinate violent criminals without hindrance. The early recourse to the Internet as a communications tool and to fundraise and recruit was, again, barely noticed in the 1990s and implications of this were seldom considered. The benefits from these activities are still being garnered by the Jihad. The Jihad movement is not an altogether articulate ideology, but it is a powerful hate-filled one and that can have attractions of its own. In the interwar years, much of the animosity between European Communists and Fascists was that both groups fed on the same discontent and sought the same recruits (a situation that recurred in Canada in the early 1990s between the Heritage Front's White Supremacists and the nihilistic anarchists of the Left). This underscores how an ideology can lure the wrathful, the sullen and the confused if it encourages them to engage in violence. Looking at Europe and North America on a country by country basis, between 10 and 25 percent of those arrested as potential Jihadists have been converts to Islam; and many of the converts were career criminals. The Jihad has now positioned itself as the 'power' ideology for those who seek approval to engage in violence. In the meantime, elements of the old radical right and left are also being drawn into approving of the Jihad, convinced that the ideology that will tear down their home societies has finally arrived. There is a final point to consider. The highest population growth rates in the world can be found in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Arab nations of the Middle East. Prosperity and education for women had the effect of slowing down natural increase, but these conditions eluded much of Africa while part of the explanation for the Middle East's fecundity also involves Arab Islamic culture's repression of women. Recent history, such as the Maoist revolts in Sri Lanka in the early 1970s or the story of the Sendaro Luminoso in Peru, has shown us what happens when rapid population growth is coupled with a basic education system that gives youth a sense of expectation until they meet narrowly selected elite that has no room for them. This may explain the rapid growth of Islamic Fundamentalism among Egyptian university students in the 1980s or among the young in Algeria since then. Westerners, especially in the English-speaking world, tend to forget the intoxicating effect an ideology can have. We forget how Soviet Marxists sacrificed themselves during the Stalin Purges, believing that going to their own unjust deaths would somehow be all right as it would aid the survival of the Revolution. We forget the fanaticism of Nazi German and Imperial Japanese troops who would fight on past the point where most soldiers would pack it in. We also forget that an ideology that believes itself to be the coming thing among the young can be infectious and dangerous, convinced as the young are of their own invincibility and entranced with the notion they will be writing the next chapter in history. Finally we forget that history has numerous examples of the effects of mass migration resulting from an expanding population. Mass migration in terms of Germanic hordes spilling over the Danube and the Rhine has not been a feature of our more recent times... large scale immigration does not seem quite so traumatic. However, many immigrants do have a problem integrating into their new society and this has historically led to higher crime rates among new arrivals -- to which a wide variety of examples of all religions and skin hues can attest. However, for societies that have a history of successfully coping with large scale immigration, Islam presents a new problem: It contains countervailing influences designed to deliberately inhibit integration by simultaneously encouraging both a sense of alienation and of superiority among young Muslims. The goal of the Jihad movement is to ensure the global domination of Islam. To achieve this, they believe that Muslims everywhere must live under Sharia law, which trumps any other legal code. Towards this end, Middle Eastern states that do not recognize the primacy of Sharia Law must be toppled, and that Muslim émigrés and minorities elsewhere should work to the same end. Moreover, the Caliphate (the single community of the believers under one ruler) should be established while the Western World -- particularly the United States -- must be weakened and then eclipsed. The Jihad's ultimate goal does not change, but there is considerable variety in the means utilized to achieve it. Watching the Right Hand, Ignoring the Left Terrorists never operate alone; they always have collaborators present in parallel political fronts. While the Animal Liberation Front terrorists -- who usually operate alone or in very small cells--have caused an enormous amount of destruction since 1975; they have always received moral support, some funding, and 'How-to' instructions in vandalism from the Animal Rights movement. For over 20 years, the Provisional Wing of the IRA acted in tandem with the Sinn Fein political party; and senior figures in both occasionally met together to plot strategy. For every European 'Urban Guerrilla' in the 1970s there may have been a dozen activists doing reconnaissance, providing safe-houses, passing money and stashing arms. The ideology of the current Jihad was formed in part by the Wahhabis and Deobandis many decades ago. Khomeini started writing his more toxic pamphlets in the 1940s, and the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in the 1920s. Wahhabis and Deobandis still practice, the Muslim Brotherhood still exists and has a large international network, and