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A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates - Part
II


 

International Trade

International trade has a range of characteristics which make it vulnerable
to abuse by terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda because the enormous volume of
international commercial transactions obscures individual transactions.
International trade is characterised by the complexity of its transactions
and payment methods.  The mixture of funds from a variety of sources
together with the limited resources available to customs agencies in tracing
them makes it very difficult to detect illegal transactions without
case-specific additional intelligence.

International commercial operations lend themselves often to the hidden
transfer of currency. Various techniques are used for this: over-invoicing
or under-invoicing of goods and services, anticipated payments which are
never made and re-invoicing through free trade areas.[37] Laundering through
over-invoicing and under-valuing of goods and services is a longstanding
method of fraudulently transferring currency across borders; it continues to
occur frequently.  It involves attributing a set price to goods and services
which differs from the actual market price.  By invoicing goods and services
at a price lower than the market, the exporter transfers currency to the
importer, since the ultimate value will be lower than the amount the
importer receives in selling them on the market.  On the other hand,
invoicing at an amount higher than the market price, the exporter receives
currency from the importer since the price of the goods and services will be
higher than their value.

In order for such operations to succeed, it is necessary that both the
exporter and importer agree on manipulating prices.  For example, if Company
“A” exports 1,000 units of an item whose value is 2 euros per unit but
invoices Company “B” at 1 euro per unit, it would lose 1,000 euros in the
operation.  This would make no sense unless both exporter and importer had
agreed to carry out such a rigged transaction.  Another possibility would be
for the two companies to be controlled by the same organisation.

Banks play a fundamental (but no longer unique) role in making international
transactions possible.  They sometimes act as simple intermediaries to
enable the movement of funds from one country to another, whilst in other
cases they carry out a dual function of intermediary and guarantor to ensure
that the conditions in the buying and selling contract are met.  Payment
methods that can be used in international trade vary in terms of the
guarantees offered and the costs involved (personal and bank cheques,
transfers, payment orders, banking remittances and credits).  The
participation of various parties in these operations and the complexity of
payment methods can make the process of observing due diligence complicated.
In addition, international trade is vulnerable to the use of falsified
documents for the purposes of money laundering, terrorist financing and the
avoidance of sanctions to breach international embargos.  The use of front
companies in high-risk jurisdictions can make it all the more difficult to
track these operations.  In other cases, international trade in services or
commodities is used as part of more complex money laundering schemes such as
the peso exchange black market, hawala and carousel fraud.

New Payment Methods

As an alternative to cash transfers and the use of bank accounts, various
payment methods have evolved which are generally used by legitimate
customers who lack access to regular banking services. They also are
convenient for terrorist groups.  Among these methods are pre-paid phone
cards, online payment services, virtual money that is exchanged in the form
of gold, silver and other metals and, most recently, mobile phone
payments.[38]

Pre-paid phone cards are a much used alternative to cash.  They can often be
obtained with complete anonymity and are easily transported, making them
particularly attractive.  One type of such cards can be used to withdraw
money from various ATM cash-point networks throughout the world.  They do
not require a bank account; nor do they require the user to deal with a bank
employee who would verify the identity of the client to ‘top’ them up.  They
can also be used to buy items in shops.  In some countries, these cards have
become very popular amongst immigrants who wish to send money to their
families overseas.

>From the point of view of countering the financing of terrorism, these cards
present a risk, since they can be ‘topped up’ by a member of a terrorist
organisation in any country, allowing other members of the organisation
access to money from cash-points.     The vulnerability of these cards lies
principally in the way they can be obtained.  Terrorists can buy cards on
the Internet, by fax and in those shops which do not require identification
from customers or apply any system for tracing suspicious transactions.
They can also move money through massive scale purchase of such cards and
their subsequent sale.

Online payment services are often a service used by people without bank
accounts or credit cards when they wish to make purchases over the Internet.
People who use this service can first use their bank accounts, credit cards,
electronic transfers or pre-paid cards or, in some cases, simply cash to
open an account with an online intermediary which will then carry out
payments.  One of these online services is PayPal, which enables anybody or
any business with email to send and receive money quickly over the Internet.
It is more difficult to know the client’s identity if the service provider
does not insist on sufficient proof of identity or is willing to accepts
cash or giro transfers to open the account.

