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Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets


January 20, 2011 | 0953 GMT 

By Sean Noonan

Paris prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin on Jan. 14 began an inquiry into
allegations of commercial espionage carried out against French carmaker
Renault. The allegations first became public when Renault suspended three of
its employees on Jan. 3 after an internal investigation that began in August
2010. Within days, citing an anonymous French government source, Reuters
reported that French intelligence services were looking into the possibility
that China played a role in the Renault espionage case. While the French
government refused to officially confirm this accusation, speculation has
run wild that Chinese state-sponsored spies were stealing electric-vehicle
technology from Renault. 

The Chinese are well-known perpetrators of industrial espionage and have
been caught before in France, but the details that have emerged so far about
the Renault operation differ from the usual Chinese method of operation. And
much has been learned about this MO just in the last two years across the
Atlantic, where the United States has been increasingly aggressive in
investigating and prosecuting cases of Chinese espionage. If Chinese
intelligence services were indeed responsible for espionage at Renault it
would be one of only a few known cases involving non-Chinese nationals and
would have involved the largest amount of money since the case of the
legendary Larry Wu-Tai Chin
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100314_intelligence_services_part_1_spyi
ng_chinese_characteristics> , China's most successful spy.

STRATFOR has previously detailed the Chinese intelligence services and the
workings of espionage with Chinese characteristics
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100314_intelligence_services_part_1_spyi
ng_chinese_characteristics> . A look back at Chinese espionage activities
uncovered in the United States in 2010, since our latest report was
compiled, can provide more context and detail about current Chinese
intelligence operations. 


Chinese Espionage in the U.S.


We chose to focus on operations in the United States for two reasons. First,
the United States is a major target for Chinese industrial espionage. This
is because it is a leader in technology development, particularly in
military hardware desired by China's expanding military, and a potential
adversary at the forefront of Chinese defense thinking. Second, while it is
not the only country developing major new technologies in which China would
be interested, the United States has been the most aggressive in prosecuting
espionage cases against Chinese agents, thereby producing available data for
us to work with. Since 2008, at least seven cases have been prosecuted each
year in the United States against individuals spying for China. Five were
prosecuted in 2007. Going back to about 2000, from one to three cases were
prosecuted annually, and before that, less than one was prosecuted per year.


Most of the cases involved charges of violating export restrictions or
stealing trade secrets rather than the capital crime of stealing state
secrets. As the premier agency leading such investigations, the FBI has
clearly made a policy decision to refocus on counterintelligence after an
overwhelming focus on counterterrorism
<http://www.stratfor.com/corporate_espionage_and_diplomacy_post_al_qaeda_age
>  following 9/11, and its capability to conduct such investigations has
grown. In 2010, 11 Chinese espionage cases were prosecuted in the United
States, the highest number yet, and they featured a wide range of espionage
targets. 

Ten of the 11 cases involved technology acquisition, and five were overt
attempts to purchase and illegally export encryption devices, mobile-phone
components, high-end analog-to-digital converters, microchips designed for
aerospace applications and radiation-hardened semiconductors. These
technologies can be used in a wide range of Chinese industries. While the
mobile-phone technology would be limited to Chinese state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) such as China Mobile, the aerospace-related microchips could be used
in anything from rockets to fighter jets. Xian Hongwei and someone known as
"Li Li" were arrested in September 2010 for allegedly attempting to purchase
those aerospace-related microchips from BAE Systems, which is one of the
companies involved in the development of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.
Similar espionage may have played a role in China's development of the new
J-20 fifth-generation fighter
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110117-chinas-military-comes-its-own> ,
but that is only speculation.

 <http://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/1-19-11-China_espionage_800.jpg> 

 <http://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/1-19-11-China_espionage_800.jpg>
Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets

 <http://web.stratfor.com/images/asia/map/1-19-11-China_espionage_800.jpg>
(click here to enlarge image)

 

Five other cases in 2010 involved stealing trade secrets. These included
organic light- emitting diode processes from Dupont, hybrid vehicle
technology from GM, insecticide formulas from the Dow Chemical Company,
paint formulas from Valspar and various vehicle design specifications from
Ford. These types of Chinese cases, while often encouraged by state
officials, are more similar to industrial espionage conducted by
corporations. Since many of the major car companies in China are state-run,
these technologies benefit both industry and the state
<http://www.stratfor.com/content/china_security_memo_april_29_2010> . 

But that does not mean these efforts are directed from Beijing. History
shows that such espionage activities are not well coordinated. Various
Chinese company executives (who are also Communist Party officials) have
different requirements for their industrial espionage. In cases where two
SOEs are competing to sell similar products, they may both try to recruit
agents to steal the same technology. There are also a growing number of
private Chinese companies getting involved in espionage. One notable example
was when Du Shanshan and Qin Yu passed on technology from GM to Chery
Automobile, a private, rather than state-run, manufacturer. In the five
trade-secret cases in 2010, most of the suspects were caught because of poor
tradecraft. They stored data on their hard drives, sent e-mails on company
computers and had obvious communications with companies in China. This is
not the kind of tradecraft we would expect from trained intelligence
officers. Most of these cases probably involved ad hoc agents, some of whom
were likely recruited while working in the United States and offered jobs
back in China when they were found to have access to important technology. 

