http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/01/new_report_dome
stic_intelligen.php

 


New report: 'Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks'


By Daveed Gartenstein-Ross January 18, 2011 10:34 PM 

 

Today I was a panelist at the rollout event
<http://www.brennancenter.org/content/event/panel_discussion_on_the_2008_att
orney_general_guidelines4/>  for a new report published by the Brennan
Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law, Emily Berman's
<http://brennan.3cdn.net/9372cfab2b4be86fd8_41m6b858n.pdf> Domestic
Intelligence: New Powers, New Risks. The report -- which is focused on the
expansion of investigatory powers in the 2008 Attorney General's Guidelines
for Domestic FBI Operations -- advocates restricting situations in which the
FBI can use highly intrusive investigative techniques; prohibiting "improper
consideration of race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, or
First-Amendment-protected activity"; and increasing oversight of the FBI's
use of its authority.

The report raises legitimate issues, and makes a contribution -- in
particular, in its explanation of how investigatory standards have loosened
since the Church Committee reforms in the 1970s. However, I emerged
skeptical of its recommendation to limit the FBI's investigative powers
because I felt the report did not provide a full picture of what the impact
would be on law enforcement efforts.

Context is key

In reviewing past FBI abuses -- or, in Berman's phraseology, "misplaced
domestic intelligence efforts" -- the report twice singled out the same Cold
War-era effort, called the Library Awareness Program. As the report
recounts, this program "included regular FBI visits to public libraries
seeking information regarding individuals who read scientific and technical
journals, sometimes asking librarians to be wary of 'foreigners' or persons
with 'East European or Russian-sounding names.'" This of course sounds
absurd on its face: a blanket suspicion of foreigners looking for scientific
or technical information?

What the report does not mention is that during this period -- in the 1980s
-- a man named Mahdi Obeidi was doing just that. Obeidi was Saddam Hussein's
chief nuclear scientist, charged with rejuvenating Iraq's nuclear program
after Israel destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981. Saddam was
fixated on building a nuclear program that could not be easily subjected to
attack the way his above-ground reactor had been. He settled on centrifuge
technology, which creates great centrifugal force by rotating at extremely
high speeds, thus separating the heavier uranium-238 isotopes from lighter
uranium-235 isotopes. After uranium-238 has been drawn out, the
highly-enriched uranium remaining at the center can be siphoned away. For a
country trying to create a nuclear weapon, centrifuges are easier to hide
and to protect than above-ground reactors.

Obeidi, in his book
<http://www.amazon.com/Bomb-My-Garden-Secrets-Mastermind/dp/0471741272/ref=s
r_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1295410092&sr=8-1> The Bomb in My Garden,
describes how he was able to create a working prototype of a magnetic
centrifuge for Saddam Hussein prior to Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait. A
large part of the research involved traveling through the US to glean the
requisite knowledge from scientists who rather naively put their trust in
him; the idea that Obeidi might be an agent of a foreign power was simply
outside their frame of reference. He obtained a significant piece of
information, which proved to be a key part of the centrifuge program, from
the University of Virginia's library. Obeidi had asked the librarian if he
could see a critical report on centrifuge technology called the Zippe
report. Asked to fill out a lengthy form and provide identification for
security reasons, Obeidi instead asked: "Would it be possible to ensure that
the report is indeed here before I fill out all these forms for it?"

The librarian brought him the report, and insisted that Obeidi fill out the
forms before he read it. Obeidi, hesitant to do so, asked: "Could I see it
for a moment to be sure it is the right document?" There, right in front of
the librarian, he flipped through the report -- and found, in the back, an
appendix listing all recipients of the report when it was first issued in
1960. A look at those names enabled Obeidi to get his hands on the report
itself -- which in turn helped him build a centrifuge prototype.

So while Berman's report, without any further rationale or analysis,
dismisses as far-fetched the FBI's concern about foreigners who were
interested in scientific or technical information, the Bureau's concern was
not misplaced. In fact, key technical information that a foreign agent
gleaned from a US library proved central to the astounding development of
Iraq's nuclear program in the 1980s. This shows us that context is key --
and a large part of my skepticism about Berman's report is its failure to
contextualize the law enforcement impact of the changes it proposes. 