Other payment systems such as E-gold are based on virtual money which is
exchanged via ounces of gold and other precious metals.  One of the
characteristics of such business transactions is that the funds which are
transferred to them are automatically converted into a specific metal (for
example, gold).  At any time, the client can see the value of the gold in
various monetary denominations such as dollars, euros, etc, and can make a
payment of a specific amount of dollars.

These systems can be used to pay for articles exchanged for specific items
through commercial websites.  The CFT risks associated arise from
registration of the online user with a limited amount of information, the
lack of identification details, the speed of business transactions, access
to items of any value whose price is difficult to establish, and fictitious
transactions whereby companies do not guarantee delivery.  All this can
enable the transfer of money between members of a terrorist organisation
pretending to pay for business transactions while the price of items is
manipulated or the goods are simply not delivered.[39]

Payments via mobile telephones are another alternative to the use of cash
and the formal financial system, principally in countries where it is
difficult to find a reliable banking network.  Technology enables the users
of mobile telephones to pass funds between individuals in anonymity: the
money sender buys a pre-paid phone card which is ‘topped up’ anonymously
with funds which are subsequently transferred to the other person’s card.
This person can withdraw money from a cash-point using the pre-paid card.
Thus, both the sender and receiver remain anonymous - another method that
may be used by terrorist organisations to transfer money.

The International Response to the Financing of Al-Qaeda

A range of international organisations such as the World Bank, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the United Nations and the International
Financial Action Group (FATF-GATT) are involved in combating the financing
of terrorism.

The World Bank and the IMF provide technical assistance to countries where
the counter terrorist financing system is weak and where this can present a
significant risk to good governance and development.  Technical assistance
from the World Bank and IMF is based on the introduction of new regulations
based on best international practices, their application by authorities in
the financial sector, the establishment of legal frameworks by financial
intelligence bodies, the development of capitation programmes and
awareness-raising to address the concerns of the private and public sectors
as well as co-operation with other organisations under multinational
programmes and the development of training material.

In Resolution 1267 (1999), the United Nations Security Council established
the “Sanctions Committee against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban”.  Its original
purpose was to monitor the application of sanctions against Afghanistan,
then largely under control of the Taliban regime which supported Osama bin
Laden and his several hundred men strong Al-Qaeda group.

The sanctions regime has, especially since 2001, been modified and
strengthened by subsequent Security Council resolutions. In this way
sanctions were extended to individuals and entities associated with
Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban throughout the world.  Those UN
resolutions that have been approved under Chapter VII of the UN Charter
require all member states to adopt a series of measures with respect to any
person or entity associated with Al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban
designated by the sanction committee.  Among these measures are freezing
their assets, preventing their members entry into a UN member states’
national territory or transiting it, and preventing the supply, sale or
transfer, direct or indirect, of military arms and equipment.

The primary responsibility for the application of these sanctions falls on
the member states; its effective application is their obligation.  The
individuals and entities suspected of terrorism feature on the consolidated
List of the Sanctions Committee it is periodically updated or revised.  The
List consists of four sections and contains 507 names (according to the
update of 3 December 2009):[40]

1.      Individuals associated with the Taliban (142)
2.      Entities and other groups or companies associated with the Taliban
(none)
3.      Individuals associated with Al-Qaeda (254)
4.      Entities and other groups or companies associated with Al-Qaeda
(111)

 

It is not necessary for charges to have been brought against an individual
by a national court or a conviction in a trial in a court of law for a
suspect to be added to the List because the sanctions are said to be of a
preventative nature.  States are obliged to disseminate the List fully to
banks and other financial institutions, intelligence agencies, alternative
money remittance services and charitable organisations amongst others.  The
Committee has a team tasked with providing analytical support for the
sanctions; that team publishes progress reports periodically.

Although there has been significant progress, there remain systemic
weaknesses in the application of the sanctions.  The List contains imprecise
and obsolete information, including the names of deceased individuals and
defunct companies.  On the other hand, some entities and individuals on the
List have taken legal action in various countries to challenge their
inclusion on the List. In other words, they challenge the Security Council’s
authority to impose sanctions based on dubious intelligence information
only.  Due to this, states are sometimes unable to put into practice
decisions taken by the Security Council without contravening their own
legislation. As a consequence, the international community is in such cases
not fully able to apply co-ordinated measures against the financing of
terrorism.[41]

The international community has so far failed to discover or block many of
the sources of financing of Al-Qaeda. The organisation headed by Bin Laden
continues to have access to money through various channels at the margins of
the formal financial system. It also makes intensive use of alternative
remittance systems and sometimes simply sends money via couriers.

