Mackenzie Briefing Notes

 

P.0. Box 338, Adelaide Station   Toronto, Ontario   M5C-2J4

Tel:  416-686-4063  E-Mail [email protected]

 

 

The New World Expansion of Hezbollah 

 


Issue # 29 -- July 2010


 




John C. Thompson




 

Introduction

With the recent defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the
distinction of being the world’s most sophisticated and globalized terrorist
group has passed to the 

Lebanese Shiite group Hezbollah.  Yet many observers reasonably argue that
this has always been more innovative and powerful than the LTTE.  Moreover,
the Tigers were a limited threat to the Western World, but this is not true
of Hezbollah.

 

In the last fifteen years, Hezbollah – both on its own account and as a
proxy of Iran – has undergone a rapid expansion beyond the Middle East.  Its
recent entry into the cocaine trade will make it more dangerous yet,
particularly inside North America.  The danger it poses must not be
underestimated.

 

The Fundamental Facts of Hezbollah

For centuries, the Shiites of what is now Lebanon were a poor under-educated
minority and often excluded from playing key roles in that country’s complex
multicultural plurality under the Sunni Ottoman Empire and the French
Mandate of 1919-1946. The multicultural constitution that came with
Lebanon’s independence kept the Shiites as a weak minority. 

There is a price for multicultural constitutions and Lebanon paid it in
their 1975-1990 Civil War when the Palestinians (particularly the PLO),
Syrians and Israelis joined the Christians, Druze and Sunnis in tearing the
country apart.  This tiny country – with a 2009 population of 4.2 million –
lost around 200,000 dead during their complex Civil War; with a
corresponding high price in economic damage and lost infrastructure.

At first the Shiites were poorly armed, less organized, and had less to
fight for other than to attempt to defend against the PLO.  This started to
change after the 1979 Iranian Revolution when proponents of the radical
Khomeinist ideology began missionary work among Lebanon’s Shiites and
provided arms.  Many Shiites welcomed the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) as
liberators when they invaded south Lebanon in June 1982 to crush the PLO.
The IDF overstayed its welcome after Arafat’s ouster from Lebanon in August
1982.  Shiites increasingly listened to the radical demagogues from Iran,
accepted their weapons, and saw Israel’s South Lebanon defence zone as an
occupying force.

Not surprisingly, Iran soon sent help to the Shiites in the form of 1,500
members of its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) into the Bekka
Valley outside the Israeli defence zone to assist with training and supply.

With this largess Hezbollah soon emerged from a splinter of the Amal Militia
and pledged itself to Iran’s revolutionary ideology.  

The exact relationship between the nascent Hezbollah, the IRGC, and the
Islamic Jihad Organization (which claimed responsibility for several
notorious acts of terrorism in Lebanon in 1982-84) have never been entirely
clear.  Imad Mughniyah was associated with all three and led many key
Hezbollah operations until his death by car-bomb in Damascus in February
2008.

The history of Hezbollah”s activities inside Lebanon and against Israel is
extensive and has been well documented elsewhere.

Given the usual complexities of Middle Eastern politics, where the old maxim
“The enemy of my enemy is my friend” is subject to a dozen sub-codicils,
Hezbollah’s relationships with other players in Lebanon have been complex.
However, its hostility to Israel and declared hatred of the United States
has been unwavering.

Like al Qaeda and Sunni terrorist groups, Hezbollah’s ideology is based on
Islam.  It seeks the supremacy of Sharia law and the global exultation of
its faith.  It seeks to supplant corrupt local governments, destroy Israel
and defeat the United States in order to achieve these aims.
Notwithstanding the many differences between Shiites and Sunnis, Hezbollah
is perfectly capable of cooperating with Sunni terrorist groups against
common enemies and has often done so.

Several points must be remembered about Hezbollah.

1)    Although a proxy and junior partner of Iran and its revolutionary
ideology Hezbollah can operate on its own initiative.  The 2006 war with
Israel resulted from an operation ordered by Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah, apparently without approval from Iran.

2)    Given support from Iran and the many lessons learned in 25 years of
frequent clashes with Israel, Hezbollah has far more experience than any
other Islamic terrorist group.  Its cells are better organized, have access
to better material, and are much better trained.  Moreover, unlike al Qaeda,
Hezbollah governs a population and picks and chooses its personnel more
selectively.

