And the sun could rise in the west, but it is not likely.

 

B

 

 

 

http://www.rightsidenews.com/2010101211859/world/terrorism/the-tide-could-tu
rn-against-radical-islam.html 


The Tide Could Turn Against Radical Islam 


Monday, 11 October 2010 20:19 Dr. Max Singer 

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 116

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The driving forces behind the growth of Islamic
radicalism - the Islamic revolution in Iran and the immense Saudi funding
for spreading Wahhabism - may not endure. By the end of this decade, the
current strength of Islamism could be shattered. US action is not required
for the Iranian regime to fall - although it could be a big help. 

rightsidenews_camps_02On the other hand it is probably only the US that
could convince the Saudis to hold onto their money rather than using so much
to sell Wahhabism throughout the world.  It is important to understand that
two quite possible developments could bring about a sea change in the
worldwide confrontation with radical Islam. 

Today it seems as if the conflict with Islamism - the small component of the
Muslim world that sees itself as actively in long-term conflict with most of
the world - will be with us indefinitely and may well be getting worse.
While this may be true, it is also important to keep in mind a scenario that
could decisively change the direction of events. 

While the Islamist energy within the Muslim world has achieved a
self-sustaining life of its own, we should also notice that the current
strength of Islamism is primarily the result of two specific influences
which have been the driving force for changing the political balance within
the Muslim world for the past 30 years. Both of these driving forces could
be removed before the end of this decade. 

The root causes of the conflict between Islamism - and indeed Muslim society
more broadly - and the rest of the world undoubtedly existed in 1979 as
strongly as they do today. But the character of politics, debate, and
behavior in the Muslim world was dramatically less troublesome then than it
is now. Thirty-one years ago two things happened to change the situation:
the Islamic revolution in Iran and the subsequent Saudi decision to sharply
increase their efforts to spread Wahhabism. 

Khomeini's Islamic revolution gained control of Iran, the largest Shiite
country in the world and a major power in Middle East affairs. Since coming
to power Iran's Islamic revolutionary regime has been a persistent creative
force, spreading Islamism throughout the Muslim world through
religious/political leadership, inspiration and advocacy, terror and
political violence, and national political measures. 

When it began, this new active Iranian program led by Khomeini to organize
and promote Islamic radicalism throughout the Muslim world threatened to
drastically increase Shiite influence among Sunnis, to many of whom the
radical message, supported by Iranian national power, had great attraction.
This possibility frightened the Saudi leadership, for whom Shiites were
historic enemies. The Saudis felt compelled to compete with the Iranian
revolutionary regime for leadership of radical Islam. 

The result of this political pressure on the Saudi leadership, plus the
great increase in their wealth following the oil price increases of
1979-1980, led to a multiplication of Saudi efforts to spread Wahhabism -
the backward-looking Saudi version of Islam - throughout the world. Since
1980, Saudi royal family members and their beneficiaries have been exporting
some $4 billion or more dollars a year to spread Wahhabi doctrines and
influence throughout the world, from the US through Indonesia, from Chechnya
and Bosnia through central Africa. One-hundred-and-twenty billion dollars
for education and propaganda is a lot of money. 

The result of this immense flow of resources from Saudi Arabia has been a
complete transformation of religious and political life in the Muslim world.
Wahhabism was a relatively small and somewhat despised element of Islam
around the world in 1979. Today Wahhabi-controlled mosques, schools,
preachers, and NGOs are a main if not dominant feature in both Muslim
majority and Muslim minority communities in almost every country. Wahhabis
control, for example, the great majority of Muslim institutions in the US -
although certainly most Muslims in the US are not Wahhabis. 

Of course both the Iranian and Saudi sources of Islamist energy could
continue to move the Muslim world indefinitely. But it is also possible that
they could disappear from the picture as suddenly as they entered it 30-odd
years ago. 

The internal legitimacy of the Iranian revolutionary regime has in the last
year become fatally undermined. There is a massive rejection of the regime
by the general public because of its destruction of the Iranian economy,
because of the forceful imposition of fundamentalist Muslim behavior on the
general public, because of the corruption of the regime, and because of its
use of violence against public protest of the stolen election last year. And
the religious leadership of the revolution has become bitterly divided. Many
of the highest religious authorities, and the original leaders of the
revolution, have formally proclaimed that the current regime is no longer
legitimate. The result has been thousands of defections, and purges, from
the leadership of the regime, including the Revolutionary Guards. 

It is quite possible that this fatally undermined regime could continue in
power - on the bayonets of the Revolutionary Guard - for many years,
especially if the outside world continues not to provide moral, political,
or financial support for the internal opposition. But it is also possible
that the regime will collapse or be overthrown this year or next, or the
year after. While no one can predict when this will happen, it is certainly
possible that the original engine of the expansion of radical Islam will
disappear in the not too distant future. 