Al-Qaeda has succeeded in moving a large part of its financial activities
through its associated groups to areas in Africa, the Middle East and
South-East Asia where the authorities often lack effective CFT institutions
and where individuals who feature on the Security Council’s List can
continue their financing activities by using  companies and fictitious
businesses to hide their transactions.  The bottom line is that despite the
Committee’s powers, Al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the network’s associates are
in a position to continue to seek, obtain, gather, transmit and distribute
considerable sums of money to support their ideological, logistical and
operational activities.

Another international organisation taking action against terrorist financing
activities is the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD).  In October 2001, the OECD adopted a set of eight special
recommendations to combat terrorist financing. In combination with the
already existing forty recommendations of its Financial Action Task Force
(FATF) to combat money laundering, these 48 recommendations form the basic
international framework meant to prevent and suppress terrorist financing
and terrorist acts.

Identifying Suspicious Operations

The current legislative framework for preventing the use of the financial
system and other areas of activity for terrorist purposes based on the
OECD’s 48 recommendations is now in place in the majority of countries.  The
basic principles for combating terrorist financing have developed in a form
essentially parallel to those regarding anti-money laundering measures.  But
there are some differences between the two issues.  In money laundering,
criminal elements generally need to deposit large amounts of money into the
financial system.  In financial transactions relating to terrorism, the
amount of money used is considerably less and is usually consistent with the
client’s stated profile, which makes them look innocuous.  All too often
financial institutions are unable to separate suspicious transactions from
those which are not.

Yet authorities often consider the financial sector to be in an ideal
position to detect money laundering and terrorist financing activities.
Reports of suspicious activities sent by financial institutions to national
financial intelligence units form the basis of this preventative system.
However, it is not easy for financial entities to detect suspicious
terrorist financing operations.  To qualify as a suspicious transaction,
deviations from the client’s profile and usual practices must be taken into
account, which implies the application of a policy based on “know your
customer”.  It is not enough to identify clients; it is necessary to know
their usual practices and sources of income.  When business relations are
established, it is necessary to obtain information from the client about the
nature of his professional or company business and establish beyond
reasonable doubt the veracity of the information provided.  In particular,
it is necessary to pay particular attention to any operation that is
complex, unusual or lacks an apparent financial or lawful purpose. In order
that personnel of a financial institution or similar entity may detect
suspicious operations when  assessing transactions, it is the norm to use a
number of indicators according to the sector of activities in which the
client is involved.  These indicators come from experience compiled by
various government agencies, international organisations and financial
intelligence units in various countries.

The financial sector uses various IT programmes aimed at detecting
suspicious operations to evaluate transactions made by customers.  Each
client is given a specific profile that describes the expected usual
practice of the said client.  In general, this includes the number of
transactions and the amounts involved which are expected to take place over
a particular period of time with an acceptable margin of deviation from the
norm.  When the client’s transactions go beyond this margin, the IT
programme issues an alert. Yet when submitted to closer scrutiny, many of
these transactions result in “false positives”.  Given that there is no
single effective set of indicators to detect suspicious transactions for
countering terrorist financing, it is necessary to evaluate a high number of
activities to come to responsible conclusions as to whether something
significant is going on or not.  This is an inconvenience, since submitting
a high number of “false positives” to further investigation takes up time
and money.  In order to avoid an excessive number of “false positives”
without adversely affecting the control of operations, it is necessary to
maintain a current profile of clients, consider adequate tolerance ratios
for each type of transaction, establish an adequate frequency for review
according to the risk presented, and take account of the conditions of the
time and the market which may affect the operations being carried out.

There is currently a general concern within financial institutions that most
of the indications they receive are orientated towards money laundering
rather than terrorist financing.  However, it is a common complaint that
they receive scant or no information about high-quality indicators that
enable the detection of financing for terrorism purposes.  Consequently,
many of the reports of suspicious transactions are valuable only if these
actually  trigger an investigation by the authorities.  There is a
significant imbalance between the high volume of reports on suspicious
activities generated by financial institutions throughout the world and the
scant value of terrorist assets located or frozen as a result of these
reports.  In many cases, the reports are clearly defensive to protect the
institution against possible sanctions from the authorities and focus on the
type of client rather than the nature of the transaction, which makes them
of little use to investigators. The large volume of suspicious transactions
filed by financial institutions tends to overburden the financial
intelligence units tasked to analyse them. Backlogs are common which reduces
the amount of actionable intelligence gained from monitoring suspicious
transactions.