Does it make us safer?

I find it hard to believe that following the report's guidance would make us
both freer and also safer. Berman argues that the report's recommendations
actually improve policing efforts in two ways: by reducing the deluge of
information that confronts law enforcement, and also by harmonizing
relations between law enforcement and affected communities (in particular
the Muslim community) by reducing feelings of stigmatization.

As to the first point, reducing the deluge of information, it is true that
analysts have trouble keeping up with the volume of threat reporting. But
that doesn't mean that depriving them of information therefore automatically
improves analytic efforts. The question is: Would the report's
recommendations take away information that is truly unnecessary, or would
they deprive law enforcement of information that it needs to more
effectively do its job? The report's arguments on this point are, to put it
mildly, unconvincing. Given the lack of consultation with law enforcement in
producing the report, it is highly implausible that an attorney with no
investigatory background somehow stumbled upon the magic formula to make the
FBI more effective by depriving it of investigatory authority. Among other
things, this view assumes an almost cartoonish incompetence on the part of
agents in the field that is not reflected in my experiences with the Bureau.

As to Berman's second point, that this report's recommendations would
improve relations between the FBI and the Muslim community, that may or may
not be true. But there are other ways to address the problem without
limiting the Bureau's investigative authority; such as training dedicated to
the issue, and strong directives dealing with how to more effectively
approach investigations without alienating critical communities.

Terrorist profiling

The main claim that Berman makes for her recommendations as a net positive
for law enforcement effectiveness is that they would reduce instances of
terrorist profiling. How much they would so is not clear after a couple of
careful readings. The report's exact recommendation is to "[p]rohibit
improper consideration of race, religion, ethnicity, national origin, or
First-Amendment-protected activity in investigative decisions." This is a
rather imprecise line -- but regardless of where exactly the report draws
the line, it's clear that it has a more restrictive approach to terrorist
profiling than the 2008 guidelines provide.

Indeed, it is evident that Berman's report views profiling as an ineffective
tool all around; it speaks, for example, of an alleged "general consensus
that profiling is ineffective." But the main factor that tends to hamper
discussions of profiling is lack of clarity about what the practice means.
Berman notes: "In the past, law enforcement organizations have successfully
policed groups engaged in organized violence -- like the mafia or the KKK --
without trenching on the civil liberties of the entire Italian-American or
Southern Christian communities." This is fair enough, but when informed
analysts speak of a terrorist profile, they are not suggesting that the
entire Muslim community should be viewed as suspect.

A better question is: Can the factors singled out by Berman's report as
particularly problematic -- religion, race, ethnicity, national origin, or
protected First Amendment activities --  be relevant when law enforcement
authorities are determining whether to deepen an investigation? It seems
clear to me that such factors can have legitimate relevance, as I will flesh
out with three examples:

*       A Muslim psychiatrist in the US military is found to be in
communication with a high-profile terrorist recruiter in Yemen. This
psychiatrist has also given several presentations outlining his views on
Islam to his command. Is profiling these views -- to see whether they map
with what some dub the "salafi jihadi" interpretation of the faith, thus
indicating a possible danger -- appropriate?
*       A college dropout in Arizona is posting on extreme right-wing web
sites. He has a great amount of anti-government anger, which is focused in
particular on his local congresswoman. These political views are protected
by the First Amendment. Moreover, his views at first blush seem to map with
those of the racist and apocalyptic Christian Identity movement. Is probing
these views -- because they constitute "First-Amendment-protected activity"
and religion -- unacceptable in determining whether he poses a threat?
[Note: Though loosely based on the Jared Lee Loughner case, this fact
pattern departs somewhat from it.]
*       There is a jihadist web site, which Berman's report counsels against
"profiling" on two levels. First, the site itself contains religious
content. And second, the speech on the web site, though extremely anti-US,
is itself protected by the First Amendment. Should investigators be allowed
to chat with individuals on the site to determine whether they intend to
carry out attacks?