3)    Hezbollah is well disciplined.  Individual members or cells seldom act
autonomously.  Many terrorist organizations (like the Animal Liberation
Front or today’s ‘home grown’ Jihadis) are not much more than a loose
network of people with a shared ideology and name brand.  By contrast,
Hezbollah rarely violates its own rules.

4)    Hezbollah has always placed a considerable emphasis on gathering
intelligence and utilizing it effectively.  This includes spies, an observer
corps, modern sensors and even advanced signals intelligence to eavesdrop on
Israeli communications.  This illustrates the effectiveness of their command
and control apparatus.

5)    Hezbollah’s political arm is a major Lebanese party in its own right.
This party secured veto power over Lebanon’s Parliament and 11 of 30 cabinet
seats for itself in 2008 (a result of a power-sharing agreement that
narrowly headed off a new civil war).  This gives Hezbollah the convenience
of political power without the burden of administering a whole nation state.
It also lets the organization operate with virtual impunity inside Lebanon
while aggrieved nation states cannot admonish Lebanon for the misdeeds of
Hezbollah.

6)    Hezbollah has also been a trail-blazer for other Islamic groups with
its provision of medical and educational services to its population.  This
facilitates recruitment and indoctrination.

7)    Hezbollah also owns its own media services and trained its own
cameraman and photographers for international news services, as was clearly
evident in the fabricated ‘news’ that came out of Lebanon in 2006.

8)    Hezbollah has an enormous appetite for money to pay for its
fortifications, arms, social programs and political apparatus.  It draws
finances from Zakat charitable donations made by Lebanese Shiites, by direct
subsidies from Iran (much reduced at the moment) and from its own business
activities.  Moreover, Hezbollah has long been involved in organized crime,
particularly in the lucrative hashish trade out of South Lebanon.  Beyond
this, it ‘taxes’ imports into Lebanon and takes a tiny piece of many
transactions made by Lebanese Shiites abroad.

By 2010, Hezbollah had greatly reinforced its position in South Lebanon and
now has stocks of over 60,000 artillery rockets – some with the range to
reach southern Israel.  They have prepared four ‘brigades’ with a view to
lunging into Israeli communities on the border.  Given Hezbollah’s long
history of kidnapping and the acute anxiety Israel suffers when its citizens
are made hostage, one can imagine the real objective of these brigades.
Hezbollah has even drawn hundreds of new recruits from Fatah and other
Palestinian groups.  The threat it poses is growing very rapidly.  This
makes an examination of its presence in the Americas even more important.

 

The Lebanese Diaspora

Much like their distant Phoenician ancestors of the Ancient World, today’s
Lebanese are constrained by the tiny size of their homeland. Both 3,000
years ago and today, this tiny maritime country has encouraged emigration.
Moreover, while the laws of governments and societies may change, kinship
networks always endure.  

Lebanon’s population today is around 4.2 million people, but 10 to 11
million Lebanese are strewn around Africa and the Americas.  Just as Hindus
and Muslims from the old British Raj once formed much of the commercial
class in eastern Africa; Lebanese provide much of the same function in
western Africa, especially in former French possessions.  Lebanese were
among the first Middle Eastern immigrants into Argentina, Brazil, the French
Caribbean, the United States and Canada; with some (mostly Christians)
coming as early as the 1870s.

Not being as commercially oriented or as comfortable abroad as Christians
and Sunnis, Lebanon’s Shiites were slow to follow other Lebanese overseas.
But they have followed in increasing numbers since the 1970s and are now
widely established.  The entire émigré community affords Hezbollah a
familiar cultural/linguistic base, but real penetration specifically
requires the presence of Lebanese Shiites.  The organization has been quick
to enable this.   

Culturally, Lebanese are very different from the rest of the Arab Middle
East.  Most Lebanese are multilingual.  Their own patois of Arabic could
arguably be a separate language in itself that owes much to a strong
infusion of Syriac (a Semitic dialect suffused with Aramaic), Turkish, and
French.  Lebanon’s long cosmopolitan history makes even rural Shiites
familiar with non-Arabic influences on diet, dress, habit and interests.

