Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Tunisia's revolution and the Islamists 
http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisias-revolution-and-islamists.htm
l

Soumayya Ghannouchi, the Guardian columnist and daughter of the Tunisian
An-Nahda leader Rachid Ghannouchi, argues for a coalition of socialists,
liberals and Islamists to overthrow the Tunisian state. Rachid himself
argues for exactly this approach in his interview with the FT:

We cannot bring out a democratic system out of this corrupt, dictatorial
system. We have to put an end to the authoritarian system and start a new
one. Basing this transition on Article 56 or 57 is a continuation of the old
system. The constitution was a tyranny, the state was reduced to one man,
who had in his hands the executive, judicial and legislative powers and was
not accountable to anyone. How can such a constitution point towards
building a democratic system, even as a starting point.

The first step of building a democratic system is to build a democratic
constitution. For this we need a founding council for rebuilding the state,
one in which political parties, the trade unions and the civil society join.
This council will rebuild the democratic constitution and will be the basis
for building the democratic system. 

Now, the fact that Ghannouchi is speaking from exile is not irrelevant here.
Most of the leadership of the An-Nahda party is exiled in London, following
from a period of repression in the early 1990s. Indeed, there's an article
in Foreign Policy almost gloating about the Tunisian revolution being
"Islamist-free". So, there's a real question of just how much influence the
Islamists can really have. At one time, they were a serious political force
in Tunisia. In the 1989 general election, their candidates - standing as
'independents' - officially received 14% of the vote. According to Francois
Burgat and William Dowell's study, (The Islamic Movement in North Africa,
University of Texas Press, 1993), the real figure was plausibly closer to
30-32%. The regime rigged the elections, of course, so there would no way to
know for sure. Subsequent repression, combined with a period of sustained
economic growth that diminished the social base for the Islamists among the
petite bourgeoisie and the rural poor, reduced the weight of An-Nahda as a
serious opposition force so that today it's tempting to dismiss them. But is
the revolution "Islamist-free"? Can it be?

Before going any further with this, it's worth saying something about who
the Islamists in Tunisia are and how the came to prominence in the first
place. The origins of Tunisia's Islamist movement are in the crisis of the
Seventies. In that period, a movement among the intelligentsia toward
reviving Islam as a basis for politics and culture, against the alienating
Euro-secularism of the Bourguibist regime, found expression in a review
called Al-Ma'rifa, and at the Zaytuna University. This coincided with a
similar sense of dissatisfaction among the rural poor, where Islamic
traditions were not as cheerfully downplayed as they were among the regime's
elite.

The material background was that Israel's humiliation of Egypt and its
allies in 1967 had raised serious questions about Arab nationalism, while
economic crisis was de-legitimizing Bourguiba's corporatist progressivism.
The state's turn toward economic liberalisation in the same period saw a
sudden sharp increase in returns for private capital, while the incomes of
the public sector salariat stagnated. For the Islamist intelligentsia, some
of whom had been on the Left previously, all of this betokened not merely a
material problem that they could struggle over - as the radical Left was
doing at just that time. It was a profound spiritual crisis. Somehow the
influx of cultural influences form the imperialist world, the economic
crisis, the turn toward neoliberalism and its corrupting effects, the defeat
of the Arab countries, the authoritarianism of the state, and their own
diminished status were related to the decline of Islam in public life. As
far as Tunisia went, the root and cause of the problem was that Bourguiba's
state was built on an attempt to impose on a Muslim population a template of
secular republican nationalism drawn from Europe. Indeed, the convulsions
that had engulfed France in the late Sixties and early Seventies proved that
its model could hardly be one worthy of emulation.

