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Germany and the Failure of Multiculturalism


October 19, 2010 | 0855 GMT 

By George Friedman

German Chancellor Angela Merkel declared at an Oct. 16 meeting of young
members of her party, the Christian Democratic Union, that multiculturalism,
or Multikulti, as the Germans put it, "has failed totally." Horst Seehofer,
minister-president of Bavaria and the chairman of a sister party to the
Christian Democrats, said at the same meeting that the two parties were
"committed to a dominant German culture and opposed to a multicultural one."
Merkel also said that the flood of immigrants is holding
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100915_german_economic_growth_and_europe
an_discontent?fn=5617393422>  back the German economy, although Germany does
need more highly trained specialists, as opposed to the laborers who have
sought economic advantages in Germany. 

The statements were striking in their bluntness and their willingness to
speak of a dominant German culture, a concept that for obvious reasons
Germans have been sensitive about asserting since World War II. The
statement should be taken with utmost seriousness and considered for its
social and geopolitical implications. It should also be considered in the
broader context of Europe's response to immigration, not to Germany's
response alone.


The Origins of the German Immigration Question


Let's begin with the origins of the problem. Post-World War II Germany faced
a severe labor shortage for two reasons: a labor pool depleted by the
devastating war - and by Soviet prisoner-of-war camps - and the economic
miracle that began on the back of revived industry in the 1950s. Initially,
Germany was able to compensate by admitting ethnic Germans fleeing Central
Europe and Communist East Germany. But the influx only helped assuage the
population loss from World War II. Germany needed more labor to feed its
burgeoning export-based industry, and in particular more unskilled laborers
for manufacturing, construction and other industries. 

To resolve the continuing labor shortage, Germany turned to a series of
successive labor recruitment deals, first with Italy (1955). After labor
from Italy dried up due to Italy's own burgeoning economy, Germany turned to
Spain (1960), Greece (1960), Turkey (1961) and then Yugoslavia (1968). Labor
recruitment led to a massive influx of "Gastarbeiter," German for "guest
workers," into German society. The Germans did not see this as something
that would change German society: They regarded the migrants as temporary
labor, not as immigrants in any sense. As the term implied, the workers were
guests and would return to their countries of origin when they were no
longer needed (many Spaniards, Italians and Portuguese did just this). This
did not particularly trouble the Germans, who were primarily interested in
labor.

The Germans simply didn't expect this to be a long-term issue. They did not
consider how to assimilate these migrants, a topic that rarely came up in
policy discussions. Meanwhile, the presence of migrant labor allowed
millions of Germans to move it from unskilled labor to white-collar jobs
during the 1960s.

An economic slowdown in 1966 and full-on recession following the oil shock
of 1973 changed labor conditions in Germany. Germany no longer needed a
steady stream of unskilled labor and actually found itself facing mounting
unemployment among migrants already in country, leading to the
"Anwerbestopp," German for "labor recruitment stop," in 1973. 

Nonetheless, the halt in migration did not resolve the fact that guest
workers already were in Germany in great numbers, migrants who now wanted to
bring in family members. The 1970s saw most migration switch to "family
reunions" and, when the German government moved to close that loophole,
asylum. As the Italians, Spanish and Portuguese returned home to tend to
their countries' own successive economic miracles, Muslim Turks became the
overwhelming majority of migrants in Germany - particularly as asylum
seekers flocked into Germany, most of whom were not fleeing any real
government retribution. It did not help that Germany had particularly open
asylum laws in large part due to guilt over the Holocaust, a loophole
Turkish
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100726_geopolitics_turkey_searching_more
?fn=3817393478>  migrants exploited en masse following the 1980 coup d'etat
in Turkey.

As the migrants transformed from a temporary exigency to a multigenerational
community, the Germans had to confront the problem. At base, they did not
want the migrants to become part of Germany. But if they were to remain in
the country, Berlin wanted to make sure the migrants became loyal to
Germany. The onus on assimilating migrants into the larger society increased
as Muslim discontent rocked Europe in the 1980s. The solution Germans
finally agreed upon in the mid-to-late 1980s was multiculturalism, a liberal
and humane concept that offered migrants a grand bargain: Retain your
culture but pledge loyalty to the state. 

In this concept, Turkish immigrants, for example, would not be expected to
assimilate into German culture. Rather, they would retain their own culture,
including language and religion, and that culture would coexist with German
culture. Thus, there would be a large number of foreigners, many of whom
could not speak German and by definition did not share German and European
values. 

While respecting diversity, the policy seemed to amount to buying migrant
loyalty. The deeper explanation was that the Germans did not want, and did
not know how, to assimilate culturally, linguistically, religiously and
morally diverse people. Multiculturalism did not so much represent respect
for diversity as much as a way to escape the question of what it meant to be
German and what pathways foreigners would follow to become Germans.


Two Notions of Nation


This goes back to the European notion of the nation, which is substantially
different from the American notion. For most of its history, the United
States thought of itself as a nation of immigrants, but with a core culture
that immigrants would have to accept in a well-known multicultural process.
Anyone could become an American, so long as they accepted the language and
dominant culture of the nation. This left a lot of room for uniqueness, but
some values had to be shared. Citizenship
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100719_geopolitics_nationalism_and_dual_ci
tizenship?fn=6717393476>  became a legal concept. It required a process, an
oath and shared values. Nationality could be acquired; it had a price.