Lebanese culture, like the rest of the Arab Middle East, places a strong
loyalty on family and kinship linkages.  The persistent weakness of Lebanese
government even before the outbreak of the Civil War only reinforced this
trait.  While Lebanese Christians have a greater involvement than Muslims in
far-flung trading and commercial relationships that utilize such linkages,
they are very much a part of the entire Lebanese society.  

This background gives several advantages to members of Hezbollah:

1)     A Lebanese Shiite will normally have exposure to a greater tradition
and experience in long-distance commerce than would commonly be found among
Jihadists from elsewhere in the Islamic World.  This has greatly facilitated
Hezbollah’s ability to participate in globalized black and grey market
activities, including narcotics and smuggling.  

2)    A Hezbollah member can be more comfortable travelling in Western or
Latin American cultures than a Sunni Jihadist and is less likely to trigger
suspicion in police and customs officials.  The easy ‘tells’ that often
attract attention for al Qaeda members (like being nervous in front of
female custom officers, not using Western-style toilets correctly, etc.)
will be less apparent. 

3)    A Hezbollah member is not necessarily dependent on the group to
financially support him when staying away from home.  Moreover, being able
to call on distant kin for accommodation and other services sometimes makes
it much more difficult to track the movements of individual members of
Hezbollah when they travel to different countries.

 

South America

Hezbollah startled the world with the deadly bombings of the Israeli embassy
in Argentina in 1992 and an Argentine synagogue in 1994. Investigators soon
realized that the terrorist attacks were supported out of the local Lebanese
community.  Attention was soon drawn to the tri-state area where Brazil,
Paraguay and Argentina all meet.  Investigators were again startled to find
that Hezbollah had a quasi-permanent presence established there amid
expatriate Lebanese before the attacks occurred.

This tri-state area has long been home to a lively smuggling industry,
particularly as products and people can slip across lightly defended borders
to a second (or third) jurisdiction when in trouble.  In 2000, Paraguayan
authorities insisted there were 460 Hezbollah operatives in the region.
There are mosques on the Argentine and Brazilian side that feature radical
Khomeinist preachers, and there is money to be made moving narcotics,
counterfeit CDs and falsified documents to and fro.

There have been no further Hezbollah attacks in the region since 1994, but
it is clear that Hezbollah sympathizers are deeply lodged in the area and
are donating a share of their profits to the organization.  In addition to
Shiite missionary work (often sourced back to the Iranian embassy in
Argentina), Hezbollah’s supporters have been working traditional old
fashioned right-wing anti-Semitism as a recruiting and networking tool.
This contrasts with the feelers for traditional old-fashioned left-wing
revolutionaries they have extended elsewhere in Latin America. 

 

Venezuela and Narcotics

Venezuela, like many Latin American countries, has experienced periods of
immigration in the past and now has a community of some 130,000 Lebanese;
over half of whom are Muslim.  This has been enough for Hezbollah and the
Iranians to leverage their way into gaining more of a foothold.  In 2007,
two explosive devices were found near the American embassy and local
Hezbollah affiliates claimed credit.  In contrast to Hezbollah’s usual
style, these were small and extremely simple and evidently intended to
scatter propaganda leaflets – which suggest the local converts still think
in terms of old-fashioned revolutionary terrorism rather than the new more
lethal style pioneered by Islamic groups.

The Hezbollah attackers in Argentina in 1994 allegedly had Venezuelan IDs
and travel documents, and Venezuelan police determined that remittances from
their Lebanese community were going to Hezbollah through businesses located
in their country.  Since Hugo Chavez took power in 1999, international
cooperation with Venezuelan police in matters concerning Hezbollah has
markedly declined.

Chavez is an anachronistic throwback to Benito Mussolini or Juan Peron
(without the organizing ability of the first or the charisma of the latter),
but he has been taking Venezuela in dangerous directions.  Like most
traditional Latin American strongmen with a penchant for demagoguery, Chavez
has been training new paramilitary forces.  Trying to inflate his image as a
hero, he has been busy posturing at the United States -- which has tried to
ignore him as gracefully as anyone can with a Chihuahua gnawing on their
ankles.  Chavez has been making overtures to Cuba, Russia and China, but
especially to Iran and Hezbollah.

By 2006 Chavez sent 500 men to train in Iran for “Oil Field Security” – not
that this is a particularly technical occupation nor was it necessary before
-- but Chavez has been creating large new paramilitary forces to act as a
political militia composed of his supporters.  The IRGC was eager to help
train the new force’s cadre.  Since March 2007, Iran Air has run a weekly
scheduled flight from Tehran to Caracas, a sure sign of the growing ties
between the two governments.