Seeking a financial profile of terrorism

Banks and other financial institutions continue to ask the authorities what
more they should be looking for to detect possible transactions associated
with terrorism.  Many of the mechanisms available to financial institutions
to detect money laundering activities are not directly applicable to
detecting terrorism.  The 11 September 2001 operatives are an example of
this.  The nineteen hijackers formed a simple plan to disguise their
transactions without revealing their intentions.  Although the US
authorities had information that several of the hijackers might be members
of Al-Qaeda, the banking personnel where they held accounts never suspected
that their clients were potential terrorists.

Financial institutions and governments have made a considerable effort to
create a profile of “the terrorist”.  The FBI  examined financial
transactions made by the 9/11 hijackers focusing on the following: they
visited the banks in groups, identified themselves as students, spent a
large proportion of their income on pilot training schools and were financed
to a large extent from money transferred from the UAE.[42]  Yet other
terrorist cells such as the London attackers used the legal income of one of
their members deposited in various bank accounts to finance the attacks.[43]
In other words, profiles may be of some help to detect more or less
identical types of attacks, but do not help much to warn of attacks
developed in a different way.

Terrorist financing does not always follow clearly recognizable guidelines.
This is especially true in cases of local cells whose members save or
collect money to finance their own activities.  These cells can use their
own legally obtained funds but can then carry out illegal operations.  In
all cases, including the latter, it is difficult to detect a terrorist
motive or even  a purely criminal one.  It is not an easy task to create a
general profile of financing and using funds for terrorist purposes.  For
example, when an Islamic charity receives money from small donations and
then makes periodic financial transfers to areas such as Afghanistan or
Chechnya, this might be to finance terrorist operations or might constitute
humanitarian aid to a very needy population.  Intelligence services and
governments can hold information that may distinguish one use of funds from
another, but it is unlikely that a financial institution would be capable by
itself of determining the difference.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is that financial information alone is not sufficient to
detect the financing of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates.  However, when combined
with other types of information held by intelligence services, it may help a
financial institution to detect signs of possible suspicious activity.  In
this sense, the development of intelligence-led indicators based on the
study of evolving terrorist operating methods and the exchange of
information between  public and private sectors should be one of the pillars
for the development of a more risk-based focus which can improve the
detection of terrorist financing operations.

About the Author: Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez holds a PhD in Economics and
Business and is Professor of Financial Economics and Accounting at the
University of Granada, Spain. He is a member of the expert group of the
EUDEFI-Project (European Union - Delivering Excellence in Financial
Investigation) which aims to strengthen and standardize the financial crimes
investigation in the European Union. He is Academic Director and tutor of
the course ‘Techniques for preventing and detecting money laundering,’
organized by the Virtual Training Center at the University of Granada. Prof.
Gómez  has published "Blanqueo Internacional de Capitales. Cómo detectarlo y
prevenirlo" ("International Money Laundering. How to detect and prevent").
Ediciones Deusto, 2007. 

Notes 

[1]  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004),
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission.
Washington, DC, p.19.  [http://govinfo.library.untedu/911/staff_statements]

[2]  These cost estimates are from the United Nations (2004), First Report
of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant
to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated
individuals and entities, United Nations, New York, p.12.
[http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/monitoringteam.shtml] 

[3]  United Kingdom Home Office (2006), Report of the Official Account of
the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005,
London.[http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/7-july-report?version=1]

[4]  Nicos Passas and A. Framis Gimenez-Salinas (2007). “The Financing of Al
Qaida’s Terrorism: Myths and Realities”, Review of Penal and Criminal Law,
2nd Semester, no.19, p.511.

[5]  National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission.
Washington, DC, p.13, [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/]

[6] United Nations (2009). Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to Resolution
1822 (2008) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals
and entities. New York: United Nations, note 47, p.22.

[7]  United Nations (2005). Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team submitted pursuant to Resolution 1822 (2008)
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.
New York:, United Nations, October 2009, note 48, p.22.