Khomeini has many spiritual heirs. The Islamic Fronts are not easily detailed. They consist of a bewildering array of organizations, most of which operate quite legally. Historically, in most front structures, only a few people deliberately or knowingly supported the active terrorists. Most of the rest, although broadly sympathetic to the aims of terrorists in the same movement, at least had a measure of plausible deniability for any active involvement. This is true for the Islamic front organizations. What makes things worse for charting the activities of the Islamic Fronts is the tradition of Taqqiyah -- religious permission to 'dissemble' to non-believers for the good of Islam. To supporters of the Jihad, misleading statements and even bald lies to non-Muslims are actually a religious duty, and one that seems exercised quite often. Westerners, largely conditioned to think that any statement is broadly true, have a hard time coping with this tactic. Front organizations have a number of roles that they perform in concert with a terrorist movement. First, there are disarming messages to deliver. In the early 1960s, the Soviets began to realize that many of their KGB agents abroad were confirming Western stereotypes about thickly accented, badly dressed thugs. Ten years later, KGB agents tended to be well dressed, urbane and articulate. Soviet diplomacy took off when people could no longer associate the USSR of labor camps and tank armies (which still existed and did right till the end) with their charming and -- almost literally -- disarming representatives. The Islamic world has plenty of screaming fanatics but is doing its very best to keep them out of view of westerners. Bearded Imams screaming 'Death to the Jews' are eased out of the picture wherever possible by polite quiet men in neat suits with a different message. "Of course, I don't approve of terrorism either, but you have to understand..." The subtext is "See how reasonable I am? Now let me communicate the terrorists' ideological message, but in a more polished way." It is appalling how many journalists and politicians fall for this. The second duty of a front organization is to communicate with the supporters of the movement. Sometimes the exact same message can be delivered so it resonates with different audiences in different ways. For instance, when a front organization talks about 'disenfranchised alienated Muslim youth', Westerners are encouraged to assume that whatever violence the youth accomplished is our fault , and that we must be more trusting and accommodating. Muslim youths hear that what they did is excusable, with a subtext that since they will never fit it in, they might as well continue to get violent. The third function of a front organization is to provide logistical support. This is the hidden function and will not be widely discussed within the organization -- plausible deniability is such a useful protection. Money has to be raised and diverted, recruits have to be talent spotted and conditioned. At times, some members of a front organization might play a part in the planning process for a terrorist attack -- such as providing safe houses, airline tickets, or undertaking reconnaissance activities. This latter role has been far more common with other terrorists than those of the Jihad, but it now seems that al Qaeda prefers to remain self-sufficient in order to preserve operational security. Sometimes, as is the case with Hezbollah, the Front organization is the terrorist group. Attempts to see Hezbollah or Hamas as a political party with hospitals and schools as being somehow separate from the terrorist cells are delusional as they are one in the same. Hezbollah also expects all members to develop intelligence on an on-going basis. The main active political front for the Wahhabis is their Dawa Missionary arm. It is funded (and comprises) several Saudi based organizations such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) and the Muslim World League (MWL). These are funded by a variety of mostly Saudi sources -- the Government, members of the royal family, and some of the country's wealthier citizens. The Dawa has built a massive infrastructure for Islam across much of the world, and particularly has funded the construction of new mosques and Islamic centres in countries that receive Islamic immigrants. It has also funded Imams for those mosques, with the net effect that the disparate Muslim immigrants in such countries are being exposed to radicalism as never before. The Deobandis have an organization similar to the Dawa but without the lush oil funding available to it. Nevertheless, Tablighi Jamaat has a presence in dozens of nations and is no longer only found in communities of South Asian Muslim migrants. Tablighi Jamaat has been directly traced to Islamic terrorism by authorities in Germany and other European nations, and seems to be more willing to be overtly radical than the Dawa. While trying to identify the structure of the Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat through a web-work of mosques, cultural centres, and madrassas and spin-off charities is difficult, the Muslim Brotherhood does have a more conventional structure of cells and satellite groups of its own. However, it tends to be more secretive and sometimes has been entirely clandestine. Strongly influenced by the Egyptian radical Sayyid Qutb (who toured the US in the 1940s and was appalled by the effects of individual freedom) and founded by Hassan al-Banna, the Brotherhood was the first organization to articulate the political objectives of the modern Jihad movement. These goals include the restoration