Shiite Islamic Missionary work is being widely undertaken, especially among
Wayuu Indians.  This is a populous tribe with a strong tradition of
opposition to government whose reserves overlap the Columbian/Venezuelan
border.  Given their militant tradition and favourable position for
smuggling, the Wayuu have a number of attractions for Hezbollah and the
Iranians. An organization styling itself Autonomia Islamica Wayuu announced
its presence in 2007 on a Hezbollah website.

So far, between Wayuu militants, some of the Latin American converts to
Hezbollah, and Chavez himself, there seems to be an absence of
sophistication and very little prior knowledge about militant Islam.  One
might wonder if the Venezuelans truly understand what they have so casually
invited into their country.  One might also wonder just how carefully
Hezbollah is playing the fish nibbling on their line.

Smuggling conduits are probably already operating full bore.  After the
Colombian government finally got the upper hand on narco-guerrillas of FARC
(with some American help) in 2007-08, it became clear that Venezuela was
playing an increasing role in the cocaine industry.  Hundreds of FARC
members have been knowingly extended Venezuelan citizenship and have freely
traveled in that country.

A Colombian raid on March 1st 2008 inside Ecuador resulted in the death of
the senior FARC leader Paul Reyes and the recovery of laptop computers whose
contents revealed the significant extent to which senior Ecuadoran and
Venezuelan government figures have become involved in the cocaine industry.
Notwithstanding the usual protestations from the usual suspects, the ties
between Chavez and the cocaine-fueled guerrillas were again confirmed in
July 2009 when AT-4 anti-tank rockets (a modern Swedish weapon widely used
by many Western armies) surfaced among FARC guerrillas in Colombia after
having been sold to Venezuela.

With the recent slump in oil prices, Hezbollah had seen diminished subsidies
from Iran.  However, the group is more prosperous than ever and is
supposedly even picking up the tab for Iranian-backed Shiite insurgents in
Yemen.  This strongly supports suggestions that Hezbollah is also
capitalizing on the weakening of FARC and is rapidly positioning itself to
become the world’s leading bulk-distributor of cocaine.

With its own ships and aircraft, Lebanese government connections and their
international alliances, Hezbollah is placed to make hundreds of millions of
dollars annually from cocaine trafficking. 

Where the Lebanese Shiite Tweedledum is openly established, the Iranian
Tweedledee is seldom far away:  IRGC has also frequently been reported to
have an open presence in Venezuela.  An AFP news story in May 25th, 2009
claimed that Venezuela has been sending uranium to Iran.  Venezuela has
deposits of uranium but no nuclear infrastructure of its own.  But for its
tin-pot dictator at the helm, Venezuela might have been almost entirely
disinterested in mining and refining its uranium.

Rumours from the uranium mine sites imply a strong Islamic presence on the
ground.  Indian workers are said to be complaining of being ordered to pray
several times daily, and that Shiite missionaries are hard at work among the
labourers.  Hezbollah is usually a little more sophisticated than this, but
the same cannot be true for some of the more boorish cadres of the IRGC.

 

Central America and Mexico

In March 2009, Michael Braun (the recently retired chief of operations for
the DEA) and six other US officials stated that Hezbollah had become
involved in the operations of Mexico’s drug cartels.  The cartels control
smuggling routes for narcotics and people into the United States, Hezbollah
brings access to government resources from Iran and Lebanon for access to
arms and major equipment.  While the cartels already have a plentiful supply
of aggressive gunmen, Hezbollah offers better training in bomb-making and
more sophisticated means of intelligence gathering.

As in Venezuela and the Tri-State Area further south; there is a small
Lebanese expatriate community in Mexico.  Again, the original immigrants
were not Shiites, but they have been able to follow.  Once again, there are
business opportunities offered by a well-developed economy with a weak law
enforcement system, and twice these conditions have been sufficient for
Hezbollah to gain a foothold elsewhere in the Americas.  Reuters reported
that Hezbollah established itself in Mexico as early as October 2006.  Two
years earlier, the CIA reported it was concerned about the possibility.