Further investigation of the jihadist web site would seem to be disallowed
by Berman's recommendations, in that the report says the FBI should be
prohibited from "posing as other people ... and recruiting informants to
glean more information in the absence of some factual basis for suspicion."
Though these methods have been controversial, there were two arrests in 2009
-- of Michael Finton and Hosam Smadi -- that used these techniques. In both
cases, the defendants literally pushed the button that they thought would
set off a bomb during the course of sting operations.

Threat environment

Right now we're in the midst of an era that is likely to see more extremism
and more violence designed to disrupt the system on which our lives depend.
Against such a backdrop we must be sure to safeguard civil liberties --
because it is all too easy to discard our cherished liberties in the name of
security -- but we must also be attentive to what powers law enforcement
needs to keep us safe.

Extremism itself can be as potent a threat to liberty as abuses inflicted by
government. Ask Molly Norris, the Seattle cartoonist who conceived of
"Everybody Draw Mohammed Day" after Comedy Central refused to air a picture
of Muhammad on their hit show South Park (even though that same episode
depicted Buddha snorting cocaine and Jesus looking at Internet pornography).
After threats to her life, she has disappeared
<http://www.seattleweekly.com/2010-09-15/news/on-the-advice-of-the-fbi-carto
onist-molly-norris-disappears-from-view/>  -- as though she never existed.
Ask Theo van Gogh, who was brutally murdered on the streets of Amsterdam
after producing a film critical of the treatment of women in Islam. And ask
Rep. Giffords.

So Berman's report asks some important questions. It makes a contribution.
But I think its recommendations, if followed, would almost certainly make us
less safe. Because the report doesn't acknowledge that fact, I find it
difficult to evaluate whether the proposals it advances for stripping the
FBI of its investigative authority would in fact be worth the cost.

 

 
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READER COMMENTS: "New report: 'Domestic Intelligence: New Powers, New
Risks'"

Posted by Mark Casper at January 19, 2011 12:24 PM ET:

So I would ask, Did the people on the panel agree or disagree with your
position? 

Posted by Charu at January 19, 2011 12:59 PM ET:

I was shocked to read about Molly Norris' forced disappearance. To the best
of my knowledge, this sad episode has been completely under the radar and
has elicited no widespread outrage in the media. This is so wrong! Her work
should appear in every publication in the US. We are all Molly Norris and we
should collectively not be cowed by these fundamentalist threats of
violence. E pluribus unum! 

If Ayaan Hirsi Ali can be provided security and go about her business
(albeit carefully) in this country, unlike the cowardly Dutch who washed
their hands off her, then Molly Norris should also have every opportunity
not to have to "disappear" out of fear of her safety. The Feds ought to grab
this opportunity to smoke out the jihadists in our midst, and not to kowtow
to them. This is shameful!!!

Posted by DANNY at January 19, 2011 2:55 PM ET:

A question the writer would be... What do you mean by "the racist and
apocalyptic Christian Identity movement" I am unfamiliar with this term,
could you explain how you picked this term when describing a young man with
mental illness? and just what does it mean?

Posted by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
<http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=23
716&Itemid=326>  at January 19, 2011 5:04 PM ET:

Mark: The panel was stacked against my position, so they disagreed. I don't
use "stacked" pejoratively, since it was the Brennan Center's roll-out of
its own report. It would be odd if they introduced the report to the world
via a panel filled with skeptics.

Danny: You always have to treat Wikipedia skeptically, but its entry on
Christian Identity does a decent job of explaining that belief system:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Christian_identity. Let me be very clear: I
have no reason to believe that Loughner was actually part of the Christian
Identity movement, and given the lack of information on any such connection,
we should assume that it doesn't exist. This is why I noted that "[t]hough
loosely based on the Jared Lee Loughner case, this fact pattern departs
somewhat from it." I included the Christian Identity connection for two
reasons. First, it arguably would have provided a greater indication at the
outset that he could pose a danger. And second, by the report's criteria,
authorities should have been especially hesitant to explore those views
because they were religious in nature. In that way, I was challenging the
report's basic paradigmatic assumption that using these factors as part of a
threat profile is repugnant, and ineffective.



Read more:
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estic_intelligen.php#ixzz1BZzk5Ou7>
http://www.longwarjournal.org/threat-matrix/archives/2011/01/new_report_dome
stic_intelligen.php#ixzz1BZzk5Ou7

 

 



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