http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/skullduggery-massive-scale
Skullduggery on a massive scale Published 11 October 2010 Stuxnet, the malware which attacked more than 30,000 computers used in industrial control systems in Iran, including that country's nuclear weapons facilities, represents a new class and dimension of malware; it can reach into the physical world, allowing attackers to run motors so fast they burn out, to turn off alarms and safety cut-offs, open effluent valves and activate pumps -- in the words of Paul Marks, it allows attackers to "carry out industrial sabotage and skullduggery on a massive scale" In Monday's issue of the Homeland Security NewsWire we run two stories which convey the same message: cyberwarfare is no longer a theoretical possibility, but a reality. * Dr. Udo Helmbrecht, executive director of ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency), the main EU cybersecurity body, says that "Stuxnet is a new class and dimension of malware.. The attackers have invested a substantial amount of time and money to build such a complex attack tool. The fact that perpetrators activated such an attack tool, can be considered as the 'first strike' against major industrial resources. This has tremendous effect on how to protect national [cyber and critical infrastructure] in the future" (see "Experts: Stuxnet 'a game changer'," 11 October 2011 HSNW) * The U.S. National Security Agency, worried about Chineses spying, earlier this year warned AT&T that if the company were to go ahead with its decision to purchase equipment for a next-generation phone system from China's Huawei Technologies, then AT&T would lose all of its U.S. government business (see "NSA threatened AT&T over buying phone gear from China," 11 October 2011 HSNW) Paul Marks, the New Scientist's chief technology correspondent, agrees <http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg20827815.200-stuxnet-the-online-front -line.html> that we are on the threshold of a new phase in warfare: Is cyberwarfare (a) one of the biggest threats of the 21st century or (b) an elaborate hoax designed to extract money from gullible governments? Stuxnet, the computer worm running rampant in Iran's nuclear facilities, tells us the answer. For Marks, Stuxnet proved a straightforward proposition: "a few lines of malicious computer code can trip electricity grids, burn out power-station generators, pollute water supplies, and sabotage gas pipelines. That cyberattacks can become real-world attacks is no longer a matter of conjecture." Note that Stuxnet represents a paradigmatic shift in information warfare (IW). Previous digital attacks by one party to a conflict on another were aimed at the digital assets of the other side. Thus, in April 2007, following measures by the Lithuanian government that many in Russia took to be hostile to the interests and sensibilities of the Russians living in Lithuania (the "near abroad"), the Web sites of several Lithuanian government departments were taken down by sustained cyberattacks from Russia. Similarly, in August 2008, Russian hackers took down Web sites of the government of Georgia during the short war between the two countries. Stuxnet was different - but it had a predecessor. On 6 September 2007 Israel destroyed a Syrian nuclear reactor days before it was to receive a shipment of fissile material from North Korea. The new aspect of the attack was not the precision of the Israeli bombing of the reactor buildings in the high desert of northeast Syria. Rather, the new chapter in warfare was opened by the Israel was able, digitally, to turn off power in Syria for an hour and half, thus blinding Syria's air defenses. Israeli commandoes approached the nuclear site, beamed it with IR beams to guide precision bombs being dropped from bombers above, then were picked up be helicopters that took them back to Israel. The United States, too, shut down Iraqi power stations during the 1991 and 2003 attacks, but in both cases the means were crude in comparison: aluminum foil strips were dropped on the station to short circuit the generators. Whoever designed Stuxnet and sent it to attack Iran's nuclear weapons facilities was building on - and extending and improving - Israel's IW capabilities as demonstrated on 6 September 2007. Marks is precise in identifying the qualitative differences - unique and frightening differences - which set Stuxnet apart from previous IW efforts, and which give us a taste of things to come: Where regular worms merely infect computer systems, Stuxnet can reach out into the physical world. It uses vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows to give an attacker remote control of the specialized factory-floor computers used to control industrial processes. These programmable logic controllers (PLCs) do not run everyday computer languages: each type of machine has its own customized language. Stuxnet is the first worm designed to attack a PLC in its own language. Its target is one of the most popular models, made by Siemens and used to run oil pipelines, power grids, and nuclear plants. The worm can allow attackers to run motors so fast they burn out, to turn off alarms and safety cut-offs, open effluent valves and activate pumps - in other words, carry out industrial sabotage and skullduggery on a massive scale. Stuxnet's origin is unknown. Iran blames the Pentagon or Israel. Regardless of who wrote it, "cyberwar just got real," Marks concludes. We do not know for sure, but we may want to speculate about the origins of Stuxnet. We said earlier that Israel, two years ago, already successfully carried out a digital attack which crossed from the digital to the physical realm. We may have another indication. During the next six months, between September 2010 and February 2011, the Israel Defense Force (IDF) will see a major rotation of generals and major generals in top military positions. Such a rotation always accompanies a changing of the guard at the very top: those who competed for the top job and lost retire, at times accompanied by commanders who were close to them personally and professionally, while those close to commander who won the top position are promoted. The replacement in February of the current chief of staff, General Gabbi Ashkenazi, with General Yoav Galant (currently commander of Israel's Southern Command, who was adamantly opposed by Ashkenazi) is no exception. One of the top officers who is retiring is Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin, who headed Military Intelligence in the last five years (although, in his case, it has less to do with changes at the top than with sheer length of service). Amir Oren, Haaretz's military analyst, wrote over the weekend: The technology unit of Military Intelligence, once dubbed the 432, last week held a change of command ceremony. The unit's outgoing commander, identified in the media only as Colonel P., is to head up computer warfare in MI's Unit 8200, which handles electronic intelligence gathering. The appointment is another step in realizing MI director Maj. Gen. Amos Yadlin's vision of making 8200 responsible for all aspects of electronic and cybernetic warfare: defense, offense and intelligence-gathering. Yadlin will retire next month after a 40-year military career, from combat pilot to three command terms in his present rank (Amir Oren, "On loyalty and superiors," Haaretz <http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/The%20technology%20unit%20of%20Mili tary%20Intelligence,%20once%20dubbed%20the%20432,%20last%20week%20held%20a%2 0change%20of%20command%20ceremony.%20The%20unit%27s%20outgoing%20commander,> , 10 October 2010) The guess here is that Stuxnet was General Yadlin's - technically, Unit 8200's - farewell present to his successors. It is as if this indefatigable advocate of heavy investment in IW capabilities was eager to demonstrate to a new generation of military leaders how such capabilities allow a country to fight a war against an enemy thousands of miles away, and do so without firing a shot. One day we will know for sure. Ben Frankel is editor of the Homeland Security NewsWire [Non-text portions of this message have been removed] ------------------------------------ -------------------------- Want to discuss this topic? Head on over to our discussion list, [email protected]. -------------------------- Brooks Isoldi, editor [email protected] http://www.intellnet.org Post message: [email protected] Subscribe: [email protected] Unsubscribe: [email protected] *** FAIR USE NOTICE. This message contains copyrighted material whose use has not been specifically authorized by the copyright owner. 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