Next to narcotics, the next largest money-maker for organized crime around
the world is supporting illegal immigration, and one destination of choice
is the United States.  With its growing influence in Mexico, Hezbollah is
positioned to take advantage of both activities and to service the American
market.  The FBI noticed Hezbollah agents on the US-Mexican border in early
2009.  In July 2010, Mexican authorities broke up a Hezbollah network in
Tijuana, just across the border from southern California.

The other attraction for Hezbollah in Mexico lies in Chiapas Province.
While the cartels are busy on the American-Mexican frontier, Mexico‘s
southern border has been in social turmoil for some years.  El Murabitun is
a sect of European converts to Sufi Islam that has been engaged in
missionary work in some parts of Latin America since the mid-1990s and plays
on some of the same themes that worked for the radical left.  One area where
they are reputed to have enjoyed considerable success is in Chiapas.

Hezbollah has sent its agents into the area since 2005 and have been taking
advantage of the inability of many converts (particularly among the local
Indians) to tell the difference between Sunnis, Shiites and Sufis.  The
Zapatistas have apparently decided not to contest with the Islamists and
instead seek common cause with them.  Hezbollah is now providing
communications in the local Mayan dialect as well as in Spanish.

An entrenchment in Chiapas would give Hezbollah the opportunity to further
facilitate smuggling from Guatemala and points south, and may make them even
more valuable partners for the cartels to the north.

 

In the United States

Although relentless in its hatred of the United States, Hezbollah has always
refrained from launching attacks on American soil.  This may not always be
true in the future.

Since the Second World War, 180,000 Lebanese have immigrated into the United
States.  Again, the Shiites were slow to follow, but since the end of the
Lebanese Civil War they have come in increasing numbers and now form the
majority in some old Lebanese neighbourhoods.  These neighbourhoods also
attract many Palestinian Arabs and are forming radicalized hubs.

At present, Hezbollah uses the United States for money raising, technology
purchases and recruiting.  It largely had a free hand in the US until 1996
when the State Department designated it a foreign terrorist organization
after the Khobar Towers bombing.  This enabled domestic law enforcement to
go after Hezbollah members in the US.  What the FBI and other investigators
found were shell companies, business fronts, and organized criminal
activities all designed to raise money for the group.

Between 1996 and 2006, US investigators detected a dozen instances of
Hezbollah raising funds in the US.  The Hammoud brothers in North Carolina
were a case in point.  They would ship low-taxed cigarettes from the
tobacco-growing state into high-taxed states like Michigan and New York and
sell them on the black market.  Another businessman made illegal bulk
purchases of cigarettes from Native smoke-shops in upstate New York and
resold them in Detroit.  Federal investigators found that they had funneled
some $8 million in profits back to Lebanon.

More modest but similar cases involved grocery stores that would sell
promotional products or condemned and stale-dated goods -- with the proceeds
going to Hezbollah.  In February 2010, three Lebanese men in Miami were
charged with offences relating to smuggling consumer products out of the
southern US to the Tri-State Area in South America..

Will Hezbollah continue to regard the US as a place to finance its
activities elsewhere or is it positioning assets for potential strikes
inside the United States at a critical moment – such as when Iran’s nuclear
program is attacked.  Notwithstanding its deep involvement in narcotics,
Hezbollah is first and always a terrorist organization with exceptionally
well-trained and disciplined cadres.  Homegrown al Qaeda-inspired Sunnis in
the US do not have the patience to act as sleeper cells; this is not true
for Hezbollah.

At an operational level, Hezbollah continually develops intelligence and
undertakes reconnaissance. Since 9/11, there have been hundreds of reports
of potentially hostile surveillance of hospitals, schools, emergency
responders, office towers, power plants, refineries and public sites.  Most
of these reports could not be adequately investigated as perpetrators leave
at the first sign that suspicions have been aroused.  As the public’s
awareness of terrorism fades and policing resources are diverted to other
tasks, more of these incidents go unreported.  While many of these
activities are thought to have been undertaken by supporters of al Qaeda,
Hezbollah is also suspect.

James Woolsey, the former head of the CIA, told a Senate Committee in
February 2009 that he is aware that Hezbollah has identified 29 key targets
in the US and the Western World whose destruction would – in the words of
Iran’s president Ahmadinejad -- “end Anglo-Saxon civilization”.  Even given
Ahmadinejad’s penchant for exaggeration, this is the sort of threat that
cannot be ignored.

