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Syria, Hezbollah and Iran: An Alliance in Flux 

Thursday, 14 October 2010 18:33 Reva Bhalla 

 
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Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad arrived in Beirut on Oct. 13 for his
first
<http://www.stratfor.com/geopolitical_diary/20101012_regional_implications_a
hmadinejads_trip_lebanon?fn=9517362334>  official visit to Lebanon since
becoming president in 2005. He is reportedly returning to the country after
a stint there in the 1980s as a young Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
(IRGC) officer tasked with training Hezbollah in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

A great deal of controversy is surrounding his return. Rumors are spreading
of Sunni militants attempting to mar the visit by provoking Iran's allies in
Hezbollah into a fight (already the car of a pro-Hezbollah imam who has been
defending Ahmadinejad has been blown up), while elaborate security
preparations are being made for Ahmadinejad to visit Lebanon's heavily
militarized border with Israel.

Rather than getting caught up in the drama surrounding the Iranian
president's visit, we want to take the opportunity provided by all the media
coverage to probe into a deeper topic, one that has been occupying the minds
of Iranian, Syrian and Hezbollah officials for some time. This topic is the
durability of the Iran-Hezbollah-Syria alliance, which STRATFOR believes has
been under great stress in recent months. More precisely, the question is:
What are Syria's current intentions toward Hezbollah?

The Origins of the Alliance

To address this topic, we need to review the origins of the trilateral pact,
starting with the formation of an alliance in 1979 between secular
Alawite-Baathist Syria and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Ideologically
speaking, the Syrian Alawite elite represent an offshoot of Shiite Islam
that the Sunnis consider apostate. They found some commonality with the
Shiite clerical elite in Tehran, but there were also broader strategic
motivations in play. At the time, Syria was on a quest to establish the
country's regional prowess, and it knew that the first steps toward this end
had to be taken in Lebanon. From the Syrian point of view, Lebanon is not
just a natural extension of Syria; it is the heartland of the Greater Syria
province that existed during Ottoman times. Since the days of Phoenicia,
what is modern-day Lebanon has been a vibrant trading hub, connecting routes
from the east and south to the Mediterranean basin. For Syria to feel like
it has any real worth in the region, it must dominate Lebanon.

A civil war that had broken out in Lebanon in 1975 (and lasted through 1990)
afforded Syria such an opportunity. The main obstruction to Syria's agenda
at the time, besides Israel, was the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
under Yasser Arafat, whose vision for a unified Palestine and whose
operations in Lebanon ran counter to Syria's bid for regional hegemony. The
PLO, in fact, was one of the main reasons Syria intervened militarily in
Lebanon in 1975 on behalf of its Maronite Christian allies. At the same
time, Syria was looking for an ally to undermine the Baathist regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq, with whom the Syrian Baathists had a deep-seated
rivalry. An alliance with Iran would grant Syria some much-needed
individuality in a region dominated by the Arab powers Saudi Arabia and
Egypt.

Coming off the success of the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran and going into
what would become a long and bloody war with Iraq, Iran was also looking for
a venue to counter the Baathist regime in Baghdad. In addition, Iran was
looking to undermine the Pan-Arab vision, establish a presence in the Levant
and promote its own Islamic vision of government. In opposition to Israel,
Hussein and Arafat, Iran and Syria thus uncovered the roots of an alliance,
albeit one that was shifting uneasily between Syrian secularity and Iranian
religiosity.

The adoption of Hezbollah by the two unlikely allies in 1982 was what helped
bridge that gap. Hezbollah, an offshoot of Amal, the main Shiite political
movement at the time, served multiple purposes for Damascus and Tehran.
Syria found in Hezbollah a useful militant proxy to contain obstructions to
Syrian influence in Lebanon and to compensate for its own military weakness
in comparison to Israel. In the broader Syrian strategic vision, Hezbollah
would develop into a bargaining chip for a future settlement with Israel
once Syria could ensure that Lebanon was firmly within Syria's grasp and was
therefore unable to entertain a peace deal with Israel on its own.

The Iranians saw in Hezbollah the potential to export its Islamic Revolution
into the Arab world, a strong binder for its still new and shaky alliance
with Syria and a useful deterrent in dealing with adversaries like Israel,
the United States and Saudi Arabia. So, Iran and Syria set out to divide
their responsibilities in managing this militant proxy. Iran was primarily
in charge of bankrolling, training and enforcing the group's ideological
loyalty to Tehran with IRGC assistance. Syria was in charge of creating the
conditions for Iran to nurture Hezbollah, mainly by permitting IRGC officers
to set up training camps in the Bekaa Valley and by securing a line of
supply for weapons to reach the group via Syria.