By the end of the Seventies, a coherent Islamist movement had emerged, the
Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI) - the tendency which Ghannouchi
co-founded. It did not seek to bring about an 'Islamic state', if such a
thing could exist. This is not to say that such a goal might not come to the
fore if the movement acquired a mass base, but it has not been a goal of the
MTI, and its successor, the An-Nahda party, since its inception. Rather, it
saw its remit as being to effect moral and social change. To accomplish
this, it sought to ally with the nationalists and even integrate itself with
the trade union movement - unlike the majority of Islamists groups who
disapprove of trade unionism as a mode of organisation based on class
struggle. This position seems to have been genuine and consistent argued,
but it was also forced on the movement to some extent. While the MTI
articulated a moral and spiritual argument about the sources of Tunisian
decline, the 1978 general strike and riots over straightforward class issues
marginalised the tendency somewhat, and compelled them to engage in such
issues more forthrightly. Ghannouchi himself was insistent that it was "not
enough to pray five times a day and fast ... Islam is activism ... it is on
the side of the poor and the oppressed".

Aside from its dialogue with the poor and oppressed, the movement maintained
a consistently pluralist approach to Tunisian politics. Nazih Ayubi's study,
Political Islam, argues that unlike the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the MTI
did not "put itself in the position of the exclusive actor with the rights
of moral tutelage over society at large", and that this approach enabled the
tendency to accept a political pluralism that was inclusive not only of
secularists but also of communists. The MTI collaborated with socialists in,
for example, organising protests against US and Israeli aggression. The
movement constantly assailed the lack of political liberty in Bourguiba's
regime, and called for "the end of single-party politics and the acceptance
of political pluralism and democracy". Later, Ghannouchi called for a
mobilisation of civil society against the state:

"There is no place for dominating society in the name of any legitimacy -
historic, religious, proletarian, or pseudo-democratic ... Bourguiba put
forward the slogan of the state's prestige, but its real content was the
monopoly of the party, of the capitalist interests within which power in the
country was located, and the monopoly which Bourguiba exercised over this
state. The time has come to raise the slogan of the prestige of society, of
the citizen, and of the power which serves both."

Ghannouchi has also made an attempt to articulate a version of womens'
rights consistent with Islamist beliefs, opposing this approach to the
"obscure theories of Sayyid Qutb". However, his criticisms of the Personal
Status Code, which includes various rights for women, point to the limits of
any claim to gender egalitarianism on the part of the MTI. That stance
allowed the movement to develop into a serious challenge to Bourguiba's
regime, and it came to occupy a disproportionate amount of the ageing
dictator's energies. Repression included arbitrary arrest and detention of
MTI activists, but also a wider series of measures to curb expressions of
religiosity. Insanely Ataturkist laws were passed banning civil servants
from praying, excluding women who wore the 'veil' from universities and
workplaces, rescinding the licenses of taxi drivers suspected of being
Islamists, and so on.

Repression against the movement was one of the factors which won it sympathy
on campuses, so that it overtook the left among students. Indeed, in this
period the typical adherent of the Islamists was below the age of 30, and
usually below the age of 25. Moreover, this student layer overlapped with
the support from the rural poor, as the youths who supported the tendency
typically came from the south and interior, away from coastal Sahel and
Tunis. As the movement developed, it did pick up support in urban areas of
Tunis, and among some of the professional types that the regime considered
its core base.

Rashid Ghannouchi was himself to become a target of Bourguiba's drive to
"eradicate the fundamentalist poison", as he ended up on trial for plotting
with the connivance of the Iranian government to overthrow the Tunisian
state. Linda Jones' profile of Ghannouchi for Middle East Report at this
time noted that while the MTI was not the "fundamentalist" sock puppet that
Bourguiba had demonsied, it had profited indirectly from Bourguiba's war on
trade unions and the Left. Nonetheless, Ghannouchi was jailed and sentenced
to a life of hard labour on evidence that was persuasive to no one, only to
be released by the subsequent Ben Ali dictatorship in its early,
liberalising days.

