[Yisrael Aumann is an Israeli-American mathematician who received the Nobel 
Memorial Prize in Economics in 2005 for his work on conflict and cooperation 
through game-theory analysis. Here Professor Aumann provides an illustration of 
his theory in practice for the benefit of laymen like us. See if you can figure 
out which character in Aumann’s example represents the real-life Benjamin 
Netanyahu. df]

 

 

 <http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/9585> Israel>'s 
Conflict as Game Theory 


 

 

Sadly, Israel ignores the basic principles of game theory.  

 

05 June 10 

 

by Nobel Prize Laureate Prof. Yisrael Aumann

 

(Israelnationalnews.com) Two men—let us call them Reuben and Simon—are put in a 
small room containing a suitcase filled with  bills totaling $100,000.  The 
owner of the suitcase announces the following:

 

“ I will give you the money in the suitcase under one condition…you have to 
negotiate an agreement on how to divide it. That is the only way I will agree 
to give you the money.”

 

Reuben is a rational person and realizes the golden opportunity that has fallen 
his way. He turns to Simon with the obvious suggestion: “You take half and I’ll 
take half, that way each of us will have $50,000.” 

 

To his surprise, Simon frowns at him and says, in a tone that leaves no room 
for doubt: “Look here, I don’t know what your plans are for the money, but I 
don’t intend to leave this room with less than $90,000. If you accept that, 
fine. If not, we can both go home without any of the money.”

 

Reuben can hardly believe his ears. “What has happened to Simon” he asks 
himself. “Why should he get 90% of the money and I just 10%?”  He decides to 
try to convince Simon to accept his view. “Let’s be logical,” he urges him, “We 
are in the same situation, we both want the money. Let’s divide the money 
equally and both of us will profit.”

 

Simon, however, doesn’t seem perturbed by his friend’s logic He listens 
attentively, but when Reuben is finished he says, even more emphatically than 
before: “90-10 or nothing. That is my last offer.”

 

Reuben’s face turns red with anger. He is about to punch Simon in the nose, but 
he steps back. He realizes that Simon is not going to relent, and that the only 
way he can leave the room with any money is to give in to him. He straightens 
his clothes, takes $10,000 from the suitcase, shakes Simon’s hand and leaves 
the room humiliated.

 

This case is called “The Blackmailer’s Paradox” in game theory. The paradox is 
that Reuben the rational is forced to behave irrationally by definition, in 
order to achieve maximum results in the face of the situation that has evolved. 
What brings about this bizarre outcome is the fact Simon is sure of himself and 
doesn’t flinch when making his exorbitant demand. This convinces Reuben that he 
must give in so as to make the best of the situation.

 

The Arab-Israeli Conflict:

 

The relationship between Israel and the Arab countries is conducted along the 
lines of this paradox. At each stage of negotiation, the Arabs present 
impossible, unacceptable starting positions. They act sure of themselves and as 
if they totally believe in what they are asking for, and make it clear to 
Israel that there is no chance of their backing down. 

 

Invariably, Israel agrees to their blackmailing demands because otherwise she 
will leave the room empty handed. The most blatant example of this is the 
negotiations with Syria that have been taking place with different levels of 
negotiators for years.  The Syrians made sure that it was clear from the 
beginning that they would not compromise on one millimeter of the Golan Heights.

 

The Israeli side, eager to have a peace agreement with Syria, internalized the 
Syrian position so well, that the Israeli public is sure that the starting 
point for future negotiations with Syria has to include complete withdrawal 
from the Golan Heights, this despite its critical strategic importance in 
ensuring secure borders for Israel.

 

The Losing Solution:

 

According to game theory, Israel has to change certain basic perceptions in 
order to improve her chances in the negotiations game with the Arabs and win 
the long term political struggle:

 

a. Willingness to forego agreements:

 

Israel’s political stand is based on the principle that agreements must be 
reached with the Arabs at any price, that the lack of agreements is untenable. 
In the Blackmailer’s Paradox, Reuben’s behavior is the result of his feeling 
that he must leave the room with some money, no matter how little.  Because 
Reuben cannot imagine himself leaving the room with empty hands, he is easy 
prey for Simon, and ends up leaving with a certain amount of money, but in the 
role of the humiliated loser.  This is similar to the way Israel handles 
negotiations, her mental state making her unable to reject suggestions that do 
not advance her interests.

 

b. Taking repetition into account

 

Game theory relates to onetime situations differently than to situations that 
repeat themselves. A situation that repeats itself over any length of time, 
creates, paradoxically, strategic parity that leads to cooperation between the 
opposing sides. This cooperation occurs when both sides realize that the game 
is going to repeat itself, and that since they must weigh the influence present 
moves will have on future games, there is a balancing factor at play. Reuben 
saw his problem as a onetime event, and behaved accordingly. Had he told Simon 
instead that he would not forego the amount he deserves even if he sustains a 
total loss, he would have changed the game results for an indefinite period.  
It is probably true that he would still have left the game empty handed, but at 
the next meeting with Simon, the latter would remember Reuben’s original 
suggestion and would try to reach a compromise.

 

That is how Israel has to behave, looking at the long term in order to improve 
her position in future negotiations, even if it means continuing a state of war 
and fore going an agreement.

 

c. Faith in your opinions

 

Another element that crates the “Blackmailer’s Paradox” is the unwavering 
belief of one side in its opinion. Simon exemplifies that. This faith gives a 
contender inner confidence in his cause at the start and eventually convinces 
his rival as well.   The result is that the opposing side wants to reach an 
agreement, even at the expense of irrational surrender that is considerably 
distanced from his opening position.  Several years ago, I spoke to a senior 
officer who claimed that Israel must withdraw from the Golan Heights in the 
framework of a peace treaty, because the Golan is holy land to the Syrians and 
they will never give it up. I explained to him that first the Syrians convinced 
themselves that the Golan is holy land to them, and then proceeded to convince 
you as well. The Syrians’ unflinching belief that they are in the right 
convinces us to give in to their dictates. The only solution to that is for us 
to believe unwaveringly in the righteousness of our cause. Only complete faith 
in our demands can succeed in convincing our Syrian opponent to take our 
opinion into account.

 

As in all of science, game theory does not take sides in moral and value 
judgments. It analyzes strategically the behavior of opposing sides in a game 
they play against one another. The State of Israel is in the midst of one such 
game opposite its enemies. As in every game, the Arab-Israeli game involves 
interests that create the framework of the game and its rules.  

 

Sadly, Israel ignores the basic principles of game theory.  If Israel would be 
wise enough to behave according to those principles, her political status and 
de facto, her security status, would improve substantially.

 

###

 

NB: At the moment, the "Peace Process" game seems to be at an impasse, Bibi 
having extended himself beyond which his coalition would crack up, and Obama 
unwilling to throw more into a losing hand before Jews and the rest of the 
electorate choose the next Congress in a little over two weeks. This doesn't 
mean Obama or Netanyahu have given up the ghost - they haven't. According to my 
own "game theory," come next month both may decide they have nothing left to 
lose. (df)

 



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