But the triumvirate did not get off to a very smooth start. In fact,
Hezbollah and Syria clashed a number of times in the early 1980s, when Syria
felt the group, under Iranian direction, went too far in provoking external
intervention (and thus risked drawing Syria into conflict). If Hezbollah was
to operate on Syrian territory (as Syria viewed it) in Lebanon, Syria wanted
Hezbollah operating on its terms. It was not until 1987, when Syrian troops
in Lebanon shot 23 Hezbollah members, that Hezbollah fully realized the
importance of maintaining an entente with Syria. In the meantime, Hezbollah,
caught between occasionally conflicting Syrian and Iranian agendas, saw that
the path to the group's survival lay in becoming a more autonomous political
- as opposed to purely militant - actor in the Lebanese political arena.

A Syrian Setback

The Iran-Hezbollah-Syria alliance operated relatively smoothly through the
1990s as Hezbollah gradually built up its political arm and as Syria kept
close watch on the group through its roughly 14,000 troops and thousands of
intelligence agents who had remained in Lebanon since the end of the civil
war. In 2000, with Iranian and Syrian help, Hezbollah succeeded in forcing
Israel to withdraw from Lebanon's southern Security Zone, an event that
greatly boosted Hezbollah's credentials as a Lebanese nationalist actor.

But fresh challenges to the pact came with the turn of the century. The 2003
U.S. invasion of Iraq, in particular, was a defining moment for both Iran
and Syria. The two allies felt enormously uncomfortable with having the
world's most powerful military on their borders, but they were also
presented with an immediate opportunity to unseat their mutual archrival,
Saddam Hussein. Iran and Syria also had different endgames in mind for a
post-Hussein Iraq. Iran used its political, militant and intelligence links
to consolidate influence in Iraq through the country's Shiite majority. In
contrast, Syria provided refuge to Iraq's Sunni Baathists with the aim of
extending its sphere of influence in the region through a secularist
former-Baathist presence in Baghdad. The Syrians also planned to use those
Sunni links later to bargain with the United States for a seat at the
negotiating table, thereby affirming Syrian influence in the region.

But before Syria could gain much traction in its plans for Iraq, its agenda
in Lebanon suffered a serious setback. On Feb. 14, 2005, a massive car bomb
in Beirut killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri, a powerful
and vocal opponent of Syrian authority in Lebanon. The bombing is strongly
believed to have been orchestrated by elements within the Syrian regime and
executed by members of Hezbollah. While a major opponent of the Syrian
regime was thereby eliminated, Syria did not anticipate that the death of
al-Hariri would spark a revolution in Lebanon (which attracted the support
of countries like France and the United States) and end up driving Syrian
troops out of Lebanon. The vacuum that Syria left in Lebanon was rapidly
filled by Iran (via Hezbollah), which had a pressing need to fortify
Hezbollah as a proxy force as war tensions steadily built up in the region
over Iran's nuclear ambitions. Though Syria knew it would only be a matter
of time before it would return to Lebanon, it also had a strategic interest
in demonstrating to the Israelis and the Americans the costs of Syria's
absence from Lebanon. The regime wanted to show that without a firm Syrian
check on Hezbollah, disastrous events like the 2006
<http://www.stratfor.com/special_report_why_hezbollah_fights?fn=8717362331>
summer confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel could occur.

The Syrian Comeback

It has now been more than five and a half years since the al-Hariri
assassination, and there is little question that Syria, once again, has
reclaimed its hegemonic position in Lebanon. The Syrian intelligence
apparatus pervades the country, and Lebanese politicians who dared to speak
out against the Syrian regime are now asking for forgiveness. In perhaps the
most glaring demonstration of the political tide shifting back toward
Damascus, Saad al-Hariri, the son of the slain al-Hariri and Lebanon's
reluctant prime minister, announced in early June that Lebanon had "made a
mistake" in making a "political accusation" against Syria for his father's
murder. The message was clear: Syria
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20091221_syria_lebanon_damascus_extends_it
s_influence?fn=2617362315>  was back.

That message did not necessarily sit well with Hezbollah and Iran. Syria
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100728_lebanon_syria_restricts_hezbollah
s_options?fn=6917362392>  wants to keep Hezbollah in check, returning to the
1990s model when Syrian military and intelligence could still tightly
control the group's movements and supplies. Iran and Hezbollah have also
watched as Syria has used its comeback in Lebanon to diversify its foreign
policy portfolio over the past year. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, for example,
have been cozying up to Damascus and have quietly bargained with the al
Assad regime to place checks on Hezbollah as a way to undermine Iran's key
proxy in the Levant. As long as these regional powers recognize Syria's
authority in Lebanon, Syria is willing to use those relationships to
exonerate itself from the al-Hariri assassination tribunal, rake much-needed
investment into the Syrian economy and, most important, re-establish itself
as a regional power. Syrian
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100727_saudi_arabia_syrian_key_counterin
g_iran_lebanon?fn=9117362369>  President Bashar al Assad's decision to visit
Beirut alongside Saudi King Abdullah was a deliberate signal to Hezbollah
and Iran that Syria had options and was not afraid to display them.

