http://ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol4Iss1.pdf

 

Improving Airline Security in the United States

By Rafi Ron

 

Almost 10 years after 9/11, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA)
recently introduced another technology system to improve airline security.
Known as Advanced Imaging Technology (AIT), or "body scanners," the new
devices created a public uproar over privacy concerns since the technology
effectively sees through a subject's clothes during screening.1 The AIT
systems have been rapidly installed at airports across the United States in
the wake of an attempted terrorist attack on a U.S.-bound airliner on
December 25, 2009.

 

On that day, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian Muslim, concealed a
small explosive device in his underwear and boarded a flight departing from
Lagos, Nigeria, connecting in Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan. The young
terrorist was on a "divine" mission to blow up the aircraft along with more
than 200 passengers and crew over Detroit. His intention was to kill as many
people as possible, including the unsuspecting Detroit suburban inhabitants
on the ground. Luckily, due to his poor skills (rather than any security
measures implemented at the airport) he failed his mission and ended up in a
federal jail.

 

This incident has special significance for two reasons. First,
Abdulmutallab's attempt revealed security failures at every
layer-intelligence analysis, airport security, and the handling of the
incident by the on-board crew as well as the handling of the plane by ground
authorities.2 Second, the attempted 

 

1 The alternative to body scanning, however, is arguably worse, as it
involves intensive manual "pat downs" that under other circumstances would
be considered a form of harassment.

2 For example, despite the grave situation on board, the captain reported to
the ground that there was no need for any emergency procedures. As a result,
the airport called off any emergency measures and the aircraft (car-rying a
detained terrorist and an unexploded device) was directed to a normal gate
linked to the terminal (full of passengers and employees) with other
aircraft close by. Passengers were allowed to disembark and mix with people
present in the gate area without any screening or questioning (ignoring the
risk of a second terrorist on board). The wounded terrorist was detained by
two law enforcement officers and was taken without any special security
measures by ambulance to the nearest hospital. This chain of events is
characterized by a lack of under-standing of the situation and resulted in
putting the pub-lic at risk of a potential disaster at the airport.attack
was almost a carbon copy of an incident that took place eight years earlier
when another poorly skilled terrorist carried a similar explosive device
(concealed in his shoe) on an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami,
earning his place in history as the "shoe bomber." What is alarming is that
Abdulmutallab's attempted terrorist attack in 2009 represents a level of
security failure worse than the one eight years earlier.

 

Similarities to the Shoe Bomber

The similarities between the two attacks are astounding. Both devices used
pentaerythritol tetranitrate (PETN) as the main explosive material. Both
contained no metal parts to avoid airport metal detection technology. Both
used improvised detonators. Both were carried on the terrorist's body to
avoid x-ray screening. Both explosives required some basic skill to
detonate, which is why both terrorists failed.

 

On the human side, both Richard Reid (the "shoe bomber") and Abdulmutallab
were inexperienced and were not able to avoid suspicion from people around
them prior to the attack. Richard Reid, for example, drew suspicion from the
security guard that interviewed him prior to checking in to his flight, to
the point that French police were called in to interrogate him for more than
two hours only to release him as a legitimate passenger. Missing the
original flight as a result, he showed up the next day and once again the
French police were summoned, although this time they cleared him to fly.
Reid still drew further suspicion from the flight attendant at the aircraft
door who described him as having a threatening appearance, as well as by the
cabin attendant who reported to the senior flight attendant a "suspicious
passenger" prior to takeoff. 

 

In both cases, there were clear "red flags" in the way their journey was
prepared. Both Reid and Abdulmutallab had one-way tickets, both paid the
travel fare in cash, and both did not check any bags (for a transatlantic
flight). Richard Reid twice failed a short interview conducted by a private
security firm (hired by American Airlines as part of a procedure implemented
on inbound flights to the United States). Abdulmutallab was not subjected to
this procedure as it had since been changed to address immigration concerns.
Security aspects of his limited human encounter were minimized to checking
his name against the "No Fly" and suspected terrorist watch lists. There is
good reason to assume, based on his behavior after his arrest, that had
Abdulmutallab been subjected to a professional security interview, he would
have been flagged as "suspicious."

 

The TSA's conclusion from the "shoe bomber" attack in 2001 was disappointing
and off the mark. It was characterized by a minimalist approach, defining
the terrorist modus operandi (MO) as "carrying a bomb in shoes" rather than
"carrying a bomb on the body." This reactive approach led to forcing
passengers to take off their shoes and submitting them to x-ray screening.
As a result, it left the door open to an al-Qa`ida operative and bombmaker
based in Yemen to take advantage of it eight years later, sending
Abdulmutallab with an explosive device concealed in his underwear. The only
surprise, perhaps, is that it took al-Qa`ida eight years to repeat the
attack. 

 

Current Security Practices Inadequate 

 

Reviewing all attempted attacks against U.S. aviation-starting with 9/11,
including Richard Reid's shoe bomb attempt, the liquid explosives plot and
Abdulmutallab's Christmas Day attack-a clear common denominator is
identified. It is the failure of aviation security technology to detect and
prevent terrorists from carrying out their missions successfully. In all of
these attacks, the weapon or the explosive devices were smuggled through
security checkpoints to the aircraft, or, as in the case of the liquid
explosives plot, was luckily stopped by early intelligence as there was
nothing at the airport that could have detected explosives in liquid form.