of the Caliphate, a single political-religious entity for the entire community of the faithful; particularly as Western-influenced Arab governments are hopelessly corrupt and also need to be toppled. The Western world must be rendered supine, and this might be achieved by using its liberal institutions and traditions against it from within. The Brotherhood works to create a mass movement and will create institutions such as schools and hospitals in Islamic countries to enhance its credibility and draw more support. It has a very long tradition of subversion, especially of other Muslim groups, through the old tactic of what British Trotskyites used to call "entryism" -- joining an organization to transform it from the inside. It is a central position of the Jihad movement that all Muslims -- indeed all of the World's people -- must eventually be governed by Sharia law, and that Sharia law must trump all other legal systems. Accordingly, every opportunity to gain a foothold for Sharia law inside the Western World is pursued nonstop. A good starting position for opposing the Jihad movement is a zero-tolerance approach to Sharia law in any guise anywhere. Interestingly, banks are starting to offer Sharia-law compliant services to Muslim customers... never mind that many of the financial backers for the Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat don't feel obliged to let their own finances be constrained this way. At the Holy Land Foundation trial in the US, many connections were drawn to the Brotherhood by prosecutors who were after the US-based charity for helping to fund Hamas. Connections were drawn to the US branch of the Brotherhood and such groups as the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA), the Muslim Students Association, the American Muslim Council, and the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). CAIR was named as an unindicted co-conspirator by the US prosecutors. The Brotherhood was also instrumental in the formation of Hamas and its network of fronts and organizations such as the al-Aqsa Foundation. Hizb ut-Tahrir: A more conventional fundamentalist Islamic group that has been in existence since the 1950s, it currently has over a million members mostly in the UK and Central Asia. While the Muslim Brotherhood seeks to simultaneously rot out the west and undercut existing Arab governments, this group is more eager to create the Caliphate of the Ummah first and then go after the rest of the world. The movement has inspired some terrorism, but does not seem to have directly incited any specific terrorist groups. The Leaderless Front of the Internet: Between dozens upon dozens of sites maintained by Islamic charities, mosques, the Dawa, key organizations and terrorist groups themselves, there are hundreds more generated autonomously by individual Muslims. Propaganda depends upon repetition, the totality of the message, and simplicity. Despite an early prediction that the Internet would prevent propaganda from being possible, modern news consumers are so overwhelmed with information choices that most of them self-select what media they will choose to watch. The internet and the great mass of material on it allow people to voluntarily propagandize themselves. The growing number of "Home-Grown" Jihadists in the Western World clearly illustrates the potential of the internet to attract recruits who indoctrinate and mentally condition themselves. With the ample provision of 'Do-it-yourself' videos and self-instruction manuals by al Qaeda and its trainers, it is even possible for aspiring terrorists to train themselves, even in techniques of mass destruction. There are many other front organizations, and it is commonly forgotten that the front can wage a political struggle to achieve the same ends that a terrorist group commits violence for. This does not mean that the fronts are inherently peaceful. Rather, in conventional Marxist revolutionary theory fronts ideally create the conditions in which the insurgent can win while fear of terrorism can let the fronts happily politick away towards a shared goal. One might as well ask a boxer which arm is more important than the other in winning his matches. The State of the Jihad Today As Sun Tzu observed, tactics should appear to be as water, without form or shape, but infinitely adaptable to circumstances. In the thirty years since the Jihad movement coalesced and began to prepare for terrorism, it has ceaselessly changed shape and orientation. These include: Proxy agencies for nation states: Hezbollah (at first) was an extension of Iran in the first decade of its existence and sometimes still operates that way. "National Liberation" movements: Groups seeking independence for their own ethnic group, examples include Uighurs and their Eastern Turkestan Islamic Movement or -- initially -- Lashkar e-Taiba in the Kashmir. Conventional Terrorist Groups: Regional or limited in original scope, limited in size of membership (usually because they also recruit from an ethnic base). Examples include Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines or Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Nexus groups that tied together or controlled several smaller groups. Though not strictly a Jihadist group, Yasser Arafat's Fatah tried to achieve political credibility by behaving diplomatically while Force 17 (his oversized corps of bodyguards) and the al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades acted as his cut-outs. Al Qaeda was the main nexus group in the 1990s, as it slowly tied in almost all Sunni Jihadist groups into a shared operational and logistical structure. Loose