[8] U.S. Department of the Treasury (2009). Assistant Secretary for
Terrorist Financing David S Cohen Remarks to ABA/ABA Money Laundering
Enforcement Conference. Washington DC.
[http://treas.gov/press/releases/tg317.htm]

[9]  United Nations (2005). Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)
Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.
New York:United Nations, pp.7-8.

[10] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission, Washington
DC., pp.20-21.

[11] The Committee’s paragraph on sanctions contains the list, and the
reasons why these individuals are on the
list.[http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/narrative.shtml] 

[12] FATF (2003). Report on Money Laundering Typologies 2003-2004.
Paris:FATF, pp.8-12.

[13] United Nations (2005). Second Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004)
concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities.
New York:United Nations,, p.17.

[14] Ibid, pp.18-19.

[15] Department of the Treasury (2008). United States of America, Press
Room, 19/6/2008.

[16]  http://thenews.jang.com.pk/top_story_detail.asp?Id=24532, 14/09/2009.

[17]  See United States, Government Accountability Office (2009). Combating
Terrorism, U.S. Agencies Report Progress Countering Terrorism and Its
Financing in Saudi Arabia, but Continued Focus on Counter Terrorism
Financing Efforts Needed, September, GAO, Washington DC.: GAO. [
http://www.gao.gov/] 

[18] Department of the Treasury (2008). United States, Press Room,
13/6/2008.

[19] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission.
Washington DC., p.67.  [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements]

[20] United Nations (2009). Fourth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to Security Council resolutions
1526 (2004) and 1617 (2005) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and
associated individuals and entities. New York: United Nations,  pp.20-21.

[21] “Tracking Al-Qaeda Money in Spain” Revista Tiempo, 13/03/08.

[22] The term “anti-government elements” refers to a complex amalgam of
changing alliances between warriors, tribal leaders, mullahs, foreign
jihadists, mercenaries, Taliban and criminal organisations.

[23] See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009), Addiction, Crime
and Insurgency: The Transnational Threat of Afghan Opium. Vienna: UNODC.

[24] “Drug seizures in West Africa prompt fears of terrorist links”.  The
Observer, 29/11/2009.

[25] “Police warn of financing of terrorism by hashish trafficking”.  El
Pais, 16/05/2004.

[26] See judgement no.65/2007of the penal court, second section of the
National Court in Madrid.

[27] “Al-Qaeda finances itself with cocaine bought in Spain”, El
Periodico.com, 6/5/2007.

[28] “Jewels stolen in Spain financed Al-Qaeda murders in Algeria”. El Pais,
19/07/2009.

[29] “Three Worked the Web to Help Terrorists”. Washington Post, 6/7/2007.

[30] “Al-Qaeda finances itself with cocaine bought in Spain, El
Periodico.com, 6/5/2007.

[31] Moneyval (2008), Money Laundering and Counterfeiting, Typology
Research, Committee of experts of anti-money laundering measures and the
financing of terrorism, Strasbourg, pp.21-25.

[32] See International Monetary Fund (2005). Regulatory Frameworks for
Hawalas and Other Remittance System., Washington DC.:IMF.

[33] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission, Washington
D.C., p.26.  .  [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/]

[34] “Al-QaedaAl-Qaeda finances itself with cocaine bought in Spain”. El
Periodico.com, 6/5/2007.

[35] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission,
Washington, DC., p. 3  [http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements]

[36] United Kingdom Home Office (2006). Report of the Official Account of
the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005.

[37] See FATF (2006), Trade Based Money Launderin. Paris: FATF.

[38] See FATF (2006). Report on New Payment Method. Paris:,FATF.

[39] FATF (2008). Money Laundering & Terrorist Financing Vulnerabilities of
Commercial Websites and Internet Payment Systems. Paris: FATF.

[40] http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/consolist.shtml. 

[41] United Nations (2009). Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Implementation Monitoring Team, submitted pursuant to resolution
1822 (2008) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals
and entities. New York: United Nations, p.5.

[42] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004).
Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission, Washington
D.C.

[43] United Kingdom Home Office (2006). Report of the Official Account of
the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005, London, p.23.

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Note: Perspectives on Terrorism invites a diversity of opinions to be
presented in articles. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Perspectives on Terrorism
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