In 1989, the movement changed its name to Hizb an-Nahda (Renaissance Party),
and contested the elections staged by Ben Ali as part of his promise of
liberalisation. The elections, fixed though they were, did disclose a trend
which is consistent with what was happening elsewhere at the time. As Fred
Halliday explained, again in Middle East Report: "Despite their failure to
win any seats in parliament, the Islamist 'independents' won around 17
percent of the vote, displacing the secular left, who won around 3 percent,
as the main opposition. Given that around 1.2 million of those of voting age
were not registered, and given the almost complete control which the ruling
party has in the rural areas, the real Islamist strength is no doubt
considerably greater than 17 percent: in the Tunis area, the figure was
around 30 percent." However, the Islamists' support was broader than it was
deep. As a movement, it was a relatively new arrival compared to its
equivalents in North Africa and the Middle East, and its handling of
religious and moral issues, though in one light relatively open and
progressive, could also characterised as cautious and timid. A subsequent
wave of repression in 1991 and 1992, centred on legal witch hunts for
'terrorism', decimated the Islamists' organisation and sent much of the
leadership into exile.

This was followed by a series of economic transformations. Among these was
the restructuring of class relations in the countryside. For example,
following the advice of the World Bank, the government turned over
state-owned agricultural cooperatives to large landowners. While this tended
to concentrate wealth among the agrarian rich, it did unleash a wave of
capital accumulation and growth that undercut support for the Islamists. The
privatization of public services also reduced the scale of the public sector
salariat, and profoundly altered the class structure in those newly private
industries. The tax codes were restructured to give the bourgoisie a lift,
and entice foreign direct investment with the promise of more repatriated
lolly. This combination of reforms not only enhanced the power of the ruling
class, but it also gave some middle class layers a sudden income boost while
also producing sufficient growth to persuade some of those who lost from the
process that they had a stake in preserving the neoliberal compact. In other
words, the same combination of political repression and ensuing class
restructuring, did for the Islamists as had done for the Left.

Contrary to what has sometimes been implied, the An-Nahda did not
subsequently disappear as a movement. Its activists continued to be
convenient scapegoats, continued to suffer repression and were to be the
bearers of the 'Al Qaeda' stigma once the 'war on terror' was under way. But
just as the secular left has been almost invisible in Tunisia for a
generation, so the An-Nahda's influence has been much diminished, and
practically subterranean since 1992-3. The current revolt is not hegemonised
by parties of the Left or by the Islamists. At its heart is the trade union
leadership, whose outlook is social democratic. But, like it or not,
An-Nahda leaders have been returning to Tunisia to participate, and will in
all likelihood gain some sort of audience. As they are less sectarian than
some of the cretins in this country who denounce them as far right
totalitarians, (and whom it is my vocation to wind up when they start
woofing and foaming at the mouth), they will probably find willing allies as
well. Just as they did when they were able last able to organise as a
tendency in Tunisia. To describe the revolt as "Islamist-free", therefore,
is almost to miss the point. The revolution, if it advances at all, is going
to have to at minimum include a general amnesty toward political exiles,
which means the An-Nahda will return. As Marc Lynch points out, it's hard to
see what kind of genuine democracy could obtain without this step. And if
the regime, entrenched as it has been since 1956, is to be defeated, then in
all likelihood it will involve some configuration of the broad coalition
that both Ghannouchis, pere et fille, are calling for.

.................................................................

Tuesday, January 18, 2011
Tunisia's 'unity government' already imploding.
http://leninology.blogspot.com/2011/01/tunisias-unity-government-already.htm
l

Several ministers have withdrawn from the 'unity government' led by the
Prime Minister and now acting president Mohammed Ghannouchi, due to the
inclusion of several hacks from the former ruling party, the Rassemblement
constitutionnel démocratique (RCD), in the government. The ministers who
have left are three UGTT leaders, apparently under pressure from protesters
demanding an end to the RCD's role in government.

The significance of this is clear. The political elite, the ruling class it
is integrated into, and in all probability a phalanx of EU and US diplomats,
wanted a constitutional lash-up that would preserve the same basic pyramid
of control with some more inclusive, and slightly more representative,
structures. The trade union federation, once it showed its ability to act
independently, defy the paramilitaries and win over at least the rank and
file of the army, was always going to be essential to that. The ruling class
is clearly weak and divided, its institutions of repression unable to keep
control. In some cities, the population has been able to effectively take
full over. No government that does not include organised labour in some
capacity will have any legitimacy. It seems unlikely that the mere inclusion
of a couple of mainstream social democrats, such as Najib Chebbi
(Progressive Democratic Party) and Mustafa Ben Jabar (Union of Justice and
Labour), will be sufficient to do the trick.