Iranian politics are extraordinarily subtle and complex and difficult for
outsiders to understand. No one can predict with confidence the result of
outside efforts to help the Iranians who are trying to remove the
revolutionary regime. It is reasonably clear that a large majority of
Iranians have reached the point where they would be very pleased for the
current regime to be replaced, and slightly less clear that the momentum of
anti-regime feeling would produce a very different government if the
Revolutionary Guard Corps. (IRGC) were to lose control. But it is not at all
clear what is required for the opposition to put together enough unity and
power to overcome the IRGC so long as it holds together and maintains its
determination to hold onto power, however many Iranians have to be killed to
do so. Even more than most, standard Iranian behavior is to try to stay on
the winning side. Therefore one key to opposition success is to convince
more Iranians - inside and outside the regime - that the regime is doomed. 

There are good reasons for prudent governments not to commit themselves to
the overthrow of the current Iranian regime. But it is hard to understand
why no democratic government has done anything at all to provide some moral
and political support to the opposition or to provide small-scale,
non-military assistance, such as communication equipment and Radio Free
Europe-style broadcasts. The US in particular could improve the opposition's
position by speaking positively about Iranians imprisoned for political
protest and treating the regime with mere diplomatic correctness and by
ceasing its policy of going out of its way to demonstrate great respect for
the regime. One cannot be sure, but it is entirely plausible that those
Iranians trying to replace the regime would have an easier time if Iranians
could see that a new regime would be welcomed by the democratic great
powers. Iranians may have more respect for these powers, and especially the
US, than we realize. 

What about the second engine, Saudi funding for the international promotion
of Wahhabism? First, the disappearance of the Iranian revolutionary regime
would remove one of main original incentives for the Saudi effort. But this
by itself would not bring the program to a stop. 

The main requirement to end the flow of Wahhabi funds from the Saudis is for
the US to recognize the harm being produced by these funds and appreciate
its power to influence - even to compel - the Saudis into halting this
activity. Saudi desistance from funding radical Islamic groups worldwide,
America could explain, is a central US security need, especially after the
removal of the Iranian power from its support of the Islamist attack on the
West. 

Perhaps the greatest reason to think that the US could stop the export of
Wahhabi funding from Saudi Arabia is the softness of the demand the US would
be making of the Saudis. The basic US message would be, "Stop giving away so
much of your money; keep it at home and use it for yourselves." That, after
all, is not a terribly harsh or oppressive proposal - although undoubtedly
it would meet a good deal of resistance. 

Nothing today in US diplomatic or political discussion faintly suggests that
the US would follow such a course with the Saudis. Nobody - except a few
people outside policy circles, such as Professors Bernard Lewis and Daniel
Pipes (and the current author) - have even mentioned such a possibility or
discussed anything in this direction. But it is such a simple idea - to try
to stop something that has caused so much harm to the world - that there
must be some possibility that it could occur to the policy-making world at
some point. 

Despite all their oil money, and oil power, the Saudi leadership understands
very deeply that they and their regime are weak and vulnerable, and that the
US is infinitely more powerful. If the US comes to understand this half as
well as the Saudis, it is not beyond the realm of possibility that the US
could lead the Saudis to understand that they could expect America to
continue to be their protector if they keep their money at home, but that
the US would come to see them as an enemy if they continue to export their
funds to promote Wahhabism in the world. Such a change would not have to
take many years. 

So, even if unlikely, it is physically quite possible that the second engine
that has been spreading Islamism through the world for 30 years could also
come to a halt in the next few years. 

The removal of these two engines would not end all our troubles, by any
means, but it seems more than plausible that their disappearance would lead
rather quickly to a change in direction of the conflict within the Muslim
world, and therefore of the relations between Islam and the West. There
would be much better reason for hope for a better future than is readily
apparent today. 

The possibility that the situation in the Muslim world could change as
sharply in our favor as it changed against us 30 years ago is one of the
reasons why Israelis should not assume that time is not on our side.

 <http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives116.html> Source: BESA Center

Dr. Max Singer, a founder of the Hudson Institute, is a senior research
associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies and the author
(with Prof. Aaron Wildavsky) of The REAL World Order: Zones of Peace, Zones
of Turmoil.

The Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies seeks to contribute to
the advancement of Middle East peace and security by conducting
policy-relevant research on strategic subjects, particularly as they relate
to the national security and foreign policy of Israel.
BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family.

 

 
<http://www.rightsidenews.com/2010101211859/world/terrorism/the-tide-could-t
urn-against-radical-islam.html> 


 



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