 

Hezbollah in Canada

Like the United States, Canada has been attracting immigrants from Lebanon
since the 1880s, although the vast majority of these were French-speaking
Christians until after the Second World War.  The Lebanese Civil War and the
relaxation of Canadian immigration guidelines resulted in a flood of Druze
and Sunni Lebanese starting in the 1970s, with Shiites following soon
afterwards.

Canada’s 2006 Census revealed that 270,000 Canadians claimed Lebanese
origins.  The Hezbollah-Israeli clash of the same year revealed that some
50,000 of these had returned to Lebanon as dual citizens – much to the
consternation of other Canadians who disliked Ottawa footing the bill for
the hasty evacuation of many of these ‘Canadians of convenience’.
Regardless, there are large well-developed Lebanese communities in many
Canadian cities.

While Lebanese Shi’ites were slow to arrive in Canada, they have come in the
tens of thousands and members of Hezbollah are among them.   Ali Adham
Amhaz, Fauzi Ayub, Mohammed Hassan Dbouk, Mohammed Hussein al Husseini and
Omar el Sayed are all among the Canadian residents variously identified as
being members of Hezbollah in the past.  At least one was recruited in
Canada.  Three were involved in purchasing high tech equipment for
Hezbollah, and at least two were involved in scams that raised over $1.3
million for the group. Another was trafficking cocaine and heroin.

One of the five was arrested in Israel, travelling there on a Canadian
passport to pre-position gear for Hezbollah.  One was producing propaganda
material for the terrorist organization back in Lebanon as recently as 2007.
At least two were known to have been gathering intelligence for potential
attacks inside Canada. 

In 2008, CSIS acknowledged that it was monitoring some 20 members of the
group inside Canada belonging to four recently activated sleeper cells.
These conducted reconnaissance against Canadian synagogues and the Israeli
embassy.  This upsurge in activity was in response to the February 2008
death of Imad Mugnniyah, Hezbollah’s legendary bomb-maker.  In any event,
after briefly sticking their periscopes up, Hezbollah’s Canadian assets have
since slid underwater again.

Hezbollah has used Canada as a place to recruit, raise money and acquire
equipment.  It is ominous that there have been no reports of the latter
three activities for over seven years.  One could be reminded of the old
movie cliché: “It’s quiet out there.” To which the inevitable response given
just before a surprise attack unfolds is: “Yeah, too quiet.”

   

Conclusions

Hezbollah is probably the most dangerous terrorist organization in the
world, being the largest, best trained, best disciplined, best financed and
best armed.  It has a presence wherever Lebanese Shiites are found but
unfortunately, it has an alarming capacity to appear in other places too.

Terrorist groups that get heavily involved in legitimate and illegitimate
funding tend to go through an evolutionary process.  As the pay roll and
expenses expand, it is difficult to curb the budget.  This tends to make
such groups more interested in continuing to make money than in pursuing
their original agendas.  Eventually, they reach a stage where they have
largely morphed into organized criminal societies that use the cause to
justify their business activities. This is a life cycle that has not been
studied as closely as it deserves.

It is clearly hard to monitor Hezbollah’s senior cadres for signs of
personal corruption but it is certain they are frantically stockpiling arms
and equipment.  They are investing time and effort in long-term expansion –
but this could be both for the purposes of the Jihad or for a gradual
evolution into a global criminal empire. 

With expansion in the Americas, particularly into the US and Canada, we will
learn soon enough whether Hezbollah is more interested in truck bombs or
narcotics trafficking.  The problem is that the answer could be explosive.

   

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The Mackenzie Institute

 

The Institute was formed in 1986 to provide research and comment on such
diverse subjects as terrorism, organized crime, political extremism,
propaganda, conflict and other such matters.  It does not shy away from
controversy.

 

The second purpose of the Institute is to work to enhance Canada’s stability
where and when it can.

 

The Institute does not accept funding from any government and preserves its
independence.  Those who support its purposes are invited to become Friends
of the Institute, and those who contribute $60 (or more) to it, receive its
publications for the next twelve months.  

 

The Mackenzie Institute

PO Box 338, Adelaide Station

Toronto, Ontario

M5C-2J4

Tel: 416-686-4063.

 

[email protected]

www.mackenzieinstitute.com




 

 



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