 

The problem started shortly after 9/11 when the TSA was created with the
conviction that the terrorist threat could be met by improving the quality
of the airport screening operation. Yet the notion that the terrorists'
success on the morning of 9/11 was the result of a "screening failure" is
misleading. At that time, box cutters and other sharp items were practically
allowed on board. Even if such items were banned, however, there was still
the open cockpit door and the FAA guideline for pilots to cooperate with
hijackers; indeed, this would have led to the same tragic result. 

Moreover, nine of the 19 terrorists on 9/11 were identified by a
computerized (non-racial) profiling system called CAPPS, which was developed
by the FAA and used by the airlines as a mandatory requirement. The response
protocol to CAPPS selection of "high risk" passengers was an additional
shallow "pat down," which was less than adequate to stop Muhammad `Atta and
his team since they did not carry banned items.

 

In the aftermath of 9/11, the policy that was created and implemented to
avoid another terrorist attack could be summarized as using screening
technology to detect forbidden items prior to boarding the aircraft. The
emphasis was on the use of technology to mitigate the threat. The other
aspect of that policy was to avoid any form of discrimination; as a result,
the search for banned items had to be carried out in a uniform manner. This
policy, however, does not recognize different individual passenger risk
levels. 

 

Indeed, this policy has proven less than successful with all the attempted
attacks since 9/11. After each attack, authorities have responded with
small, reactive changes in policy. After 9/11, for example, a substantial
portion of security resources was spent on confiscating small sharp items
even after reinforced cockpit doors were introduced. After Richard Reid's
shoe bomb attempt, security focused on footwear only, neglecting more
intensive searches of the passenger's body. After the liquid explosives
plot, authorities implemented a demanding policy of limiting quantities of
liquids carried on board the plane, yet avoiding any response related to
checked bags. It was only after the recent action by Abdulmutallab to carry
a bomb on board in his underwear when authorities finally moved to deploying
"full body scanners."

 

Clearly, the one conclusion that can be drawn with certainty is that there
is an urgent need to find a more effective way to achieve "airport
security." Steps need to be taken to put airport security one step ahead of
the terrorists, rather than pursuing a reactive approach which characterizes
the present strategy.

 

Applying the Israeli Model

 

A growing number of people in the U.S. government, the aviation industry,
the media and the general public are pushing toward a strategy modeled on a
real "risk-based" approach, or, in other words, "profiling." The proven
success of the Israeli aviation security model, which is based on this
approach, has drawn much attention, and it has become an attractive option
to many in the United States. There is little dispute over the track record
of the Israeli model, but most people who suggest its implementation "as is"
are not fully familiar with it. 

 

The Israeli model was developed and refined for use by Israeli aviation and
tailored to address the unique conditions that exist in Israel. Largely
speaking, it is based on the understanding that each passenger carries a
different risk level and that the depth of security processing and search is
adjusted to the individual's risk level. At the heart of this model is an
interview process with every single passenger by a highly skilled
professional. The term "profiling" is usually used to describe this process.

 

The American environment, however, is different from the Israeli one in many
ways. Therefore, one has to be cautious when attempting to implement a
similar solution in the United States. For example, the ethnic profile of
the majority of travelers on Israeli aviation is rather uniform compared to
the plural ethnic profile of the American population. There are also a
number of differences in the legal environment between the U.S. constitution
and Israeli law. There are differences in the volume of passenger traffic,
as well as the fact that more than 80% of travelers on Israeli aviation are
international travelers equipped with passports and other travel documents
that contain significant information about the passenger and their flight
history. Most flights to and from Israel are also long-haul flights, which
require passengers to arrive at the airport three hours before
departure-this allows authorities adequate time to complete a face-to-face
interview process.

Having mentioned the above differences, the Israeli concept is still valid
for the U.S. environment after some substantial and careful modifications.
First, discriminating factors such as ethnicity, religion or gender must be
removed to meet U.S. constitutional requirements. There is still enough
behavioral information left to computerized (non-discriminating) security
profiling program that would divide the passenger population into risk
groups. The security checkpoint and baggage screening system would respond
to the risk group level with a compatible level of search, including the use
of highly professional face-to-face interviews for those passengers
designated as "high risk."

 

The key to the success of this approach is that it preserves the ability to
identify the risk where it exists and adjust the search level to achieve the
most effective result. By using the interview technique with the "high risk"
passengers, authorities can take advantage of the terrorists' "Achilles
heel": the difficulty in maintaining a "cover story" in a professional
interview situation. 

It is never too soon to replace the current ineffective "one size fits all"
approach with an effective "risk-based" strategy that builds on U.S.
advantages and the terrorists' vulnerabilities.

 

Rafi Ron is a leading aviation security expert with more than 30 years of
security and counterterrorism experience worldwide. He served as the
Director of Security at Tel-Aviv Ben-Gurion International Airport and the
Israeli Airport Authority from 1997 to 2001. Mr. Ron helped establish the
EL-AL sky marshal program. Mr. Ron was hired by Massport immediately after
9/11 to upgrade security for Boston Logan Airport. Among the new programs he
instituted was the development of the Behavior Pattern Recognition (BPR)
protocol that helps authorities identify terrorists before they endanger
airports or aviation travelers. In 2001, Mr. Ron formed New Age Aviation
Security and New Age Security Solutions where he is president and CEO. In
that capacity he manages aviation security related projects in the United
States and internationally, including: threat and vulnerability studies,
security planning, system design and integration, and training.



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