So the class character of the revolt is coming more clearly to the fore. The
New York Times reports that the character of the protests has been changing,
as middle class layers have accepted the new situation and celebrated a 'new
freedom', while those still protesting are "more working class". But this is
also a blow to imperialism, in the sense that it will prove difficult to
impose a regime that simply cleaves to the solutions of the IMF and EU.

This is precisely one of the reasons why the working class protesters want
the RCD out. Which is not to say that the IMF and EU will lose their
leverage over Tunisia. Nor is it likely in the immediate term that Tunisia
would withdraw from its treaty commitments to Africom, and thus from its
role in the wider structure of US imperial control in the African continent.
But if, as seems increasingly possible, the revolt spreads and takes down
some other pro-American regimes in Egypt, Jordan or Algeria, then Obama has
problems. One can well imagine him, despite his ongoing commitment to
aggression in Afghanistan and Pakistan, going down as a Carter-style
weakling if a few US embassies in the region start to look vulnerable. Which
is why I would expect some sort of panicked intervention by the US and its
local proxies to be going on even as you read.

.......................................................................

What the Arab papers say
Jan 17th 2011, 15:21 by The Economist online
http://www.economist.com/blogs/newsbook/2011/01/tunisias_revolution_arab_pre
ss

THE Arab press has been awash with responses to the protests in Tunisia
deposing Zine el-Abedine Ben Ali. Their views range from from elation at the
fall of Tunisia's president, to concern over how the power vacuum will be
filled and speculation about which corrupt Arab leader could be next to
fall. 

In al-Sabah, a Tunisia daily, Mohamed al-Taweer revels in patriotic pride: 

..the sons of our nation have demonstrated to the world once again that, by
its peaceful nature which rejects all violence and extremism without
exception, nothing can stop the desire of the people for freedom, democracy,
and social justice.

Salih Atiya, also writing in al-Sabah, praises Mohammed Bouazizi, the man
who sparked the protests by setting himself on fire, and the other
protesters as martyrs, marvelling at the fact that Mr Ben Ali really is
gone:

May we dare dream? But then, doesn't every reality start as a dream? "Should
the people one day truly aspire to life, then fate must needs respond"! 

These last lines are from the final verse of the Tunisian national anthem,
which has been widely quoted in newspaper editorials, in tweets and on
Facebook pages throughout the Arab world since Mr Ben Ali's expulsion.

In the Lebanese opposition newspaper, al-Akhbar, John Aziz suggests some
lessons to be learned from the uprising in Tunisia:

All the blood, sweat and bullet-torn flesh have demonstrated how the
neo-conservative model was wrong, how democracy can come about without
foreign fleets, without the imposition of the star-spangled banner, without
the smiling faces of Jay Garner and David Petraeus. Second, democracy can
grow out of cultures of military repression without resorting to Islamic
radicalism and without devolving into a situation of "one man, one vote…one
time!" Third, not only has America failed to promote democracy in this
region, it has actually propped up regimes which stifled its flowering.

Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of al-Quds al-Arabi, a pan Arab daily,
congratulates the Tunisians on the ouster of Mr Ben Ali:

Thank you to the Tunisian people. Thank you to the martyrs whose sacred
blood helped achieve this supreme victory. Thank you to the army for turning
their backs on the tyrants and siding with the people, upholding the
security and stability of their country over all else.

In Dar al-Hayat, a London-based Arabic newspaper, Mostapha Zayn criticises
Mr Ben Ali for his failures as a leader:

The Tunisian government could have been a model for the Arab world. And
indeed it was, albeit a model of oppression and martial law in a region
already infamous for oppression and martial law.