independent cells: Groups that form around one or two key characters, share an ideology with a larger movement but are still largely self-dependent for money, arms and equipment and technical expertise. Most of the "Home Grown" Jihadists arising out of Islamic communities within the Western world constitute such, but are now increasingly likely to be linked with more conventional terrorist groups. Autonomous individuals: Lone Jihadists acting out with a gun, a knife or a car having been staging a growing number of attacks; one of the most notorious was the November 2009 attack by Major Nidal Malik Hasan on US soldiers at Fort Hood. Perhaps because of political correctness and fear of the implications of lone attackers, authorities and the press have tended to gloss over the enabling role Islam can play in facilitating an attack by a disturbed individual in addition to the Jihad's ability to allow individuals to recruit, condition and train themselves. Many episodes have gone entirely unrecognized as terrorism -- but the swelling numbers of these incidents will soon change this perception. At various times in the past twenty years, the Jihad movement has utilized all of the above models, usually simultaneously. This argues to several points. The Jihad movement has an interoperable ideology that easily allows partisans and supporters of the movement to slide from one organization to another and for cooperation between its different components. Even the divide between Shiite and Sunni Islam can be bridged. Americans in Fallujah in 2004 were startled to find some Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps support for abu Musab al-Zarqawi's al- Qaeda franchise even though the latter was already notorious for his outrageous attacks on Iraqi Shiites. Al-Zarqawi was also reported to have slipped into Iran for medical treatment in 2005, apparently with the support of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. This interoperability also cuts across other lines. For the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing Khalid Sheik Mohammed (the planner behind several of al Qaeda's most brilliant attacks) may have been responsible for the plan to topple one tower into the other. The identity of the person who did the reconnaissance for the attack is not known to the public. Khalid's nephew Ramzi Yousef, a trained al Qaeda terrorist, travelled to New York as the bomb expert and the explosive package he assembled was much more sophisticated than its fertilizer base would lead one to believe. In New York, Yousef was able to recruit two Palestinians, two Egyptians and an Iraqi through Omar Abdel-Rahman's circle. After the attack, his escape route lay through Canada where he was able to pick up a new identity and flee to Pakistan. The perpetrators of this one attack cut across family and national lines, and displayed a widely mixed standard of competence. The initial plan was well conceived, the bomb design used widely available improvised materials, and the logistics worked. However, the incompetent behaviour of Yousef's locally recruited assistants helped prevent the bomb from being properly placed (sparing the World Trade Centre for another eight years) and gave the FBI some easy successes at the start of their investigation. Years later, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab tried to ignite a new kind of bomb on Flight 253 on Christmas Day 2009 as it approached Detroit. A well educated Nigerian youth with a wealthy father, he adhered to a more radical interpretation of Islam than his father, and this was reinforced during his schooling in the UK and the Middle East. Abdulmutallab particularly appears to have felt alone and isolated during these years but for his activities with hard-line Mosques and student groups. In short, he was talent spotted and conditioned. In the summer of 2009, he went to Yemen to study Arabic at the behest of a radical cleric, dropped out of school and apparently went off to a new al Qaeda sanctuary in the interior of the country. Elements of the Dawa complex kept track of him in four countries and saw to it he was drawn off for training at an appropriate moment. He was also disposable, hence his role as a suicide attacker. The technique involved in his bomb was also highly innovative and well conceived -- a good design to defeat standard aviation security measures. The technique of injecting a powerful acid into liquid explosives worked under lab conditions, but for now appears to be too awkward for suicide attackers to successfully use operationally. Once again, a well conceived attack failed during the delivery. The amorphous support network provided by the maze of political fronts and charities is rarely subjected to any disruption. Trials like that of Texas-based members of the Holy Land Foundation take years to conclude, during which time the funding and political support they provided for Hamas is replicated a dozen times over through new networks. Knocking out the logistic arrangements behind a terrorist movement is never easy; under current conditions it is next to impossible when it involves the Jihad movement. The interoperability of the Jihad movement can also be seen in, for example, Afghanistan where the supposedly local Taliban has contained numbers of volunteers from such diverse places as Algeria, Chechnya, Indonesia and Yemen. The Taliban/al Qaeda bases in Northwestern Pakistan encompass an even greater variety of Muslims, including converts gained in European and North American schools and prisons. Ever since the 1980s, the Jihad movement has looked for territory it can control as it never really did possess