These cases show how Chinese state-run companies can have an interest in
espionage in order to improve their own products, both for the success of
their companies and in the national interest of China. The U.S. Department
of Justice has not provided specific details on how the stolen
defense-related technologies were intended to be used in China, so it is
hard to tell whether they would have enhanced China's military capability. 

First-generation Chinese carried out 10 of the 11 publicized cases in the
United States last year. Some were living or working temporarily in the
United States, others had become naturalized American citizens (with the
exception of Xian and Li, who were caught in Hungary). The Chinese
intelligence services rely on ethnic Chinese agents because the services do
not generally trust outsiders. When recruiting, they also use threats
against family members or the individuals themselves. Second- and
third-generation Chinese who have assimilated in a new culture are rarely
willing to spy, and the Chinese government has much less leverage over this
segment of the ethnic-Chinese population living overseas. 

In the 11 cases in 2010, it is not clear what payments, if any, the agents
might have received. In some cases, such as those involving the trade
secrets from Valspar and Ford, the information likely helped the agents land
better jobs and/or receive promotions back in China. Cash does not typically
rule the effectiveness of newly recruited Chinese spies, as it might with
Western recruits. Instead, new Chinese agents are usually motivated by
intelligence-service coercion or ideological affinity for China. 

The outlier in 2010 was Glenn Duffie Shriver, an American student with no
Chinese heritage who applied to work at both the U.S. State Department and
the CIA. His was the first publicized case of the Chinese trying to develop
an agent in place in the United States since Larry Chin. Shriver studied in
China in 2002 and 2003. The recruitment process began when he returned to
China in 2004 to seek employment and improve his language capabilities.
After responding to an ad for someone with an English-language background to
write a political paper, Shriver was paid $120 for producing an article on
U.S.-Chinese relations regarding Taiwan and North Korea. 

The woman who hired him then introduced him to two Chinese intelligence
officers named Wu and Tang. They paid Shriver a total of $70,000 in three
payments while he tried to land a job with the U.S. government. Shriver
failed the exams to become a foreign service officer and began pursuing a
career with the CIA. He was accused of lying on his CIA application by not
mentioning at least one trip to China and at least 20 meetings with Chinese
intelligence officers. It is not clear how he was exposed, but customs
records and passport stamps would have easily revealed any trips to China
that he did not report in his CIA application. On Oct. 22, 2010, Shriver
pleaded guilty to conspiring to provide national defense information to
intelligence officers of the People's Republic of China and was sentenced to
48 months in prison in accordance with his plea agreement. 

A few Americans have been accused of being Chinese agents before, such as
former Defense Department official James Fondren, who was caught and
convicted in 2009. These cases are rare, though they may increase as Beijing
tries to reach higher levels of infiltration. It is also possible that the
FBI has been reaching only for low-hanging fruit and that Chinese espionage
involving Americans at higher levels is going undetected. If this were the
case, it would not be consistent with the general Chinese espionage MO. 

China takes a mosaic approach
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/china_cybersecurity_and_mosaic_intelligenc
e>  to intelligence, which is a wholly different paradigm than that of the
West. Instead of recruiting a few high-level sources, the Chinese recruit as
many low-level operatives as possible who are charged with vacuuming up all
available open-source information and compiling and analyzing the
innumerable bits of intelligence to assemble a complete picture. This method
fits well with Chinese demographics, which are characterized by countless
thousands of capable and industrious people working overseas as well as
thousands more analyzing various pieces of the mosaic back home. 

Another case in 2010 was an alleged China-based cyber-attack against Google
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20100114_china_security_memo_jan_14_2010>
, in which servers were hacked and customer account information was
accessed. Last year, more than 30 other major companies reported similar
infiltration attempts occurring in 2009, though we do not know how
widespread the effort really is. China's cyber-espionage capabilities
<http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/20090225_china_pushing_ahead_cyberwarfare_
pack>  are well known and no doubt will continue to provide more valuable
information for China's intelligence services. 


The Renault Case


Few details have been released about the Renault case, which will likely
remain confidential until French prosecutors finish their investigation. But
enough information has trickled in to give us some idea of the kind of
operation that would have targeted Renault's electric-vehicle program. Three
Renault managers were accused: Matthieu Tenenbaum, who was deputy director
of Renault's electric-vehicle program; Michel Balthazard, who was a member
of the Renault management board; and Bertrand Rochette, a subordinate of
Balthazard who was responsible for pilot projects. Various media reports -
mostly from Le Figaro - claim that the State Grid Corporation of China
opened bank accounts for two of the three managers (it is unknown which
two). Money was allegedly wired through Malta, and Renault's investigators
found deposits of 500,000 euros (about $665,000) and 130,000 euros (about
$175,000) respectively in Swiss and Liechtenstein bank accounts. 