To be French, Polish or Greek meant not only that you learned their
respective language or adopted their values - it meant that you were French,
Polish or Greek because your parents were, as were their parents. It meant a
shared history of suffering and triumph. One couldn't acquire that.

For the Europeans, multiculturalism was not the liberal and humane respect
for other cultures that it pretended to be. It was a way to deal with the
reality that a large pool of migrants had been invited as workers into the
country. The offer of multiculturalism was a grand bargain meant to lock in
migrant loyalty in exchange for allowing them to keep their culture - and to
protect European culture from foreign influences by sequestering the
immigrants. The Germans tried to have their workers and a German identity
simultaneously. It didn't work.

Multiculturalism resulted in the permanent alienation of the immigrants.
Having been told to keep their own identity, they did not have a shared
interest in the fate of Germany. They identified with the country they came
from much more than with Germany. Turkey was home. Germany was a
convenience. It followed that their primary loyalty was to their home and
not to Germany. The idea that a commitment to one's homeland culture was
compatible with a political loyalty to the nation one lived in was
simplistic. Things don't work that way. As a result, Germany did not simply
have an alien mass in its midst: Given the state of affairs between the
Islamic world and the West, at least some Muslim
<http://www.stratfor.com/germany_poorly_executed_militant_plot?fn=6517393485
>  immigrants were engaged in potential terrorism. 

Multiculturalism is profoundly divisive, particularly in countries that
define the nation in European terms, e.g., through nationality. What is
fascinating is that the German chancellor has chosen to become the most
aggressive major European leader to speak out against multiculturalism. Her
reasons, political and social, are obvious. But it must also be remembered
that this is Germany, which previously addressed the problem of the German
nation via the Holocaust. In the 65 years since the end of World War II, the
Germans have been extraordinarily careful to avoid discussions of this
issue, and German leaders have not wanted to say things such as being
committed to a dominant German culture. We therefore need to look at the
failure of multiculturalism in Germany in another sense, namely, with regard
to what is happening in Germany.

Simply put, Germany is returning to history. It has spent the past 65 years
desperately trying not to confront the question of national identity, the
rights of minorities in Germany and the exercise of German self-interest.
The Germans have embedded themselves in multinational groupings like the
European Union and NATO to try to avoid a discussion of a simple and
profound concept: nationalism. Given what they did last time the matter came
up, they are to be congratulated for their exercise of decent silence. But
that silence is now over.


The Re-emergence of German Nation Awareness


Two things have forced the re-emergence of German national awareness. The
first, of course, is the immediate issue - a large and indigestible mass of
Turkish and other Muslim workers. The second is the state of the
multinational organizations to which Germany tried to confine itself. NATO
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101011_natos_lack_strategic_concept?fn=571
7393417> , a military alliance consisting mainly of countries lacking
militaries
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20101015_us_and_europe_face_military_spend
ing?fn=5017393472>  worth noting, is moribund. The second is the state of
the European Union. After the Greek
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100517_germany_greece_and_exiting_eurozone
?fn=3317393482>  and related economic crises, the certainties about a united
Europe have frayed. Germany now sees itself as shaping EU institutions so as
not to be forced into being the European Union's ultimate financial
guarantor. And this compels Germany to think about Germany beyond its
relations with Europe.

It is impossible for Germany to reconsider its position on multiculturalism
without, at the same time, validating the principle of the German nation.
Once the principle of the nation exists, so does the idea of a national
interest. Once the national interest exists, Germany exists in the context
of the European Union only as what Goethe termed an "elective affinity."
What was a certainty amid the Cold War now becomes an option. And if Europe
becomes an option for Germany, then not only has Germany re-entered history,
but given that Germany is the leading European power, the history of Europe
begins anew again.

This isn't to say that Germany must follow any particular foreign policy
given its new official view on multiculturalism; it can choose many paths.
But an attack on multiculturalism is simultaneously an affirmation of German
national identity. You can't have the first without the second. And once
that happens, many things become possible.

Consider that Merkel made clear that Germany needed 400,000 trained
specialists. Consider also that Germany badly needs workers of all sorts who
are not Muslims living in Germany, particularly in view of Germany's
demographic problems. If Germany can't import workers for social reasons, it
can export factories, call centers, medical analysis and IT support desks.
Not far to the east is Russia,
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100119_russia_continued_demographic_chal
lenge?fn=6417393474>  which has a demographic crisis of its own but
nonetheless has spare labor capacity due to its reliance on purely
extractive natural resources for its economy. Germany already depends on
Russian energy. If it comes to rely on Russian workers, and in turn Russia
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20100621_germany_and_russia_move_closer?fn=2
617393488>  comes to rely on German investment, then the map of Europe could
be redrawn once again and European history restarted at an even greater
pace.

Merkel's statement is therefore of enormous importance on two levels. First,
she has said aloud what many leaders already know, which is that
multiculturalism can become a national catastrophe. Second, in stating this,
she sets in motion other processes that could have a profound impact on not
only Germany
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20081006_german_question?fn=2817393415>  and
Europe but also the global balance of power. It is not clear at this time
what her intention is, which may well be to boost her center-right coalition
government's abysmal popularity. But the process that has begun is neither
easily contained nor neatly managed. All of Europe, indeed, much of the
world, is coping with the struggle between cultures within their borders.
But the Germans are different, historically and geographically. When they
begin thinking these thoughts, the stakes go up.

 

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