Pakistan's turbulent northwest Frontier provinces. Regional conflicts such as that in Chechnya, Bosnia, those waged by the Albanians in Macedonia and Kosovo were all investigated, but a new base area was never satisfactorily established. Only after the 1996 Taliban invasion of Afghanistan (and Osama bin Laden's expulsion from the Sudan) were Sunni Jihadists able to set up a base area for training and sheltering key leaders. This state of affairs vanished after 9/11 but the yearning for a territorial base has never vanished. By contrast, Hezbollah's hammerlock on South Lebanon has provided another example of territorial control, but Hezbollah's business acumen is necessary to subsidize the social infrastructure that helps validate their dominating presence and the group has long had access to a better arms locker than al Qaeda has ever enjoyed. Hezbollah's proximity to Israel also meant that the group has literally entrenched itself in southern Lebanon and houses their families atop their bunkers and tunnels. So, what is new with the Jihad? Hezbollah has been expanding rapidly in the last two years, particularly in South and Central America where -- thanks to Hugo Chavez's cozy cooperation with Iran -- the group has become increasingly involved in cocaine trafficking. Hezbollah's ability to smuggle to Africa, Europe and the Middle East is netting them vast new sums and gaining them access to various parties in Latin America's underworld. They also tax almost every transaction in southern Lebanon and among the dispersed Lebanese Shiite Diaspora. Thanks to this influx of money, they are buying more arms than ever and may have over 50,000 artillery rockets stashed in southern Lebanon -- some with the range to hit central Israel. They have facilitated a Shiite insurrection in rural Yemen. They are emerging as a partner, rather than a subordinate, to Iran and are gearing up for a second encounter with Israel. Hezbollah's growing saliency is also attracting recruits from beyond Shiite circles -- and hundreds of Fatah gunmen recently defected to the group. Al Qaeda has spent two years funneling arms, money and expertise into two countries -- Yemen and Somalia. Harakat al Shabaab, their Somali franchise, has recovered much of the territory their predecessor group (the Islamic Courts Union) lost and is striving to keep Somalia ungovernable. It has also been able to recruit heavily among the youth in Somali Diaspora communities in North American and Australia. AQAP (al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) is an amalgam of existing groups in Saudi Arabia and Yemen; it is also noteworthy that supporting it is a priority for what remains of Osama bin Laden's al Qaeda. The group seeks to establish a sanctuary area in rural Yemen (where the terrain is formidable and tribalism is as entrenched as it is on the Pakistani-Afghan frontier) to work towards control of Yemen and to undermine the Saudi Royal Family. Judging from the reach and pronouncements of the Dawa cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, they have ambitions beyond the Arabian Peninsula. It must be remembered that there are many ancient ties between Yemen and Somalia and that control of both can threaten all shipping through the Red Sea. Somali pirates are bankrolled and armed by Yemenis, and the lucrative Somali Khat trade depends on Yemeni cultivators to supply the narcotic plant. The Taliban/al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan are waging a two-front war, but seem to be putting more resources into Afghanistan. Their logistics improved in 2009 and Taliban fighters were often accoutered as light infantrymen (wearing boots and webbing, as opposed to flip-flop sandals and clothing alone); and were more likely to have had some training in infantry tactics than was the case earlier. In 2009, some 9,000 IEDs were planted in Afghanistan which suggests something much more than a rudimentary logistics structure. They have gravitated beyond hosting irregulars and are now fielding platoon and company-sized units; but US missile strikes and Pakistani Army incursions into their base areas are wearing their overall strength down. This suggests that 'Taliqeda' forces in the region may have overreached themselves last year when they directly threatened the survival of the Pakistani government. The al Qaeda franchise in North Africa (al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, or AQIM) is still growing since its formal establishment in 2005. It has a wide footprint across the Sahara but seems to have real strength only in Algeria for now although it is rapidly recruiting and training inside other North African nations (and in Europe). In early 2009, news reports suggested that they had a mishap with an unknown chemical or biological agent they were preparing in Algeria, killing a number of members of the group. Notwithstanding an admission of defeat by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), the group rebounded in 2009 with the end of the American surge and the start of the US drawdown. It has staged very deadly destabilization attacks on the Iraqi government and has continued to pursue the instigation of a wider sectarian conflict by attacking Shiites. At the same time, Iran is also funneling arms and supplies to the Sadrist Shiite militias to attack Iraqi Sunnis while continuing to support AQI. Lashkar-e-Taiba is one of the Kashmiri Jihadist groups, and scored a spectacular success with its assault on two hotels in Mumbai in November 2008. Closely linked to the Taliban and al Qaeda, the group has an international support structure of its own but it has been quiet