This does not mean Syria is ready and willing to sell out its Hezbollah and
Iranian allies. On the contrary, Syria derives leverage from maintaining
these relationships and acting as the bridge between the Shiite revivalists
and the Sunni powers. Syria has illustrated as much in its current mediation
efforts among the various Iraqi factions that are torn between Iran on one
side and the United States, Saudi Arabia and Turkey on the other. But if we
go back to reviewing the core reasons Syria agreed to an alliance with Iran
and Hezbollah in the first place, it is easy to see why Hezbollah and Iran
still have a lot of reason to be worried.

Syria's priority in the early 1980s was to achieve suzerainty in Lebanon
(done), eliminate the threat posed by Saddam Hussein in Iraq (done) and
remove any key obstacles in Lebanon that could challenge Syria's authority.
In the 1970s, that obstacle was the PLO. Today, that obstacle is Hezbollah
and its Iranian backers, who are competing for influence in Lebanon and no
longer have a good read on Syrian intentions. Hezbollah relies heavily on
Syria for its logistical support and knows that its communication systems,
for example, are vulnerable to Syrian intelligence. Hezbollah has also grown
nervous at the signs of Syria steadily ramping up support for competing
militant groups - including the Amal Movement, the Syrian Social Nationalist
Party, al-Ahbash, the Nasserites, the Baath Party and the Mirada of Suleiman
Franjiyye - to counter Hezbollah's prowess.

Meanwhile, Iran is seeing one of the key prongs in its deterrent strategy -
Hezbollah - grow increasingly vulnerable at a time when Iran is pressed to
demonstrate to the United States and Israel that the costs of an attack on
its nuclear installation are not worth incurring. The Iranian competition
with Syria does not end in Lebanon, either. In Iraq, Syria is far more
interested in establishing a secularist government with a former Baathist
presence than it is in seeing Baghdad develop into a Shiite satellite for
the Iranians.

For now, Syria is adroitly playing
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100928_syrian_president_reshuffles_secur
ity_intelligence_leaders?fn=9617362325>  both sides of the geopolitical
divide in the region, taking care to blend its reassurances toward the
alliance and its primary negotiating partners in Saudi Arabia with threats
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100827_lebanon_syrias_plan_preempt_iran_
and_hezbollah?fn=3017362395>  of the destabilization that could erupt should
Syria's demands go ignored. Syria, for example, has made clear that in
return for recognition of its authority in Lebanon it will prevent Hezbollah
from laying
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/lebanon_sinioras_decisions_hezbollah?fn=24
17362387>  siege on Beirut, whether they are ordered to do so by Tehran as
part of an Iranian negotiating ploy with the Americans or whether they act
on their own in retaliation against the al-Hariri tribunal proceedings. At
the same time, Syrian officials will shuttle regularly between Lebanon and
Iran to reaffirm their standing in the triumvirate. Behind this thick veneer
of unity, however, a great deal of apprehension
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/lebanon_hezbollah_sours_syria?fn=871736235
7>  and distrust is building among the allies.

The core fear residing in Hezbollah and Iran has to do with Syrian
intentions moving forward. In particular, Hezbollah would like to know if,
in Syria's eyes, the group is rapidly devolving from strategic patron to
bargaining chip with every ounce of confidence that Syria gains in Lebanon.
The answer to that question, however, lies not in Syria but in Israel and
the United States. Israeli, U.S. and Saudi policymakers have grown weary of
Syria's mercantilist negotiating style in which Syrian officials will
extract as much as possible from their negotiating partners while delivering
very little in return.

At the same time, Syria cannot afford to take any big steps toward militant
proxies like Hezbollah unless it receives firm assurances from Israel in
backchannel
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/israel_syria_direct_talks_and_hezbollahs_d
emise?fn=1917362397>  peace talks that continue to stagnate. But Syria is
also sensing an opportunity at its door: The United States is desperate to
complete its exit strategy from Iraq and, like Israel, is looking for useful
levers to undermine Iranian clout in the region. One such lever is Syria,
which is why the mere idea of Israel and Syria talking peace right now
should give Iran and Hezbollah ample food for thought

 



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