Assuming this is true, it is still unclear what the money was for. Given
that the three executives had positions close to the electric-vehicle
program, it seems that some related technology was the target. Patrick
Pelata, Renault's chief operating officer, said that "not the smallest
nugget of technical or strategic information on the innovation plan has
filtered out of the enterprise." In other words, Renault uncovered the
operation before any technology was leaked - or it is intentionally trying
to downplay the damage done in order to reassure investors and protect stock
prices. But Pelata also called the operation "a system organized to collect
economic, technological and strategic information to serve interests
abroad."

Renault is convinced a foreign entity was involved in a sophisticated
intelligence operation against the company. The question is, what foreign
entity? On Jan. 13, Renault filed an official complaint with French
authorities, saying it was the victim of organized industrial espionage,
among other things, committed by "persons unknown." French Industry Minister
Eric Besson clarified Jan. 14 that there was no information to suggest
Chinese involvement in the case, though he previously said France was facing
"economic war," presuming that the culprits came from outside France. The
source for the original rumors of Chinese involvement is unclear, but the
French clearly backed away from the accusation, especially after Chinese
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei called the accusation "baseless and
irresponsible" on Jan. 11 (of course, even if the Chinese were the culprits
they would certainly not admit it). 

The Chinese have definitely targeted energy-efficient motor vehicle
technology in the past, in addition to the Ford and GM cases, and Renault
itself is no stranger to industrial espionage activities. In 2007, Li Li
Whuang was charged with breach of trust and fraudulent access to a computer
system while working as a trainee at Valeo, a French automotive components
manufacturer, in 2005. The 24-year-old was studying in Paris when she was
offered the trainee position at Valeo. Investigators found files on her
computer related to a project with BMW and another with Renault. 

The new Renault case, however, is very different from most Chinese espionage
cases. First, it involved recruiting three French nationals with no ethnic
ties to China, rather than first-generation Chinese. Second, the alleged
payments to two of three Renault employees were much larger than Chinese
agents usually receive, even those who are not ethnic Chinese. The one
notable exception is the case of Larry Chin, who is believed to have
received more than $1 million in the 30 years he spied for China as a
translator for U.S. intelligence services. Renault executives would also be
paid as much or more in salaries than what was found in these bank accounts,
though we don't know if more money was transferred in and out of the
accounts. This may not be unprecedented, however; STRATFOR sources have
reported being offered many millions of dollars to work for the Chinese
government. 

Another problem is the alleged use of a Chinese state-owned company to
funnel payments to the Renault executives. Using a company traceable not
only to China but to the government itself is a huge error in tradecraft.
This is not likely a mistake that the Chinese intelligence services would
make. In Chin's case, all payments were made in cash and were exchanged in
careful meetings outside the United States, in places where there was no
surveillance. 

Thus, STRATFOR doubts that the Renault theft was perpetrated by the Chinese.
The leak suggesting otherwise was likely an assumption based on China's
frequent involvement in industrial espionage. Still, it could be a sign of
new methods in Chinese spycraft. 


Higher-level Recruitment?


The Shriver and Renault cases could suggest that some Chinese intelligence
operations are so sophisticated that counterintelligence officers are
unaware of their activities. They could mean that the Chinese are recruiting
higher-level sources and offering them large sums of money. Chin, who got
his start working for the U.S. Army during the Korean War, remained
undetected until 1985, when a defector exposed him. There may be others who
are just as well hidden. However, according to STRATFOR sources, including
current and former counterintelligence officers, the vast majority of
Chinese espionage operations are perpetrated at low levels by untrained
agents.

There is little indication that the Chinese have switched from the
high-quantity, low-quality mosaic intelligence method, and cyber-espionage
activities such as hacking Google demonstrate that the mosaic method is only
growing. The Internet allows China to recruit from its large base of capable
computer users
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20101208-china-and-its-double-edged-cyber-sw
ord>  to find valuable information in the national interest. It provides
even more opportunities to vacuum up information for intelligence analysis.
Indeed, cyber-espionage is being used as another form of "insurance," a way
to ensure that the information collected by the intelligence services from
other sources is accurate. 

If China is responsible for the Renault penetration, the case would
represent a change in the Chinese espionage MO, one aiming at a higher level
and willing to spend more money, even though most of the cases prosecuted in
the United States pointed to a continuation of the mosaic paradigm.
Nevertheless, counterintelligence officers are likely watching carefully for
higher-level recruits, fearing that others like Chin and Shriver may have
remained undetected for years. These cases may be an indication of new
resources made available to Western counterintelligence agencies and not new
efforts by the Chinese. 

One thing is certain: Chinese espionage activities will continue apace in
2011, and it will be interesting to see what targets are picked.

 

Reprinting or republication of this report on websites is authorized by
prominently displaying the following sentence, including the hyperlink to
STRATFOR, at the beginning or end of the report.

"Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chinese-espionage-and-french-trade-
secrets>  is republished with permission of STRATFOR."



Read more:
<http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chinese-espionage-and-french-trade-
secrets?utm_source=SWeekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=110120&utm_content=
readmore&elq=276f0183b6de4eeebbc50fcf5ee32028#ixzz1BaaAgeN2> Chinese
Espionage and French Trade Secrets | STRATFOR 

 



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