through most of 2009 without launching any major attacks. Despite -- or perhaps because of -- its close ties to the Pakistan ISI, Indian outrage over the Mumbai attacks has probably resulted in this low profile for the moment. The group is too large and well organized to remain quiet for long. Among the Palestinians Fatah and Hamas have both been relatively quiet for most of 2009, the latter largely because of the Israeli assault on the Gaza sanctuaries in December 2008 and January 2009. Fatah, and to some extent, opinion on the Palestinian street is favoring more of a restrained mode for the moment. One influence for this is a concern over the growing Iranian nuclear threat to Israel; many Palestinians are quite sure where the fallout would go. A second influence is the political uncertainty in both Jerusalem and Washington... there is a sense that the cards are being reshuffled and the next deal might be more favorable to their interests. Attacks by "Homegrown" Jihadists inside the Western World are few and far between -- normally because they get detected at some point before an attack is actually delivered. While constant failure might be expected to have a deterring influence, the Jihadists don't count their losses and are still coming on in greater numbers than ever before. Worse still, as the Jihadists have delivered very few effective attacks, police resources are being drawn off for other functions which means attacks are being detected later and later in the planning cycle. Opportunistic attacks by lone Jihadists are increasing in number too. This is a rapidly growing threat and will present us with enormous challenges soon. Punching Fog: What Next? For societies that have groomed themselves to be tolerant and open, survival will have its costs. Terrorism always presents a society with a number of challenges, and good choices might be illusions. When confronted by a series of hard choices, pick the ones that let you survive because defeat by an ideology is always far costlier than any victory, no matter how bloody. The Post-WW2 values of tolerance and the older Western values of individual freedom and individual conscience, political pluralism and the rule of law are integral to the prosperity of the Western World and everything that has flowed from it. These values have almost erased many internal differences within Western Societies and allowed many nations to peacefully absorb many newcomers. The Jihad movement sees these strengths as weaknesses to exploit; making the most use of them they can although they would have no intention of keeping these values once in the driver's seat themselves. If the 20th Century has any lessons to teach, it is about how horrific violent ideologues can be when they achieve power. The Jihad movement would be no less harmful than Stalin's Russia, Hitler's Germany, Mao's China, or Pol Pot's Cambodia -- so why give them the chance? No matter how odious resistance to them may be, the consequences of not resisting them would be far worse. There is an old military axiom that the best practice is to never prop-up failure and only reinforce success. A recipe for defeat is to do the opposite. Deferring counter-terrorism efforts to police and the legalism of courts and lawyers is in accord with the best practices that the Western world has developed over centuries. However, they are often inadequate in dealing with terrorism in a timely manner and -- worse still -- the front organizations are doing their level best to insert supporters into the police and legal community. Between the actions of 'progressive' lawyers, crusading journalists, social campaigners, and the agents of the Front organizations in the legal system, it is getting harder and harder for police and intelligence agencies to operate effectively. This is compounded by the need to protect human rights, requirements to preserve secrecy for ongoing activities by police and security agencies, and the difficulty of turning intelligence grade material into legal standard of proof. What makes things even worse in dealing with the Jihad is the concept of Taqqiyah. Jihadists and their supporters lie and misdirect, without shame or hesitation, in dealing with Western courts, news media, and other audiences. A characteristic of Islam is that an individual alone must decide for himself about his obligations to the faith and the Ummah (community of all the believers). He can get guidance and instruction, but must still decide for himself where his duty and loyalty lies. Unfortunately, this implies -- as the families of 13 dead soldiers at Fort Hood have learned -- that it might be unsafe to trust any Muslim. Yet, at the same time, not trusting any Muslim might well drive more of them into the arena of the Jihadists. We are on the horns of a dilemma and both points are going to gore us. There is no perfect solution, but there are some good principles to remember. First, when fighting violent people, be violent. Don't wear kid gloves when in a boxing ring. Second, when fighting an ideology -- fight the ideology. Jihadist guerillas and insurgents prosper where they are unopposed, and become shy when faced with action. Hamas has been quiet since the Israelis went into the Gaza strip. Al Qaeda in Iraq re-emerged as the American presence retreated from the streets. India's rage and the threat of military action after Mumbai inhibited the LeT. What other possible conclusions can be drawn from this? Terrorism depends upon our restraint, and usually it is a good idea to be restrained -- to be careful about inflicting casualties on non-combatants and be particular about our treatment of prisoners and the