In Saudi Arabia, which offered refuge to the fleeing Mr Ben Ali to the
bemusement of many of its citizens, Qaynan al-Ghamidy controversially
compares democracy in the West to democracy in the Arab world, writing in
al-Arabiyya:

Are the Western values of justice, freedom, and democracy suitable for
Arabs? There can be no denying that they are. As the second caliph Umar bin
al-Khattab is said to have asked: "How can you enslave people when their
mothers bore them as freemen?"...If an iconic figure like Umar promoted such
values values as freedom, justice, and accountability, do the Arabs really
need to imitate the West?

But whereas the West translated these values into tangible laws and civil
institutions, the Arabs and Muslims merely touted them without following
their spirit. And this is the fundamental difference between Western and
Arab civilization. But now, with the Tunisian uprising, no one knows what
direction their compass will point them. In any case, those Arabs who
sincerely care for their country should study what is happening in Tunisia
and do what needs to be done immediately to recreate the same set of facts
in their own land.

The editor-in-chief of al-Watan, a Saudi paper, argues that the protests are
not just about food prices, but injustice, making many other regimes ripe
for change:

Any observer of the scene from non-Arab nation would note that while the
issue of bread prices ostensibly set the spark for these protests, there
were already fires smoldering under the ashes. In every country witnessing
demonstrations protesting living standards, the focus has quickly shifted
towards civil freedoms and corruption. ...It appears that most regions are
poised to undergo an orange revolution if conditions continue on their
current trajectory.

Burhan Ghalyoun, a Syrian writer based in France, analyses Ben Ali's failed
strategy in a Tunisian newspaper, El-Chourouk:

The Tunisian uprising which has been raging for the past month wasn't a
surprise to anyone—anyone, that is, except the ruling elites, who had
complacently believed that they had found the magic formula that would allow
them to stay in power for the rest of time and stave off the change so
urgently hoped for since the downfall of President Habib Bourguiba. This
formula—applied by most Arab regimes—is derived from the Chinese model,
which combines two elements: first, cordoning politics from the public
sphere by prohibiting even civil society activism, much less direct
political action; and second, taking control of the economy, whether through
direct foreign investment, accumulating wealth by means fair or foul, or
outright expropriation.

Tariq al-Hameed cautions that initial excitement may be misplaced in an
editorial in Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, a widely read pan-Arab newspaper:

What makes these unfolding events so serious is that, because of the closed
nature of Tunisia's repressive society, no one knows if the protests which
have swept the streets are organized or spontaneous. We don't know if this
is going to end in the replacement of one dictatorship for another, if this
is a true revolution riding the wave of popular discontent, or whether it
will result in any real improvement. We don't know if the inscrutable
Tunisia of yesterday has emerged from its closed doors or whether it has
only plunged deeper into the unknown depths, adding just one more tragedy to
the endless tragedies of the Arab world.

Muhammad Ya`qouby in the Algerian Echorouk Online compares Tunisia's
revolution to that of Algeria over two decades ago:

Granted, Tunisia is lagging 23 years behind Algeria's 1988 revolution,
assuming of course that there is a single, uniform path to democracy… But
Tunisia could become a shining model for the Arab world if it manages to
avoid the pitfalls of its neighbour's experience and take the right approach
to democracy, avoiding the demagoguery and lack of foresight which marred
out our political transition. The Algerians took to the streets in 1988 to
demand lower prices, an end to corruption, and an end to discrimination.
Twenty three years later, they are still seeking the same things.

On the other hand, Wa'il al-Qandeel of an independent Egyptian newspaper,
al-Shorouk, predicts that Tunisians will succeed in forging a truly
democratic future:

I don't think that these downtrodden Tunisians are going to accept anything
less than complete concession to their demands. The time for incremental
gains is past; the name of the game now is comprehensive change. If this
comes to pass, verdant Tunisia—that enchanting little country on the
Mediterranean—will become the role model for a brave new Arab world.

For full translations and commentary, visit Meedan.net





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