wounded. Hiding in schools and mosques, or behind their own families, might appear to provide Jihadists with temporary tactical advantages; but against well-trained Western troops, these ploys really offer little protection. But there will be occasions where rounds miss and restraint is momentarily abandoned in the heat of combat... these things happen and we should all do well to remember that. Insisting on high standards is good, demanding impossible ones is not. The conduct of the Israeli Defence Forces during Operation Cast Lead during 2008/2009 -- notwithstanding the bleating from the usual suspects -- was both exemplary and an example to emulate under similar circumstances. American roving Predator Drones with Hellfire Missiles must be allowed to roam over areas where Jihadist leaders feel safe... after all, if countries want their sovereignty to be respected, than it is incumbent on them to ensure their territory is not used as a sanctuary for terrorists. Otherwise, get used to the occasional explosion in your hinterland. However, the struggle against the Jihad depends upon much more than this. Both arms of the Jihad are trying to work us over with feints, jabs, hooks and parries. In the interests of toleration and inclusion, we cannot even openly identify the enemy. We must accept his arguments at face value and are told it is 'hurtful' to debate him. We are attacked, and then must hear the supporters of the attacker tell us how defending ourselves is provocative. The legendary boxer Mohammed Ali would herd his opponent into a corner of the ring -- playing 'rope a dope' so that the rival boxer would get hemmed in and be unable to move, fall, or do anything but accept the barrage of blows until he was too disoriented to fight any further. Then the knockout blow would finish the match. This is the same tactic that the Islamic Front groups are pursuing... which means that it is time for some fancy footwork. The fundamentalist ideology does not like freedom of religion. For us, there is no sensible reason to permit the Dawa and Tablighi Jamaat to function openly in our societies. If we accept religious pluralism here then we should insist on it elsewhere. Why should Saudi-funded Mosques be built in our cities, when Asian, African and Western workers inside Saudi Arabia are not allowed to openly practice their religions there? Freedom of religion also means the freedom to criticize any particular faith and the freedom of all people to change their faith. If Khomeinists and Wahhabis want to convert our violent criminals and addle-pates, fine... but it would be interesting to see how Islam really fares in an atmosphere of religious tolerance, because it has never fairly competed with other religions in such circumstances. It will not be easy to practice selective discrimination against the followers of one religion, but until its supporters are themselves prepared to tolerate others as equals -- not second class dhimmi at best -- then it may be a necessary response. Ergo, no obvious religious trappings should be tolerated. The recent bans in Europe on Burkas and Minarets and a blanket ban on Sharia Law in any guise should be emulated, until such time as restrictions on other religions are lifted in Islamic countries. The popular symbol for Justice is of a blindfolded woman holding a scale. Bearing in mind that the practice of Islamic Law is inimical to Western legal traditions, it might be time to loosen the blindfold. Islamic 'lawfare' has been practiced enough against many Western commentators and writers to recognize it for what it is. Between Taqqiyah and Dawa funding for court challenges (and an irritating habit of abandoning suits when the discovery stage of a trial comes up), it is time that judges ceased humouring vexatious suits and understood that warfare by litigation is a substitute for terrorism. There is an urgent need for legislation that retroactively compensates the targets of lawfare -- from the pockets of the plaintiffs. Moreover, legislators must understand who they are really dealing with when receiving submissions from members of the Front organizations. Societies built upon immigration have been exceptionally tolerant by the standards of most societies in human history; but there still must be a necessary degree of assimilation for the larger society to survive. It must be completely understood that no aspect of Sharia Law can ever trump our existing legal codes and that tolerance must also be practiced by those who would claim its protections. Those are the rules, live by them here or live elsewhere. The fight against the Jihad will take decades, cost tens of billions of dollars and ultimately claim millions of lives (so far, the death toll has been much less than this and most of the dead have been Muslims slain by other Muslims... particularly in Algeria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Pakistan). But a successful Jihad movement that takes control of Middle Eastern governments and becomes dominant elsewhere will result in the murder of people in the tens or hundreds of millions. Firmness and resolution will save those lives let us act accordingly. John Thompson is President of the Mackenzie Institute which studies political instability and terrorism. He can be reached at: [email protected] [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [email protected]. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [email protected] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [email protected] Unsubscribe: [email protected] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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